ML18057B295
| ML18057B295 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1991 |
| From: | Jorgensen B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18057B296 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-91-17, NUDOCS 9110080022 | |
| Download: ML18057B295 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000255/1991017
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II I
Report No. 50-255/91017(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255
Licensee: Consumers Power Company
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, MI
49201
Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant
Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI
Inspection Conducted:
September 10 through 20, 1991
Inspectors:
E~ R. Schweibinz, Senior Project Engineer
J. R. Roto , Resident Inspector
Approved By:
2A
Inspection Summary
Date
EA: 91-126
License No. DPR-20
_9 - "30 --91
Inspection on September 10 through 20, 1991, (Rehort No. 50-255/91017(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Special safety- inspection byte senior proJect engineer
and the resident inspector of actions on previously identified items,
reportable events, and operational safety.
Results: Of the areas inspected, one apparent violation was identified
regarding the return to service of containment spray pumps (paragraph 5).
9110080022 911001
ADOCK 05000255
Q
1.
DETAILS
Persons Contacted
a.
Consumers Power Company
- G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager
- R. M. Rice, Plant Operations Manager
- R. D. Orosz, Nuclear Engineering & Construction Manager
- P. M. Donnelly, Safety & Licensing Director
- K. M. Haas, Radiological Services Manager
- J. L. Hanson, Operations Superintendent
- K. E. Osborne, System Engineering Superintendent
- M. J. Kane, Plant Operations Shift Supervisor
- M. T. Nordin, Electrical Engineering Section Head
R. K. Moceri, System Engineer
C. S. Kozup, Technical Engineer
- J. C. Petro, NPAD Site Supervisor
R. J. Frigo, Operations Staff Support Supervisor
- J. L. Kuemin, Licensing Administrator
- C. T. Hillman, Licensing Engineer
- T. J. Palmisano, Administrative & Planning Manager
b.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- B. L. Jorgensen, Chief, Projects Section 2A
- J. K. Heller, Senior Resident Inspector
- J. R. Roton, Resident Inspector
- E. R. Schweibinz, Senior Project Engineer
C. N. Orsini, Reactor Engineer (Intern)
- Denotes those present at the Exit Interview on September 20, 1991 .
. Other members of the plant staff were also contacted during the
inspection period.
2.
Actions on Previously Identified Items (92701)
(Closed) Unresolved Item (255/91012-03):
A lack of indication of the
control power (closing coil power) for circuit breakers could lead to
unrecognized inoperability of required safety equipment.
The condition
apparently obscured inoperability of Containment Spray Pump P-54C, as
addressed in paragraph 4.
In Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-255/91-016,
August 22, 1991, the licensee committed to provide remote and local
indication of closing coil power for 2400 and 4160 volt solenoid operated
breakers. This modification is scheduled for the next refueling outage
for the safety-related breakers, and the following refueling outage for
the nonsafety-related breakers.
This item is closed.
2
... 3.
Reportable Event (92700)
The inspector reviewed the following Licensee Event Report (LER) by means
of direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of
records.
The review addressed compliance to reporting requirements and,
as applicable, that immediate corrective action and appropriate action to
prevent recurrence had been accomplished.
(Closed) LER 255/91-016 Inoperability of Containment Spray Pump P-54C
The corrective actions were reviewed and found to be acceptable.
A
corrective action that was not listed in the LER was also reviewed.
This
involved a proposed change to General Operating Procedure (GOP) 2, to test
start the containment spray pumps prior to exceeding 325°F, to ensure
operability. If the LER were to be revised, the licensee was encouraged
to include the change to GOP 2 as a corrective action.
The inoperability
of containment spray pump P-54C is addressed in paragraph 4.
This LER is
closed.
4.
Containment Spray Operability-Chronology (71707)
This inspection identified the following Technical Specifications (TS) as
applicable:
a.
TS 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be established,
implemented, and maintained covering the activities recommended in
Appendix
11A
11 of Regulatory Guide 1.33,
11Quality Assurance Program
Requirements," as endorsed by CPC-2A QAPD [Quality Assurance Program
Description].
Paragraph f.(4) of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33 includes
procedures for startup of safety-related PWR systems, and instructions
for energizing, startup, and changing modes of operation as appropriate,
for the containment cooling systems.
b.
Technical Specification 3.4.1 requires containment spray pumps to be
operable before reactor criticality.
c.
Technical Specification 3.4.2 permits a single containment spray
pump to be inoperable during reactor power operation, but specifies
redundant component testing and a time limit of seven days.
The operational history and related procedures for the containment
spray pumps were reviewed as they relate to unresolved item 255/91012-03,
licensee corrective action package E-PAL-91-017, and LER 255/91-016.
The following chronology was developed:
02/11 /91
Containment spray pumps P-54A, P-548, and P-54C were
verified operable via conduct of the Surveillance Test
(Q0-10) "Containment Spray Pumps Surveillance Test.
11
The final part of the test included steps to rack out
the circuit breakers and remove their control power fuses.
3
03/03/91
03/10/91
03/25/91
03/26/91
05/23/91
This is a necessary action during certain plant shutdown
modes of operation, because the containment spray system
shares some components with the shutdown cooling system.
Prior to the plant exceeding 325°F, the fuses were
reinstalled and the circuit breakers racked in.
