ML18046B291
| ML18046B291 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1982 |
| From: | Wambach T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Vandewalle D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| TASK-02-03.A, TASK-02-03.B, TASK-02-03.B1, TASK-02-03.C, TASK-2-3.A, TASK-2-3.B, TASK-2-3.B1, TASK-2-3.C, TASK-RR LS5-82-2-76, LSO5-82-02-076, LSO5-82-2-76, NUDOCS 8202230315 | |
| Download: ML18046B291 (20) | |
Text
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. ii i
Docket No. 50-255 LS05 02-076 Mr. David J. VandeWalle Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company 1945 W. Pa rna 11 Road Jackson, Michigan 49201
Dear Mr. VandeWalle:
February 19, 1982
.. ~..
SUBJECT:
PALISADES - SEP TOPIC II-3.A, HYDROLOGIC DESCRIPTION, II-3.B, FLOODING POTENTIAL AND PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS, II-3.B.l, CAPABILITY OF OPERATING PLANTS TO COPE WTIH DESIGN BASIS FLOODING CONDITIONS; AND II-3.C, SAFETY-RELATED WATER SUPPLY (ULIMATE HEAT SINK)
Our letter (Docket No. 50-255, LS05-81-03-076) to you dated March 20, 1981, transmitted for your review the staff's draft evaluation of the subject SEP Topics II-3.A, II-3.B, II-3.B.l, and II-3.C.
Your letter (R.A. Vincent to D.M. Crutchfield) dated August 13, 1981, provided comments on that submittal.
The enclosed eval.uation is the staff's final position on the subject topics.
In summary, these positions are as follows:
o Topic II-3.A, Hydrology Description As stated in the enclosed evaluation, the probable maximum prec1p1-tation is established at 25.5 inches of rainfall over a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> period.
All building structures should be designed to withstand this rainfall.
In addition, the ground water hydrostatic pressure against structures should be based on water height at grade elevations.
o Topic II-3.B, Design Basis Flood The design basis flood level for the Palisades site should be at s~'-f elevation 597.1 feet msl until the NRC can review and concur with
.s J
/
definitive analyses to be presented by Consumers Power Company.
In
/(f a meeting on February 3, 1982, Consumers Power Company summarized
(
)
flood analysis results of a finite element computer model.
The compu-'1)5CA.'-'t 0V
- ter modeling approach predicted a maximum flood level.of approximately 588.4 feet msl.
A schedule for the submittal of this analysis has not Ao-.>!
been provided.
I. f'/\\. c~o.rifs 8202230315 - 820219 -- --- -- -- --.
PDR ADOCK 05000255 p
"i;.~ o Topic II-3.B.l, Coping with a Design Basis Flood The staff's estimated flood level (597.1 feet msl), theoretically poses a threat to the plant because it exceeds the flood level by 2.4 feet whereby the plant can be safely shutdown.
The need for procedures and/
or plant modifications to protect all safety-related equipment neces-sary to achieve a safe shutdown condition will be determined following resolution of Topic II-3.B, Design Basis Flood.
o Topic II-3.C, uatimate Heat Sink As stated in the enclosed analysis, if no additional protective action is taken tHe* ultimate heat sink pumps will be lost if flooding exceeds 594.7 feet msl.
This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for Palisades.
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/enclosure:
See next page NRC FORM 318 (10/80) NRCM 0240
... ~J.~.~--
Sincerely, Thomas V. Wambach, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Divi~ion of Licensing
Mr. David J. VandeWalle
. cc M.* I. Miller, Esquire
- Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite 4200 One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secretary Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue.
