ML18051A596
| ML18051A596 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1983 |
| From: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Vandewalle D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| TASK-15-02, TASK-15-2, TASK-RR LSO5-83-09-017, LSO5-83-9-17, NUDOCS 8309160236 | |
| Download: ML18051A596 (7) | |
Text
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Docket No. 50-'t5'5 LS05-83 017 Mr. David J. VandeWalle Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company 1945 West Parnall Road Jackson, Michigan 49201 Dear Mr.
Vande~Jalle:
September 14, 1983 S.UBJECT:
EVALUATION OF MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK - PALISADES PLANT
~- - -
In Section 4.30.1 of the Integrated Pl ant Safety /1.ssessment Report ( IPSAR) for your faci 1 i ty (NUREG-0820), the staff approved your proposal to modify the main-steam line isolation valves (MSIVs) to prevent a single failure from causing a blowdown of both steam generators and, ultimately, a loss of decay heat removal capabi 1 i ty in the intact steam generator 1 oop.
That proposal resulted from the evaluation of Topic XV-2, "Spectrum of Steam Piping Failures Inside and Outside Containment 11 under the Systematic Evaluation Program.
The staff concluded that the MSIV modification you proposed for the integrated assessment was appropriate primarily because (1) decay heat removal without an isolated steam generator is an event which is beyond the analyzed design-basis for your facility and, therefore, decay heat removal under such circumstances cannot be assured, and (2) there have been several MSIV failures at Palisades such that the postulated single failure has a fairly high probability.
Decay heat removal through the secondary system is necessary for such events, because the High Pressure Safety Injection System does not have sufficient capacity to permit decay heat remova 1 through the primary system by feed and b 1 eed.
The modi fi ca-t ion of the MSIVs \\'/as scheduled to be completed during the Cycle 7 (1985) refueling outage.
In a letter dated August 15, 1983, Consumers Po1-Jer Company (CPCo) requested that this modification be deferred for approximately one year, so that alternative corrective a~tions may be evaluated further.
In that submittal, CPCo concluded that the MSIV modification may not be cost-effective based on the results of recent probabilistic analyses of the accident sequence. This conclusion is partly due to automating and adding a third pump to the auxiliary feed\\'Jater system.
The time extension \\flaS requested to confirm critical assumptions in the probabilistic analysis and study alternative correctiv~ actions to increase the reliability of decay heat removal through tile secondary system.
The submittal accurately identifies the supporting analyses which the staff concludes are necessary OFFICE~ * * * * * *.***********.* J........ *-. -*----___.!.. __. __ -*--~
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- NRC FORM 318110/80) NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
- U.S. GPO 1983-400-247
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- David J. Vande1~a I I e
-i-to confirm assumptions regarding the secondary system decay heat removal function, except that the evaluation and subsequent procedural revisions should address the effect of the cooldown and repressurization on the primary system to avoid pressurized thermal shock of the vessel.
In a meeting with CPCo on July 26, 1983, the staff noted that there are considerable uncertainties in probabilistic analyses beyond the design-basis events.
Moreover, the staff has expressed its concern regarding your ability to demonstrate the decay heat removal function for such events and the consequences of excessive cooldown on the reactor vessel.
However, the staff believes that your proposed evaluation of alternatives is desirable because it might result in a more effective corrective action that.would provide a broader range of protection (i.e., higher reliability for several events).
Continued plant operation, in the interim, is acceptable based on the low probability of the pipe break and the improved reliability of the existing MSIVs.
Inservice inspection of the main-steam piping conducted during the refueling outages in 1979 and 1983, in accordance with Technical Specification 4.12, found no evidence of significant deterioration in the critical welds sampled since the plant began commercial operation in 1971.
These inspections have confirmed the lovv probability of the pipe break.
The causes of MSIV failures experienced in the past have been identified and corrected, and MSIV operability is verified during each refueling outage by the valve closure time test required by Technical Specification 4.8.
The staff recommends that the MSIV tests in the current (1983) outage be conducted as close to normal operating temperature as practical to enhance the confirmation of valve reliability.
On this basis, the staff concludes that the extension you have requested to continue the evaluation of this issue is acceptable.
The results of your evaluation are to be submitted by September l~ 1984.
You should pl an to provide preliminary results to all ow sufficient time for the staff's review prior to the implementation of any necessary corrective actions.