However, pumps P-54A and P-54C were not tested with
the circuit breakers in the CONNECT position (i.e.,
the pumps were not
11bumped
11 or operated to establish
operability).
Pump P-548 was started for system
air sweeps, verifying it could be operated. All three
pumps had local indications which were believed to reflect
operable closing coil power, but (as noted in paragraph 2
above) did not.
The reactor was taken critical.
have appropriate procedures for
spray pumps to service prior to
apparent violation of TS 6.8.1,
The licensee failed to
the return of containment
critically. This is an
(255/91017-0la(DRP)).
The reactor was taken subcritical for reasons unrelated to
the containement spray system.
The containment spray pumps
were no longer required operable.
The reactor was taken critical. The containment spray pumps
were again required to be operable.
After rendering them inoperable on 02/11/91, the licensee
failed to verify that containment spray pumps P-54A and
P-54C were in an operable status until 05/22 and 05/23/91,
respectively. It was subsequently found that pump P-54C
was not operable prior to reactor criticality on 03/10/91
and 03/26/91.
This is an apparent violation of TS 3.4.1
(255/91017-0lb(DRP)).
Containment spray pump P-54C failed to start locally during
surveillance test Q0-16 despite energized lights indicating
"control power available.
11
The auxiliary operator (AO)
contacted the Shift Supervisor and was instructed to repeat
the attempt to start the pump.
The pump failed to start on
the second attempt.
The AO then checked both sets of fuses
and found them to be in good condition.
He re-installed
the fuses, and attempted another pump start.
The pump
started on the third attempt.
The licensee failed to have containment spray pump P-54C
operable between 03/10-25/91, and between 03/26/91 and
05/22/91, while the plant was in power operation.
Redundant components were not tested and the duration
exceeded seven days.
This is an apparent violation of
TS 3.4.2 (255/91017-0lc(DRP)).
4
05/23/91
06/24/91
06/25/91
06/26/91
06/27/91
06/28/91
07/09/91
07 /10/91
08/15/91
An internal corrective action document (deviation
report-PAL-91-097) was issued and reviewed.
The initial
Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) review determined
that an event report was not immediately required; further
evaluation was requested.
Past operability of pump P-54C
since reactor startup was not addressed in associated
documentation.
The evaluation was conducted and two possible causes were
listed. Either the closing coil fuses were not making up
properly, thus disabling the breaker's closing circuitry,
or local control switch (152-114) contacts may not have
adequately closed during the first two start attempts.
The most probable cause of the breaker's failure to close
was believed to be the failure of the fuses to complete the
closing circuit.
However, a Work Order was issued to
measure contact resistance of the local control switch
(152-114) and inspect associated control circuit wiring.
The event was again discussed in a CARB meeting, in the
presence of an NRC inspector. A request was made for
additional time to evaluate the root cause of the event.
The operability of pump P-54C from startup until May 23,
1991, was not discussed .
The NRC inspector discussed D-PAL-91-097 with the electrical
engineering section head and the system engineer to discuss
the control power circuit for 2400 volt circuit breakers.
The NRC Inspector obtained schematic diagrams for two types
of 4160 volt breakers.
These two schematic diagrams were
discussed with the system engineer and two shift supervisors.
The inspector also qustioned how the shift supervisors return
equipment to an operable status after the breakers have been out
of service.
They indicated the components are always start-tested.
The NRC inspector discussed the breaker issue with the Plant
Operations Manager and System Engineering Superintendent.
The inspector officially notified the licensee concerning
Unresolved Item 255/91012-03 and requested a review of how
pump operability was verified when the breakers and fuses
were reinstalled on or prior to March 3, 1991.
A CARB meeting was conducted to discuss the breaker issue and
operability of the containment spray pump.
The NRC inspector reviewed deviation reports (DRs) and work
orders issued in 1990 and 1991 for related issues.
One
event was found (D-PAL-90-194) relative to the output
circuit breaker for Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 failing
5
to close on August 14, 1990.
in the synchronizing circuit
with the fuse holder fingers
closing coil circuit.
The problem was thought to be
but subsequently proved to be
not making contact in the
08/22/91
LER 255/91-016 was issued; see paragraph 3, above.
5.
Management Interview
The inspectors met with licensee representatives - denoted in
Paragraph 1.a - on September 20, 1991, to discuss the scope and
findings of the inspection as described in these details.
They
were informed that they could expect to be contacted concerning
an enforcement conference on these matters.
The licensee was requested to be prepared to address the following
issues at the enforcement conference:
a.
The accuracy of the findings and the bases for each of the apparent
violations.
b.
Any bases for considering Containment Spray Pump P-54C operable
between February 11 and May 23, 1991.
c.
Assuming P-54C was not operable:
(1)
Safety implications regarding P-54C alone.
(2)
Occasions, duration, and safety implications of other known
equipment inoperability in the subject period.
d.
The apparently similar inoperability of the 1-1 diesel generator
breaker in 1990 (documented on D-PAL-90-194) and whether resolution
of that problem could or should have prevented the containment spray
pump operability problem.
In addition, the likely informational content of the inspection report
with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during
the inspection was also discussed.
The licensee did not identify any
such documents/processes as proprietary.
6