Jackson, Michigan 49201
- Judd L. Bacon, Esquire Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Myron M. Cherry, Esquire Suite 4501
- One IBM Plaza
- Chicago, Illinois 60611 Ms*. Mary P. Si ncl air Great Lakes Energy Alliance 5711 Summerset Drive Mtdland, Michigan 48640
.~alamazoo Public Library 315 South Rose Street Kalamazoo, Michigan 49006 Township Supervisor Covert Townshi Route 1, Box 10 Van Buren County, Mic.hi gan 49043 Office of the.Governor* (2)
Room l - Capitol Building Lansing, Michigan 48913
- Wi 11 i am J. Scanlon, Esquire 2034 Pauline Boulevard Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103
.Pal isades**Plant ATTN:
Mr. Robert Montross Plant Manager Covert, Michigan 49043 Palisades Dock~t No.*50-255
~ev. 2/8/82 U. s: Environmental Protection Agency Federal Activities Branch Region V Office ATTN: *Regional Radiation Representative 230 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60694 Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr *. George C. Anderson Dep~rtment of Oceanography University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195 Dr. M. Stanley Livingston 1005 Calle Largo Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 Resident Inspector c/o U. S. NRC Palisades Plant Route 2, P. o. Box 155 Covert, Michigan 49043 James G. Keppier, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137
... :.*e*.
SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM
- ~*
TOPICS *rr-3.A,.II-3.B, II-3.B.l, AND 11-3.C PALISADES.
PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT A.
INTRODUCTION This section provides a brief descr~ption of the hydrologic features of the site and surrounding area.
Additionally, both surface and groundwater and their interfaces with.plant safety~related buildings and systems are described..
The De~ign Basis Flood for the plant is developed, u~ing current criteria, and is compare~ to the design bas{s eveht used when the plant was built. Deviations and their safety significance are discus~ed.* In.
addition to~ Design.Basis Flood from offsite sources, a local Probable Maximum Flood resulting from Probable Maximum Precipitation on the plant area is.also developed to dete,rmine flood potential from the local runoff.
- Where physical protectio~ is used to prevent plant flooding, the design and design bases are reviewed and ~ompared to current criteria. The variations.,
if any, and their safety significance with respect to structural and equipment distress are discussed.
The Desi.gn Ba.s_is Groundw~ter -~evel is determined in accordanc*e with I
current cr.iteria. There are no Permanent d'.?\\*latering s~1stems at th::
Palisades Plant.
- The information used to perfonn the reviews was gathered from the licensee's files, NRC files, and the site visit.
In some cases, detailed information was not available.
In such cases, the staff and its consultants conservatively estimated any parameters required for analysis.
For this evaluation the staff consultants were the u.s.* Army Coastal Engineering Research Center and the Franklin Research Cent~r.
s.* CURRENT REVIEW CRITERIA The current criteria applicable to this topic area:
{1) Standard Review Plans 2.4.l, 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.5, 2.4.7,*2.'4.8, 2.4.10, 2.4.11, 2.4.12 and Branch Technical Position HGEB-1, 2.4.14, 3.4.1 and 9.2.S;(l)
(2)
{2) Regulatory Guides 1.102, 1.127, 1.27, 1.59, and 1.70; and (3) American National Standard Institute Standard Nl70-1976. (3)
Regulatory Guides 1.59 and 1.102 have been specifically identified by the NRC's Regulatory Requirements Review Committee as needing conside~ation for backfit on operating reactors.
These guides were utilized herein for determining whether the facility design complies with current criteria, or as the bases'for equivalent alternatives acceptable to the staff.
Thg* acceptability or nonacceptability of any deviations ideQtified in this evaluation and the need* for further action will be judged during the integrated assessment for this facility. The judgement will include structural a*nd system reviews of groundwater and surface water levels, associated loadings and submergence for safety related buildings and equipment.
.,i. C.
RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES Interface topics are:
II-4.E, Dam Integrity, III-3.A, Effects of High Water Level on Structures, 1 )
- 2)
- 3) III-3.B, Structural and Other Consequences {e.g., Flooding ofSafety-
- 4)
- 5)
- 6)
- 7)
. 8)
- 9)
Related Equipment in Basements) of Failure of Underdrain Systems, III-6, Seismic Design Considerations, VII-3, Systems Required for Safe Shutdown, VIII-2, Onsite Emergency Power Systems - Diesel Generator, IX-3, Station Service and Co9ling Water Systems, XVI, Technical Specifications; and III-7.B, Design Codes, Design Criteria, Load Combinations and Reactor Cavity Design Criteria.
- Hydr~logic review and inp~t related to Topic III-3.C, 11 Inservice Inspection of Water Control Structures 11 will be provided in anoth~r document.
To~ic III-3.B, 11Structural and Other Consequences of Failure of Underdrain Systems 11 is not ap-pl i cable to the Pai i sades Pl ant si nee no-. permanent dewateri ng sy_stems are associ-.
ated with either safety or non-safety related buildings and equipment.
D.
REVIEW GUIDELINES Three areas will be examined:
- 1) the flood potential from severe local precipitation,
- 2) the flood potential and ice effects from Lake Michigan; and
- 3) groundwater levels.
- In all area.s, only the safe~y related aspects will be considered with respect to*:
present NRG staff criteria, whether the external events can themselves lead to accidents resulting in a release of radioactivity, and quantification of the differences between present staff criteria and existing capabilities.
The safety significance of each subject is discusse*d.
~ *' E.
HYDROLOGIC EVALUATION
- 1.
HYDROLOGIC DESCRIPTION The site is located on the eastern shore of Lake Michigan.
The lake is about 240 miles long and. 60 miles wide, and ha~ two major basins.
The southern basin, on which the plant is located, extends southward of a line between Milwaukeei Wisconsin and Grand Haven, Michigan and is smaller and shallower than the northern basin.
The average monthly lake l~vel based on over 100 years of records is 578.73 feet above the International Great Lakes Datum (feet !GLD).. !GLD in the plant area can be converted to Mean Sea Level Datum (msl) by adding 1.558 fe~t to the !GLD value. This conversion is actually for St.. Joseph, Michigan, but is representative of the plant site. The highest and lowest mean monthly stillwater lake levels were 581.94 feet IGLD *and 575.35 feet !GLD, respectively.
During a mild winter, Lake Mich~gan can be expected to be covered 10 percent by ice. During a normal and severe winter the ice cover is apout 40 percent and 80 percent, respectively.
An ice cover about one foot thick can be expected in a normal or severe winter.
In many areas of the Great Lakes wind driven ice ridges have adversely influenced structures. The intake crib is located well offshore (some 3,000 feet) ana the closest safety related structure is the screenhouse~ 0hich is located back from the shoreline.
The surface of the land on the southern shore of.Lake Michigan, near the site, rises in sand dunes from an upper beach elevation of about 600 ft.
msl to a maximum elevation of 740 feet msl, and then drops abruptly to 610 feet msl about.2400 feet from the lakeshore.
e*. There are no perennial or intermittent ~treams on the site, or near enough to the site to constitute a flood threat. Consequently, there are no dams whose failure would" constitute a threat to the plant.
The main plant area and buildings are at approximately ~rade elevation 589.0 feet msl.
This level is ~bout 5.5 feet above the h1ghest Lake Michigan mean monthly level.
Grade level entrance doors a~e at elevation 590.0 feet msl.
Safety.related equipment below elevation 590.0 ft. *msl is protected from Lake Mi~higan flooding (surges and wind driven waves) to that general level by submarine type floodproof doors and/or* curbs on floor openings.
The service water pump motors are the controlling (lowest) safety equipment which are unprotected against flooding and are located at elevation 594.67*
ft msl.
Other important equipment that may be affected by water from surges or seiches entering the plant includes:
the condensate pumps,
- 4160V (Bus lA/Bus lB) an~ 2400 V (Bus lE) switchgear, the hydrogen seal ciil unit, fire pumps, fe~dwater pumps, and the instrtiment air compressors.
The int~k~ crib and connecting pipeline and submarine type flood doors are considered wat~r control struc~ures that will be included under topic I
III-3.C, 11 Inspettion of Water-Control Structures Associated with Nuclear Power Plants.
11
.... 2.0 FLOOD POTENTIAL AND*PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS.
2.1 LOCAL FLOODING Independent estimates were made of the flood levels which would occur at safety related buildings, assuming an occurrence of a* very intense local storm.
The local Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) was used as the measure of the upper level of storm severity necessary for.consideration under the present staff criteria.
