ML18079A280

Responds to Licensees Statement of Matl Facts:No Genuine Issue to Be Heard

ML18079A280
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/30/1979
From:	Johari Moore, Beverly Smith NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
To:
Shared Package
ML17193A281	List: ML18079A279 ML18079A280 ML18079A281 ML18079A282
References
NUDOCS 7905150187
Download: ML18079A280 (14)

Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3/30/79 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of

)

) Docket No. 50-272 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC &

GAS COMPANY

) Proposed Issuance of Amendment

} to.Facility Operating License

} No. DPR-70.

(Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. l)

~

NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO LICENSEEiS STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE TO BE HEARD The NRC Staff responds to the Licensee's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue to Be. Heard, with the following state-ments as to which the Staff believes there is no genuine issue to be heard,- and which the Staff believes are sufficient to support a favorable ruling upon the Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition.

Many of.the Staff's stated material facts are reiterations of those set forth by Licensee, as indicated by parenthetical cross-references. Several additional stated material facts further supporting the Licensee's motion,

-ll are also set forth in this response.

.. J/ Failure to repeat any of the Licensee's stated material.facts

• indicates only that in the Staff's view, and under its theory of the case, establishment of such facts as-being beyond dispute is not necessary to a ruling upon the Motion for Summary Disposition *.The Staff does not di sag*ree with the substance of any of the *material facts stated by Licensee.

7 9 0 5 1 5 0 ( ~1 '_!.-

. ' Consolidated Contentions Colemans 9 and LACT l

• Colemans Contention 9 The Licensee has given inadequate.consideration to alternatives.to tbe proposed action.

In particular, the licensee has not adequately evaluated alternatives associated with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission adopting the "no action 11 alternative for Licensee's application, which would implicate the following:

a. expansion of spent fuel storage capacity at reprocessing plants;

b. licensing of independent spent fuel ~torage installations;

c. storage of spent fuel from Salem No. l at the storage pools of other reactors; and

d. ordering the generation of spent fuel to be stopped or restricted (leading to the slow-down or termination of nuclear power prciduction until ultimate disposition can be effectuated).

Lower Alloways Creek Township. (LACT) Contention l The Licensee has not considered in sufficient detail possible.

alternatives to the proposed expansion.of the spent fuel pool.

Specifically, the.Licensee has not established that spent fuel

• cannot be stored at another reactor site. Also,. while the GESMO proceedings have been terminated, it is not clear that the spent fuel could not by some arrangement with Allied Chemical Corp. be stored at the AGNS Plant in Barnwell,.South Carolina. Furthermore, the Licensee has not explored nor exhausted the possibilities for disposing of the spent fuel outside of the U.S.A.

1. Increasing the storage capacity ~f the spent fuel pool will have a negligible environmental impact. * (Licensee No. 2}

2. The AGNS Barnwell reprocessing plant is not available to store Salem Unit l fuel prior to the Salem Unit l fuel pool being filled. (Licensee No. 39}

3. The planned Exxon Nuclear Company storage pool at its proposed Oak Ridge,* Tennessee reprocessing facility will not be available to store Salem Unit 1 fuel prior to the Salem Unit 1 fuel pool being filled.

{Licensee No. 40}

4. The fuel storage pools at the Morris, Illinois facility and Nuclear Fuel Services facility at West Valley, New York will not be available to store Salem Unit 1 fuel prior to the Salem Unit l fuel pool being filled. (Licensee No. 41)

Licensing of Independent Spent Fu~l Sto~age Installations The Staff agrees with the following Licensee's statements of material

• facts as to which there is no genuine issue to be heard with respect to the alternative of licensing of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI). The Staff has added statements where appropriate.

5. *.It is highly unlikely that an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI") could be available to accept fuel by 1983 or

• 1984.

(Licensee No. 34)

6. Costs associated with storage at an ISFSI would be greater than the costs of installing new racks at Salem Unit 1. (Licensee No. 42)

7.

Any interim fuel storage provided by the U.S. Department of Energy would not be available before 1984. {Licensee No. 43)

8.

MO, NFS, AGNS are not available as Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) {EIA, pg. 14).

9. Because an ISFSI facility, whether owned and operated by a private company or the Government, would require offsite transportation, and a structure,* pool, and supporting systems would have to be erected.

and installed, it is unlikely that the environmental impact of this alternative would be less than that of the proposed action.

Storage of Spent Fuel from Salem Unit No. l at the Storage Pools of Other Reactors /whether onsite or offsite?

10. If the unenlarged capacity of the Salem Units rand 2 fuel pools were sh.ared jointly, both pools would be full by 1983. {Licensee No. 33) 11;, It*is unlikely that th~ Hope Creek units would be sufficiently complete to enable fuel to be stored prior to the unmodified Salem unit r:17 fuel pool being full. (Licensee No. 36)

.~ *-

12. Installing racks capable of storing Salem Unit l fuel in the Hope Creek units would limit storage of spent fuel at these units.

