ML18089A483

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Proposed License Change Requests 83-17,83-18 & 83-19 Re Mod of Unit 1 Tech Spec Tables 3.3-1 & 3.3-3 to Be Consistent W/Unit 2 & Correcting Typographical Error Re Diesel Generator Surveillance
ML18089A483
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 12/27/1983
From:
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Shared Package
ML18089A482 List:
References
NUDOCS 8401100317
Download: ML18089A483 (7)


Text

Ref: LCR 83-1 7 PROPOSED CHANGE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SALEM NO. 1 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Modify Salem No. 1 Technical Specifications, Table 3.3-1 (Action

1) and Table 3.3-3 (Action 13) to read the same as Salem No. 2 Technical Specifications, Table 3.3-1 (Action 1) and Table 3.3-3 (Action 13) respectively *.

REASON FOR CHANGE Due to recently added requirements to perform periodic preventive maintenance on the reactor trip breakers, the one ( 1) hour time frame presently allowed for surveillance testing on Unit 'No. 1 does not provide a reasonable amount of time to enable the pe-rformance of necessary breaker alignment and post maintenance operability testing.

The one (1) hour presently allowed for surveillance testing of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) and Engineered Safety Features (ESF) automatic actuation logic has been, historically, a difficult requirement to meet. There have b~en occasions where the ACTION statement requirement to shut do~n the plant has been commenced and a Licensee Event Report submitted due to Salem technical staff's having to exceed the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> provision to complete the testing.

The need to rush in the performance Of these important and comprehensive test procedurea increases the potential for mistakes and, thereby, diminishes the level of safe operation that the testing is designed to enhance.

  • NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION Allowing 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, rather than the presently allowed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, for performance of surveillance testing on Unit No. 1 will not result in any significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident, nor significantly reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specification Bases. The results of the change have been found by the NRC on Salem Unit No. 2 and in the Standard Tech Specs for Westinghouse PWR's, NUREG 0452, Rev. 3, to be clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the reactor trip system in the Standard Review Plan.

(

~I 8401100317 831227 PDR ADOCK 05000272 P PDR

LCR 83-17 (continued)

Since there are no modifications to the plant o~ the plant procedures, the possibility of a new or different accident from any accident previously evaluated is not created. *1

.The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards for a No Signif.icant Hazards. determination by providing *examples of actions not likely to involve a*

  • Significant Hazards Consideration in* the Federa,l Register (48FR14870). One of th(~, examples- (vi) relates to changes that may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously-analyzed accident or that may reduce in some way a sa£ety margin, but where the resµlts of the change are clearly withi.n all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or component specified in the Standard Review Plan. These changes will- also establish consistency in the Technical Specifications for identical equipment on Salem Units 1 and 2. This action also conforms, therefore, to example (i) which is provided in 48FR14870.

Since the proposed changes involve actions that conform to two referenced examples in 48FR14870, we have determined that this application for amendment involves No Significant Hazar.ds Consideration.

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TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE. NOTATION

  • w.ith the reactor* trip system* breakers* in the Closed position and the control rod drive system capable of' rod: withdrawal.
  • **The channel ( s) associated with the: protective. func ti ans derived from the out of service: Reactor Coolant Loop sha.ll be placed in the tripped
  • condition.
  1. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4. are not. applicable.
    1. High voltage to detector may be. de-energized above P-6.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the. number of channels OPERABLE one 1ess than required by the. Minimum' Channels OPERABLE* requirement,. be in HOT STANDBY within*6, hours;. however, one* channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance-- testing* per* Specification 4. 3. 1. 1 provided:the* other channel is OP.ERABLE.

ACTION* 2 - With the* number of OPERABLE channels one 1ess than the Total Number* of Channels, STARTUP and/ or POWER OPERATION* may proceed pro'1ided the fa.Hawing cond.itfons are satisfied:

a. The. inoperable channe.l is pl aced in the tripped.

condition. within l hour.

I!~ . The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however,. one additional channel may be bypassed for up. to 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />s* *far survefl lance* testing. per Spec.ification 4.3.1.1.

c:~ Either,, THERMAL POWER is:. restricted to < 75% of **

RATED *THERMAL and *the. Power* Range,* Neutron Flux trip setpo.int. i.s*. reduced to:~ 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER wtthin;.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; or,. the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO i's monitored: at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> *.

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one* less than required by the Mfnimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the*

THERMAL POWER level:

SALEM - UNIT l 3/4 3-5

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TABLE 3.3-3 \Continued)

TABLE NOlATlON 1Trip function may be bypassed in ),;his MODE below P-11.

'*Trip function may be bypassed 1n **~his MOOE below P-12.

  • '*The channel{s) associated with th*1 protective functions derived from the out of service Reactor Coolant Loop shall be placed in the tripped mode.

The provisions of Speeification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION STATE-1ENTS ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLO SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />; however, one channe1 may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveil 1a nee l testing per Spedfkation 4.3.2.1.1.

ACTION 14 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed. until performance .

of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, provided the inoperable channe.1 is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

ACTION 15 - With a channel associated with an operating loop inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within Z hour-s or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the fo11owing 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />;.

however, one channel associated with an operating loop may be bypassed for. up to 2 hQurs for survei 11 ance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1. l.