Rainfall was assvmed to occur in the immediate plant vicinity, including the sand dune area east of the plant, and the res~lting run~ff ~as determined to move overland toward Lake Michigan.
Point-rainfall depths used to numefically~escribe Probable Maximum Precip-itation (25.5 inches in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />) were obtained from Hydrometeorological Report No. 51,(4) for the 13.9 acre drainage area.
The time of drainage area concentratio~ and the resulting peak runoff discharge rate (555 cubic.
feet per second) were computed using methods described in Design of Small
- Dams. (5) Part of the resulting flood water would pond in the concrete surface water collection *well east of the service building.
The staff.
di~ not have enough post-construction topographic information to accurately determine the division o'f flow around the plant buildings.
In order to approximate the elevation for the service building, it was assumed that one-:half of *the 555 cfs w*ould 'flow toward the service, building.
In such a situation~water would pond to a depth of five feet on the east side of the service building.
For the remainder of the plant area the runoff,
water depth would be less than six inches above ground elevation and should not constitute a flood threat. The licensee has indicated(5) that-the
- . e."e.*..
service building is not* safety related.
The staff concludes, therefore; that~ 1With one exception, a severe 1ocal storm cannot adversely effect.
safety related facil itie?,_ ev.e~ for events as severe as used by *the staff for licens~n~ new reactors.
~he one exception relates to wHether severe local precipitation can exceed the capacity of drainage features_on the roof and plant structures. This issue i*s addressed in SEP Topic.. 'iri~7.8, Design Coqe, Design Criteria, Load ~ombinations, -an.d Reactor Cavity Design Criteria.
- 2. 2 LA.KE MICHIGAN FLOODING AND ICE EFFECTS j
Visual observations during the SEP site visit" ind.icate that the only protection against the erosional forces of Lake Michigan is ripra~ on the beach~ south of the mixing basin.
In considering the erosion potential of waves from Lake Michigan with respect to safetY related facilities,.we.
conclude the location of such structures is adequate to prevent water inquced erosion from a severe event from adversely affec~ing the plant.
The potential for wind driven ice ridges in Lake Michigan,_.which occur relatively frequently, to adversely influence the plant was considered.
For example, *th.e effect on the cooling water make-up capability was examined.
The intake c~ib is 3150 feet 6ffshore and the top deck is approximately 20 feet below* the mean low water level in Lake Michig~n. The original crib structure was severely damaged cy a combination of ice and wave action.
The present crib structure was designed to withstand substantially gr~ater forces than the original crib but the possibility of future progressive damage.over
- the*years can not be ruled out.
The system was originally designed to provide 390,000 gpm of cooling water on a once through basis plus service water flow.
However, the installation of cooling towers at the site reduced the water ~equirement to 16,000 gpm service water and 60,000 gpm dilution water flow.
It is unlikely that a failure of the intake crib would completely block the 11 foot diameter buried intake pipe.
Should the intak~ pipe be completely blocked, there is still an alternate source of intake water available from the* discharge mixing basin which has direct access *to Lake Michigan during normal lake levels. It is our understanding that this alternate system can prov.ide service water*
~Y opening and closing two valves.
. The licensee has not submitted for NRC review any calculations
- relevant to the evaluation of the surge in the southern basin of Lake.
Michigan associated with a Probable.Maximum meteorological event, nor its effects on the design and operation of the plant.
Our consultant, the U._S. Army Coastal Engineering Research Center (CERC), previously deve1*oped(s, 9) a Probable Maximum Surge (PMS) for the Palisades site of 13.6 feet using the method presented in a paper entitled "The Prediction of Surges i"n the.Southern Basin of.Lake Michigan" by G. W. Platzman, S. M. Ivish and L. A. Hughes, Monthly Weather Revie~, Vol. 93, No. 5, May 1965.
The 13.6 foot surge added to the maximum historical monthly lake level of 583.5 ft msl (581.94 feet IGLD) yields a Probable Maximum Surge level of 597.1 feet msl and is the current criteria design Qasis
- flood level for the Palisades Plant. This level is 8.1 feet *above grade level.