If, as a result of this further evaluation, CPCo concludes that the MSIV modification is necessary, that modification is to be made during the Cycle 8 (presently scheduled for 1986) refueling outage.
cc:
K. Toner. CPCo Service list - Palisades Sincerely, Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing
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- U.S.GPO 1 83-400-247
David J. VandeWalle
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In a meeting with CPCo on July 26, 1983, the staff noted that there are considerable uncertainties in probabilistic analyses beyond thedesign-basis events. Moreover, the staff has expressed its concern regarding your ability to demonstrate the decay heat.removal function for such events.
Mowever) the staff believes that your proposed evaluation of alternatives is desirable because it might result in a more effective corrective action that would provide a broader range of protection (Le.,
higher reliability for several events).
Continued plant operation, in the interim, is acceptable based on the low probability of the pipe break and tile improved reliability of the existing MSIVs.
Inservice inspection of the main-steam piping conducted during the refueling outages in 1979 and 1983, in accordance with Technical Specification 4.12, found no evidence of significant deterioration in the critical welds sampled since the plant began commercial operation in 1971.
These inspections *have confirmed the low probability of the pipe break.
The causes of MSIV failures experienced ir. the past have been identified and corrected, and MSIV operability 1 s verified during each refueling outage by the valve closure time test required by Technical Specification 4.8.
The staff recommends that the MSIV tests in the current (1983) outage be conducted as close to nonnal operating temperature as practical to enhance the confirmation of valve reliability.
On this basis, the staff concludes that the extension you have requested to continue the evaluation of this issue is acceptable.
The results of your evaluation are to be submitted by September l, 1984.
You should plan to provide preliminary results to allow sufficient time for the staff's review prior to the implementation of any necessary corrective actions.
If, as a result-of this-further evaluation, CPCo conclude_s that the MSIV modification is necessary, that modification is to be made during the Cycle 8 {presently scheduled for __ 1~}16]-Y..E:lfu~)Jri~-ou:tage~-*~-=-~~-
cc:
K. Toner, CPCo Service list - Palisades
- See previous tissue for concurrences.
Si nee rely, Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing NRCFORM318!10/80lNRCM0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
- U.S.GPO 1983~400*247
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David J. Vande\\fJa 11 e In a meeting with CPCo on July 26s 1983, the staff noted that there are considerable uncertainties in probabilistic analyses beyond the design-basi s events. Moreover, the staff has expressed its concern regarding your ability to demonstrate the decay heat removal function for such events. However, the staff believes that your proposed evaluation of alternatives is desirable because it might result in a more effective corrective action that would provide a broader range of protection (i.e.,
higher reliability for several events).
Continued plant operation, in the interim, is acceptable based on the 1 ow probability of the pipe break and the improved rel i abi 1 i ty of the existing MSIVs.
Inservice insepction of the main-steam piping conducted during the refueling outages in 1979 and 1983, in accordance with Technical Specification 4.12, found no evidence of significant deterioration in the critical \\.'Jelds sampled since the plant began commercial operation in 1971.
These inspections have confirmed the low probability of the pipe break.
The causes of MSIV failures experienced in the pa~t have been identified and corrected, and MSIV operability is verified during each refueling outage by the valve closure time test required by Technical Specification 4.8.
The staff recommends that the MSIV tests in the current (1983}
outage be conducted as close to normal operating temperature as practical to enhance the confirmation of valve reliability.
On this basis~ the staff concludes that the extension you have requested to continue the evaluation of this issue is acceptable.
The results of your evaluation are to be submitted by September 13 1984.
You should pl an to provide preliminary results to all ow sufficient time for the staff's revie\\tJ prior to the implementation of any necessary corrective actions.
If, as a result of this further evaluation, CPCo concludes that the MSIV modification is necessary, that modification is to be made during the 1985 refueling outage.
cc:
K.
Toner~ CPCo Service list - Palisades
- See pre~ious tissue for concurrences.
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NRC FORM 318 110/801 NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY U.S. GPO 1983-400-247
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Davi~ Jo Vande~Jalle
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In a meeting with CPGo on July 26, 1983, the staff noted that there are considerable uncertainties in probabilistic analyses beyond the design-basis events. Moreover, the staff has expressed its concern regarding your ability to demonstrate the decay heat removal function for such events.
However~ the staff believes that your proposed eval uation,A)f alternatives is desirable because it might result in a mpre-effective corrective action that \\'IOuld provide a broader range offprotection (i.,e.~
higher reliability for several events).
