ML18081A520
| ML18081A520 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 10/11/1979 |
| From: | Schneider F Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IEB-79-07, IEB-79-7, NUDOCS 7911120035 | |
| Download: ML18081A520 (4) | |
Text
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Frederick W. Schneider Vice President Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Pl.ace Newark, N.J. 07101 201 /430-7373 Production Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director of USNRC Off ice of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Dear Mr. Grier:
NRC IE BULLETIN NO. 79-07 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE NO. l UNIT SALEM GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-272 October 11, 1979 On October 9, 1979, a meeting was held between representatives of our Company and Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut and other NRC staff to discuss the activities related to IE Bulletin 79-07 necessary to return Salem Unit No. 1 to service.
The purpose of this letter is to document and commit to the agreements reached at that meeting.
The program to bring us into complete compliance. with IE Bulletin 79-07 will entail three phases as described below:
Phase I Prior to entering Modes 3 and 4, the fo1lowing work will be accom-plished:
- 1)
Completion of pipe stress analysis on safety related systems.required for safe shutdown.
- 2)
Re-evaluation of the associated supports, nozzles, and penetrations, within the inaccessible area.
- 3)
Re-evaluation of the supports, nozzles, and penetrations for entire Auxiliary Feedwater System.
- 4)
Re-evaluation of the supports for the Reactor Coolant
-System Pressure Boundry.
- 5)
Field modification to supports and penetrations evaluated in (2), (3) & (4) that fail to meet our criteria stated in our September 21, 1979 submittal (Attachment I).
Field modification to nozzles which fail to meet manufacturer's acceptance criteria.
~:L
- uu 12 o 0 3§
B.H. Grier 2 -
10-11-79 IE Bulletin 79-07
- 6)
Re-evaluation of the supports, nozzles, and penetra-tions of the following systems:
a)
High pressure safety injection using the Chemical and Volume Control System.
b)
Low pressure safety injection using the Safety Injection System.
c)
Main Steam System up to the isolation valves to include the steam supply to the steam driven auxiliary feed pump~
d)
Containment Spray and Recirculation.
7}
Field modification to supports and penetrations evaluated in (6) that fail to have a factor of safety of at least 2.
Field modification to nozzles which fail to meet manufacturer's accept-ance criteria.
Phase I -
Bases For Entering Modes 3 And 4 Accomplishing items 1 through 6 and the corresponding reanalysis and modifications required by IE Bulletin 79-02 assures.the *integrity of the reactor coolant system and the availability of a short term heat sink (the auxiliary feedwater system}.
Accomplishing item 7 will give reasonable assurance of* the operability of those systems.
The re-quirements of the Technical Specifications will be met at all times.
As further justification, the reactor coolant activity as analyzed on October 9, 1979 is:
Co-58 l.7lx10-3uci/ml; Co-60 4.77xlo-3uci/ml; Mn-54 l.3lxlo-4uci/ml; and no detectable iodine.
The source range counts are between 1 and 2 CPS.
Given this very low overall activity level, any risks from radiological considerations during Mode 3 oper-ation are considered minimal*.
Based on the above discussion, entering Modes 3-and 4 represents no threat to the health and safety of the public.
,.~
B.H. Grier 3 -
10-11-79 IE Bulletin 79-07 Phase II Prior to enteri~g Modes 1 and 2 the following work will be accom-plished:
Field modification and corresponding modifications associated with the IE Bulletin 79-02 to supports and penetrations evaluated in item 6 of Phase I that fail to meet our criteria as stated in our September 21, 1979 submittal (Attachment I).
Modifications will be made within the time constraints of the action statements of *the Technical Specifications if.re-evaluation shows that system operability is affected.
Phase II - Bases For Entering Modes 1 and 2*
Accomplishing all items in Phases I and II assures systems operability in compliance with the Technical-Specifications and the ability to perform safe shutdown and maintain hot standby.
Given these condi-tions, entering Modes 1 and 2 represents no threat to the health and safety of the public during the period of time necessary to complete all of the requirements of IE Bulletin 79-07.
In addition to the above safety bases justifying the return to service of the unit, PSE&G presently has an excessive amount of forced outage capacity.
Added to our average short term forced outage of 1000 mw, we now have two large efficient units totaling 900 mw which will not return to service until December 15, 1979 and March 1, 1980, respec-tively.
With Salem Unit 1 out of. service, the economic penalty to the electric customers is approximately $600,000 per day.
Additionally, the nuclear generation produced by Salem would save over 1.5 million gallons of oil daily.
Phase III Within 60 days of entering Mode 2, re-evaluation and field modifications as appropriate, of supports, nozzles,- and penetrations remaining to be evaluated in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-07 and 79-02, will be ac-complished.
Modifications will be made within the time constraints of the action statements of the Technical Specifications if re-evaluation shows that system operability is affected.
B. 10-11-79 IE Bulletin 79-07 The program and commitments described above are meant to modify the program proposed by supplementary response letter to IE Bulletin 79-07 on September 21, 1979. *In addition, this information should be con-sidered as a supplemental response to the letter of August 28, 1979 (Ref:
IAL No. 79-12).
The completion of Phase I is presently scheduled for October 15, 1979, at which time it is our desire to proceed to Mode 3 to perform rod position indication calibrations and rod drop tests.
This activity is expected to take approximately eight (8) days during which time the commitments of Phase II will be accomplished.
On October 23, 1979, the unit is expected to be ready to proceed into Mode 2 and 1.
We believe this to be a realistic schedule* and which can only be met by the maxi-mum effort of our plant staff and supporting groups and the cooperative effort of the NRC staff in Bethesda and Region I Inspection and En-forcement.
We sincerely appreciate the attention you and your staff are giving this subject.
CC NRC Off ice of Inspection
- and Enforcement Sincerely, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Washington, DC 20555