.*.
- Short period wave activity must also be considered in addition to surge level for review of Topic III-3.A, Effects of High Water Level on Structures.
We have postulated 60 knot winds over a 123 mile Lake Michigan fetch.
Our analysis indicates the fro~t wall of the intake screenhouse could see a
. maximum force of 27,300 pounds per foot ~f wall length.
The level ~f appl i-cation of the "resultant" force is 596.5 feet msl.
The waves would runup to about elevation 605 feet msl.
We recognize that the assumption of wind speed and duration may be conservative.
SEP Topic III-3.A, Effects of High Water Level on Str.uctures, evaluated this load and concluded that the intake struc-ture is acceptable.
The licensee and architect engineer (conference phone call to NRG on October 1, 1980) concluded that the design basis flood level for construction was probably the high mean monthly lake level of record (583.5 feet msl) plus a 6.0 foot surge or elevation 589.5 feet msl.
They also stated that the flood level was probably not a factor in any structural analyses.
The maximum flood level for which the plant can safely shu~down is pro-vided in Amendment 15 to the FSAR.
Question 2.4 therein states:
"What is.the maximum increase in lake level above the 590.0 ft msl design value due to an especially severe seiche or storm surge for
. which the plant could be shutdown safely", with or with 0out. special procedures and provisions executed at the time of flooding?"
The licensee response was:
"The auxiliary building is safe from flooding up to elevation 603 ft. msl.
The floor at 590 ft.. msl is protec~ed against entry of water by watertight marine-type doors to be installed at the.
exterior entrance of the diesel generator room, at doorways at
- .elevatio~ 590 ft. msl between the auxiliar~ building and the tu~bine building, and at the doorway connecting the boiler room with the auxiliary building.
The cont~inment building and tendon access gallery are of watertight construction and are inherently safe against flooding.
The auxiliary feed pump room in the turbine b~ilding is protected from flooding by a watertight door to be installed-at.the entrance from the condensate pump room and by watertight seals around other *penetrations to the room~
The service water pump motor windings in the screenhouse are above elevation *594.67 ft msl.
The remainder of these pumps are not affected. by high water.
Protection of the auxi 1 i ary bui 1 ding and the auxil i*ary feed pump room provides the ability to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition with flood levels up to elevation 594.67 ft msl. The service water pump motors are the limiting item of equipment at 594.67 ft msl:
The equipm~nt available with water levels at 594.67 ft msl includes the auxiliary feed-water pumps, shutdown cooling equipment, ~omponent cooling equipment, emergency diesel generators and engineered safeguards equipment."
e*.
-11 ~
Based upon the assessment above, we *conclude that at least one effect, namely submergence above *elevation 594. 67 feet msl, co~~titutes a *safety concern.
This level is 5.67 feet above ~lant grade and 11.17 fee~ above the historical maximum mean monthly lake level.
We have conservati~ely estimated that the likelihood of an event that would produce.a f1ood level to elevation 594.67 feet msl could be as great as io-4 per year.
The*licensee has taken exception(6, lO) to ~he estimate of the design basis.surge level (597.l ft ~sl).
We requested o~r second consultant,
- the Franklin Research Center (FRC) to review the bases for the ex.cepti on J
and the original 13.6 foot surge estimate made by our other consultant in 1969.*
FRC concluded(?) that the exception was without merit.
The bases for the* conclusion are comparisons o'f hydrography (water depths and* bottom slopes) at a number of locati*ons.
In a meeting on February 3, 1982, the licensee presented results of a recent analysis that predicted significant lower flood levels (588.4 ft. ms!).
The schedule for submittal of this analysis has not been established.
In the meantime, until the NRC can re~
view this new analysis the 13.6 foot surge is considered the equivalent of c~~rent licensing_ criteria for design.basis flooding..
FRC has noted the existence of a Litensee Emergency Operating Procedure
.(EDP) for coping with severe Lake Michigan surges. This review indicated that the EOP did not provide sufficient guidance to plant opera~ors or
-.other 1 i censee personne 1 with respect to act i ans necessary in the event-of ~evere surges.
