ML18045A282

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Response to NRC 800418 Interrogatories Re Civil Penalty Proceeding.Includes Info Re Sept 1979 Discovery of Two locked-open Manual Containment Isolation Valves & Associated Radiation Releases.Certificate of Svc & Documents Encl
ML18045A282
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/23/1980
From: Mark Miller, Murphy P
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.), ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE
To:
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
Shared Package
ML18045A283 List:
References
NUDOCS 8006300513
Download: ML18045A282 (51)
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In the Matter of )

} Docket No. 50-255 CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY ) License No. DPR-20 (Palisades Nuclear Power Facility) } (Civil Penalty)

CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF INTERROGATORIES AND DOCUMENT REQUESTS Pursuant to the Agreed Order entered by the Ad.min-istrative Law Judge on June 9, 1980, Consumers Power Company

("Consumers"} submits the following answers, objections and documents in response to the NRC Staff's discovery requests initiated on April 18, 1980:

All persons identified in the answers to NRC Staff Interrogatories to Consumers Power Company, unless otherwise indicated, are employees of Consumers Power Company with the following address and telephone number:

Palisades Nuclear Plant Covert, Michigan 49403 (616)764-8913

.General Objection:

Various materials may have been collected, prepared or analyzed in preparation for trial in this proceeding.

Some of these materials may be responsive to some or all of oso3

.s the NRC Staff's Interrogatories. All such materials are exempt from discovery pursuant to 10 CFR §2.740(b} (2) absent

,It the showing provided for therein. The investigations include, 8006300 u5J3 G-

generally, interviews, document reviews and.factual investi-gations by William K. Shideler, Investigator for Consumers,.

Legal Department, Consumers Power Company, 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201, (517)788-0549, Judd L~

Bacon, Managing Attorney for Consumers, Consumers Power Com-pany, 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201, (517)788-1366, Paul M. Murphy and Alan P. Bielawski, outside counsel for Consumers, Isham, Lincoln & Beale, One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois 60603, (312)558-7537~

In addition, various physical tests have been initiated at the request of counsel. These are currently on-going or the results are under analysis. Any further description of such investigations, or the identity of the persons collecting, preparing, analyzing or currently in possession of the results would tend to disclose the mental impressions, con-clusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of Consumers.

Interrogatory No. 1 Describe each investigation conducted or being conducted by Consumers Power Company since September 11, 1979, into the circumstances surrounding the discovery on that date of two locked-open manual containment isolation valves in Contain-ment Building penetration 4a. at the Palisades Nuclear Power Facility. In addition, (a) Identify the persons who have conducted or participated in each of these investigations on behalf of Consumers Power Company. Identify these persons' position or other relationship to Consumers Power Company.

(b) Identify all persons interviewed by Consumers Power Company or its agents during the course of each of these investigations. For each person so identified,

  • ,ji (i)

Identify his or her position with, or other rela-tionship to, Consumers Power Company; (ii) Identify the date on which and the person (or persons) by whom such person was interviewed; (iii) Describe the purpose of the interview and summarize the information elicited from the interviewee; (iv) Identify any transcript, affidavit, memorandum, or other document prepared as a result of such. inter-view; (v) Identify any documents which refer to or discuss the interview.

(c) For each of these investigations provide the date the investigation was completed or is expected to be com-pleted, the results of each investigation, and if the results differ from the conclusions and analysis pre-sented in the Consumers Power Company's Licensee Event Report 79-037 (dated September 28, 1979 and revised October 31, 1979) the basis for the changed conclusion or analysis. If an investigation is not yet completed, provide the results when completed.

(d) State whether any tests, experiments, or other analyses have been performed as a part of these investigations on any equipment used at the Palisades Nuclear Power Facility. For each test, experiment or analysis, (i) Identify each piece of equipment so tested or analyzed in such experimentation and identify the purpose for which such equipment is used at the Palisades Nuclear Power Facility.

(ii) Identify the date on which the equipment was tested or analyzed and identify the persons who performed the tests, experiments, or other analyses to which the equipment .was subjected.

(iii) State the purpose for conducting such testing, experimentation or analysis of the equipment, i.e.,

what were the results of the testing intended ~

show and what conclusions may be drawn from the test results?

(iv) Describe the methodology used in the test, experi-ment, or analysis. This description should include an identification of the assumptions, techniques, conditions, and other relevant parameters used in performing the test, experiment, or analysis.

(v)

Describe the results of the test, experiment, or analysis and include in this description the con-cl us ions which Consumers Power draws from these results. Identify the person or persons who ana-lyzed the resul ts and drew those conclus.ions for Consumers Power Company.

(vi) Identify all documents which relate or refer to the test, experiment, or analysis.

Answer

1. On or about September 13, 1979, Bernard L. Schaner, the Palisades Operations Supervisor, investigated the Sep-tember 11, 1979 discovery of the two locked-open manual containment isolation valves at Containment Building penetration 4a. Mr. Schaner did so by reviewing plant records and interviewing various plant employees. on September 20, 1979, the Palisades Plant Review Committee held a special meeting to review the probable sequence of events as outlined at the meetings by H. W. Keiser, Palisades Plant Operations/Maintenance Superintendent.

Those in attendance were James G. Lewis, Palisades Plant General Manager, G. H. R. Petitjean, Palisades.

Plant Technical Engineer, J. J. Palmer, Palisades Plant Technical Superintendent. H. W. Keiser, R. E. Mieras, Palisades Plant Shift Supervisor, and B. L. Schaner.

The Committee did not conduct any interviews. The conclusions from this limited investigation were those presented in Consumers' Licensee Event Report 79-037 dated September 28, 1979, which was authored by George H. R. Petitjean.

