ML18081B107

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Forwards IE Bulletin 80-04, Analysis of PWR Main Steam Line Break W/Continued Feedwater Addition. Written Response Required
ML18081B107
Person / Time
Site: Salem 
Issue date: 02/08/1980
From: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Martin T
Public Service Enterprise Group
References
NUDOCS 8002250652
Download: ML18081B107 (6)


Text

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 631 PARK AVENUE KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 February 8, 1980 Docket No. 50-311 Public Service Electric and Gas Company ATTN:

Mr. T. J. Martin Vice President - Engineering and Construction 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-04, is forwarded for action. A written response is required.

If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

~~

~

Director

Enclosures:

1.

IE Bulletin No. 80-04

2.

List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins CONTACT:

D. L. Caphton (215-337-5253) cc w/encls:

E. N. Schwalje, Manager - Quality Assurance 80022506~Z-.

~

ENCLOSURE 1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555 SS INS No. : 6820 Accessions No.:

7910250504 IE Bulletin No. 80-04 Date: February 8, 1980 Page 1 of 3 ANALYSIS OF A PWR MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK WITH CONTINUED FEEDWATER ADDITION Description of Circumstances:.

Virgini~ Electric and Power Co. submitted a report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated September 7, 1979 that identified a deficiency.in the original analysis of containment pressurization as.a result of reanalisis of steam line break for North Anna Power Station, Units 3 and 4. **

Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation performed a reanalysis of containment pressure following a main steam line break and determined that, if the auxiliary feedwater system continued to supply feedwater at runout conditions to the steam generator that had experienced the steam line break, containment design pressure would be exceeded in approximately 10 minutes.. The long term blowdown of the water supplied under runout conditions by the auxiliary feedwater

  • system had not been.considered in the.earlier analysis.

. On O.ctober 1, 1979, the forego.i.ng information was provided to a 11 holders of operating licenses and construction permits in IE Information Notice No. 79-24. The Palisades facility did an accident analysis review pursuant to the information in the notice and discovered that with offsfte power available, the condensate pumps would feed.the affected.generator at an excessive rate.

This excessive feed was not considered in the analysis for the steam line break accident.

On January 30, 1980, Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company informed the NRC of an error in the main steam line break analysis for the Maine Yankee plant.

During a review of the main steam line breakana1ysis, for zero or low power at the end of core lifei the licensee identified an incorrect postulation that the startup feedwater control valves would remain positioned 11as isJI during the transient.

In reality, the startup feedwater control valves will ramp to 80% full open due to an override signal resulting from the low steam generator pressure reactor trip signal. Reanalysis of the event shows the opening of the startup valve and associated high feedwater addition to the affected steam generator would cause a rapid reactor cooldown and resultant return-to-power, a condition outside the plant design basis.

Actions to be Taken by the Licensee:

For all pressurized water power reactors with an operating license and those reactors listed in Attachment 1:

IE Bulletin No. 80-04 Date: February 8, 1980 Page 2 of 3

1.
  • Review the containment pressure response analysis to determine if the potential for containment overpressure for a main steam line break inside containment included the impact of runout flow from the auxiliary feedwater system and the impact of other.energy sources, such.as continuation of feedwater or condensate flow.

In your review, consider your ability to detect and isolate the damaged steam generator from these sources and the ability of the pumps to remain operable after extended operation at runout flow.

2.

Review your analysis of the reactivity increase which results from a main steam linebreak inside or outside containment.

This review should consider the reactor cooldown rate and the potential for the reactor to return to power with the most reactive control rod in the fully withdrawn position.

If your previous analysis did not consider all potential water sources (such as those listed. in 1 above) and if the reactivity. increase is greater than previous analysis indicated the report of this review should include:

a.

The boundary conditions for the analysis, e.g., the end of life shutdown margin, the moderator temperature coefficient, power level and the net effect of the associated steam generator water inventory on the reactor system cooling, etc.,

b.

The mostrestrictive single active fa1lure in the safety inj~ction system and the effect of that failure on delaying the delivery of high concentration boric acid solution to

c.

The effect of extended water supply to the affected steam

.. generator on the co~ criticality and return to power,

d.

The hot channel factors corresponding to the most reactive rod in the fully withdrawn position at the end of life, and the Minimum Departure from Nucleate Boiling Rati6 (MDNBR) values for the analyzed transient.

3.

If the potential for containment overpressure exists or the reactor-re-

. turn-to-power response worsens, provide a* proposed corrective action and a schedule for completion of the corrective acti~n.. If the unit is operating, provide a description of any interim action that will be *taken until the proposed corrective action is completed.

4.

Within 90 days of the date of this Bulletin, complete the review and evaluation required by this Bulletin and provide a written response describing your reviews and actions taken in response to each item.

Reports should be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy should be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, O.C.

20555.

.. IE Bulletin No. 80-04 Date: February 8, 1980 Page 3 of 3 For boiling water reactors with an operating license or a construction permit and all pressurized water reactors with a construction permit, not listed in, this Bulletin is for information purposes only and no written response is required.

Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance 'expires 7/31/80.

Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.

Attachment No. 1 to IE Bulletin No. 80-04 Plants with construction permits that are required to respond to the bulletin:

Diablo Canyon McGuire North.Anna 2 Salem.2 Sequoyah If the permit holders have responded to earlier requests from the NRC on some

.of the items presented in the bulletin, they may respond to the bulletin by reference to the response to the earlier request.

Bulletin No.

79-25 79-02 (Rev.* 2) 79-26 79-27 79-28 79-018 80-01 80-02 80-03 ENCLOSURE 2 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Subject Date Issued Failures of Westinghouse 11/2/79 BFD Relays in Safety-

  • Related Systems

. Pipe Base Plate Designs 11/8/79

. Using Concrete Expansion Bolts Boron Loss From BWR 11/20/79 Control Blades Loss of Non-Class-1-E 11/30/79 Instrumentation and Con-

. trol.Power System Bus During Operation Possible Malfunction 12/7/79 of NAMCO Model EA180 Limit Switches at Elevated Temperatures

  • Environmental Quali-1/14/80 fication of Class IE

. Eqoipment Operability of ADS Valve 1/14/80 Pneumatic Supply Inadequate Quality Assurance for Nuclear Supplied Equipment 1/21/80 loss of Charcoal From 2/6/80 Standard Type II, 2 Inch, Tray Adsorber Cells IE Bulletin No. 80-04 Date: February 8,.1980 Page 1 of 1 Issued To All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL)

  • .. or Construct ion Permit (CP) (for Action)

All Power Reactor

. Facilities with an OL or CP All BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an

  • oL All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL and those nearing Licensing (for Action)

All Power Reactor

.*Facilities with a CP (for. Information)..

  • A 11 Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactors with an OL except SEP Plants All BWRs with an OL All BWRs with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP.