ML18085A458

Forwards Fr Notice of Revised Section 10CFR50.48 & App R to 10CFR50 Re Fire Protection Features of Nuclear Power Plants. Effective Date for Criterion 3 of App a Should Be 800217 Instead of 800219

ML18085A458
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	12/04/1980
From:	Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Mittl R Public Service Enterprise Group
References
FRN-45FR76602, RULE-PR-50 NUDOCS 8101080011
Download: ML18085A458 (19)

Text

1 DISTRIBUTION:

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PDR LPDR DEC 4 i9BO LB# 3 R/F RTedesco FMiraglia JKerri gan Jlee Docket No.:

50~311 Mr. R. L. Mittl, General Manager licensing & Environment Engineering Fi Construction Department Public Service Electric-& Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101

Dear Mr. Mitti:

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ACRS ('16)

RVol lmer VNoonan VBenaroya RFerguson OELD bee:

NSIC TIC The Commission published on November 19, 1980 (45 FR 76602) a. revised Section 10 CFR 50.48 and a new Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 regarding fire protection features of nuclear power plants. The revised Section 50.48 and Appendix R -

,.will become effective on Febru~ry 17, 1981 which is 90 days after publication. -

A copy of the Federal Register Notice is enclosed (note that the February 19, 1981 date in the notice is incorrect and should be February 17, 1981). Appendix R is applicable to plants licensed prior to January 1, 1979.

t1ith regard to pl ants 1 icensec! after January L 1979, paragraph 50.48(e) requires all fire protection features needed to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix f\\ to 10 CFR 50 to be completed in accordance with the provisions of their licenses.

On February 17, 1981, the effective date: for this rule, this requirement will supersede the currently effective dates for previously approved fire protection modifications that are given in license conditions (45 FR 71569, October 29, 1980).

Enclosure:

Federal Register Notice cc: See next page_

81010800_11 NR.C FORM 3'18 (9-76) NRCM 0240

• Sincerely,

()rlgtnru s'igned by Robert L. TedesCQ Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing

• -u.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979-289-369

ro~~et ~c.: 5C-311 Mr. R. L. ~itt l," Genera 1 Manage,.

Licensing & Env1ronmant OEC

• Engineering & Construction Department Publtc Service Electric & Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New* Jersey 07101

Dear fl.r. M1tt1:

--(

4 \\980 DI.IBUTION:

Docket File PDR LPDR LB# 3 R/F RTedesco FMi ragl i a JKerri gan Jlee IE (3)

ACRS (16)

RVol lmer VNoonan VBenaroya RFerguson OELD bee:

NSIC TIC The Commission published on November 19, 1980 (45 FR 76602) a revised Section 10 CFR 50.48 and a new Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 regarding fire protection features of nuclear power plants. The revised Section 50.48 and Appendix R

• nill become effective on February 17, 1981 which is 90 days after publication.

,q copy of the Federal Register Notice is enclosed (note that the February 19, 1981 date in the notice is incorrect and should be February 17, 1981).

A~pendix R is app11cable to plants licensed prior to January l, 1979.

With re~ard to plants licensed after January 1, 1979, paragraph 50.48(e) requires all fire protection features needed to satisfy Criterion 3 cf Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 to be completed in accordance with the provisions of their licenses.

On February 17, 1981, the effective date fer this rule, this requirement will supersede the currently effective dates for previously approved fire protection modifications that are given fn license conditions (45 FR 71569, October 29, 1980)e

Enclosure:

Federal Register Notice cc: See next page OFFICE SURNAME DATE NRC FORM 3l!H9*76J NRCM 0240 --

Sincerely, Qrigfnal signed by Robert L. Tedesco Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing

• -Cru.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING*OFFtC.E:.1919-2a9~6~~'-

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!*~r. Leif J *. No.rrholm.

c/o U. s._ Nuclear. e.egulatory Commission O rawer. I

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Wednesday November 19, 1980 Part II I

Nuclear Regulatory

... -*--~--Commission * --* *- * --

Fire Protection Program for Operating Nuclear Power Plants

76602 Federal Register I VoL 45. No. 225 I Wednesday. November 19, 1980 I Ruies and Regulatior.s NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 Fire Protection Program for Operating Nuclear Power Plants AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUllllAAY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require certain provisions for fire

• protection in operating nuclear power plants. This action is being taken to upgrade fire protection at nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979, by requiring resolution of certain contested generic issues in fire _protection safety evaluation reports.

EFFECTIVE DATE: February 19, 1981.

Note.-The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has submitted this rule to the Comptroller General for review as may be appropriate under the Federal Reports Act, as amended (44 U.S.C.

3512). The date on which the reporting requirement of this rule becomes effective, unless advised to the contrary, reflects inclusion of the 45-day period that statute allows for such review (44 U.S.C. 3512(c)(2)).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

David P. Notley, Office of Standards Development, U.S. *Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, phone 301-443-5921' or Robert L.

Ferguson. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S; Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, D.C. 20555, phone 301-492-7096.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On May 29, 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published in the Federal Register (45 FR 36082) a notice of proposed rulemaking inviting written suggestions or comments on the proposed rule by June 30, 1980. The notice concerned proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,"

which would require certain minimum provisions for fire protection in nuclear power plants operating prior to January l, 1979. Fifty-one comment letters were received regarding the proposed amendments. A number of comments

. pertained to specific requirements in the proposed Appendix R, and these will be dealt with below. However. there were three substantive contentions which were raised by many of the commenters.

These three comments are summarized as follows:

1. Most commenters stated that the 30

.day commenbperiod:was. ~oo short to....

. petmitadequate.detailed response and:

that foe comment oenori snould nave been extended.

The Commission does not agree. The NRC has been developing fire protection requirements since 1975. The NRC published comprehensive fire protection guidelines, Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1. and its Appendix A in 1976. Licensees have compared their fire protection programs against these guidelines and have discussed their deviations from these guidelines with the NRC staff for the past Four years during the NRC's fire protection reviews of operating reactors. A Safety Evaluation Report and, in most cases, supplements to the Safety Evaluation Report. have been issued for each operating reactor. These reports describe fire protection alternatives that have been proposed by the licensee and found acceptable by the staff as well as unresolved fire protection issues remaining between the staff and the licensee. Proposed Appendix.R provided the Commission's requirements for resolving those issues. Thus, it concerns only a limited number of issues derived from the use of the earlier guides. The Commission believes that a 30-day comment period was adequate under

• these circumstances.

2. -Many licensees questioned the need.

for backfitting all the requirements of Appendix R. They* commented that they had previously complied with staff fire protection recommendations in "good faith" and have committed to or completed certain modifications. They contend that the staff has properly determined that these modifications provide at least the level of fire protection described by the guidance contained in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

They also contend that these modifications provide a level of protection at least equivalent to that contained in the proposed rule. They express the concern that the proposed rule was written in such specific language that fire protection issues that were thought closed would be reopened and new, but not necessarily better, modifications would be required. These modifications could be accomplished only by the expenditure of considerable engineering, design, and construction effort and at great undue expense. The commenters request that the requirements in the proposed rule be rewritten to specify only the general requirements of what needs to be accomplished.

are aiready set iorth in Genera; iJes1gr:

Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 and in the NRC guidance documents. These general provisions gave rise. to a number of disputes over whether specific methods adequately accomplished the intended goal. The pr.:iposed rule is intended to provide sufficient specific guidance to ensure satisfactory resolution of these issues.

Thus. reverting to generalized guidance would not accomplish the intended purpose of the proposed rule.

The second issue involved some instances in which the specific wording used resulted in unnecessary and unintended restrictions. For example.

the proposed rule called for a "fresh water" supply. For firefighting purposes,*

brackish water is satisfactory and a "fresh" water supply is unnecessary.

Similarly, the proposed rule called for an "underground" yard fire main loop.

Often portions of a fire main loop run above ground in and as they enter structures. The Commission had not intended to prohibit running portions of a fire main loop above ground. Other similar changes are discussed in Section**

III. "Specific Requirements/' of this*

preamble.

The third issue relates to imposition of requirements on plants with presently installed or with existing commitments to install fire protection features previously determined by the staff to satisfy the guidance of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. The Commission

• generally agrees that, except for three sections that will be back fitted, Appendix R should not be retroactively

• applied to features that have been previously approved by the NRC staff as satisfying the provisions of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

The NRC staff had intended, in its original proposal for Appendix R. that the requirements be applicable only for the resolution of unresolved disputed fire protection features. Thus, the staff -

had not intended the provisions of Appendix R to require modification of previously approved.features. This was not clearly described in the proposed rule as published for comment. In fact, the Supplementary Information published with the proposed arule explicitly indicated that "[a]ll licensees will be expected to meet the requirements of this rule, in its effective form, including whatever changes result from public comments."

In determining whether the specific requirements of Appendix R should be imposed on licensees with presently installed or existing commitments to install fire protection features previously These comments raise three related issues. The first relates to the need for specific requirements. The general

• requirements relatfog to fire protection*

,,.. *,"determined to*salisfy.;;Appendixi:*A;'tcf*;'c'* '.. :.***"* 0*!"*"*,,;e,! 'i Branch Te.chnicalPosjtion.BTP,APCSB*.. * --, __,... '"

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Federal Register I Vol. 45. No. 225 I Wednesdav. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76603

\\1.5-l. it is important to recognize that AppenJix R addresses only a portion of the specific items contained in the more comprehensive document. Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and its Appendix A. Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 has been the basic fire protection guidance used by the staff iri their fire protection reviews conducted for all operating plants during the past several years. For many plants.

licensees proposed systems and features that satisfactorily achieved the fire protection criteria set forth in Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and began to promptly implement such features and svstems.

• Satisfactory features and systems are.

already in place and in operation in many plants. There is a reasonable degree of uniformity among most of these approved features for all facilities since they were reviewed against the same criteria of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. In general. the features previously approved by the NRC staff in its reviews of fire protection using the criteria of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 provide an equivalent level of fire protection safety to that provided under the specific provisions of Appendix R.

Thus. the further benefit that might be provided by requiring that previously approved features be modified* to conform to the specific language set forth in Appendix R is outweighed by the overall benefit of the early implementation of such previously approved features, which in many cases are currently being installed.

Nevertheless, as a result of its continuing review of fire protection ma tiers. the NRC staff has ind~ated to the Commission that there are :

requirements in three sections in which the protection afforded by Appendix R over and above that previously*

accepted. may be desirable. The Commission has decided that these requirements should be retroactively applied to all facilities. This decision is not meant to reflect adversely on previous licensee or staff evaluations; rather its purpose is to take fully into account the increased knowledge and experience developed on fire protection matters over the last several years.

