ML18082A664
| ML18082A664 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1980 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Schneider F Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007020519 | |
| Download: ML18082A664 (8) | |
Text
6 UNITED STATES WCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W
REGION I 631 PARK AVENUE KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 Docket No. 50-272 50-311 Public Service Electric and Gas Company ATTN:
Mr. F. W. Schneider Vice President - Production 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101.
Gentlemen:
June 20, 1980 The enclosed IE Circular No. 80-15, 11 Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Cooling and Natural Circulation Cooldown, 11 is forwarded to you for information.
No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
~ YYL (il(~
Grier
Enclosures:
- 1.
IE Circular No. 80-15
- 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Circulars CONTACT:
E. G. Greenman (215-337-5267.)
cc w/encl s:
- F. P. Librizzi, General Manager - Electric Production E. N. Schwa'lje, Manager - Quality Assurance R. L./Mittl, General Manager - Licensing and Environment H. J. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station
/
f
/
/
ENCLOSURE 1
. UNITED STATES SSINS No.: 6835 Accession No.:
8005050073 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.
20555
- IE Circular No. 80-15 Date:
June 20, 1980.
Page lof 4
. LOSS OF. REACTOR COOLANT PUMP COOLING 8ND NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLOOWN
.Description of Circumstances:
This Circular contains informationron the St. Lucie Unit 1 response to a total lass of component cooling water ( CCW) fl ow to reactor co*o l ant pumps.
Pres-surizer level and primary system pressure response indicate that voids were formed in the reactor vessel during the ensuing natural.circulation cooldown.
The void was believed to have been steam.in the area located directly under
- the reactor vessel head.
At time 0226 on June 11, 1980 with St. Lucie Unit 1 at full power, an electrical short across a solenoid valve terminal board caused one of two series containment isolation valves in the CCW return from all reactor coolant
- pumps (RCP) to fail shut.
The terminal short resulted from environmental effects of a minor steam leak in the immediate vicinity of the solenoid valve.
After unsuccessful attempts to restore CCW flow, the reactor was tripped manually at time 0233. Within two minutes, all four RCPs were also manually tripped. A natural circulation cooldown was initiated at approximately 0300.
Component.cooling water flow to RCPs was restored at 0400.
The solenoid operated air valve whose terminal board had shorted was bypassed with a temporary air line to reopen the CCW valve (HCV-14-6).
Although variations in seal leakoff flowrates were observed, the seals on the four idle RCPs did not fail. St. Lucie has *ayron Jackson reactor coolant pumps with three stage mechanical seals plus a vapor seal. Controlled reactor coolant bleedoff flow is used for seal cooling and lubrication.
The pumps do not have a seal water injection system.
The natural Circulation tooldown continued uneventfully until after time 0600.
The highest cooldown rate achieved was approximately 65 to 70 F per hour.
- Between 0600 and 0630 RCS pressure was reduced from 1140 to 690 psi by charging water through the pressurizer auxiliary spray line. Pressurizer level increased rapidly around 0700 while charging via the auxiliary spray line.
Pressurizer level continued variations for approximately five hours while the cooldown and depressurization continued.
When charging was shifted to the RCS 1 oops, pressurizer J eve l decreased at rates lower than the rates of increase in 1 eve l when charging through the auxiliary spray 1 ine. During a two minute interval while charging into the pressurizer auxiliary spray line at 88 gpm, pressurizer level rose at a rate approximately ten times greater than the charging flowrate.
IE Circular No. 80-15 June 20, 1980 Page 2 of 4 The cause of pressurizer level variations appears to be formation of a steam void in the reactor head area due to a temperature lag with respect to bulk coolant temperature that developed because of insufficient cooling flow in that area during natural circulation cooldown.
Gas concentration in a 0730 RCS sample was determined by the licensee to be 32 cc/kg hydrogen and 16 cc/kg nitrogen. These concentrations were not high enough to cause a significant volume of gas to come out of solution.
The indicated subcooling margin (Tsat - Thot) ranged between 220 and 150 F when the reactor head steam void developed between 0600 and 0700.
The minimum required subcooling of 50 F was not approached during the cooldown until around time 1219 at a pressurizer.
pressure of approximately llfr psig.
An annotated record of pressurizer level is enclosed only to illustrate the high amplitudes and rates.of pressurizer level variations. Insufficient information is contained in the enclosure to enable ~etailed evaluatioh of the RCS behavior.
Shutdown cooling using low pressure safety injection (LPSI) purrip lB was established at time 1051.
At time 1227, LPSI pump lA was.started taking suction from the refueling water tank (RWT) and. discharging into the low pressure safety injection header common to both LPSI pumps.
The common recirculation line motor operated isolation valves to the RWT were opened at 1226.
LPSl 1A was operating with its recirculation (miniflow) line open.
The LPSI pump 18 recirculation line should have been clos*ed, The pressurizer was filled to what was believed to be a water solid condition by charging at 88.*
gpm and using LPSI pump 1A to inject water and maintain near shutoff head pressure on the RCS.
RCS pressure rose from the minimum 110 psig to 200 psig (time 1300 reading) during the time LPSI pump lA was operating.
The cold calibrated pressurizer level instrument indication rose to.64 percent and remained constant while hot calibrated channels rose to 100% level.
Temperature correction data for the cold calibrated level instrument didn't.
extend to 360 F, which was the approximate pressurizer temperature when the pressurizer indicateq full. Constant level on the cold calibrated channel indicated the pressurizer was solid, but *continued charging flow at 88 gpm was not causing pressure to rise above 200 psig, as it should have had the RCS been solid.
Letdown had been secured while filling the pressurizer.
The indica-tions of a steam void in the reactor vessel head were no longer evident after
. RCS pressure increased although the exact time when the void disappeared has not been established.
During the time LPSI pump iA was operating with miniflow recirculation to the RWT, the absence of rising pressure in response to charging flow was investi-gated.
RWT level increased 0.3 feet (approximately 4500 gal.) during this period. Miniflow from LPSI pump 18 operating in the shutdown cooling mode is believed to have been the discharge path from the RCS to the RWT.
After
.shutdown cooling system warmup, the LPSI pump lB miniflow manual isolation valve had been shut. After RWT level increased, this valve was found one turn open, which would have all owed mini fl ow back to the RWT from 1PSI pump 18.
.e IE Circular No. 80-15 June 20, 1980*
Page 3 of 4 miniflow was isolated. Continued charging with two pumps at 88 gpm total flowrate caused a slight rise in both pressurizer pressure (to 260 psig) and cold calibrated pressurizer level.
Letdown in excess of charging "flowrate was*
established at 1430., and by 1500 a steam bubble was drawn in the pressurizer with level in the indicating range.
The RCS *was degasified over *the next day, then depressurized and drained to
- inspect ~nd replace all RCP seals._ All seals have been ~emoved and visual inspection showed ho signs* of degradation of these seals.
- This event is significant for several reasons.
It. is an example of a natli"ral circulation cool down during which a steam void formed under *seemingly nornial *
. conditions that was large enough to cause large, rapid variations in pres-suriier level. The possibility of a total loss of component cooling water to reactor coolant pumps due to the single failure of any one of four CCW contain-ment isolation valves was hi9hlighted. Inadequate control of LPSI system
- alignment allowed an unanticipated discharge of reactor coolant directly to the refueling water tank apparently through a pump recirculation line.
Recommended Action for Power Reactor Licensee Consideration:
- 1.
Disseminate this information to all licensed operating personnel working
- at power reactor facilities. T.hese personnel should become aware of the possibility of steam void formation in the reactor vessel head during.
natural circulation cooldown even when a high subcooling margin exists in the reactor coolant_loops.
- 2.
Review and revise natural circulation cooldown and shutdown cooling procedures to caution operators against the anomalous conditions that occurred and to include appropriate recovery action if they do occur.
- 3.
EstabJ ish a natural.circulation cool down and depressurization rate envelope that will both preclude steam void formation and assure adequate core cooling.
Incorporate this envelope in cooldown procedures.
- 4.
Evaluate the design of component cooling water systems to determine vulnerability to single failures that could cause loss of RCP cooling, common cause failures of RCP seals and reactor coolant system leaks through failed seals at multiple locations.
- 5.
Consider installation of a reactor vessel head metal temperature monitoring system, if not already installed. It should aid the operator in preventing a reactor head to bulk coolant temperature differential large enough to form a steam void during natural circulation cooldown.
IE Circular No. 80-15 June 20, 1980 Page 4 of 4 If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
No written response to this Circular is required.
Enclosure:
Annotated record of pressurizer l~Vel
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IE Circular No. 80-15 June 20, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Circular Subject
. Date of Issued to No.
Issue 80-14 Radioactive Contamination of 6/24/80 All holders *of Power Plant Demineralized Water and Research Reactor System and Resultant Internal licensees (Operating Contamination of Personnel and Construction Permits), and Fuel Cycle licensees 80-13 Grid Strap Damage in 5/18/80 All holders of Reactor Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies OLs and CPs 80-12 Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator Key 5/14/80 A 11 holders of Reactor May Fall Out of Place When Ols and CPs Mounted Below Horizontal Axis 80-11 Emergency Diesel Generator 5/13/80 All holders of a power Lube Oil Cooler Failures reactor OL or CP 80-10 Failure to Maintain 4/29/80 All holders of Reactor Environmental Qualification Ols and CPs of Equipment 80-09 Problems With Plant Internal 4/28/80 All holders of a power Communications Systems reactor OL or CP 80-08 BWR Technical Specification
. 4/18/80 All General Electric Inconsistency - RPS Response BWR 1s holding a power Time reactor OL 80-07 Problems with HPCI Turbine 4/3/80 All holders of a power Oil System reactor OL or CP 80-06 Control and Accountability 4/14/80 Medical licensees in Systems for Implant Therapy Categories G and Gl Sources 80-05 Emer9ency Diesel-Generator 4/1/80 All holders of a power Lubricating Oil Addition and reactor OL or CP Onsite Supply 80-04 Securing of Threaded Locking 3/14/80 All holders of a power Devices on Safety-Related reactor OL or CP Equipment