Any other investigations are subject to our General Objection.

(a) See above.

(b) (i) Ted B. Jones, Palisades Plant Auxiliary Opera-tor; Enos I. Thompson, Palisades Plant Shift Supervisor. Possibly others not now known.

(ii) On or about September 13, 1979. B. L. Schaner.

(iii) To obtain facts to permit the evaluation of the discovery on September 11, 1979, of two locked-open valves in Containment Building penetration 4a.

See attached document A.

(iv) There are no notes of the interviews as such, but attached documents A and B reflect the results of the interviews.

(v) None.

(c) Our investigations continue. No conclusions have been reached. See our General Objection.

(d) See our General Objection.

Interrogatory No. 2 Describe all calculations or estimates which Consumers Power Company has made of radiation releases or doses which might be incurred as a consequence of the manual containment iso-lation valves being open during normal or accident conditions.

(a) Describe the accident or other incident postulated to have led to such radiation releases or doses.

(b) Describe all other assumptions which influence the cal-culation or estimate.

(c) Identify the date on which the calculation or estimate was made and identify the person or persons who made the calculation or estimate.

(d)

Identify the potential radiation releases or doses cal-culated or estimated.

(e) Identify each document which contains or which refers to the calculation or estimation.

Answer

2. Consumers has transmitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, by Attachment to letter of December 6, 1979, from R. C. Youngdahl to Victor Stello, its calculational package describing: (1) the flow through the contain-ment purge bypass system as a function of time after a DBA; (2) an estimate - along with literature referenced -

of charcoal adsorber iodine efficient; (3) calculations showing thyroid doses resulting from this flow and ad-sorber efficiency as a function of time; and (4) calcu-lations of required adsorber ef f ici.ency to meet the dose limits of 10 CFR Part 100. Results of these analyses, as more fully described in the calculational package, show that 10 CFR Part 100 limits are not exceeded for a postulated DBA. See also our General Objection.

Interrogatory No. 3 In the discussion of certain dose calculations on page three of Mr. Youngdahl's letter of November 29, 1979, to Mr. Stello, it is stated that "[w]e espect [sic] to make further refine-ments in the calculation using test data."

(a) Describe the refinements made to the calculations re-ferred to in Mr. Youngdahl's letter; (b) Describe the 2-hour thyroid dose.at the site boundary determined from these revised calculations; (c)

Describe the whole body dose at the site determined from these revised calculations; and (d) Identify all documents in which contain the refined calculations or which refer to the refined calculations&

Answer

3. The calculational package attached to the December 6, 1979 submittal, described in the response to Interroga-tory 2, provides all of the revised calculations and analyses referred to in the November 29, 1979 letter from Mr. R. C. Youngdahl to Victor Stello. As more fully described in the calculational package, the re-vised calculations take into account: (1) the discovery that the purge valves were 4" in contrast to 3" (a fact that increased the flow rate and resulted in an increased whole body and thyroid dose); (2) an increase in char-coal adsorber efficiency which decreased the thyroid dose; and (3) credit for the resistance to flow in the metal ductwork downstream of the filters which decreased both thyroid and whole body doses.

The resulting two-hour thyroid dose resulting from a postulated DBA is 112 rem. (See CPCo Internal Memo JLB 74-79 dated December 5, 1979.)

The resulting two-hour whole body dose resulting from a postulated DBA is 3.75 rem. (See CPCo Internal Memo RWS 168-79 dated-December 5, 1979.)

.v Interrogatory No. 4 Identify the person or persons who installed the replacement HEPA filter in the containment building exhaust valves bypass line (penetration 4a) on April 5, 1978.

(a) State whether this person or these persons opened the two manual containment isolation valves during the replacement of the filter or the functional testing of operability of the replaced filter.

(b) State whether this person or these persons closed the two manual containment isolation valves upon conclusion of the replacement and the testing of the replacement filter. If Consumers Power Company states that the valves were closed at the conclusion of the replacement and testing of the filter, describe the basis for reach-ing such conclusion and, (i) Identify the person who closed the valves; (ii) Identify the date on which said person closed the valves and identify the time at which the valves were closed in relation to the replacement and testing of the new HEPA filter; (iii) Identify the date on which and describe the cir-cumstances under which Consumers Power Company first learned that to this person stated the valves had been closed; (iv) Identify each document relied upon to show that this person or persons closed the valves.

Answer

4. Richard D. Story, Assistant Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor.

(a) No.

(b) No.

Interrogatory No. 5 Identify the person or persons who completed the Containment Integrity Checklist C.L.3.3. prior to the return to operation of the Palisades Nuclear Power Facility in April 1978. In addition,

(_

(a) State whether this person or these persons inspected the condition of the two manual containment isolation valves in penetration 4a. during completion of the checklist. If this person or these persons inspected the valves in penetration 4a., identify the precise time and date at which the valves were inspected and identify the stage of completion of operations involv-ing the replacement and testing of the HEPA filter;* and.

(b) State whether this person or these persons manipulated in any manner the two manual containment isolation valves in penetration 4a. during completion of the checklist *.

State whether this person or these persons closed the two valves. If Consumers Power Company states that the valves were closed by this person or these persons, describe the basis for reaching such conclusion and

{i) Identify the person or persons who closed the valves;

{ii) Identify the time and date on which said person or persons closed the valves;

{iii) Identify the date on which and describe the cir-cumstances under which Consumers Power Company first learned that this person or persons stated the valves were closed; and

{iv) Identify each document relied upon to show that this person or persons closed the valves.

Answer

5. The following persons completed the Containment Integrity Checklist C.L.3.3. prior to the return to operation of the Palisades Plant in April 1978: Jerry Keich, D. Lested, Donald Kaupa, James McEwen and Duane A.

