ML18082A737
| ML18082A737 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1980 |
| From: | Schneider F Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8007170570 | |
| Download: ML18082A737 (6) | |
Text
Frederick W. Schneider Vice President Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 201/430-7373 Production June 13, 1980 Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Off ice of Inspection and Enforcement USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Dear Mr. Grier:
NRC IE BULLETIN 80-06 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (ESF) RESET CONTROLS SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 Pursuant to the requirements of the subject bulletin, a review has been made of the electrical schematics of systems which perform safety-related functions upon receipt of an engineered safety features (ESF) actuation signal.
These syste~s -include:
Safety Injection Residual Heat Removal Charging/Letdown Component Cooling Isolation Pressurizer Relief Tank Isolation Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Isolation Containment Ventilation (Purge/Pressure-Vacuum Relief)
Fire Protection Isolation Main Feedwater Isolation Control Air Isolation Demineralized Water Isolation Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Steam Line Isolation Containment Spray Sampling Isolation Radiation Monitoring Sampling Isolatio/
Control Room Ventilation Isolation Main Feed Pumps
- / t
B. H. Grier 2 -
6-13-80 The circuitry for the above systems, which receive the following ESF signals from the protection system, were reyiewed to determine the consequences of_a protection system reset:
safety injection
- containment spray containment ventilation isolation containment isolation phase A
- containment isolation phase B feedwater isolation main steam isolation A limited previous review was made in response to NRC requirements related to TMI reviews (Bulletin 79-06A and NUREG~0578) on protec-tion system reset causing a potential radioactivity release.
Two instances were reported at that time to the NRC and have since been corrected as described in our responses to Bulletin 79-06A and NUREG-0578.
The review, done,in accordance with Bulletin 80-06, included all ESF actions as noted including a verification of our previous limited review.
Three instances-were discovered which are described below:
- a.
Fire Protection Isolation -
The fire protection system is isolated from the containment through automatic closure of valve 1FP147 (Unit 1) and 2FP147 (Unit 2) upon phase A isolation signal.
This valve circuit utilizes a main-tained alternate action control switch for manual opera-tion of the valve.
Upon reset of the protection system, the valve will return/remain in the position it was in prior to receipt of ESF signal.
Current operating pro-cedures require the FP147 valves to be closed during power operation and under administrative control.
However, due to the potential for reopening, the valve control circuit will be revised to assure that the valve remains closed upon protection system (phase A isolation) reset.
It should be noted that reset of safety injection, which allows the operator to perform accident recovery operations, will not cause reset of phase A isolation signal to FP147 valves.
There are separate reset pushbuttons for safety injection and isolation phase A.
..,A.
B. H. Grier 3 -
6-13-80
- b.
Feedwater Isolation -
The feedwater regulating valves BF19 and BF40 as indicated in the attached fl.gure 1, re-ceive a feedwater isolation signal.
These valves incor-porate a modulating control circuit; upon protection sys-tem reset, the valve circuit returns to modulating control.
In the case of BF19's, the modulating control is from the automatic feedwater control system.
If feedwater demand is called for then the valves will reopen.
In the case of the BF40's, there is manual modulating control from the control room.
If, prior td reset, th~ operator set the controls to open the valves, the valves would reopen following protection system reset.
As shown in figure 1, the termination of main feedwater to the containment/steam generators is accomplished in a number of ways, both redundant and diverse.
In addition to closure of the.BF19 and BF40 valves,. th~ BF13 motor operated valves receive closure signals and the main feed-water pumps are tripped.
Upon protection system reset, the BF13 valves will not reopen once closed unless the operator takes action to do so.
Although the potential exists for the BF19 and BF40 valves to reopen following a protection system reset, the diverse and redundant means of isolation of main feedwater to the containment assures that safety function is still performed.
No design change is warranted.
- c.
Stearn Line Isolation -
The main steam warmup valves, 11MS18 through 14MS18 (Unit 1) and 21MS18 through 24MS18 (Unit 2) which are used during startup, receive a main steam isolation signal.
These valves incorporate a manual modulating control circuit on Unit 2 only.
This circuit operates similar to the BF40 valves described previously.
Therefore, if the operator had required the valve to be open upon protection system reset, the valve would reopen to the desired position.
The valve control circuit will be revised to prevent reopening.
The MS18 valves on Unit 1 remain shut upon protection system reset and require no modification.
B. H. Grier 4 -
6-13-80 The protection system is tested as part of the preoperational test-ing of the plant.
In order to verify that the actual installation is consistent with the review that was performed for protection sys-tem reset, additional testing will ~e performed to demonstrate*that equipment remains in its. emergency.mode of operation upon.resetting of the'ESF actuation signals.
The tests will be conducted during the next refueling outage for Unit 1, scheduled for September, 1980, and prior to full power operation on Unit 2 which will shortly be undergoing low power testing.
The design changes for the fire protection isolation valve circuit will be accomplished for Unit 1 during the next refueling outage.
The design changes for the fire protection isolation valve and main steam warmup valves will be accomplished for Unit 2 prior to power operation.
If you have any further questions, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Attachment CC:
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement USNRC Washington, D. C.
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FREDERICK W. SCHNEIDER, being duly sworn according to law deposes and says:
I am a Vice President of Public Service Electric and Gas Company, and as such, I signed the letter dated June 13, 1980, to Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director, NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region 1, in response to NRC Bulletin No. 80-06 "Engineered Safety Feature Reset Controls."
The matters set forth in said response letter are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
FREDERICK W. SCHNEIDER Subscribed and sworn to before me
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