The first of these sections is related to fire protection features for ensuring that svstems and associated circuits used to a~hieve and maintain safe shutdown are free from fire damage. Appendix A to DTP APCSB 9.51 permits a combination of fire-retardant coatings and fire detection and supression systems without specifying a physical separation distance to protection redundant

• s~is.tems (AppendixA;,D.~(2]),.and.such.*

arrangements were accepted in some early fire protection reviews. As a result of some separate effects tests, the staff changed its position on this configuration. and subsequent plans have been required to provide additional protection in the form of fire barriers or substantial physical separation for safe shutdown systems.

No credit for such coatings as fire barriers is allowed by Section III.G of Appendix R. Appendix A to Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5.1 and the proposed Appendix R recognized that there were plant-unique configurations that required fire protection features that are not identical to those listed in Section III.G of Appendix R. For these cases, fire protection features were developed by the licensee and described in a fire hazards analysis. Some of these arrangements were accepted by the staff as providing equivalent protection to the requirements of Section !II.G to Appendix R.

Requirements that account for all of the parameters that are important to fire protection and consistent with safety requirements for all plant-unique configurations have not been developed.

In light of the experience gained in fire protection evaluations over the past four

. years, the Commission believes that the licensees should reexamine those previously approved configurations of fire protection that do not meet the requirements as specified in Section III.G to Appendix R. Based on this reexamination the licensee must either meet the requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R or apply for an exemption that justifies alternatives by a fire hazard analysis. However, based on present information, the Commission does not expect to be able to approve exemptions for fire-retardant coatings used as fire barriers.

The second relates to emergency lighting.Section III.J of Appendix R calls for a-hour emergency lighting, whereas in some cases less than a-hour emergency lighting has been accepted as satisfying Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. While an adequate level of safety may be provided by less than an a-hour supply, an a-hour system would provide added protection and would generally involve only a small cost. The Commission therefore believes that licensees should upgrade the previously approved facilities to satisfy the a-hour lighting requirement of Appendix R.

The third relates to protection against fires in noninerted containments involving reactor coolant pump permitted either an oil collection system or a fire suppression system. The staff has also accepted an automatic fire suppression system as an acceptable method of fire protection for this application. The Commission has concluded that fire suppression systems do not give adequate protection for fires that may be induced by seismic events.

The Commission therefore believes that previously approved suppression systems should be replaced with oil collection systems that can withstand seismic events.

The technical basis on which these three sections are based are further discussed in Section III, "Specific Requirements," of this preamble.

3. Most commenters stated that the implementation schedule contained in the proposed rule is impossible to meet for any of the operating plants. The commenters further stated that if the implementation schedule in the effective rule is the same as that in the proposed rule, the Commission must be prepared to either shutdown each operating nuclear power plant; or process '

exemption requests.

The commenters then concluded that the implementation schedule should be rewritten to allow an adequate time pried for compliance. The proposed rule stated that "all fire protection and modifications identified by the staff as necessary to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part, whether contained in Appendix R to this part or in other staff fire protection guidance (except for alternate or dedicated shutdown capability] shall be completed by November 1, 1980 unless, for good cause shown, the Commission approves an extension," (proposed paragraph 50.4a 1.(c]). The Commission went on to state its intention in the Statement of Consideration to the rule that"... no plant would be allowed to continue to operate after November 1. 1980, or,

. beyond an extended date approved by the Comission, unless all modifications (except for alternate or dedicated shutdown capability) have been implemented."

The Commission has reconsidered the implementation schedule and has determined that it should be modified for the following reasons:

• After reviewing the comments and the information developed as a result of completion of fire reviews over the past 6 months, the s.taff has informed the Commission that the date of November 1, 19aO, is not possible because the effective date of the rule will be after that date.

• The staff has informed the Commission that it would expect lubrication oil (Section III.O of Appendix.RJ. The proposed rule

• • -.. _.virtually alLlicense*e!l~t9,request.e......., -.... *..

76604 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday, November HI, 1980 / Rules and Regulations exemptions if the new implementation dates do not provide an appropriate period of time for complying with the requirements of Appendix R. The time and manpower resources needed by the licensees to prepare such requests and by the staff to formulate.

recommendations on these requests is not warranted from the standpoint of timely fire protection improvement.

• The revised implementation schedule provides a careful balance of these considerations, calling for the remaining fire protection modifications to be implemented *and installed on a phased scheduie that is as prompt as can be reasonably achieved.

The revised schedules distinguish between requirements imposed for the first time on the licensee by Appendix R and those requirements already imposed in license conditions or Technical Specifications issued prior to the effective date of the rule. For requirements imposed by Appendix R, including the items "backfit" to all plants, the schedule provides a reasonable time after publication of the rule for completion of required.

• modifications. For requirements already imposed by license conditions providing for implemention after November 1, 1980, the Commission has reviewed these schedules and has found that in some instances the allotted time for completion of the required modifications may be excessive. Thus, for fire protection features other than those covered by Appendix R, although the Commission has extended the compliance dates beyond the November 1, 1980, date in the proposed rule, the Commission has added a requirement that limits the compliance schedule in existing licenses if such schedules extend beyond what we now believe should have been a reasonable schedule initially. Relief from such limitation may be granted by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation upon a showing that there is good cause for extending such date and that public health and safety is not adversely affected by such extension.

It should also be noted that for licensees whose license conditions imposed a schedule with a compliance date of November 1, 1980, or other date prior to the effective date of§ 50.48, the Commission has suspended such compliance dates by promulgating on October 29, 1980, a temporary rule

§ 50.48 (45 FR 71569), which will be superseded by this rule.

To better understand the nature of the public comments received and the stafrs resolution of these comments, the

.,..,,,.,;,.,_--.}g,llo~ng section.will consider each.. _.,

• section of Appelid~:R tcrthis*part.. In '.. :..

Section III. we provide a summary of the Technical Basis for each requirement, followed by a summary of the public comments and a statement of the staffs disposition of those comments.

Section I. Introduction and Scope This section has been revised as a result of comments to include a discussion of the importance of safe shutdown capability and the distinction between requirements for "safety-related" equipment and equipment needed for "safe shutdown."

Section II. General Requirements This section has been substantially rewritten as a result of comments to provide a concise summary of general requirements. The specific requirements were consolidated with the appropriate parts of Section III. "Specific Requirements," except that the credit given for 50-foot separation has been dropped.

Section Ill Specific Requirements The requirements in this rule are based upon principles long accepted within that portion of American industry that has been classified by their insurance carriers as "Improved Risk" or "Highly Protected Risk". In each of these cases,.the Commission has decided that the overall interest of public safety is best served by establishing some conservative level of fire protection and ensuring that level of compliance exists at all plants. The following is a list of the specific technical bases and resolution of public comments for each of the specific requirements in Appendix R.

A. Water Supplies for Fire Suppression Systems Technical Basis.

One of the basic fire protection requirements for a modem industrial site in the United States is a separate water distribution system for fire

-protection with dual water supplies.

Duplicate water supplies are required to ensure uninterrupted fire suppression capability allowing for single failures and periodic maintenance and repair of vital portions of the systems. Duplicate water supplies may consist of separate suctions for fire pumps from a large body of water such as lake, river, or pond or from two water storage tanks.

For nuclear power plants, the distribu~ion system is required to consist of a loop around the plant with suitable valves for isolating portions of the system for maintenance or repair without interrupting the water supply to the various fire suppression systems in the plant. Thus, with dual supplies and a loop concept"aµ adequ_ate.-water supply can be'ensured fo*each manual "or.

automatic water suppression system throughout the plant.

An ensured minimum volume of water is set aside and dedicated for fire protection uses to be available at all times regardless of other simultaneous water uses in the plant. This water volume is dedicated for fire service by means of separate storage tanks or separate pump suctions from a large body of water. When common tankage is employed for fire service needs and other water services, the fire pump suctions must be at the bottom of the tank and other water supply suctions must be located at a higher level to ensure that the minimum dedicated water volume is set aside for fire protection needs. Administrative controls by themselves, such as locked valves to ensure adequate water supply for fire fighting needs, are deemed unacceptable at nuclear power plants.

Comment Resolution Many commenters stated that we were bei::t~ too restrictive by stipulating an undel'IP'ound yard fire main loop and freJr> wa.*

• i Joolies. Our intent was only that a yard fire main loop be.

furnished. We have deleted the specification for an underground loop

• since special conditions may dictate that part of the loop be above ground or inside safety*related buildings. Such arrangements are acceptable.

With regard to the specification for a fresh water supply, the staff was attempting to avoid potential plant problems that are not associated with fire protection. From a fire protection standpoint; salt or brackish water is acceptable for fire suppression provided the fire protection system is designed and maintained for salt or brackish water. The requirement for fresh water supplies is therefore dropped. Other operational problems unrelated to fire protection that may result from the use of salt or brackish water for fire suppression activities are outside the scope of this regulation.

Several commenters took issue with the requirement for two separate redundant suctions, stating that some pla.1~s t.se a single large intake strucfure on a lake or a river for all water requiren.ents. The requirement for separate intake structures was not intended and the rule has been clarified.

Several comments called for deleting the requirements for dedicated tanks or use of "ertical standpipe for other water services when storage tanks are used for combined service-water/fire-water uses, on the ba&is that this is overly restrictive and other ways are available to ensure a dedi~ated supply such as weirs, suction location, etc. Two separate but*'

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Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 I Wednesday, November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 7660?

related issues are involved here. The first is the requirement for dedicated.

water storage tanks for fire fighting purposes. The suggestion that the requirement for dedicated tanks be deleted was rejected for the reasons

• stated in the preceding Technical Basis.

The either point deals with ensuring minimum water storage capacity for fire suppression activities* when storage tanks are used for combined service-water /fire-water uses. The term "vertical standpipe for other water service" simply means that the suction for other wafer uses in common storage tanks will be located sufficiently high to ensure the minimum water volume needs for fire suppression activities. If the commenters were assuming that "vertical standpipe" referred only to.

pipes inside the tank, this is not the case. In fact a standpipe exterior to the storage tank is more desirable since any leakage would be immediately evident.

• an an internal standpipe a leak in the pipe could actually allow depletion of

• the water otherwise to be reserved for fire uses. The rule has been clarified to allow physical alternatives for water supply dedication but to preclude exclusive use of administrative controls for this purpose.

Some commenters objected to the requirement that other water systems used as a backup water supply for fire protection should be permanently connected to the fire main system and suggested that it would be sufficient to provide a water suppiy capable of being connected to the fire main system within ten minutes of the loss of normal water supply or pumps. The rule does not address backup water supplies. The requirement means that, if another water system is used as one of the redundant water supplies, it must satisfy all of the requirements of the fl.re protection water supplies. Additional backup supplies need not meet these requirements..

One commenter asked why only a two-hour water supply is required when the Browns Ferry Fire lasted well over two hours. All of the investigations of the Browns Ferry Fire clearly show that if water had been used immediately, the fire would have been extinguished much earlier. Indeed once the manual fire..

fighting activities were started with the use of only one fire hose stream, the fire was extinguished within one-half hour.