Kaleward, all of whom were Auxiliary Operators, and Charles Smith, Shift Supervisor.

{a) One of the above persons, James McEwen, inspected the test port located between the two valves at penetration 4a., and inspected other penetrations in the vicinity, during completion of the check-

.v list. The checklist did not call for Mr. McEwen to inspect the two manual containment isolation valves at penetration 4a. Mr. McEwen states that he has no specific recollection of the position of the valves at the time the checklist was being completed. Mr. McEwen stated, however, that he is familiar with the valves and probably would have noticed and taken corrective action had they been open a~ the time he checked the test port. The location of the test port with respect to the valves is such that it would be difficult to inspect the test port without noticing the condition of the valves. Since Mr. McEwen signed off on the test port and did not take any corrective action with respect to the valves, he believes that they were closed at the time he checked the test port.

The precise time and date at which Mr. McEwen inspected the test connection at penetration 4a.

is not known with certainty. However, plant docu-ments indicate that this may have been done on April 1 or 2, 1978, between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.

The HEPA filter replacement and testing was not completed until April 6, 1978.

(b) No.

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Interrogatory No. 6 Describe the locking mechanism on the two manual containment isolation valves. In addition, (a) Describe the equipment required to manipulate, i.e.,

to open or close the valves; and (b) Identify all persons who would have had access to such equipment.

Answer

6. A steel chain is threaded through the spokes of the valve operating wheels, through the valve yoke and is joined at the ends with a key-operated padlock.

(a) Unlock the padlock, remove the lock from the chain, remove the chain from the handwheels, operate the handwheels.

(b) Each Auxiliary Operator assigned to areas where locked valves are located, each Shift Supervisor and the Operations Supervisor have the necessary keys. The Shift Supervisor has the custody of an extra key in a locked cabinet at his desk.

Interrogatory No. 7 State whether any person manipulated the manual containment isolation valves between April 5, 1978, and September 11, 1979.

(a) Identify each person who manipulated the valves; (b) Identify the date on which each such person manipulated the valves; (c) Describe the manner in which each such person. manipulated the valves; (d) Identify the date on which and describe the circumstances under which Consumers Power Company first learned that each such person manipulated the valves; and

.t e (e) Identify each document relied upon to show that each such person manipulated the valves.

Answer

7. It appears from existing documentation that the valves were manipulated. However:; we cannot be certain.

(a) We do not know.

(b) Existing documentation would suggest that valves were opened and closed on April 6., 1978. We have not as yet identified any other instances of mani-pulation of the valves during that time frame.

(c) See answer to Interrogatory 6.

(d) Not applicable.

(e) Documents C. D, E.

Interrogatory No. 8 Identify the person who discovered the two manual contain-ment isolation valves in penetration 4a. in a locked-open position on September 11, 1979.

Answer

8. Ted B. Jones, Auxiliary Operator.

Interrogatory No. 9 In his letter of November 29, 1979, to Mr. Stello, Mr. Young-dahl of Consumers Power Company states in effect that there have been "many instances involving similar events, where licensees have not been cited at all for noncompliance or where, if cited, they have been penalized at a much lower level."

(a) Identify each of the "many instances" to which Mr. Young-dahl referred in his letter; (b) State the reasons why each of these "many instances" are similar events" to the incident at the Palisades Nuclear Power Facility.

Answer

1. (a) The "many instances" referred to appeared in NRC press releases and event summaries by NUS Corp's Licensing Information Service and by Nuclear Power Experience, and are listed below. Except where civil penalties are expressly described, none were levied, so far as we are aware.
1. In December 1973, containment integrity at Surry Unit 2 was violated twice. An operator investigat-ing a containment air pressure alarm had entered the airlock and had left the outer door open. As he was investigating air leaking around the inner hatch, the hatch failed to open and was torn from its hinge. The force of the air rushing through the airlock into the containment forced the operator through the open hatch and threw him about 20 feet into a crane. The operator had violated prescribed operating procedures by leaving the outer airlock door open. The second containment integrity vio-lation occurred when containment vacuum was broken following a reactor trip to rescue the injured operator while the reactor was at a stable hot shutdown condition.
2. The quantity of 1,130 gallons of water was released from the laundry tank of the Dresden Plant into the Illinois River through a valve that should have been closed, on August 25, 1974. On Decem-

. \.)

ber 16, 1974, the AEC proposed a fine of $25,500 for 18 apparent violations between June and Sep-tember 1974. The penalty was paid on December 20, 1974.

3. In October 1974 at Point Beach Unit 1, it was dis-closed that a 3/8" airlock gauge valve was open, perm~tting air to flow from the airlock to the atmosphere, so that whenever the inner door of the airlock was opened, containment integ.ri ty would be violated. The licensee calculated that contain~

ment integrity could have been violated for about three hours over a three-day period and that

.113 microcuries of particulate activity and 3.78 x 104 microcuries of gaseous activity could have been released. It was not determined how the valve was opened, but it was presumed to have been accidentally opened as a means of venting the air-lock during an exit by a group of men.

4. In December 1975, containment integrity at Trojan was violated for up to five minutes of each hour over a 17-hour period while the inner door of the' personnel airlock was open and a 3" pipe penetra-tion parallel with the outer door was also open.

S. On July 12, 1977, when Zion Unit 2 was shut down to repair "water hammer" damage, a routine sur-veillance test was conducted improperly, resulting in some safety circuits being disabled temporarily,

. L so that part of the ECCS actuating circuitry would not have responded automatically in the event of a cooling pipe break. In proposing the civil penal-ties, NRC cited "continuing management inadequacies" at all three operating Commonwealth Edison reactors.

The civil penalty of $21,000, proposed on October 4, 1977, was paid on October 17, 1977.

6. In November 1977, while Quad, Cities Unit 1 was at 93% power, secondary containment integrity was violated twice when both the inner and outer access doors to the reactor building were opened at the same time to accommodate a radwaste truck. A plant staff assistant had misinterpreted the tech-nical specifications requirement for secondary containment integrity. Also, the electrical inter-locks installed on the doors to prevent both from opening simultaneously were not operable.
7. On four occasions, while Hatch Unit 1 was at power during the period September 1977 through January 1978, secondary containment was violated as per-sonnel inadvertently opened both reactor to control building airlock doors at the 130-foot elevation.

An additional event occurred when the airlock doors at the 164-foot elevation were opened. Three additional events were reported at unspecified elevations in December 1977 and January 1978. In February 1978, plant personnel inadvertently opened both airlock doors on t*he reactor building 130-foot elevation. Five similar events occurred within 30 days. In January 1979, plant personnel again inadvertently opened both doors of the reac-tor building 130-foot airlock after an interlock feature had been added to these doors to prevent such occurrences. For reasons unknown, a switch provided in order to def eat the interlock in an emergency had been operated, thus de-energizing the interlock unti.l the switch was manually reset.

8. A series of events at Dresden Unit 3 between Octo-ber 1977 and January 1978 involved the failure to follow procedures for taking safety-related equip-ment out of service for testing or maintenance, the most significant of which involved the dis-abling of both emergency diesel generators for
  • Dresden Unit 3 and the failure of station personnel to detect the error during an equipment status check. The loss of emergency power persisted for about three hours before it was found by the NRC inspector. A civil penalty of $21,000 was proposed on March 28, 1978, and was paid on April 4, 1978.
9. A reactor building personnel airlock leak rate test on Three Mile Island Unit 2 during August 1978 indicated excessive leakage. Most of the leakage was found to be through a 1/4" hole in the bulkhead that had apparently been drilled for supports for electric cabling sometime after the previous leak rate test was performed in December 1977.
10. In October 1978, the containment airlock inner door on Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 was opened to repair a failed operating mechanism. Contrary to the tech-nical specifications, the inner door remained open for the next 89-1/2 hours, at which time repairs were completed and the airlock again became oper-able. The reactor was taken critical during this period. Failure to maintain both doors closed while effecting repairs was due to personnel error.
11. During the week of October 19, 1978, while Salem Unit 1 was shut down for maintenance, all five containment fan coil units service water isolation valves were found to be tripped closed. Apparently, background radiation had caused the fan coil units service water radiation monitors to alarm, causing service water isolation to the fan coil units.
12. On October 30, 1978, during a routine inspection at Crystal River Unit 3, it was discovered that both concentrated boric acid storage tank discharge valves were closed. This isolated the concentrated boric acid injection system from the reactor coolant system. The apparent cause of the event was iden-tified as improper valve alignment made in restor-

. i ing the concentrated boric acid system from re-circulation mode to normal operation mode.

13. The FSARs for the Surry and North Anna Units required all containment spare pipe penetrations to be sealed at both ends by welded pipe caps.

Inspections in October and November 1978 disclosed that 21 penetrations on Surry Unit 1, 22 penetra-tions on Surry Unit 2 and all 26 spare penetrations on North Anna 1 and 2 had been capped on only one end. Surry had been in operation for five years.

14. On November 10, 1978, containment integrity at Cook Unit 2 was broken by disassembling a NESW check valve while the unit was being cooled down for a planned cold shutdown outage during which the valve was scheduled to be repaired.
15. In November 1978, during power operation of St. Lucie Unit 1 following a maintenance outage, four solenoid-operated NaOH addition system valves were found to have been removed. The fuses had been removed to de-energize the valves during a plant cooldown prior to a maintenance outage.

During the plant heatup following the outage, replacement of the fuses (which was required by operating procedure) was inadvertently missed.

16. On December 13, 1978, the reactor of Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 was taken critical during a routine trip*

recovery while a component cooling heat exchanger was out of service and a salt water sub-system was partially drained. Personnel had failed to verify that the systems were not in a degraded condition prior to taking the reactor critical, thus violating the technical specifications.

17. On December 21, 1978, investigation at Rancho Seco during a power increase following a refueling out-age revealed that one leg of the "A" Loop RCS Flow Transmitter was valved out, compromising the power/imbalance trip. The cause of the event was operator error.
18. On January 4, 1979, during normal startup testing of Hatch Unit 2 with the reactor in cold shutdown, a review of residual heat removal pump operability data sheets revealed that there had been several instances where pump 6.P requirements, as given in the table in the procedure, had not been met~ yet, the procedure had been signed off as acceptable.

Also, instances had occurred where the referenced

~P valve had been changed without explanation.

The cause was identified as personnel error due to a lack of understanding of the procedures.

19. On January 25, 1979, during preparations for leak testing the personnel airlock at the Palisades Plant, it was discovered that a pressure gauge normally mounted on the outer door of the airlock was missing. This condition resulted in a 1/4" opening between the inside of the airlock and the auxiliary building, which in turn caused a loss of containment integrity whenever the airlock inner door was opened. This condition was believed to have existed since the previous airlock test on July 3, 1978. The procedure for performing the leak test required removal. of the gaug.e in order to connect the test apparatus, but did not specify gauge replacement.
20. On February 23, 1979, during steady full power operation at Kewaunee, high water level alarms were received for the lA and lB SFPs. Investiga-tion showed that an incorrect valve lineup during RWST cleanup operations had allowed a transfer of water from the RWST to the SFP, resulting in a RWST level below the minimum level for operation required by the technical specifications. An auxiliary operator had failed to verify proper valve lineup when placing the SFP post-filter back in operation following filter change-out.
21. On March 1, 1979, while entering the Crystal River Unit 3 reactor building for maintenance and inspec-tion, it was discovered that the inner airlock door was unlatched, resulting in a breach of con-tainment integrity. Due to inadequate design of the containment airlock latching mechanism, the inner locks could be satisfied without the latch-ing mechanism engaging if the inner personnel doo.r was closed too fast.
22. On March 4, 1979, two manual containment isolation valves used for instrument room sampling at Cook Unit 1 were discovered to be in the open position.