We support this finding, and conclude that any surge.
above elevation 594.67 feet MSL*has.~.relatively hlgh like1ih6od of failin~
e*. :..
all the equipment and r~lated systems indicated in sectio~ E.1.
we agree. with FRC's conclusions(?) with re~ard to the licensee's Moreove*r, I
prov1 s ions}
to cope with high lake levels and surgs ~nd we conclude that the existing/
procedures a~e not adequate t~ deal with Lake Michigan_flood.leveis}
above 594.67 ft msl.
3.0 DESIGN BASIS GROUNDWATER LEVELS No dotketed information is curr~ntly availabl~ regarding actual groundwater levels. The architect engineer (conference phone call of October 1, 1980) has stated that design calculations f*or below grade structures and liquefaction both used a grouridw~ter level of 585.0 fe~t ms1.
Since no info~mation is.available to substantiate an upper limit groundwater level for design bases, the staff recommends that structural analyses of other than flood scenarios use a groundwater elevation at grade l eve 1. This would vary from about elevation 589.0 ft msl on the
- east* side of the plant to about elevation 625 ft msl, on the west side of the plant.
Should this conservative assumption lead to unacceptable structural. problems, then groundwater hydrographs for the site would be requiied to substantiate the uppe~ limit of groundwater fluctuations.
These hy~r~static l~ads on structures were evaluated in Topic III-3.A, Effects of High *water Level on Structures and were:found to be acceptable.
The licensee states that the Palisades plant does not have a perman-ent dewatering system that is used to lower the normal groundwater 1 evel.
e*.
,/**
4.0 REFERENCES
- 1. Standard Review Plans, NUREG 0800 (formerly NUREG 75/087},
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Corrrnission, Office of *Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
- a.
2.4.1 Hydrologic Description
- b.
2.4.2 Floods
- c.
2.4.3 - Probable Maximum Floo~ (PMF) on Streams and Rivers
- d.
2.4.5 - Probable Maximum Surge and Seich~ Flooai~g
- e.
2~4.7 - Ice Effects
- f.
2.4.8 - Cooling.Water Canals and Reservoirs
- g.
2.4.10 - Flooding Protection Requi.rements
.h. *2.4.11 - Low Water Considerations
- i. 2.4.12 Groundwater
- j. 2.4.14 Technical Specifications and Emergency Operation Requirements
- k.
3.4.1 - Fiood Protection
- 1.
9.2.5 Ultimate Heat Sink
- 2.
R~gulatory Guides_, U.S. Nuclear RegL:latory Commission, Office of Stan6ards Development.
- a.
1.102 - Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants
- b.
1.127 - Inspection of Water Control Structures.Associated with Nuclear Power Plants
- c. 1.27 Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants-
- d.
1.59 - Design Basis Floods for Nuc1e~r Power-Plants
- e.
1.70 - Standard Format. and* Content of )afety Ana*lysis Reports ~or Nuclear.Power Plants, NUREG-75/094.
- 3.
American National Standard N170-1976, 11Standards for Determining Design Basis Flooding at Power Reactor Sites, 11 Published by the American Nuclear Society (ANS-2.8).
- 4.
U.S. Departm.ent of Commerce, National Oc.eanic and Atmospheric Administration - U.S. Department of the Army Corps of Engineers, Hydrorieteor1ogica1 Report No. 51, June 1978, "Probable Maximum Precipitation Estim~tes; United States East*of the 105th Meridian."
- 5.
U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau *o*f Reclamation (now the Water and Power Service), 1977, "Design of Small Dams.
11
- 6.
Consumers Power Company ltr, R. A. Vincent to Dr., NRR, dated, August 13, 1981, Docket No. 50-255.
- 7.
Franklin Research Center Techni ca 1 Eva 1 uati o.n RepC?rt, Hydrol ogic Considerations for Palisades Nuclear Power Station, FRC Task 418, dated November 13, 1981.
- 8.