The staff would find unacceptable any condition in which a postulated fire that could threaten safe shutdown capability could not be controlled and extinguished within two hours with any combination of.manual and automatic fire suppression activities;Therefore~ a two*

hour water supply is considered adequate. It should also be noted that this minimum dedicated water volume is based on maximum flow rates. Since most fires are controlled and extinguished with much smaller flow rates, this requirement realistically represents a dedicated water volume far in excess of two hours.

B. Sectional Isolation.Valves.

C. Hydrant Isolation Valves Technical Basis. These two requirements are similar and can be treated together. Proper valving is required to isolate portions of the water distribution system for maintenance or repair without interrupting the water supply to manual or automatic fire suppression systems inside the plant.

Valves are similarly required to permit isolation of outside yard hydrants from

• the water distribution system for maintenance or repair without interrupting water supply to fire suppression systems inside the plant.

Visually indicating valves such as post indicator valves are preferred so that the position of the valve can be readily determined. However, key-operated valves (commonly known as curb valves) are acceptable for these purposes where plant-specific conditions warrant their use.

B. Section Control Valves-Comment Resolution. Many commenters stated that the requirement for "approved visually indicating" sectional control valves was overly restrictive, unnecessary, and not specific with by a visually indicating ar*key-operated

[curb) valve," and there was an opportunity to comment on this document.

D. Manual Fire Suppression Technical Basis. Considerable reliance is placed on automatic fire suppression systems throughout a nuclear power plant.

However, manual fire fighting activities often can control and extinguish slowly developing fires before an automatic fire suppression system is actuated. In addition, fires that are controlled 9r extinguished by automatic systems require a certain amount of manual response. Also, some areas of the plant do not warrant the installation of automatic fire suppression systems.

Manual response is the only fire suppression available for these areas:

thus, it is important that manual fire fighting capability be present in all areas of the plant, and that standpipe and hose stations be located throughout the plant. The standpipe and hose stations are to be located so that at least one effective hose stream can lie brought to bear at any location~in the plant containing or presenting a hazard to structures, systems, or components important to safety. They are to be supplied from the fire water supply system except for those inside

.containment, which may be connected to other reliable water supplies if a separate penetration into containment cannot be made for fire water service needs.

respect to who should give the approval.

Comment Resolution The Commission has accepted this suggestion: the rule now requires that Several commenter& sugges.~~d adding sectional control valves shall be a sentence reading "Standpipe'and hose provided to isolate portions of the fire stations are not required if sufficient main for maintenance or repair without justification can be provided that shutting off the entire system. Post adequate fire protection features have indicator or key-operated valves are been provi~ed to account for a given fi.re mentioned as two examples of area." This suggestion was rejected. The acceptable valves.

staff has taken the position that the C. Hydrant Block Valves-Comment minimum requirements are that at least Resolution. A number of commenters one effective hose stream that will be made suggestions for rewording this able to reach any location that contains section. This section has been clarified or could present an exposure fire hazard to state the requirement for capability to to the safety-related equipment. The isolate hydrants from the fire main Commission concluded that no analyses without disrupting the water supply to can identify hazards so carefully that automatic or manual fire suppression this minimum requirement can be systems in any ar.ea containing or further reduced.

presenting a fire hazard to safety-related E. Hydrostatic Hose Test Technical or safe shutdown equipment.

Basis. Fire hoses should be One commenter suggested that this hydrostatically tested periodically to requirement be dropped in its entirety ensure that they will not rupture during since it "is a new requirement which has use. The requirement for a minimum test not been subjected to the peer review pressure of 300 psi comes from NFPA process." This suggestion was rejected No. 196 (National Fire Protection on the basis that Appendix A to BTP Association Standard No. 196-APCSB 9.5-1 contains the following Standard for Fire Hose), a nationally sentep.ce: :'The lateral to each*hydrant ;,

~ecognized consensus *standard. This

. ' from 'the'yara*m'ain1should* b'e; controlli!'d;.'.:'shindaid '.contains 'other'g'tiidan~' for tlie }:;.f,\\ i;,,. :,... -~'"}...,....

76606 Federal Register / \\'ul -15. :\\a. 225.1 \\\\'edncsday. >:O\\ember 19. 19'80 '

Ruit~s and Regulations use and c:;1re of fire host? that n:Pst industrws find useful.

CommP.nt Resolution Many commenters pointed out the erroneous usage of the term "service pressure"' rnther than "operating pressure** in this requirement. The intended meaning for this requirement is that all hoses would be tested at a pressure greater than the maximum pressure found in the fire protection water distribution systems. The correct terminology is "operating pressure." The rule has been so changed. In addition, the staff added a specific minimum test pressure requirement of 300 psi to meet the NFPA standard.

One commenter also pointed out that hoses should be inspected for mildew.

rot. cuts, or other damage. Although this is a valid comment. it is not an unresolved issue with any licensee so it need not be covered by this rule. In addition. such inspections are already being performed in accordance with the plant's Technical Specificaitons.

F. Automatic Fire Detection Technical Basis. The requirement that automatic fire detection systems be installed in all areas that contain safe shutdown or

• safety-related systems or components follows generally accepted fire protection practice. Installation of such fire detection capability is independent of any requirements for automatic or manual fire suppression capability in an area. The purpose of these detection systems is to give early warning of fire conditions in an area so that the fire brigade can initiate prompt actions to minimize fire damage within the plant.

Comment Resolution svstem in all such art!as should be retained. The fire !1.izc1rds analysis ma~*

call for a separate suppression system.

but this would be in addition to the fire detection system.

G. Protection or Safe Shutdown Capability Tech1ifcaj Basis. The objective for the protection of safe shutdown capability is to ensure that at least one means of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions will remain available during and after any postulated fire in the plant. Because it is not possible to predict the specific conditions under which fires inav occur and propagate. the design basis

• protective features are specified rather than the design basis fire. Three different means for protecting the safe shutdown capability outside of containment are acceptable. The first means is separation of redundant safe shutdown trains and associated circuits bv means of 3-hour fire rated barriers.

The second means is a combination of separation of redundant safe shutdown trains and associated circuits by a 1-hour fire rated barrier and automatic fire suppression and detection capability for both redundant trains. The third means.

which may be used only when redundant trains and associated circuits are separated by 20 feet or more of clear space. requires automatic fire suppression and detection systems in the area. An alternative or dedicated safe shutdown capability independent of the fire area is required if fire protection for safe shutdown capability cannot be provided as outlined above. For cables and equipment needed for safe shutdown located inside of noninerted containments. a lesser degree of fire protection is permitted because transient exposure fires are less likely inside containment during plant operation. Section lll.M. "Fire Barriers,"

discusses the technical basis for the 3-hour barrier. and Section lll.L, "Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability," discusses the technical basis for safe shutdown capability.

Comment Resolution Many commenters suggested that the words "automatic fire detection capability" be substituted for "automatic fire detection systems" on the basis that, as worded, the requirements are too limiting. They stated that an automatic sprinkler system with appropriate alarm check valves and central alarm features provides acceptable detection/ alarmmg capability. Several commenters claimed that a separate detection system is not Many commenters suggested that the needed in areas covered by sprinkler first paragraph be changed slightly and systems equipped with fusible link the rest of this section deleted. The sprinkler heads. A fusible link has a basis for their contention is that the rule time delay before it actuates. However, should state simply the requirement to more importantly, a smoldering protect cables or equipment of systems localized fire that could do damage may necessary for safe shutdown of the plant not generate enough heat to melt the and leave specific implementation fusible link. While we do not disagree details in some other type of document.

that the alarm from an automatic fire We have modified this section by suppression system serves as removing the listing of considerations, notification that a fire exists, we deleting Table I. and revising the concluded that the minimum...

... _wording to provide clarification.

requirement for-a separate-fire'detecti'ori * *--c **' *H:*_Fire' Brigaae/;_.,., *<<.'**,,c. ***::..

• I. Fin* Br1j,!ad' Training Technical Basi.;. ~lost modern industriai plants with replacement cost values approaching those of a modern nuclear powered eiectric generating station have a full-time fully equipped fire department. including motorized fire apparatus. Because of the reduced severity of fire hazards in a nuclear generating station as compared to a manufacturing plant, the Commission believes that it is not necessary to mandate a fully staffed fire department.

However. manual fire response capability is required at a nuclear plant and a properly equipped and fully trained fire brigade will satisfy this need. The Commission has determined that a brigade of five persons constitutes the minimum size sufficient to perform the actions that may be required by the brigade during the fire and to provide some margin for unanticipated events. 1 Similarly. the training requirements listed are considered the minimum needed to ensure that the fire brigade will be able to function effectively during a fire emergency.

The proposed rule required emergency breathing apparatus without specifying the number of such pieces of apparatus.

The rule has been modified to specify the personnel for whom such apparatus is to be provided and to specify reserve air requirements.

H. Fire Brigade-Comment Resolution. Many commenters suggested changing this requirement to a simple statement that a trained and equipped, nominal size, site fire brigade of five persons be provided on each shift unless a lesser number is justified. This recommended change was rejected by the Commission for the reasons stated in the Technical Basis.

Some commenters objected to the exclusion of the shift supervisor from the fire brigade. The commenters felt that the shift supervisor should go to the fire and provide the benefit of his expertise and authority. The rule would not prevent this. However, the shift supervisor may have to go elsewhere during the course of a fire that adversely affects plant operation. The fire brigade leader must stay with the fire brigade and be assigned no other responsibilities during a fire emergency.

therefore. the shift supervisor must be excluded from membership on the fire brigade.

l. Fire Brigade Training-Comment Resolution. Many commenters have

'This is discussed at length in the NRC staffs "Evaluation of Minimum Fire Brigade Shift Size",

dated June 8. 1979; copies are available from David P. Notley. Office of Standards Development. U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory.Commission._ Washington. D.C.

. 20555.* -

..-~ > *;,"_

)

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 I Wednesday, November 19. 1980 I Rules and Regulations 76607 sta tl'c'. ::.d: >:RC *J5ed unnecessarv de1ai1 *

n s;:-eliing out specific requirements for classroom instruction. fire fighting prac'.?CP. and fire drills. Some commenters felt that these requirements were more detailed than anything the Commission has published with.regard to opera tor training. The Commission here points out that most of the investigations of the TMI accident identified inadequately trained operators as an important factor and that work is now being done in this area. The fact is not that the training requirements spelled out here for the fire brigade members are excessive when compared to training requirements for reactor operators. but that fire brigade training is further along in development, and training parameters that are essential to a comprehensive program have been identified.

J. Emergency Lighting Technical Basis. Emergency lighting is required in all nuclear power plants. Battery-powered lights with capacities of 1 112 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is usually sufficient for emergency egress. However, the postfire emergency lighting requirements in a nuclear power plant are of a different kind. The need is for lighting that aids the access to equipment and components that must be manually operated by plant personnel to effect safeflant shutdown during plant emergE!ncies. Because such activities may extend over a considerable period of time both during and after the fire, it is prudent to provide 8-hour battery emergency lighting capability to allow sufficient time for normal lighting to be restored with a margin for unanticipated events.

fire emergen.:: anci operat<J!o :nvoi\\"e:*

in saie plant snutdown shou1C: not also have to be concerned with lighting in th~

area. The small cost differential between 2-hour supply and the substantial additional protection afforded by the 8-hour supply does not warrant reducing this requirement. The Commission has decided to require an 8-hour battery power supply in all areas needed for opera lion of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes.

K. Administrative' Controls Technical Basis. The fire protection program uses administrative controls for fire prevention and prefire planning. The items listed in this section are generally accepted within the fire protection community as minimum requirements for an effective administration of the fire protection program. Controls are placed on the storage and use of combustible materials to reduce the fire loading in safety-related areas and on ignition sources to avoid careless operations.

Procedures are used to control actions to be taken by individuals who discover a fire and by the fire brigade for the development of preplanned fire fighting strategies and actual fire fighting techniques.

Comment Resolution mod1i1cations tu prov1r.ie aiternauve shutdown svstems are extensive. ;,

dedicated s~*stem lha1 is essentially a minimum c~oabilitv safe shutdown train and is independent of those already existing may be provided. This minimum capability lS required to maintain the

• process variables within those va;ues predicted for a loss of off site power. The case of loss of offsite power is assumed because fires in certain circumstances (e.g., electrical distribution system~)

could cause or be related to such a loss.

Fire damage to cold shutdown capability is limited to damage that can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to provide a margin in achieving cold shutdown conditions. Consideration is given to associated circuits because most plants were not designed with this concept in mind. Should either the alternative or dedicated capability be required to function because of a fire, it must not be disabled by fire damage to associated circuits. Also, this capability does not have to meet the single failure criterion because it is only one of several levels of defense. Seismic Category I criteria is not imposed because fires that-would require the installation of alternative or dedicated shutdown capability are not seismically induced.

Comment Resolution Many commenters stated thatthis Many of the commenters stated that requirement was much too detailed for a this requirement exceeded the scope of regulation. Some stated that the Appendix R by defining alternative requirements should apply only to those shutdown requirements. They stated areas having safe shutdown equipment.

that the time requirements are excessive Other commenters stated that a simple and should be dropped. They also statement that administrative contend that this regulation does not procedures should be established to take into account the many pla_nt control the various fire hazards reviews being conducted under the throughout the plant was sufficient, and Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP].

Comment Resolution that the details could be spelled out in a It is generally understood that cold Many commenters stated that the regulatory guide or some other similar shutdown is the ultimate safe shutdown requirement for emergency lighting is document.

condition and that, for each fire area, overly restrictive in three specific.s: first, Minor changes have been made in the different means may be used and may that emergency lighting is unnecessary wording of this requirement for be necessary to achieve cold shutdown.

in many of the designated areas; second, clarification.

Because a fire in certain areas at some that the requirement for sealed beam or L. Alternative and Dedicated plants would have the capability of fluorescent units is overly restrictive; Shutdown Capability.

disabling systems required to achieve third, that the requirement for individual Technical Basis. In some locations both hot and cold shutdown, it is 8-hour battery power supply is (such as the cable spreading room]

necessary to specify the minimum excessive. Three commenters within operating nuclear power plants, it capability and time requirement for each recommended a 2-hour battery power is not always possible or practicable to condition necessary to achieve safe supply; five commenters recommended a protect redundant safe shutdown shutdown. We agree that evaluations plant-specific power supply; and one systems against adverse effects of fire or being made under the Systematic commenter recommended that there be fire suppression activities only through Evaluation Program (SEP] may also call no permanent installation.

the use of fire protection features for alternative or dedicated shutdown These suggestions have been accepted because the -redundant safe shutdown capability for reasons other than fire in part. Lighting units with 8-hour systems in a given fire area are too close protection. For example, seismic, battery supplies are to be provided in all to each other. Alternative shutdown flooding. or emergency core cooling areas needed for operation of safe capability has usually been required to requirements resulting from the SEP may shutdown equipment and in access and be independent of the control room, require additional modifications. Each egress routes thereto. The reasoning cable spreading room, switchgear rooms licensee should be aware of the status of behind the requirement for an 8-hour and cable riser areas because redundant the SEP so that the requirements battery power supply is that there can systems in these areas are not resulting from SEP can be effectively

• be a great deal of:otner activity,duriz:ig0a ;; *.-cadeq11ately. s.eparated.,Wh_en*plant 11-J'.L":':ii.integrated. with those-relating to fire

76608 Federal Register / \\\\Jl..fa :\\u. 225 I WednP.sJa~* :\\ovember 19. 1980 ! Rules and Regulations protec:ti*>n to the extent possible.

However. the Commission h;is decided that the modifications required to complete the fire protection program should not be deferred until the SEP review is completed.

M. Fire Barriers.

Technical Basis. The best fire protection for redundant trains of safe shutdown systems is separation by unpierced fire barriers-walls and ceiling-floor assemblies. Because these barriers are passive fire protection features, they are inherently reliable provided they are properly installed and maintained. Fire barriers have been used successfully for many years to subdivide large potential fire losses into smaller, more acceptable risks. Even fire barriers with openings have successfully interrupted the progress of many fires provided the openings were properly protected by fire doors or other acceptable means.

Fire barriers are "rated" for fire resistance by being exposed to a "standard test fire". This standard test fire is defined by the American Society for Testing and Materials in ASTN E-119. "Standard for Fire Resistance of Building Materials." Fire barriers are commonly rated as having a fire resistance of from 1 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Most "Improved Risk" or "Highly Protected Risk" (as classified by insurance carriers] industrial properties in the United States require fire barriers to have a resistance rating of 2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

While a nuclear power plant has a low fire load, the potential consequences of fire are serious.

Therefore, the Commission has selected 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> has been as an acceptable minimum fire resistance rating for fire barriers separating redundant trains for safe shutdown systems. This will give ample time for automatic and manual fire suppression activities to control any potential fire and for safe shutdown activities to properly control the reactor.

Many operating plants, or plants that are already built but that are not yet operating, have both trains of safe shutdown equipment located in close proximity and a single fire could damage or destroy the functional capability of both redundant trains. If specific plant conditions preclude the installation of a 3-hour fire barrier to separate the redundant trains, a 1-hour fire barrier and automatic fire suppression system for each redundant train will be considered the equivalent of 3-hour barrier.

If the 1-hour fire barrier and automatic fire suppression for each redundant train cannot be provided because of plant-specific cond~ti.ons, alternative or dedicated shutdowns capability will be required to ensure safe shutdown capability. The use of a 1-hour barrier in conjunction with automatic fire suppression and detection capability for each redundant train of safe shutdown equipment is based on the following considerations. Automatic suppression is required to ensure prompt. effective application of suppressant to a fire that could endanger safe shutdown capability. The activation of an automatic fire detection or suppression system does not occur until sufficient smoke or heat has been developed by the fire. Therefore, the Commission is requiring a 1-hour barrier to ensure that fire damage will be limited to one train until the fire is extinguished.

These requirements have now been incorporated in Section III.G, "Fire Protection of Safety Functions."

Comment Resolution Several commenters made a number of suggestions of an editorial nature.

One suggestion was to add "or unless other fire protection features have been the national consensus standard used

• for testing and rating these cabie penetration seals. Since the cables conduct the heat through the barrier.

and since the cable insulation is combustible. the acceptance criteria of the ASTM Standard E-119 relating to temperature on the unexposed side must be appropriately modified.

Comment Resolution Some commenters suggested that this entire section be deleted and replaced with the following two sentences:

"Penetration seals shall provide the equivalent protection which is required of the fire barrier. Evaluation of the penetration seals based upon a design review and relevant test data or qualification tests may be made." The commenters felt that sufficient test data are available to permit evaluation of design requirements without full-scale mockup testing and that many of the items spelled out in the regulation, such as the water hose stream test. were too detailed and did not belong in the regulation. The Commission has reconsidered this issue and revised the rule to (a] require the use of noncombustible materials only in the construction of fire barrier penetration seals, (b) require fire barrier penetration seals to be qualified by test; and (c]

require such tests to satisfy certain acceptance criteria.

0. Fire Doors.

Technical Basis. Door openings in fire walls constitute another breach that must be protected. Fire doors that have been tested and rated for certain fire exposures are installed to protect these openings. Fire doors frequently fail to protect the openings in which they are installed because they are not fully closed. Various methods are available to licensees to ensure that fire doors are in proper operating condition and that they will be closed during a fire. These options are listed in Appendix R.

provided to ensure equivalent protection" in the first paragraph, where three-hour rated fire barriers were stipulated unless a lower rating was justified by the fire hazards analysis.

The Commission feels that this adds nothing in the way of clarification and the suggestion was not adopted. The second paragraph requires that structural steel forming a part of or supporting any fire barrier have a fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier. An exaII'ple was given of metal lath and plaster covering as being one means of providing equivalent protection. Several commenters stated that they thought this was too narrow and would be interpreted by some people as the only acceptable method permitted. Since the example seemed to be confusing, a decision has been made to eliminate it. Other comments to the effect that the requirement was excessively restrictive with regard to fire barrier penetrations, including fire Comment Resolution doors and their associated frames and*

Many commenters stated that this hardware. and ventilation systems have requirement is too detailed and should been acted upon by the staff and the be deleted. Minor editorial changes have requirement, as it had affected these been made in order to more clearly state items, was deleted.

the requirements.

N. Fire Barrier Cable Penetration Seal P. Reactor Coolant Pump Lubrication Qualification.

System.