The valves had been inadvertently left open follow-ing a routine sample of the instrument room.

23. On March 6, 1979, an operator at Davis-Besse Unit 1 mistakenly closed two BWST outlet valves instead of a BWST to borated water recirculation pump valve, placing the unit in violation of a technical specification.
24. On March 10, 1979, during normal operation of Hatch Unit 1, it was discovered that plant service water had not been valved into the lB diesel generator. The cause of the improper valve lineup was identified as a maintenance procedure which did not specify the correct valve alignment.
25. On March 23, 1979, during a routine inspection of a dry well and torus ventilation valves at Peach Bottom Unit 3, the inflatable disc seals were found depressurized subsequent to plant startup with reactor power not exceeding 2%. Technical specifications concerning primary containment integrity were exceeded for approximately four hours. The cause of the incident was identified as a procedural deficiency following modification to the valves, resulting in the operator being unaware of manual operation to inflate seals.
26. On March 27, 1979, during routine surveillance testing on the turbine-driven emergency feed pump at Three Mile Island Unit 1, a steam regulating valve was found closed, preventing emergency feed pump turbine operation from the main steam lines.

Apparently, the valve had been closed for main-tenance prior to heatup because of the failure of the switching order and the switching and tagging procedure to specify that the valve should be open, and because personnel had mistakenly assumed that valve lineup checks for startup would insure correct positioning of the valve. Heatup occurred with the valve in the improper position.

27. On April 8, 1979, it was determined that the outer personnel airlock door on Farley Unit 1 was not operating properly. The door was intentionally left open, and a temporary "do not shut this door" was posted. The following day, while fuel was being moved, personnel leaving containment noticed that both doors were open, although the technical specifications required at least one door in each airlock to be closed during the movement of irra-diated fuel. This event was attributed to the lack of a prerequisite in the fuel handling proce-
  • t dure verifying closure of both doors immediately prior to fuel movement.
28. On April 10, 1979, while performing a s.pec-ial inspection at the Arnold Plant as a result of a previous reportable occurrence, a containment purge inlet valve and a torus purge outlet valve were found to be not sealing properly due to their tee ring seals not being pressurized. The root cause was identified as inadequate design change installation procedures, resulting in improper adjustment of the tee ring seal air actuator valve linkage upon completion of a valve operator design change.
29. On April 11, 1979, engineering review at Peach Bottom Unit 2 found.valving associated with seis-mically qualified ESW system supply to nonseis-mically qualified RBCCW system was normally open.

This could have resulted in leakage from the ESW if a seismic event had caused failure of an RBCCW heat exchanger.

(b) In some instances, containment integrity was breached (1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 14, 19, 21, 22, 25, 27, 28) or con-tainment integrity requirements otherwis.e violated (10, 13). In a number of cases, valve alignment was found to be improper, with adverse safety consequences (2, 12, 17, 20, 23, 24, 26, 29). In other cases, the possibility of an accident was increased or the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident was decreased (5, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 26, 29). In two instances, there was actually a release of radio-activity (riot present in the Palisades case) (2, 3). A number of the occurrences involved numerous or repeti-tive noncompliances (2, 5, 7, 18) or noncompliances that apparently persisted over a significant period of time (3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 19, 25). Many were caused by failure to follow procedures (1, 6, 8, 10, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 27), and in some cases by pro-cedures that were themselves inadequate (19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28).

The following persons prepared or contributed to the prepara-tion of the foregoing responses:

Interrogatory Answers 1 Through 9 William K. Shideler, Legal Investigator Judd L. Bacon, Managing Attorney Paul M. Murphy, Outside Counsel Alan P. Bielawski, Outside Counsel David P. Hoffman, Nuclear Licensing Administrator Interrogatory Answer 1 Bernard L. Schaner, Palisades Plant Operations Supervisor - Nuclear Interrogatory Answers 2 and 3 Robert A. English, Staff Health Physicist Roger w. Sinderman, Corporate Health Physicist Interrogatory Answer 5 Donald A. Kaupa, Palisades Plant Shift Supervisor James McEwen, Palisades Plant Auxiliary Operator Interrogatory Answer 6 William K. Shideler, Legal Investigator Interrogatory Answer 8 Ted B. Jones, Palisades Plant, Auxiliary Operator Interrogatory Answer 9 Russell C. Youngdahl, Executive Vice President DATED: June 23, 1980 Respectfully submitted, CONSUMERS POWER COMP By~~~~ Paul M. Murphy One of Its Attorneys Michael .I. Miller Paul M. Murphy Alan P. Bielawski ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE Suite 4200 One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312)558-7500 DOCUMENTS SUPPLIED *HEREWITH A. Consumers Power Company Event Report E-PAC-79-047 (partially completed) with attached notes of B. Schaner, 9-13-79 B. Consumers Power Company Event Report E-PAC-79-047 with attached Corrective Action Sheets

c. Procedure Authorization dated 12-29-76 and attached Procedure No. H.P.6.27 D. Procedure Fo~ In pl~ce Testing Of HEPA Filters And Iodine ,Z\dsorbers, NCS-375 dated 3-11-75 E. Equipment Outage Request, Maintenance Order No. 78-VAS-064 initiated 4-5-78, completed 4-7-78

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned, one of the attorneys for Consumers Power Company, certifies that on this date he filed 20 copies, plus the original, of the attached pleading with the Secretary of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and served a copy of same on each of the persons at the addresses shown on the attached service list by United States mail, postage prepaid.