  • ACTION 16 - With the-number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channel s*p opera ti on* may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the* Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; one additional channel may be bypassed for up "

to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for survei 11 ance testing per Speci fi ca ti on 4. 3. 2. 1 . 1

  • 3/4 3-21 SALEM - UNIT 1

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Ref:.- *.: tc1t. 83-18° PROPOSED CHANGE TECHNICAL SPECIFIC.l\TIONS SALEM NO. 2>-

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Corr.ect the apparent typographical error in the third sentence o"f section 4.8.1.1.2.c.7 of the* Salem Unit.2 Technical Specifi-cations to read, 11 * *

  • after completion of this 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> test, perform Specification 4. 8.1.1. 2.c .4. 11 \

REASON FOR CHANGE The fiha-1 draft Technical Specifications issued for comment in September 1980 were worded, in Section 4.8.1.1.2.c.7, the same as described above in the Description of Change. But, when Revision 0 of the Unit No. 2 Tech. Specs. was issued with the Full Power Operating License in May 1981, the subject. sentence

  • read, 11 * *
  • after completion of this 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> test-, *perform Speci-fication 4. 8. 1.1. 2. c. 7b. 11 There is no Specification 4.8.1.l.2.c.7a or 7b.

The test procedures _which accomplish the surveillance require'.""*

ments of Section 4;8~1.1.2.c.7 were ~ritten prior to receipt;of the Ful.l Power-Operating License Tech. Specs, *. and were based on the surveillance requirements* that were incorporated in the previous issuances of the Tech. Specs .. which called f"or perform-i:ng. Specification 4.8.1 *. 1.2 ... c *. 4 after completion of the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

.test of Specifitation 4.* 8.1.1.2.6.7.

  • SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS. EVALUATION The.propo~ed correction will restore the subiect specification to its interided wording and meaning. Tha.correctioq will requi*re, and be in ag_reement w-ith, the testing that has been periodically conducted as originally worded.

Because this- proposed amendment: irtvolves*only an administrative

( typographic*al) chan*ge, it will not involve any significant increase irr the probability of an accident previously evaluated or* a~ significant. reduction in a margi.n- of safety. Becau.se no change in ope~ating conditions will r~sult~ the propo~ed amend-ment does. not create the possib,ility of* a new" or different kind of accident fr.om any *accident. previous.ly evaluated. Because no changes in ariy accident analysis will result,.the* proposed amendment does not involve any increase in*the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

This proposed chang.e conforms to example ( i) in 48 FR 14870 which was provided as guidance by the Commission for no significant hazards determinations and. therefore is deemed to not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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Ref: LCR 83-19 PROPOSED CHANGE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SALEM NO. 1 AND 2 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Change the response time for the Unit 2 Overtemp9rature 6T trip on Table 3.2-2, "Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Response Time" from < 2.0 seconds to < 5.0 seconds and change the corresponding response time on Unit 1 from < 6.0 seconds to <

5.0 seconds.

REASON FOR CHANGE This change is nece.ssary on Unit 2 to allow the use of resistance temperature detectors (RTD's) in the reactor coolant system that meet the environmental qualification criteria of I Regulatory Guide 1.97. The RTDs that meet the requirements of . I Regulatory Guide 1.97 have longer response "times than the previously installed (unqualified) detectors. This causes the overall response of the Overtemperature 6T to exceed the Unit 2 technical specification response time requirements of ~ 2.0 seconds.

This requirement on Unit No. 1 is presently < 6.0 seconds for the same (identical) equipment and is proposed to be changed on that Unit in the interest of conservatism and continuity in the technical specification.

SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION The time delay to trip assumed in the accident analyses for Salem*Units 1 and 2 Overtemperature 8T is shown in Table 15.1-3 of the Salem UFSAR as 6.0 seconds total time delay. To raise the allowed response time for Unit 2 from < 2. 0 seconds to the proposed < 5. 0 seconds will .not result in any increase in the

- probability of an accident. The consequences of an accident could be increased by the change on Unit 2 due to. lengthening the Overtemperature 6T trip response time; but, since the response time ~ould remain less than that time response assumed in the accident analyses, the increase in conse*quences would not be of significant magnitude.

j**

12/19/83 The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specification Bases is not reduced since the applicable Bases state, "The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function assoc.ia ted with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses."

This change for Onit 1 is conservative (ie-shortening the response time requirement): The operation of both Salem Units, as a result of this change, will remain within previously analyzed bounds and clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the reactor trip system in the Standard Review.Plan and existing requirements of Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications.

The proposed 5.0 seconds respon$e time will provide a conservative limit relative to the accident analysis of the UFSAR and will, at the same time, provide sufficient latitude to allow the use of presently a~ailable 7 environmentally qualified, RTD's.

Since there are no modifications to the plant or the plant procedures, the possibility of a new or different accident from any accident previously evaluated is not created.

The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards for a No Significant Hazards determination by providing examples of actions not likely to involve a Significant Hazards Consideration in the Federal Register (48FRI4870). One of the examples (vi) relates to changes that may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously-analyzed accident or that may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or.

component specifie& in the Standard Review Plan~ These changes will also establish consistenty irr the Technical Specifications for identical equipment on Sale~Units 1 and 2. This action also conforms, therefore, to example (i) which is provided in 48FRI4870.

Since the proposed changes involve actions that conform to two reference examples in 48FRI4870, we have determined that this application for amendment involves No Significant Hazards Consideration.


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