Technical Basis. Unpierced fire Technical Basis. Each reactor coolant barriers offer the best protection for pump motor assembly typically contains separating redundant trains of safety-140 to 220 gallons of lube oil. Oil leaking related or safe shutdown equipment.

from some portions of the lube oil However, these barriers must be pierced system may come in contact with for both control and power cables.

surfaces that are hot enough to ignite the These penetrations must be sealed to oil. The resulting fire could be large. and achieve a degree of fire resistance access to the fire would be delayed.

equivalent to that required of the.barrier., :.::because.. of the*time,required :to:enterithe..,_,. '-*' -._.;.: :'.:;,,

that is pierced. ASTM Staridard E-119 is.<* con"tainment. Containent air temperature...

e Federal Register I Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 I Rules and Regulations 76609 would increase, severe localized pump oil collection system is covered l.Jy Capubility."l Jn thP firr hazards an;tlys1s environments would develop in the area paragraph C.2 because its function is for a plant. thr> E!qu1pmrmt relied upon to of the fire, and a large amount of smoke required to protect safety-related perform both functions must be would be generated. These conditions systems rather than to perform a safety identified for each fire area. It follows could affect operability of safety-related function. Because the failure of the oil that any associated non-safety circuits equipment inside containment.

collection system for a seismically in the fire area that could adversely Therefore. an oil collection system is induced oil fire should not prevent a affect the identified shutdown necessary to confine any oil discharged safety-related system from performing equipment by feeding back potentially due to leadkage or failure of the its safety function (Regulatory Guide disabling conditions (e.g.. hot shorts or lubrication system and to prevent it 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification,"

shorts to ground) to the power supplies from becoming a fire hazard by draining paragraph C.2), the oil collection system or control circuits of that equipment it to a safe location. These occurrences should be designed,.engineered, and must also be evaluated. Of course such could pe random or could be seismically installed so that its failure will not lead disabling conditions must be prevented induced because the existing lube oil to a fire affecting safety-related to provide assurance that the identified system piping and oil collection systems equipment as a result of an earthquake.

safe shutdown equipment will function may not be designed to withstand a The proposed rule permitted two as designed. These requirements have alternatives-an oil collection system or design basis seimic event.

an automatic fire suppression system.

now been incorporated in Section III.L, Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 We have deleted the alternative of the "Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown states that for operating plants, suppression system because Capability."

"postulated fires or fire protection unacceptable damage may result to the Comment Resolution system failures need not be considered concurrent with other plant accidents or safety~related systems from the burning Many commenters stated that this the most severe natural phenomena."

of oil before the suppression system is actuated and because the fire water requirement should be deleted because The basis for that statement is two fold.

supply system is not designed to many older plant designs did not First, nuclear power plants are massive withstand seismic events. In addition, consider associated circuits and this is, structures, and essential services are these pumps are located within the therefore, a new design requir~ment.

designed to withstand earthquakes and biological shield inside containment, The commenters felt that the a;nalysis other natural phenomena. Second. the therefore, timely fire brigade action that will be required to satisfy.this history of many fires associated with would be difficult if the suppression requirement will be.both long and recent earthquakes have been system malfunctions. Further, if the complicated and the requirement should evaluated. These evaluations showed that such fires usually are due to failure suppression system becomes inoperable therefore be deleted.

.of piping or tanks of flammable gasses during operation, a fire watch or patrol The Commission rejected these or liquids such as municipal natural gas cannot enter the area during operation.

suggestions for the following reasons.

distribution systems or gasoline storage Comment Resolution

1. Virtually all of the fire protection and/or dispensing stations. Where such A number of commenters suggested modifications made to date have been potential fire hazards exist in nuclear that this section is too detailed and required to correct deficiencies that

• ~:*~*~

power plants (e.g., hyd,rogen for should be substantially modified. This resulted from lackof consideration of

• ~~

generator cooling, or oil fuel for the requirement was changed to delete the certain specific items during initial emergency diesel generator or station option of protecting the reactor coolant design and construction.

'~f.

space heating boilers) they are designed

2. The Browns Ferry fire showed the

'lt pump lubrication system with an

~~

and installed to withstand the damaging automatic fire suppression system. We necessity of divisional separa'tion of the effects of various natural phenomena, have modified the rule to indicate that associated circuit of the control cables and other special fire protection features the requirement that the oil collection to prevent the disabling of safety are provided as necessary. However, system be designed to provide systems by a single fire. This has been General Design Criterion 2 Design Bases reasonable assurance that it will discussed with licensees during for Protection Against Natural withstand the Safe Shutdown evaluations of alternative and dedicated Phenomena requires that structures, Earthquake can be met by satisfying shutdown capability and is necessary to systems. and components Important to paragraph C.2. of Regulatory Guide 1.29, ensure that safe shutdown systems will safety be designed to withstand the "Seismic Design Classification," as be able to function properly in the event effects of earthquakes without loss of described above.

of fire.

capability to perfonn their safety Q. Associated Circuits.

3. The staff considers incomplete any function. Regulatory Guide 1.29, Technical Basis. When considering fire hazard analysis that does not "Seismic Desisn Classification,"

the consequences of a fire in a given fire describes an acceptable method for area during the evaluation of safe consider the effects of fire damage to circuits that are associated with safe identifying and classifying those shutdown capabilities of a plant, the shutdown *systems.

features of light-water-cooled nuclear staff must be able to conclude that one power plants that should be designed to train of equipment.that can be used As indicated above, as a result of the withstand the effects of the Safe immediately to bring the reactor to a hot comments received on this issue, it is Shutdown Earthquake. In this guide.

shutdown condition remains unaffected unclear that associated circuits have in paragraph C.'1 applies to systems that by that fire. The staff must also be able fact been adequately considered by are required to remain functional to to conclude that damage to one train of licensees in their reviews using the ensure heat removal capability:

equipment used for achieving cold guidance of Appendix A to BTP APCSB paragraph C.2 applies to systems that do shutdown will be limited so that the 9.5-1. To ensure that the associated not have to remain frunctional for that equipment can be returned to an circuits are considered. all operating purpose, but whose failure could reduce operable condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. (See nuclear power plants will be required to

(": -*

the functioning of those systems 9over.ed Technical Basis for Sec.tion.l~l,G,

. meet the requirements of Section 111.G.of. *........ -

.... by pa.ragraph:C;tr.:The:reaclor<<:oolant-::::.'}'*'*'1\\Protecfion of Safe Shutd-own Appendix R.

• ** *_._ 1**,'<s--*

• 76610 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19, 1980 I Rules and Regulations General Comments Resolution:

Several commenters contended that Commission regulations mandate that an adjudicatory hearing be conducted prior to a final decision. One commenter labeled the regulation an "order" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551(6)) (APA]

and asserted that 10 CFR 2.204 of the Commission's regulations. "Order for Modification of License," applies to this rulemaking proceeding.

The Commission disagrees with these comments. A "rule" is defined in the APA to mean "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement * *

• or prescribe law or policy * * *" (5 U.S.C.

551(4)). The agency action questioned here is clearly one that treats similarly situated licer{sees equally and that prescribes future conduct or requirements. For those licensees who have not already provided an equivalent level of fire protection, certain specific fire protection features are required.

Various of these requirements would apply to approximately 40 facilities. The commenter's characterization of the rule as an order, along with the assertion that 10 CFR 2.204 mandates a hearing before the rule becomes final is incorrect. On its face, that regulation

[which does grant a hearing right) applies only to Commission orders that modify a license. 2 It does not apply to requirements promulgated through a rulemaking action conducted in accordance with the requirements of applicable law.

Several commenters contended that the environmental impact had not been adequately addressed. One commenter, citing the requirements in Section III.A of Appendix R for two water supplies and two separate redundant sections as examples of requirements involving environmental issues, contended that the Commission relied upon its staffs "unsupported determination that, pursuant to 10 CFR § 51.S(d); an environmental impact statement, appraisal. or negative declaration is not required." The Commission has considered Section III.A and has further considered the remaining requirements of Appendix R and remains convinced that the regulations are not substantive and are insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact.

One commenter suggested that all plants be required to install dedicated shutdown capability. The Commission does not agree. We believe that the Commission's overall fire protection program involving extensive plant-specific fire protection modifica lions that are based on guidance set forth in Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and its Appendix A and the specific requirements of Appendix R to resolve disputed issues provide adequate fire protection.

One commenter stated that the ambiguity of the proposed regulation with regard to critical items requires that it be renoticed. The commenter referenced three portions of the proposed Appendix R as examples of such ambiguity. They were Section III.G, Section Ill.N, and Section lll.Q. We have reviewed these examples.

In reference to the first example, the commenter stated that the first paragraph of Section IIl.G identifies alternative shutdown capability as an optional protective feature and that paragraph III.G.2.c then identifies alternative shutdown capability as a minimum fire protection feature. We do not agree with this statement. The first paragraph of Section lll.G identifies alternative shutdown capability as one option in a combination of fire protection features for a specific fire area. Paragraph III.G.3 indicates when this option should be used.

• In reference to the second example, the commenter stated that Section III.N requires a pressure differential across the test specimen during the testing of fire barrier penetration seals but fails to define the pressure differential. This comment is incorrect. The pressure differential called for by the proposed provision was the maximum pressure differential that the barrier would experience in the specific plant installation. In any event, the requirement for pressure differential during such testing has been deleted since only noncombustible material is now being used for such seals.

In reference to the third example, the commenter stated that Section lll.Q is totally lacking in definition. We do not agree. Footnote 6 references Regulatory Guide 1.75 and IEEE Std 384-1974. The latter document is a commonly used industry standard that defines associated circuits and provides guidance for ensuring that such circuits do not compromise the independence of the shutdown circuits they are associated with.

Based on the above examples and our review of the other provisions of the

'It should also be noted that§ 2.204 is codified m proposed rule, we do not believe that Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 2. The s~~pe of Subpart B the rule as proposed was ambiguous so is specifically limited to "cases imllated b_y the st_aff

. as to require renoticing. Moreover, it

• * *to impose requirements by.*orderon.a,,:... *,.**

• licensee" (10 CFR-2.2oo(a)). [Emphasis supplied.]

should be-noted that, based on other comments received on the proposed regulations. other commenters demonstrated a thorough understanding of the proposed requirements.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and Sections 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that the following amendments to Title 10. Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, are published as a document subject to codification.

1. A new § 50.48 is added to read as follows:

§ 50.48 Fire Protection.

(a) Each operating nuclear power plant shall have a fire protection plan that satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part. This fire protection plan shall describe the overall fire protection program for the facility, identify the various positions within the licensee's organization that are responsibile for the program, state the authorities that are delegated to each of these positions to implement those responsibilities, and outline the plans for fi::e protection, fire detection and suppression capability, and limitation of fire damage. The plan shall also describe specific features necessary to implement the program described above, such as administrative controls and personnel requirements for fire prevention and manual fire suppression activities, automatic and manually operated fire detection and suppression systems, and the means to limit fire damage to structures, systems, or components important to safety so that the capability to safely shut down the plant is ensured. 3

[b) Appendix R to this part establishes fire protection features required to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A fo this part with respect to certain generic issues for nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January l, 1979.

Except for the requirements of Sections III.G, lll.J, and III.O, the provisions of Appendix R to this part shall not be applicable to nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January l, 1979, to the extent that fire protection features proposed or implemented by 3 Basic fire protection guidance for nuclear power plants is contained in two NRC documents:

• Branch Technical Position Auxiliary Power Conversion System Branch BTP APCSB 9.5-1.

"Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plant*. for new plants docketed after July 1. 1976.

dated May 1976.

• Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. "Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1. 1976." for plants that were operating or under various stages of design or construction before July 1. 1976, dated August 23.

1976.

Also see Note 4.

Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesdav. '.'iovember 19. 1980 / Rules anr. Regulations 76611 the i1censee han been accepted by the NRC staff as satisfying the provisions of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 4 reflected in staff fire protection safety evaluation reports issued prior to the effective date of this rule. or to the extent that fire protection features were accepted by the staff in comprehensive fire protection safety evaluation reports issued before Appendix A to Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 was published in August 1976. With respect to all other fire protection features covered by Appendix R, all nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January l, 1979 shall satisfy the applicable requirements of Appendix R to this part. including specifically the requirements of Sections III.G. III.J, and III.0.

(c) All fire protection modifications require to satisfy the provisions of Appendix R to this part or directly affected by such requirements shall be completed on the following schedule:

(1) Those fire protection features that involve revisions of administrative controls, manpower changes, and traii:ting, shall be implemented within 30 days after the effective date of this section and Appendix R to this part.

(2) Those fire protection features that involve installation of modifications that do not require prior NRC approval or plant shutdown shall be implemented within 9 months after the effective date of this section and Appendix R to this part.

(3) Those fire protection features, except for those requiring prior NRC approval by paragraph (c](5) of this section, that involve installation of modifications that do require plant shutdown, the need for which is justified in the plans and schedules required by

. the provisions of paragraph (c)(5) of this section, shall be implemented before startup after the earliest of the following events commencing 180 days or more

• Clarification and guidance with respect to permissible alternatives to satisfy Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 has been provided in four other NRC documents.

• "Supplementary Guidance on Information Needed for Fire Protection Evaluation." dated October 21. 1976.

• "Sample Technical Specification." dated May

12. 1977.

• **Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities. i\\dministrative Control and Quality Assurance," dated June 14. 1977.

• "Manpower Requirements for Operating Reactors." dated May 11. 1978.

A Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report that has been issued for each 'operating plant states how these guidelines were applied to each facility and identifies open fire protectmn issues that will be resolved when the facility satisfies the appropriate requirements ofApp'endix R ro this part.

after the effective date of this section and Appendix R to this part:

(i} the first refueling outage; (ii) another planned outage that lasts for at least 60 days; or (iii) an unplanned outage that lasts for at least 120 days.

(4) Those fire protection features that require prior NRC approval by paragraph (c)(5) of this section, shall be implemented within the following schedule: Dedicated shutdown systems-30 months after NRC approval: modifications requiring plant shutdown-before startup after the earliest of the events given in paragraph

[c)(3) commencing 180 days after NRC approval; modifications not requiring plant shutdown-6 months after NRC approval.

(5) Licensees shall make any modifications necessary to comply with these requirements in accordance with the above schedule without prior review and approval by NRC except for modifications required by Section Ill.G.3 of Appendix R to this part. Licensees shall submit plans and schedules for meeting the provisions of paragraphs

[c)(2), [c)(3), and (c)(4) within 30 days after the effective date of this section and Appendix R to this part. Licensees shall submit design descriptions of modifications needed to satisfy Section Ill.G.3 of Appendix R to this part within 30 days after the the effective date of this section and Appendix R to this part.

(6) In the event that a request for exemption from a requirement to comply with one or more of the provisions of Appendix R fi!ed within 30 days of the effective date of this rule is based on an assertion by the licensee that such required modifications would not enhance fire protection safety in the facility or that such modifications may be detrimental to overall facility safety, the schedule requirements of paragraph (c) shall be tolled until final Commission action on the exemption request upon a determination by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation that the licensee has provided a sound technical basis for

• such assertion that warrants further staff review of the request.

determines. upon ii showing by the licensee. that there is good cause for extending such date and that !he public health and safety is not adversely affected bv such extension*. Extensions of such da.te shall not exceed the dates determined by paragraphs [c)(1) through (c)(4] of this section.

(1) Those fire protection features th~i involve revisions of administrative controls. manpower changes. and training shall be implemented within 4 months after the date of the NRC staff Fire Protection Evaluation Report accepting or requiring such features.

(2) Those fire protection features involving installation of modifications not requiring prior approval or plant*

shutdown shall be implemented within 12 months after the date of the NRC staff Fire Protection Safety Evaluation*

Report accepting or requiring such features.

(3) Those fire protection features, including alternative shutdown capability, involving installation of modifications requiring plant shutdown shall be implemented before the startup after the earliest of the following events commencing 9 months or more after the date of the NRC staff Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report accepting or requiring such features:

(i) The first refueling outage; (ii) Another planned outage that lasts for at least 60 days; or (iii) An unplanned outage that lasts for at least 120 days.

(4) Those fire protection features involving dedicated shutdown capability requiring new buildings and systems shall be implemented within 30 months of NRC approval. Other modifications requiring NRC approval prior to installation shall be implemented within 6.months after NRC approval.

(e) Nuclear power plants licensed to operate after January 1, 1979. shall.

complete all fire protection modifications needed to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part in accordance with the provisions of their licenses.

2. A new Appendix R is added to 10 CFR Part 50 to read as follows:

Appendix R-Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979 I. Introduction and Scope This Appendix applies to licensed nuclear power electric generating stations that were operating prior to January 1. 1979, except to the extent set forth in paragraph 50.48(b) of this part. With respect to certain generic issues for such facilities.it sets forth fire protection features required to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part.'

(d) Fire protection features accepted by the NRC staff in Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Reports referred to in paragraph (b) of this section and supplements to such reports.. other than features covered by paragraph (c), shall be completed as soon as practicable but no later than the completion date currently specified in license conditions or technical specifications for such facility, or the date determined by paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(4) of this section, whichever is sooner. unless the D.

f N 1 R

.R.. "l.,.

1rector. o. uc ear eactor** egu at1on;;t'\\<:'r*>>,*:.*' See-.footnote:4.:*.,*'1',.,,._,.,,,_.,,,,.; <...,:.. *:

76612 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part specifies that "Structures, systems. and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize. consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions."

When considering the effects of fire. those systems associated with achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to safety because damage to them can lead to core damage resulting from loss of coolant through boiloff.

The phrases "important to safety," or "safety-related," will be used throughout this Appendix R as applying to all safety functions. The phrase "safe shutdown" will be used throughout'this Appendix R as applying to both hot and cold shutdown functions.

Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of function of systems used to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents under postfire conditions does not per se impact public safety, the need to limit fire damage to systems required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions is greater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems required to mitigate the consequences of

.design basis accidents. Three levels of fire damage limits are established according to the safety functions of the structure. system, or component:

Safety function F~e damage limils Hot Shutdown............. One train of equipment necessary to

. achieve hot shutdown from either the control room 01 emergency con-trol station(*I must be mlllntained free of fire damage by a single fire, including an eJl!>OSUfe fire.'

Cold Shutdown........... Both trains of equipment necessaiy to achieve cold Shutdown may be damaged by

• single fire, including an mq>osure fire, but damage must be limited so that at least one train can be repaired 01 made operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> using onsite cape.bi~

ity.

Design Basis Both trains of equipment necessary Accidents.

f0t mrtigation of consequences fol*

lowing design basis Ql:Cidents may be damaged by a single exposure fire.