DATE: June 23, 1980

' Paul M. Murphy / ///

Honorable Ivan w. Smith Administrative Law Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 James P. Murray, Esq.

Director and Chief Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Rulemaking and Enforcement Division Office of Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 James Lieberman, Esq.

Judd L. Bacon, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Consumers Power Company Office of Executive Legal Director Washington, D.C. 20555 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Stephen G. Burns, Esq. . .

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Executive Legal Director Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing and Service Section Off ice of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

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  • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - *
  • COHPLETED BY _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ D A T E - - - -

DETERHitlED e; (5. l.J..,_,f\A).. ._ /. APPROVED BY DATE

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..... : *.-.*:(Gold) - COPY~ - (FOR ERs) FORWARD TO NUCLEAR LICENSING ADHINISTRATOR UPON COHPLETION OF PART 3;

i.

,_ --.~:}~-'*.:

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  • -* ...  :.-;~:**,:.
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FORl1 Q.A-17 FOl\/1 Q.A-1~

REV 4- 6/ 78 CORRECTIVE ACTION SHEET TIHE OF OCCURRENCE .* . 1 II Date .:..; /~ ; HOUR ~ *~ (_/t:..,.-

.. ** ~-

SAFETY RELATED I Ii YES \_,- NO EVALUATION PART 3 t=::::::::==:::::i COMPLETION PROPOSED REHEDIAL CORRECTIVE ACTION: PRC: YES_:i_ NO_ _

HEETIHG

_ _....;--;..*'.;.;....;;..*...;"--'"'...;U=---"-*\_~/.._;;l_.__-._,;._~i:...C>:'.:::"=*-*-G!""-'~.ld::*:..*.;:.._,::;.*.;:rf"'..;;;*-::;.*_<.,~ PRIOR TD PLACING RELIANCE YES

  • NO X

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DEPT/PLANT_,_.-""""-'~--~-;=..*__,,p_,._*.._~'---

,:{~-,-r:x:gi~-= -- SECT I ON (-:-) ;.::,..._

APPROVED BY_...._~_*_i_.-*--.*,,_,,_.,,.

t~~f;fil~~'

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DETERHIHED BY "-_;;~_t APPROVE~ BY .

.. ::=.~ *' .

DATE PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:_......._ _ PRC: .YES_ _ NO ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:;..*-------- ,* ..

HEETIHG PRIOR TO PLACING RELIANCE

>C"YES NO ASSIGNED. TO--------~

DEPT/PLANT_*--------

SECTION APPROVED BY_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

  • .*: .. .-.~-:..

DATE APPROVED REQD COHPLETI ON DATE 8 7 6 5 PRIORITY:

):::~i'>4 . ~3 - *2 .. *  ;=*--------------:-.--_'_,

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COHPLETED B Y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - DATE-----

DATE APPROVED BY .DATE (Gold) COPY 4 - (FOR ERs) FORWARD TO NUCLEAR LICENSING ADHIHISTRATOR UPON COHPLETION OF PART 3; (FOR DRs AND HRs - DISCARD).

(Pink) - COPY 3 - FORWARD TO QA UPON COHPLETION OF PART 3. *"":.' ..

. _ _ (Canary)- . COP.Y 2 - FORWARD TO OR I GI tlAT I HG DEPARTHEtlT UPON COHPLET I ON OF PART 5.  ;.*

.. ~ ..

-_;: .* ~--(White) - COPY 1 - FILED IH DOCUMENT CONTROL CENTER UPON COMPLETION OF PART 5 *

... ..-/'. -- - * * * .FORWARD ALL CORRECTIVE ACTION DOCUMENTS THROUGH YOUR CORRECTIVE ACTION COORDINATOR! *. . -*<,;~.:, >_,~~:~*~: '.~':)~:;:;;;-'.' ... ,: -- .

, ,**,'**i:, *Pl** .. *\' ,;e!:&:.~ ,;;i,,,*:'~i~~'.!{;~,J::,\ .f:'~.?;,* ' ;.;~ft)'.~;'; . /'e:;*_'~~~:;,if~il\iJ~t~;j~~4t~:

\ ...

PROG tlO ll.P.(1.2*

Health Physics Procedure PP.GE 1 OF 2

(( consumers Power TITLE; INPLACE HEPA AND ClL\RCOAL FILTER TESTING REVISIO;J 3 DATE 12/29/76 1.0 PURPOSE To demonstrate collection efficiency of accident ventilation filters.

2.0 REFERENCES

o Technical Specifications Table 4.22> Item 11.

3.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA The collection efficiency for each filter is 99% per appropriate section of Procedure NCS-375.

4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Shift Supervisor Approval Required Shift Supervisor Initials ~~-*~C~t~*.ztl...__"--~~~~Date ~-lf_,__~~lf~-?'--1!"~~-
2. Radiation lfork Permit needed to enter or physically work on ventilation systems.

5.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITS

  • Same as Acceptance Criteria.