Continued plant operation, in the interim, is acceptable based on the low probability of the pipe break and the relative reliability of the existing MSIVs.
Inservice insepction of the main-steam piping conducted during the refueling outages in 1979 and 1983~ in accordance with Technical Specification 4.12, found no evidence of significant deterioration in the critical welds sampled since the plant began commercial operation in 1971.
These insp<=ct ions have conf1 rmed the low probab i1 i ty of the pipe break.
The causes of MSIV failures experienced in the past have been identified and corrected, and MSIV operability is verified during each refueling outage by the valve closure time test required by Technical Specification 4.8.
The staff recommends that the MSIV tests in the current (1983) outage be conducted as close to normal operating temperature as practical to enhance the confinnat1on of valve reliabilitya On this basis, the staff concludes that the extension you have requested to continue the evaluation of this issue is acceptable.
The results of your evaluation are to be submitted by September lt 1984.
You should plan to provide preliminary results to allow sufficient time for the staff 1s review prior to the implementation of any necessary corrective actions.
If, as a result. of this further evaluation, CPCo concludes that the MSIV modification is necessary, that modification is to be made during the 1985 refueling outage.
cc:
K. Toner, CPCo Service list - Palisades Si nee rely, Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing OFFICE~ **** ~~-~~ :.Q~........ -~-~P.~.=. P.L........ ~.. P.~.=.~.~......... Qg~.~~=.~~......... QR~.~?.:-~~-........ ~~-=.?.~.=.~.~........... ~.=. ~-~*......
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NRC FORM 3101101001NRCM0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
- u~s. GPO 1983-400-241
David to confirm assumptions regarding the secondary system decay heat removal function, except that the evaluation and subsequent procedural revisions should address the effect of the cooldown and repressurization on the primary system to avoid pressurized thermal. shock of the vessel.
In a meeting with CPCo on July 26, 1983, the staff noted that there are considerable uncertainties in probabilistic analyses beyond the design-basis events.
Moreover, the staff has expressed its concern regarding your ability to demonstrate the decay heat removal function for* such events and the consequences of excessive cooldown on the reactor vessel.
However, the staff believes* that your proposed evaluation of alternatives is desirable because it might result in a more effective corrective action that would provide a broader range of protection (i.e., higher reliability for several events).
Continued plant operation, in the interim, is acceptable based on the low probability of the pipe break and the improved reliability of the existing MSIVs.
Inservice inspection of the main-steam piping conducted during the refueling outages in 1979 and 1983, in accordance with Technital Specification 4.12, found no evidence of significant deterioration in the critical welds sampled since the plant began commercial *Operation in 1971.
These inspections have confirmed the low probability of the pipe break.
The causes of MSIV failures experienced in the past have been identified and corrected, and MSIV operability is verified during each refueling outage by the valve closure time test required by Technical Specification 4.8.
The staff recommends that the MSIV tests in the current (1983}
outage be conducted.as close to normal operating temperature as practical to enhance the confirmation of valve reliability.
On this basis, the staff concludes that the extension you have requested to continue the evaluation of this issue is acceptable.
The results of your evaluation are to be submitted by September l, 1984.
You should plan to provide preliminary results to allow sufficient time for the staff's review prior to the implementation of any necessary corrective actions.
If, as a result of this further evaluation, CPCo concludes that the MSIV modification is necessary, that modification is to be made during the Cycle 8 (presently scheduled for 1986} refueling outage.
cc:
K. Toner, CPCo Service list - Palisades Sincerely,
~
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Mr. David J. VandeWalle cc M. I. Miller, Esquire Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite 4200 One Pirst National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secretary Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Judd L. Bacon, Esquire Consumers Power Company 212 West Michtgan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 James G.
Keppl~r, Regional Administrator.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region-III 799 Roosevelt.Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Township Supervisor Covert Townshi.
Route 1, Box 10 Van Buren County, Michigan 49043 Office of the Governor (2)
Room 1 - Capitol Building Lansing, Michigan 48913 Palisades Plant ATTN:
Mr. Robert Montross Plant Manager Covert, Michigan 49043 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Federal Activities Branch Region V Office ATTN:
Regional Radiation Representative 230 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 Resident Inspector c/o U. S. NRG Palisades Plant Route 2, P. O. Box 155 Covert, Michigan 49043 Lee E. Jager, P.E., Chief Environmental and Occupational Health Services Administration Michigan Department of Public Health.
3500 N. Logan Street Post Office Box 30035 Lansing, Michigan 48909