(Licensee No. 37)

13. Expansion of the Salem Unit 2 SFP rather than Salem Unit 1 SFP was considered by the Staff and found that the Unit l pool would be.full by 1982 and the Unit 2 in early 1989. This alternative is inconsistent with the objective of maintaining occupational exposure a~ low a~

reasonably achievable. Moreover, this alternative would result in.

greater environmental impacts than those associated with the expansion of Salem Unit l spent fuel pool

• 14 *. A survey by the u. S. Energy Research and Development Administration concluded that up to 46% of operating nuclear plants will lose the ability to refuel during the period of 1975-1984 without additional spent fuel storage pool expansions or access to offsite storage facilities.

15. It is unlikely that there will be storage space available at any other reactor on or off Artificial Island for Salem Unit l spent fuel

~rior to the tim~ that the unenlar~ed fuel pool would be fill~d *

. ~-..~,.~.... -**-*; ".....

e e *,

16. Disposal of the spent fuel from Salem Unit 1 outside the United States is not a viable alternative * (Licensee No. 45)

. 17. The incremental replacement power costs associated with a shutdown of Salem Unit l would be at least $300,000 per day.

(Licensee No. 46)

18. The costs for repl~cing the fuel storage racks for Salem Unit l are

$3,000,000.

(Licensee No. 47)

19. Conservation measures would not curtail the use of Salem Unit l, since I

it is the most economical to operate of the Licensee's Units arid would continue to be used as a 11base load unit.

11 Reduction of power at Salem would result in higher costs kw-hr of power delivered.

20. Extending the operating cycle from twelve (l2) mon.ths to eighteen (18) months has not been assessed by the NRC.

Even if this cycle was approved, it would not reduce the amount of fuel discharged.

/

Colemans Contention 2 The Licensee has given inadequate consideration to the occurrence of accidental criticality due to the increased density or compaction of spent fuel assemblies. Additional consideration of criticality is required due to the following.

2A. *Deterioration of.the neutron absorption material provided by the Baral plates located*between the spent fuel bundles.

21.

The only materials used in the fuel storage racks, the rack interties

• and wall restraints are Type 304 stainless steel and Baral material.

(Licensee No. 1)

22.

The Baral material is sealed between an inner and outer stainless steel shroud.

(Licensee No. 2)

23.

The stainless steel shroud protects the Baral from exposure to the spent fuel pool environment.

(Licensee N9. 3)

24.

The replacement of the racks will be conducted pursuant to a quality assurance program meeting the requirements of 10 CFR.Part 50, Appendix B.

(Licensee No. 11)

25. Nondestructive testing of the fuel cells has been conducted to assure at least 95% leak tightness with 95% confidence level. (Licensee No. 12)

26. A helium leak test capable of detectirig any significant leak in the stainless steel shroud was utilized to assure leak*tightness. (Licensee No. 13)

27.

Exxon Nuclear Company has conducted a series of tests to determine the potential eff_ects of a hypothetical leak in the stainless steel shroud.

(licensee No. 14)

28. A potential leak could, at most, cause the inner shroud to bulge and move toward the center of the cell. (Licensee No. 15)

29.

In the unlikely event that a leak exists in a fuel storage cell after installation in the pool and before fuel is inserted, the worst potential consequences would be failure to be able to insert the fuel, losing the affected cell from service. (Licensee No. 16)

30. Prior to loading fuel in any location, a procedure will be utilized to_determine whether cell swelling exists at that loc~tion and whether the ce 11 can be made serviceable. : (Licensee No. 17)

31. If a leak develops in a fuel cell with fuel already in place, the most severe result would be that the fuel could not be withdrawn with the normal fuel withdrawal force of the fuel handling machine.

(Licensee No. 18)

32. If a leak develops in a fuel storage cell with fuel already in place, semi-remote tooling would be utilized to provide vent holes in the top of the storage cell to relieve the pressure and permit routine removal.

(Licensee No. 19)

33. Experiments conducted by Exxon Nuclear Company show that simulated storage cells with a leak simulating hole will sustain aluminum corrosion which will consume only a small percentage of the aluminum in the Baral core after a 40 year exposure and B4C particles would not be dislodged.

(Licensee No. 26)

34.

PSE&G has committed to a long term fuel storage cell surveillance program, utilizing the same materials and manufacturing procedures as.are specified for the fuel storage celJs. (Licensee No. 27)

35. If water enters the Baral cavities, pitting corrosion due to galvanic corrosion would be anticipated on the aluminum cladding on the Baral at the various points where it contacts stainless steel.

36. If pitting corrosion occurs, the boron carbide matrix (boral) would not dissolve and it would remain embedded in the aluminum corrosion products.