6.0 ATTACHHENTS

1. QA letter of review 4/4/75
2. Nuclear Contain~ent Systems certificate of qualification.
3. Nuclear Containment Systems QA Nanual, NCS-Ql, Rev. O.
4. Procedure for Inplace Testing of HEPA Filters and Iodine Absorbers> NCS-375 Rev. l~ 8/22/75 7.0 PROCEDURE
1. Attach current instruI!lent calibration data with Palisades Representative verfication to working copy of procedure. *-

**-- ***- ->[vt=:..#...:>i)o/L ?lloct:::..P'-=>il.c O:::>V~l~"'

2. Do procedure NCS-375, Rev. 1,, 8/22/75. r

-'t-l l'

"'t'~

r....,

-t---=-'S"'l""

lu C>....:> ....., .. (

/11 ~ ,o,/.. -!~q

~ ~'f,\.

r** I NOTE: Actions taken to correct deficiencies should be recorded under "Remarks". Where appropriate, the "as found" and "as left" values and/or conditions should be recorded also.

~*- 3. The Health Physics Departm2nt Yill file working ~opy of H.P.6.27. *The

'lfJ~nical Superintendent is to receive a copy of data sheets.

06aoo .ff/

PALlSADES NUCLEAR PLANT

-- PROC NO H.P.2.27 Health Physics Procedure PAGE 2 OF 2 TITLE i INPLACE HEPA AND CHARCOAL FILTER TESTING REVISION 3 consumers PD'J/!!r *,

DATE 12/29/76

/

- ... . . ....... ..,_ ...{

((,_;~"~ ~ ~~?,i~J :; " ~ i",;J **

..,_,.'<VJ .

rJ,'lSU:~:'." File 1'rai.ning SS 12/1

.\.! . . He.:llth Pilys"l. Shii:t Supcrvi~or::> (

- i'- To Rad Pro Supv. Op2r-at:ions Supv.

'*' R~!C Supv. Maintenance Supt.

Rnc! Pro Offjce fRC.:'-1 JGLewis R~IC Technician's Office. cunsumzn

( OATC::

12/29/76 Respir~tory Procram PDWBf Associate Health Physicist

{TO~*leek) gDmp'.aD}

5*J!-lJ:::cT PP.OCEDURE AUTilORIZATION INTl:RNA!..

Coriri!::sPo..:?:><:Nc t:

I!ffOID1ATION COPIES: . RWSinden!lan Associate Health Physicist CEAxtell {JHart)

RBDeWitt {Training Coard. (Hidland The £allowing {procedures) (~E~m;JO:l£~~~~ isfa-:-r.2 authorized to be utilized by the Plant Staff~ taking into account plant conditions and other considerations as listed.

PROCEDURE DESCRIPTION Procedure: Permanent Inplace HEPA and Charcoal Filter Testing Procedure. Number R.P.6.27 Revision N~ber.~~3~~--=-~~-

12/29/76 GD}Iichie PRC Review Date_ _ l_2_/_9_/7_6_ __

Revision O Author DJChinavare (RR-3:

li/0£";:(.

v ."'*- ,/

\"EShockley Plant Health Physicist

./

I'

<J ( _.Q_.--..:,""I

(_ . JGLe\.lis Plant Super1ntendent CONTROlltD cop*y

o.

PROCEDURE  ; . *:

'*FOR '*.,

IN PLACE TESTING OF HEPA FILTERS ' **** 1

'* ~* ..

. AND IODH!E ADSORBERS *.'.,*

, . NCS-375 ,... *

. NUCLEAR CONTAi'NHENT SYSTEMS, INC.

COLmmus, OHIO 43219 REVIE\~ED *B~. *~r.,2.-l~

  • *. l'*

BY IN-PLACE TESTING APPROVED BY*~iJ.~ ,_ _E_~~*_f EC 'UJ'.E;_~\I_E 3 /21}7 5 REVISION NO.l 8/22/75

  • *J, * ~ ! '*

. ~-.

  • .'7,'*':-'

NUCLEAR CO**.fTAn;:*il*Xr SYSTEMS, INC. . ';"

  • P.O. BOX 19827 - COLU:*IBUS, OHIO l~32 l9 (61';) 25 2-1420

. :_~(lbssoo *£ 30 .~ ...

  • -~; *-******,*", * .....,,.,.,.,_,,_ __..,, *** **<,-**~****--* w-*~**

. ..,,'**~;*

e. e:'; . Rev. l* . .....,._

SCOPE

1. O This procedure covers the in-placing testing of the H°igh Efficiency Pat.*ticulatc Air (HEPA) filters and Iodine Adsorbcr filters.

STANDARD r.

2. 0 This procedure comp 1 ies with ORN1'-NS IC-65, "Design, Cons true ti011, and Testing of High-Efficiency Ai.r Filtration Systems for Nuclear Applications'~ and ANSI N5l0, "Testing of N'uclear Air Cleaning Systems", and .in accord *with ANSI 101/1 ancl Regulatory Guide 1.52.
  • * . I

' .. * *~ ' . '

.. ~...

  • "***. *l *, ~-

VISUAL INSPECTIO~ '**.,: .- . , . .... -*:.

3.1 A visual inspection of the co;nponents or subsystems to be tested, their holding devices, ga_skets, housing; and all components ~* *, .

shall .  :.*: ....

be made before any leak test. .. ... .. ,',* **-'.*.. *:'c.*

. _.....~ .*.. ' *. ' .* '* . *. ... .

3.2 Complete.a visual report, NCS Form No. 1 attached to this NCS-375

... pr~cedure, page 6.~ ...,. *: . .*.'

    • . ;; \

. >,: .~;* .. *.' . : . . . -

_ ..... '*.\

1.

..' r

~

c_

> . *., *~

~' .:\-'.

