ML18081A837
| ML18081A837 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1979 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Martin T Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001070159 | |
| Download: ML18081A837 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGUU\\TORY COMMISSION REGION I 631 PARK AVENUE KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 Docket Nos. 50-354 50-355 50-311 DEC 2 11979 Public Service Electric & Gas Company ATTN:
Mr. T. J. Martin Vice President Engineering and Construction 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Gentlemen:
This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter. No specific action or response is requested at this time.
However, we anticipate that further NRC evaluations will result in issuance of an IE Circular, Bulletin, or NRR Generic Letter in the near future which will recommend or request specific applicant or licensee action.
If you have any questions regarding the matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
Enclosures:
- 1.
IE Information Notice No. 79-32
- 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices CONTACT:
S. D. Ebneter (215-337-5296) cc w/encls:
E. N. Schwalje, Manager - Quality Assurance, Engineering.and Construction Department
ENCLOSURE 1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 SSINS No.: 6870 Accession No:
7910250511 IE Ihformation Notice No. 79-32 Date:
December 21, 1979 Page 1 of 2 SEPARATION OF ELECTRICAL CABLES FOR HPCI AND ADS This notice contains information on boiling water reactors (BWR 1s) regarding the routing of high pressur~ coolant injection (HPCI) system and automatic depressurization system (ADS) cables in the same cable tray.
Such routing violates design criteria for separation of these safety systems.
This potential cable separation problem for BWR 1s is highlighted as a result of our review of recent Licensee Event Reports (LER 1s):
Hatch Units 1 & 2, Brunswick Unit 1, and James A. FitzPatrick (See references for LER identification).
Description of Circumstances:
The Hatch LER 1s state that the NSSS supplier (General Electric) contacted plant management about possible irregularities in cable separation between HPCI and ADS. Plant engineering personnel subsequently confirmed that separation criteria per design notes were not met because HPCI system inboard steam supply isolation valve cables were routed wit)l ADS control cables.
The
- architect-engineer (AE) was notified of the HPIC/ADS cable separation problem and they are formulating a design change to provide for proper cable separation.
Other, immediate corrective action was not provided in the LER.
The Brunswick LER states that cables for the HPCI system steam supply inboard isolation valve are located in sect1ons of cable tray containing ADS cables.
Also, their analysis of those cables revealed that if the isolation valve were in the wrong position, then a failure at a tray section containing these cables might result in a combination of cable failures which could impair the operability of both the HP.CI and ADS systems.
The problem is common to both units at Brunswick. The AE, United Engineers and Constructors, is said to be preparing plant modifications to provide sufficient isolation of HPCI and ADS cables.
The licensee stated that a review of emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) and their primary containment isolation valves is being performed to veri.fy that no other cable separation problems exist. *Also, the.cable separ-ation criterion for HPCI and ADS systems is to be redefined in the cable separation specifications to prevent future recurrences of this event.
The FitzPatrick plant staff was informed of the HPCI/ADS cable routing problem by the AE, Stone and Webster, following a fire hazard analysis conducted by the AE. Six cables which could affect the control of the steam supply inboard isolation valve for the HPCI system are located in the same c.able trays as IE Information Notice No. 79-32 Date:
December 21, 1979 Page 2 of 2 some ADS cables. Initial corrective action by the licensee to preclude spurious closure of the HPCI system inboard steam supply isolation valve was to de-en-ergize the valve by racking out the breaker.
In addition, for purposes of primary containment isolation, the outboard valve was maintained in its normal, closed position and checked daily.
However, re-evaluation of the initial corrective action indicated the preferred method of assuring operability of both the ECCS and primary containment isolation functions would be to provide additional protectirin against a fire which might involve cables of both the HPCI and ADS, and to restore the inboard isolation valve to a fully operable
.condition.
Accordingly, FitzPatrick initiated an hourly patrolling fire watch and restored the inboard isolation valve to a fully operable condition.
The hourly patrolling fire watch parallels that required by Technical Specifications when early warning protection against a potential fire must be taken due to inadequate or inoperable fixed detection systems.
The FitzPatrick plant staff was also informed by Stone and Webster that other (third party) cables (not identified in the LER) could affect the operation of the inboard isolation valve for the HPCI steam supply due to their proximity to both HPCI and ADS cables.
The licensee has decided to re-route the cables of concern to correct both problems, and states that a preliminary design modification has been completed.
Conclusions Our review indicates that lack of separation of HPCI and ADS cables is a possible generic problem for all BWR4 1s and that earlier designs may also be affected. Permanent resolution of this problem, corrective action in the meanwhile, and separation from other systems such as RCIC or isolation condenser are under consideration by the NRC.
It is anticipated that further NRC eval-uations will result in issuance of an IE Circular, Bulletin, or NRR generic letter in the near future which will recommend or request specific applicant or licensee actions.
This Information Notice is provided to inform licensees of a possible significant matter.
If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
No written response to this Information Notice is required.
References:
- 1.
Hatch 1, LER #79-056/0IT-O, dated September 11, 1979
- 2.
Hatch 2, LER #79-098/0IT-O, dated September 11, 1979 3~
Brunswick 1, LER #79-068/0IT-O, dated October 9, 1979
- 4.
FitzPatrick, LER #79-056/0IT-O, dated October 9, 1979
- 5.
FitzPatrick, LER #79-056/0IT-l, dated November 19, 1979
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. Information Notice No. 79-23 79-24 79-25 79-26 79-12A 79-27 79-28 79-29 79-30 79-31 ENCLOSURE 2 IE Information Notice No. 79-32 Date:
December 21, 1979 Page l of 1 RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Subject Date Issued to Issued Emergency Diesel Generator 9/26/79 All Power Reactor Faci-
. Lube Oi 1 Coolers lities with an Operating Litense (OL) or Construe-tion Permit (CP)
Overpressurization of Con-10/1/79. All Power Reactor Faci-tainment of a PWR Plant lities with an OL or CP After a Main Steam Line Break Reactor Trips at Turkey 10/1/79 All Power Reactor Faci-Point Unit 3 and 4 lities with an OL or CP Breach of Containment 11/5/79 All Power Reactor Facil-Integrity ities with an OL or CP Attempted Damage to New 11/9/79 All Fuel Facilities, Fuel Assemblies
.Research Reactors and Power Reactors with an OL or CP Steam Generator Tube 11/16/79 All Power Reactor Faci-Ruptures at Two PWR lities with an OL or CP Facilities Overloading of Structural
- 11/16/79 All Power Reactor Faci-Elements Due to Pipe Support lities with an OL or CP Loads Loss of Nonsafety Related Reactor Coolant System In-strumentation During Operation Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances, 10 CFR Part 21 Use of Incorrect Amplified Response Spectra CARS) 11/19/79 All Power Reactor Faci-lities with an OL or CP 12/6/79 All Power Reactor Faci-lities with an OL or CP 12/13/79 All Power Reactor Faci-lities with an OL or CP