~t~

~~~°::~~!~ta ~~~~t~.,:~

external lo any structures, or.items, or components located in* or adjacent to that same area The effects of such fire (e.g.. smoke, heat. or ignition) can adVersefy affect those structures, or.items, or components important to safety.

Thus, a fire involving one train of safe shutdown equipment may constitute an exposure fire for the* redundant train located in *1ne same area, and a fire involving combustibles other than etther redundant train may constitute an exposure fire to both redundant trains located in the same area The most stringent fire damage limit shall apply for those systems that fall into more than one category. Redundant systems used to mitigate the consequences of other design basis accidents but not necessary for safe shutdown may be lost to a single exposure fire. However. protection shall be provided so that a fire within only one such system will not damage the redundant system.

II. General Requirements A; Fire Protection Program A fire protection program shall be established.at each.nuclear power plant. The program shall establish the fire protection policy for the protection of structures.

systems. and components important to safety at each plant and the procedures. equipment.

and personnel required to implement the program at the plant site.

[).Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown Capability In areas where the fire protection fea lures cannot ensure safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire in that area. alternative or dedicated safe shutdown capability shall be provided.

III. Specific Requirements.

The fire protection program shall be under the direction of an individual who has been delegated authority commensurate with the responsibilities of the position and who has A. Water Supplies for Fire Suppression available staff personnel knowledgeable in Svstems both fire protection and nuclear safety.

• Two separate water supplies shall be The fire protection program shall extend provided to furnish necessary water volume the concept of defense-in-debth to fire and pressure to the fire main loop.

protection in fire areas important to safety.

Each supply shall consist of a storage tank.

with the following objectives:

pump, piping,,and appropriate isolation and

• to prev1mt fires from starting:

coµtrol valves. Two separate redundant

• to detect rapidly. control, and extinguish suctions in one or more intake structures promptly those fires that do occur:

from a large body of w.ater (river. lake. etc.)

• to provide protection for structures, will satisfy the requirement for two separated systems, and components important to safety water storage tanks. These supplies shall be so that a fire that is not promptly separated so that a failure of one supply will extinguished by the fire suppression activities not result in a failure of the other supply.

will not prevent the safe shutdown of the Each supply of the fire water distribution plant.

system shall be capable of providing for a B. Fire Hazards Analvsis period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> the maximum expected A fire hazards analysis shall be performe<l water demands as determined by the fire by qualified fire protection and reactor hazards analysis for safety-related areas or systems engineers to (1) consider potential in other areas that present a fire exposure situ and transient fire hazards; (2) determine hazard to safety-related areas.*

the consequences of fire in any location in When storage tanks are used for combined the plant on the ability to safely shut down service-water/fire-water uses the minimum the reactor or on the ability to minimize and volume for fire uses shall.be ensured by control the release of radioactivity to the means of dedicated tanks or by some environment: and (3) specify measures for physical means such as a vertical standpipe fire prevention, fire detection, fire for other water service. Administrative suppression, and fire containment and controls, including locks for tank outlet alternative shutdown capability as required valves, are unacceptable as the only means for each fire area containing structures, to ensure minimum water volume.

systems, and components important to safety Other water systems used as one of the in accordance with NRC guidelines and two fire water supplies shall be permanently regulations.

connected to the firemain system and shall C. Fire Prevention Features be capable of automatic alignment to the fire Fire protection features shall meet the main system. Pumps, controls. and power following general requirements* for all fire supplies in these systems shall satiafy the areas that contain or present a fire hazard to requirements for the main fire pumps. The structures, systems. or components important use of other water systems for fire protection to safety.

shall not be incompatible with their functions

1. In situ fire hazards shall be identified required for safe plant shutdown. Failure of and suitable protection provided.

the other system shall not degrade the fire

2. Transient fire hazards associated with main system.

normal operation. maintenance, repair, or B. Sectional Isolation Valves modification activities shall be identified and Sectional isolation valves such as post eliminated where possible. Those transient indicator valves or key operated valves shall fire hazards that can not be eliminated shall be installed in the fire main loop to permit be controlled and suitable protection isolation of portions of the fire main loop for provided.

maintenance or repair without interrupting

3. Fire detection systems, portable the entire water supply.

extinguishers, and standpipe and hose C. Hydrant Isolation valves stations shall be installed.

Valves shall be installed to permit isolation

4. Fire barriers or automatic suppression of outside hydrants from the fire main for systems or both shall be installed as maintenance or repair without interrupting necessary to protect redundant systems or the water supply to automatic or manual fire components necessary for safe shutdown.

suppression systems in any area containing

5. A site fire brigade shall be established, or presenting a fire hazard to safety-related trained, and equipped and shall be on site at or safe shutdown equipment.

. all times.

D. Manual.Fire Suppression

6. Fire detection and suppression systems Standpipe and hose systems shall be shall be designed, installed, maintained, and installed so that at least one effective hose tested by personnel properly qualified by stream will be able to reach any location that experience and training in fire protection contains or presents an exposure fire hazard systems.

to structures. systems, or components

i. Surveillance procedures shall be important to safety.

established to ensure that fire barriers are in Access to permit effective functioning of place and that fire suppression systems an4*

the fire*brigade shall be provided to all areas components are;operabJe,*. *,:G.,... ::*:~ "*::'<' -'. "*'d*that.contain or:present an exposure*fire...

Federal Register I Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 I Rules and Regulations 76613 hazard to structures, systems, or components important to safety.

Standpipe and hose stations shall be inside PWR containments and BWR containments that are not inerted. Standpipe and hose stations inside containment mav be connected to a high quality water supply of sufficient quantity and pressure other than the fire main loop if plant-specific features prevent extending the fire main supply inside containment. For BWR drywells, standpipe and hose "stations shall be placed outside the dry well with adequate lengths of hose to reach any location inside the dry well with an effective hose stream.

E. Hydrostatic Hose Tests Fire hose shall be hydrostatically tested at a pressure of 300 psi or 50 psi above maximum fire main operating pressure, whichever is greater. Hose stored in outside hose houses shall be tested annually. Interior standpipe hose shall be tested every three years.

F. Automatic Fire Detection Automatic fire detection systems shall be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown or safety-related systems or components. These fire detection systems shall be capable of operating with or wi~hout offsite power.

G. Fire Protection of Safe Shutda-.vn Capability

1. Fire protection features shall be provided for structures. systems. and components important to safe shutdown. These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that:

a. One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station(s] is free of fire damage: and

b. Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold ~hutdown from either the control room or emergency control station(s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

2. Except as provided for paragraph G.3 of this section, where cables or equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts. open circuits, or shorts to ground, or redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are located withi:i the same fire area outside of primary containment, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided:

a. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating.

Structural steel formins a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier:

b. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trairis by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or hour rating. In addition. fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area:

Inside noninerted containments one of the fire protection means specified above or one of the following fire protection means shall be provided:

d. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20.feet with no intervenins combustibles or fire hazards:

e. Installation of fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system in the fire area: or

f. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by e noncombustible radiant energy shield.

3. Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits."

independent of cables. systems or components in the area, room or zone under consideration, shall be provided:

a. Where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot shutdown does not satisfy the requirement of parasraph G.2 cf this section; or

b. Where redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown located in the same fire area may be subject to damage

' * * 'ire suppression activities or from t.'!e rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems.

In addition, fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system shall be installed in the area, room, or zone under consideration.

H. Fire Brigade A site fire brigade trained*end equipped for fire fighting shall be established to ensure adequate manual fire fighting capability for all areas of the plant containing structures, systems, or components important to safety.

The fire brisade shall be at least five members on each shift. The brigade leader and at least two brigade members shall have sufficient training in or knowledge of plant safety-related systems to understand the effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown capability. The qualification of fire brigade members shall include an annual physical examination to determine their ability to perform stenuous fire fighting activities. The shift supervisor shall not be a member of the fire brigade. The brigade leader shall be competent to assess the potential safety consequences of a fire and advise control room personnel. Such competence by the brigade leader may be evidenced by possession of en operator's license or equivalent knowledge of plant safety-related systems.

The minimum equipment provided for the hrisade shall consist of personal protective equipment such as turnout coats, boots, gloves, hard hats, emergency communications

. equipment. portable lights, portable ventilation equipment, and portable extinguishers. Self-contained breathing apparatus usins full-face positive-pressure masks approved by NIOSH (National fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area: or "Alternative shutdown capability is provided by rdrouting, relocating or modificating of existing

c. E?closure of cable ?nd _equipment and systems: dedicated shutdown capability is provided associated non-safety Circuits of one by installing new structures and systems for the redundant-train-in a fire barrier;hav.ing,:a*:lf1*..*.;.1:,;*function*of post-fire.shutdown* F;;_,,. '"*k.*,..,,,..,.. *,,.

Institute for Occupational Safetv and Health-approval formerly given by the U.S.

Bureau of Mines) shall be provided for fire brigade. damage control. and control room personnel. At least 10 masks shall be available for fire brisede personnel. Control room personnel may be furnished breathing air by a manifold system piped from a storage reservoir if practical. Service or rated operatins life shall be a minimum of one-half hour for the self-contained units.

At least two extra air bottles shall be located on site for each self-contained breathing unit. In addition, an onsite &-hour supply of reserve air shall be provided and arranged to permit quick and complete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned. If compressors are used as a source of breathing air. only units approved for breathins air shall be used:

compressors shall be operable assuming a loss of offsite power. Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and contaminants.

I. Fire Brigade Training The fire brigade training program shall ensure that the capability to fight potential fires is established and maintained. The program shall consist of an initial classroom instruction program followed by.periodic classroom instruction. fire fighting practice, and fire drills:

1. Instruction

a. The initial classroom instruction shall include:

(1) Indoctrination of the plant fire fighting plan with specific identification of each individual's responsibilities.

(2) Identification of the type and location of fire hazards and associated types of fires that could occur in the plant.

(3) The toxic and corrosive characteristics of expected products of combustion.

(4) Identification 'of the location of fire fighting equipment for each fire area and familiarization with the layout of the plant.

including access and egress routes to each area.

(5) The proper use of available fire fighting equipment and the correct method of fighting each type of fire. The types of fires covered should include fires in energized electrical equipment, fires in cables and cable trays, hyclrosen fires, fires involving flammable and combustible liquids or hazardous process chemicals. fires resulting from construction or modifications [welding], and record file fires.

(6) The proper use of communication, lighting, ventilation, and emergency breathing equipment.

(7) The proper method for fighting fires inside buildings and confined spaces.

(8) The direction and coordination. of the fire fighting activities (fire brigade leaders only).

(9] Detailed review of fire fighting strategies and procedures.

(10] Review of the latest plant modifications and corresponding changes in fire fighting plans.

Note.-ltems (9] and (10] may be deleted from the trainins of no more than two of the non-operations personnel who may be assisned to the fire brigade.

b. The instruction shall be provided by

... -;.*qualified *individualihw~lt* are:knowli!dg'eable,

-~------~-------------~1 76614 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 ! Rule,s an.cl Regulations experienced. nnd suitably trained in fighting the types of :'1rPs :h:il r.ould nccur in the plant and in u,::ni? ihP :qws o! Pquipment available m the nuclt>ar onwer plan:.

c. Instruction shdll be provided to all fire brigade members and fire brigade leaders.

d. Reguiar planned meetings shall be held at least every 3 months for all brigade members to review changes in the fire protection program and other subjects as necessarv.

e. Periodic refresher training sessions shall be held to repeat the classroom instmction program for all brigade members over a two-year period. These sessions may be concurrent with the regular planned meetings.

2. Practice Practice sessions shall be held for each shift fire brigade on the proper method of fighting the various types of fires that could occur in a nuclear power plant. These sessions shall provide brigade members with experience in actual fire extinguishment and the use of emergency breathing apparatus

.. :ider strenuous conditions encountered in fire fighting. These practice sessions shall be provided at least once per year for each fire brigade member.

3. Drills

a. Fire brigade drills shall be performed in the plant so that the fire brigade can practice as a team.

b. Drills shall be performed al regular intervals not to exceed 3 months for each shift fire brigade. Each fire brigade member should participate in each drill, but must participate in at least two drills per year.

A sufficient number of these* Jrills, but not less than one for each shift fire brigade per year. shall be unannounced to determine the fire fighting readiness of the plant fire brigade. brigade leader. and fire protection systems and equipment Persons planning and authorizing an unannounced drill shall ensure that the responding shift fire brigade members are not aware that a drill is being planned until it is begun. Unannounced drills shall not be scheduled closer than four weeks.