Colemans Contention 2B The Licensee has given inadequate consideration to the occur.rence of accidental criticality due to the increased density or compaction of spent fuel assemblies. Additional consideration of criticality is required due to the following.

28 Deterioration of the rack structure leading to failure of the rack and consequent dislodging of spent fuel bundles.

37~ The material properties for structural components used in the.. design and analysis of the rack were taken from Appendix I of Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and* Pressure

• Vessel Code.

(Licensee No. 4)

38. Type 304 stainless steel is compatible with the spent fuel pool environment.

(Lic~nsee No. 5)

• 39. Type 304 stainless steel is utilized in the present spent fuel racks *.

(Licensee No. 6) 40 *. Type 304 stainless steel is resistent to corrosion and deterioration in dilute boric acid solutions.

(Weeks affidavit pg. 2) *

41. No instances of stress corrosion of weld sensitized-stainless steel

• have yet occurred in-:spent fuel storage pools.

(Weeks affidavit pg. 3)

42.

• It is possible that, at some time, a highly localized stress corrosion.

may develop in the heat affected zones of the.welds, especially where residual stresses from welding are high. It is highly unlikely that

. this would produce sufficiently severe degradatiori to affect the structural integrity of the racks.

(Weeks affidavit pg. 4)

- *11 -

Colemans Contention 2D The Li~ensee has given inadequate consideration to the occurrence of accidental criticality due to the increased.density o*r compaction of spent fuel assemblies. Addition.al consideration of criticality is required due to the following.

Combinations of the above as it relates to A & B.

43. Neither the spent fuel storage racks or neutron absorption material are likely to undergo significant deterioration during the design life of the spent fuel storage racks. (Weeks affidavit pg. 3)

Colemans Contention 6 The Licensee has given inadequate consideration to qualification and testing of Baral material in the environment of protracted association with spent nuclear fuel, in order. to validate.its continued properties for reactivity control and integrity.

I a

o

• 44. Baral material has been exposed in water for periods up to 20 years without any significant deterioration.

45.

The Baral material will not be* affected by long term exposure to low-level radiation in the spent fuel pool environment.*

Lower Alloways Creek Township (LACT), Contention 3 While the Licensee has requested increased spent fuel storage

. capacity at its Salem Unit 1. it has not limited the use of such

...; 12 -.

storage.facility to fuel removed from Salem Unit 1 *. Storage of spent fuel.from other units on.or off Artifical Island, therefore is a possibility and such storage creates.many.hazards not analyzed by the Licensee in its application. Included among these hazards are those created by unloading spent fuel casks *

~

, I

46. Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 is a pressurized water reactor (PWR}.

47.

Hope Creek Generating Station, the other nuclear power plant located on Artificial Island, uses boiling water nuclear reactors (BWR).

48.* Storage of BWR spent fuel in a PWR's spent fuel pool would raise an unreviewed safety question~

49. Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) does not possess a license to receive for storage in the spent fuel pool at Salem Unit 1, byproduct or special nuclear material produced by the operation of other facilities.

50. Licensee*s Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), as amended, makes no mention of the possibility that-it will move spent fuel between Salem Units 1 and 2.

- 13 *-

51.

Movement of spent fuel from Salem Unit 2 to Salem Unit 1 would raise an unreviewed safety question.

Colemans Contention 13 The.Licensee has failed to give adequate consideration to the cumulative impacts of expanding spent fuel storage at Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit l in association with the recently filed proposed amendment to the application for an operating license at the sister unit, Salem Unit 2.

(See Amendment No. 42, Docket. No. 50-311, filed April 12, 1978 which.proposes modifications of spent fuel storage which the Intervenor believes are similar in scope to the Salem Unit 1 application~)

52~ Most of the releases of r~dioactiv'e m~terial which contribute to offsite doses occur as a result of the initial transfer of fu~l from the reactor to the reactor f~el /pooji, iil injti~l storage,* and*'*during its k~nsfer from the fuel ~torage pool to the shipping cask for shipment offsite. The isotope of interest as far as offsite doses during the incremental peridd of fuel storage is concerned is Kr-85.

(Licensee No. 48)

53.

Even conservatively calculated, the additional dose due to the change in spent fue1 racksin both Salem Units 1 and 2 attributable to Kr-85 would be 0.005 mrem/year and less than 0.005 manrem/year to.the population within 50 miles.

(Licensee No. 49)

~..

e: ~

I 54.. Other than the very slight increase in radioactive effluents there are no other cumulative effects resulting from the fuel pool storage increase. (Licensee No. 50}

55. The exposures from Kr-85 represent an increase of less than 0.5% of the exposure from the station evaluated in the Salem 2 FES for an individual at the site boundary and the population.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 30th day of March, 1979.

Respectfully submitted,

~I/~

tlarry H. Smith Counsel for NRC Staff Janice E. Moore

• Counsel for NRC Staff*

'* J I