U.S. Army Coastal Engineerfog Research Center,~ ltr from A. C. Rayner to R. S. Boyd, dated October 17, 1968, Docket Nos. 50-315 and 316.
- 9.
U.S. Army Coastal Engineering Research Center, ltr J. M. taldwell to R. S. Boyd, d~ted October 30, 1~69, Docket No. 50-255.
- 10.
Consumers Power Company ltr, R. A. Vincent to Dr, flRR; dated September 28, 1981, Docket.No; 5Q-255,
e*.
TOPIC II-3.C SAFETY RELATED WATER SUPPLY (UHS)
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This topic reviews the acc~ptability of a particular feature of the cooling water ~ystem, namely, the Ulti~ate Heat Sink (UHS).
The review is based on current criteria contained in Regulatory Guide l.27(l)_ (Rev; 2) which is an interpretation of General Design Criteria 44, "Cooling Water" and General Design Criteria 2, Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
This regulatory guide has been specifically.identified by the NRC's Regulatory Requirements Review.Committee as needing consideration for b~ckfit on operating reactors. This guide is utilized in determining whether the facility design complies with current criteria, or.the facility has some equivalent alternatives acceptable to the staff. The acceptability or non-acceptability of any deviations identified in this evaluation and the need for ~urther action will be judged during the integrated assessment for.this facility.
In addition to Regulatory Guide 1.27, guidance is also confained in:
Standard Review Plans 2.4. ll and 9.2.5, (2) American National Standards Institute Standard N17Q-i976,(3) and Regulatory Guides 1.59 and 1:127.(l)
The UHS as reviewed under this -topic is that complex of Wi;iter sources, including necessary retaining structures (e.g., a pond with its dam or a cooling tower supply basin) and the canals or conduits ~onnecting the source with but not including, the cooling water system intake structures.
This topic interfaces with Topic numbers II-3.B, III-1, III-3.A, III-3.B, III-3.6, III-6, VI-7.D, VII-3, VII-4, VIII-2, IX-3, XV-24, and.XVI, for the review of structures containing the safety related water supply system, the systems themselves and eme*rgency electrical power.
- 2.0 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (UHS)
The ultimate heat sin~ for the Palisades Plant is Lake Michigan.*
Water is withdrawn by pumping from Lake Michigan*via an intake crib thrdugh service water pumps located tn the screen* house,* Based on our analyses, t.he ultimate heat sink complex would meet current regalatory criterta with regard to f1 coding except for an occurrence of the Probable Maximum Surge on Lake Michigan.
Flooding at the screen house would inundate the service
- water pumps (see the review for To~ics II-3.A and B), and fire water pumps.
A review of the surge mechanism indicates that the wtnd-i.nduced setdown of the water surface can theoret{cally equal tbe setup (i.e., surge).
The actual setdown would be l~ss. Using the probable maximum surge height of 13 *. 6 feet and the lowe~t mean monthly lake level of record ~76.91 feet msl) results in a probable maximum lake level of 563.31 feet msl, This level would not cause a loss of cooling water over the intake crib which is at about elevation 558.9 feet msl.
e*.
- e The seismic capa6ility of UHS structures* and conveyances is determined to be Seismic Class 1 as evaluated in Topic III-6~Seismic Design Consider-ations).
Therefo~e, we conclude that the cooling water from Lake Michigan will be physically present arid *available after a major earthquake.
3.0 REFERENCES
(1) u.s.*Nuc1ear Regulatory Commission, Office* of Standards Pevelopment, Regulatory Guides.
(a)
- 1. 127 -
11 Inspection of \\.later Control Structures Associated.
with Nuclear Power Plants".
. {b) 1.27 - "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants" (c) 1.59 - "Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants" (2)
U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Corrmission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Standard Review Plans, NUREG-0800 (formerly NUREG-75/087).
(a) 2.4.11 - "Low Water Considerations"
{b) 9.2.5 - "Ultimate Heat Sink" (3). American National Standards* Institute, Standaid N170-1976, "Standard for Determining Design Basis Flooding at Power Reactor Sites, published by the American Nuclear Society_ (ANS-2.8).
.*