At least one drill per year shall be performed on a "back shift" for each shift fire brigade.

c. The drills shall be preplanned to establish the training objectives of the drill and shall be critiqued to determine how well the training objectives have been met.

Unannounce_d drills shall be planned and critiqued by members of the management staff responsible for plant safety and fire protection. Performance deficiencies of a fire brigade or of individual fire brigade members shall be remedied by scheduling* additional training for the brigade or members.

Unsatisfactory drill performance shall be followed by a repeat drill within 30 days.

d. At 3-vear intervals. a randomlv selected unannour{ced drill shall be critiqued by qualified individuals independent of the licensee's staff. A copy of the written report from such individuals shall be available for NRC review.

e. Drills shall as a minimum include the following:

[1) Assessment of fire alarm effectiv_eness.

time requjred to notify and assemble fire brigade. and selection. placement and use of required additional fire protection ir. the equipment. and fire fighting strategies.

worh dCti,*ity procedure.

[21 Assessment of each brigade member's

5. Govern the use uf ignition sources by use knowledge of his or her role in the fire 0! a name permit system to control welding.

fighting strategy for the area assumed to name cutting. brazing. or soldering contain the fire. Assessment of the brigade operations. A separate permit shall be issued member's conformance with established for each area where work is to be done. If plant fire fighting procedures and use of fire work continues over more than one shift. the fighting equipment. including self-contained permit shall be valid for not more than 24 emergency breathing apparatus.

hours when the plant is operating or for the communication equipment. and ventilation duration of a particular job during plant equipment. to the extent practicable.

shutdown.

[3) The simulated use of fire fighting

6. Control the removal from the area of all equipment required to cope with the situation waste. debris. scrap. oil spills. or other and type of fire selected for the drill. The combustibles resulting from the work activity area and type of fire chosen for the drill immediately following completion of the should differ from those used in the previous activitv. or at the end of each work shift.

drill so that brigade members are trained in which~ver comes first.

fighting fires in various plant areas. The

7. Maintain the periodic housekeeping situation selected should simulate the size inspections to ensure continued compliance and arrangement of a fire that could with these administrative controls."

reasonablv occur in the area selected.

8. Control the use of specific combustibles allowing f~r fire development due to the time in safety-related areas. All wood used in required to respond. to obtain equipment. and safety-related areas during maintenance.

organize for the fire. assuming loss of modification. or refueling operations (such as automatic suppression capability.

lay-down blocks or scaffolding) shall be (4) Assessment of brigade leader's treated with a flame retardant. Equipment or direction of the fire fighting effort as to supplies (such as new fuel) shipped in thoroughness. accuracy. and effectiveness.

untreated combustible packing containers

4. Records may be unpacked in safety-related areas if Individual records of training provided to required for valid operating reasons.

each fire brigade member. including drill However. all combustible materials shall be critiques, shall be maintained for at least 3 removed from the area immediately following.

vears to ensure that each member receives the unpacking. Such transient combustible iraining in all parts of the training program.

material. unless stored in approved These records of training shall be. available containers. shall not be left unattended for NRC review. Retraining or broadened during lunch breaks. shift changes, or other training for fire fighting within buildings shall similar periods. Loose combustible packing be scheduled for all those brigade members material such as wood or paper excelsior. or whose performance records show polyethylene sheeting shall be placed in deficiencies.

metal containers with tight-fitting self-closing

j. Emergency Lighting metal covers.

Emergency lighting units with at least an 8-

9. Control actions to be taken by an

• hour battery power supply shall be provided individual discovering a fire, for example, in all areas needed for operation of safe notification of control room, attempt to shutdown equipment and in access and extinguish fire, and actuation of local fire egress routes thereto.

suppression systems.

K. Administrative Controls

10. Control actions to be taken by the Administrative controls shall be control room operator to determine the need established to minimize fire hazards in areas for brigade assistance upon report of a fire or containing structures. systems. and receipt of alarm on control room annunciator components important to safety. These panel. for example, announcing location of controls shall establish procedures to:

fire over PA system, sounding fire alarms,

1. Govern the handling and limitation of the and notifying the shift supervisor and the fire use of ordinary combustible materials.

brigade leader of the type. size. and location combustible and flammable gases and of the fire.

liquids. high efficiency particulate air and

11. Control actions to be taken by the fire charcoal filters. dry ion exchange resins. or brigade after notification by the control room other combustible supplies in safety-related operator of a fire, for example. assembling in areas.

a designated loca lion. receiving directions

2. Prohibit thq storage of combustibles in from the fire brigade leader. and discharging safety-related areas or establish designated specific fire fighting responsibilities including storage areas with appropriate fire selection and transportation of fire fighting protection.

equipment to fire location. selection of

3. Govern the handling of and limit protective equipment, operating instructions transient fire loads such as combustible and for use of fire suppression systems. and use nammable liquids. wood and plastic of preplanned strategies for fighting fires in products. or other combustible materials in specific areas.

buildings containing safety-related systems

12. Define the strategies for fighting fires in or equipment during all phases of operating.

all safety-related areas and areas presenting and especially during maintenance.

a hazard to safety-related equipment. These modification. or refueling operations.

strategies shall designate:

4. Designate the onsite staff member

a. Fire hazards in each area covered by the responsible for the inplant fire protection specific prefire plans.

review of proposed workactivitiesJo identify*"".:h.:,fire extinguishants**best suite-d-for;,,, c:~:."'* *****

potential transient fire hazards* and specify.*

controlling the fires associated with the fire

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 I Wednesday. No_vember 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76615

."":**.",t"i;.;;: ;:i !ho! area nnC the nearest iocation u1 :nesp extmgu1shants.

. \\lost ia\\'orable direction from which to

,

:n(' n fire m each area m view of the

-. <:-:-..at1ur direction. access hallwavs. stairs.

,nc aoors that are most likeiy to be-tree o!

f;re. and the best station or eievation for fi:<htmg the fire. All access and egress routes thd 1 im*olve locked doors should be specifically identified in the procedure with the appropriate precautions and methods for access specified.

d. Plant systems that should be managed to reduce the damage potential during a local fire and the location of local and remote controls for such management (e.g.. any hydraulic or electrical systems in the zone covered by the specific fire fighting procedure that could increase the hazards in the area because of overpressurization or electrical hazards).

e. Vital heat-sensitive system components that need to be kept cool while fighting a local fire. Particularly hazardous combustibles that need cooling should be designated.

f. Organization of fire fighting brigades and the assignment of special duties according to job title so that all fire fighting functions are covered by any complete shift personnel complement.These duties include command control of the brigade, transporting fire suppression and support equipment to the fire scenes, applying the extinguishant to the fire, communication with the control room, and coordination with outside fire departments.

g. Potential radiological and toxic hazards in fire zones.

h. Ventilation system operation that ensures desired plant air distribution when the ventilation flow is modified for fire containment or smoke clearing operations.

i. Operations requiring control room and shift engineer coordination or authorization.

j. Instructions for plant operators and general plant personnel during fire.

L. Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability

1. Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability provided for a specific fire area shall be able to achieve and maintain subcritical reactivity conditions in the reactor, maintain reactor coolant inventory achieve and maintain hot standby 7 conditions for a P,WR (hot shutdown 7 for a BWR) and achieve cold shutdown 7 conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter. During the postfire shutdown. the reactor coolant system process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c.

power, and the fission product boundary integrity shall not be affected: i.e.. there shall be no fuel clad damage. rupture or any primary coolant boundary, or rupture of.the containment boundary.

2. The performance goals for the shutdown functions shall be:

a. The reactivity control function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditions.

b. The reactor coolant makeup function shall be capable of maintaining the reactor

As defined in the Standard Technical Specifications.

coolant ien?l a bo\\'e the to::i of the corr f.y BWRs and be within the ievel indication in the pressurizer for PWRs.

c. The reactor heat removal function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining decay heal removal.

d. The process monitoring (unction shall be capable oi providing direct readings of the process variables necessary to perform and control the above functions.

e. The supporting functions shall be capable of providing the process cooling, lubrication, etc.. necessary to permit the operation of the equipment used for safe shutdown functions.

3. The shutdown capability for specific fire areas may be unique for each such area, or it may be one unique combination of systems for all such areas. In either case, the alternative shutdown capability shall be independent of the specific fire area(s) and shall accommodate postfire conditions where offsite power is available and where offsite power is not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Procedures shall be in effect to implement this capability.

4. If the capability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown will not be available because of fire damage, the equipment and systems comprising the ml!ans to achieve and maintain the hot standby or hot shutdown condition shall be capable of maintaining such conditions until cold shutdown can be achieved. If such equipment and systems will not be capable of being powered by both onsite and offsite electric power systems because of fire damage, an independent onsite power system shall be provided. The number of operating shift personnel, exclusive of fire brigade members, required to operate such equipment and systems shall be an site at all times.

5. Equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions shall not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment and systems shall be limited so that the systems can be made operable and cold shutdown achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Materials for such repairs shall be readily.

available on site and procedures shall be in effect to implement such repairs. If such equipment and systems used prior to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the fire will not be capable of being powered by both onsite and offsite electric power systems because of fire damage, an independnet onsite power system shall be provided. Equipment and systems used after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by offsite power only.

6. Shutdown systems installed to ensure postfire shutdown capability need not be designed to meet seismic Category I criteria, single failure criteria, or other design basis accident criteria, except where required for other reasons, e.g.. because of interface with or impact on existing safety systems, or because of adverse valve actions due to fire damage.

7. The safe shutdown equipment and systems for each fire area shall be known to be isolated from associated non-safety circuits in the fire area so that hot shorts.

open circuits, or shorts to ground in the associated circuits will not prevent operation of the safe shutd<iwn:.equipment..The.

separation and barriers between travs and*

co~duits contaimng associated r:trcuits of one safe shutdown division and trays and conduits containing associated circuits or.

safe shutdown cables from the redundant division. or the isolation of these associated circuits from the safe shutdown equipment, shall be such that a postulated fire involving*

associated circuits will not prevent safe shutdown.*

• M. Fire Barrier Coble Penetration Seal Qutilificotion Penetration seal designs shall utilize only noncombustible materials and shall be qualified by tests that are comparable to tests used to rate fire barriers. The acceptance criteria for the test shall include:

1. The cable fire 'barrier penetration *seal has withstood the fire endurance test without passage of flame or ignition of cables on the unexposed side for a period of time equivalent to the fire resistance rating required of the barrier:

2. The temperature levels recorded for the unexposed side are analyzed and demonstrate that the maximum temperature is sufficiently below the cable insulation ignition temperature: and

3. The fire barrier penetration seal remains intact and does not allow projection of water beyond the unexposed surface during the hose stream test.

N. Fire Doors Fire doors shall be self-closing or provided with closing mechanisms and shall be inspected semiannually to verify that automatic hold-open, release, and closing mechanisms and latches are operable.

One of the following measures shall be provided to ensure they will protect the opening as required in case of fire:

1. Fire doors shall be kept closed and electrically supervised at a continuously manned location: *

2. Fire doors shall be locked closed and inspected weekly to verify that the doors are in the closed position;

3. Fire doors shall be provided with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms and inspected daily to verify that doorways are free of obstructions: or

• 4. Fire doors shall be kept closed and inspected daily to verify that they are in the closed position.

The fire brigade leader shall have ready access to keys for any locked fire doors.

Areas protected by automatic total flooding gas suppression systems shall have electrically supervised self-closing fire doon or shall satisfy option 1 above.

0. Oil Collection System for Reactor Coolant Pump The reactor coolant pump shall be equipped with an oil collection system if the containment is not inerted during normal operation. The oil collection system shall be so designed, engineered. and installed that failure will not lead to fire during normal or design basis accident conditions and that

• An acceptable method of complying with this alternative would be to meet Regulatory Guide 1.75 position 4 related to associated circuits and IEEE Std 384-1974 (Section 4.5) where trays from redundant safety divisions are so protected that postulated fires affect trays from only one safety

. division..,

• .)

\\

76616 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. >iovember 19. 1980 there is reasonablr assurance that the system will.withstand the SHfe Shutdown EHrthquakr '

Such collecuon systems shall be capable of collecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems.

Leakage shall be collected and drained to a vented closed container that can hold the entire lube oil system inventory. A flame arrester is required in the vent if the flash point characteristics of the oil present the hazard of fire flashback. Leakage points to be protected shall include lift pump and piping, overflow lines, lube oil cooler, oil fill and drain lines and plugs. flanged connections on oil lines, and lube oil reservoirs where such features exist on the reactor coolant pumps.

The drain line shall be large enough to accommodate the largest potential oil leak.

[Sec. 161b. Pub. L.83-703, 68 Stat. 948; sec. 201. Pub. L.93-438, 88 Stat. 1242 (42 U.S.C.

2201[b J, 5841))

Dated at Washington, D.C.. this 17th day of November 1980.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission.

(FR Doc. 80-36175 Filed 11-18-80: 8:45 am)

BIWNG CODE 7590-01-11

" See Regulatory Guide 1.Z~"Seismic Design Classification" Paragraph C.Z.

Rules and Regula t1on:-