'*  :* '.I"

' .... J : *~*

"" .** . ****** -i'

<*c** ,, .**- /.*

i ..* . . . -

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,-~ ~

  • . * -* ! * \ ~ ;

>(2)

~

...... '\_;,

  • EQUIP~*tENT & SYSTE~*I TESTS A. l Tes ting of HEPA Filter Banks.*** *

. . . *Perform the following steps on the high efficiency filter systems

. ' ~ '

.... listed below nnd attach a completed test report f.or each ~iltcr **:.*...

... sys tern to this procedure. _: . * '::* * ... * . .

  • '*1* ** *,

4.1.1*-..Est~blish air flo~; through the1 filter *being tested.

Heasure

.' record the resistance across :the filter bank.

  • l~.1. 2 Conne~t 'the penetrometer sampling line to upstream sampling port : *

<:.and calibrate it against its built-in standard in accordance *

  • the manufacturer's. ins true tion.
  • gene1:ator tion and adjust the g17nerator as
  • .:*:* *~ *. <*r**::'.*. , *. ~. . ::-.~*;,~~:;t::'.~;;*/(\< ., .-*,. * **:

Corinect the penetrometer to the ~pst~cam sample poi.~t, allow stabiU.ze, and adjust it t;o read 50% or higher on the lowest sen- . *

.. :sitivity _scale, readjusting. the DOP geaerator as necesse.ry. 'Record

... the upstream reading *. *rt may prove in larger systems a lower or .-:*;

  • different scale reading is necessary to establish an upstream. reading *

.* .. ,, ,*,,_ .** .. /

  • " '. '1  :. ' **

.'.** .~{;::_*,,;~-.\.

~'  ;* ~ .

connect the sampling.line to th; d~wnstream s*;rr.ple po*i;,.t,

  • allolv

'**' * <*the photometer to stabilize~ and record ..the .downs tre~m reading.

'. :~._:..,. ....

., . .. . ~- .

Repeat steps 5 a1i.d 6 and i~ecord .the new re<<1dings if . . ..

. significant differences occur,*. recheck until the readings remain

constant within about +5%. ** e the final constant
  • ~~cub.ting the leak~se.

'r .;.'*'.~-:~.,\**~: -<~~;1\: . :- ,

Calculate the* leakaee from* the

. * .  % J,eulrnge *' ~~here L 100 Cd

!'.l'll:,\.,,,.,.,. ** * --~ ~ '** - . ., - -

.?, ~?.~} ,,.:;,~ ""'* T..*11. u1 , .-..:n l. ca, .. ~1gc:: . Cu . . ..

. 1.{ *-it;"::;.;.. )2.//it.(}; !f~ "'17Ccr.::-., r,=:=gdownstreum entration; from photometer readini

-:.**~

.. . " ~

'-., '"'.:"-'*.'* ;,,; .c~,-~kJ;ttp,~f~f!~r(~O'\Wtntration; from photometer reading .

. '-:l i::_':..**.' ~.-.. -.:; \ .. y

' ' ----

  • _ _, !" '3 . ":.' .* . .. . .:*'.

. 4*.1.9 If th;~l~-a!,'ag~*-:t~a..t..~r than t e specified.value of Section 5.0, scan the dm-ms tream fac;-of-tin!""bank as fol lous:

  • " . '*' *,*1. ., *..... '.- ..* <-!*.,:-*., .

1* * *

a. Cennect a sa;nple line to downstrcn1n sample port ~nd udjust the
penetrometer to zero wh~n set to the most sensitive scale *.. ** * ...

.

  • b. *
  • Disconncc t _.the sn:ni1le Li.ne frcm the cowng tream sample port and ....

~ttnch a scanning probe. Traverse Lhe do':,*nstream side of bunk

  • . at a rate of about 10 fl:/rnin. with the probe held about l to l 1/2

' -~: .

. .* 7.* ' .

  • ".l'.*

~ .....

A inches from the S.:!C ti on to be checked. It is reco;-,uncndcd that the seal between the mounting frame ~n<l the housing be scanned

'*' -~ . -' . " -

first; then the peripheries of the individual filtersJ and finally the cores of the individual filters. .

c. A leak is indicated by a sustained and reporclucible deflection of the meter needle \*Then the probe is held at the point in question on 0L1e scale division or more. , .. *
  • d. Hark the indicated leaks. Aftpr necessary rep:iirs or filter
  • replaccmenJ:, retest the system in accordnnce with Steps 1 thru 8.
4. l. 10 If the HEPA filter system contains more that one bank of filters, each bank must be tested individually. *complete a separate test report for each bank. .:.

.. ':* './

.~ '

Close system after testing.* * ..  :-;. ,.;

  • \.
  • ' *;.'.";* 'a. :_' .. *

.'* T:

. a. Discon~ect ~11 s&~ple lines~

~~ ,. _... _
. ** . .. ' '

<,_,. b. *.Seal. all injection and sample *ports. . ',,_-._,

  • ~*:;:. !** c: . ._.. . '. ::*. *.:~: *.. ..* ...
c. Notify designated plant personnel. that test is con1pleted and sys tern
    • may be put .in normal operati_on.

~,:

.~. -

4. 1. 12 Complete a test report,. for each HEPA bank on NCS Form No. : 2,- attached
  • to this procedure. page 7. ,.. ** *

,*" ~' .... '; .

  • ,:J_

.*.* . ' "rl_'

1.,,.

.. . *- -' - -.~--.

Rev. l

  • ' .. 4.2 Testing of Io<line Adsorber Banks Perform the following steps on each iodine adsorber bank listed.

(~

below and attach a completed test report for each bank to this procedure. . : _:'

4.2.l Each iodine adsorber shall be inspected individually for any ,.-.. '

visible damage prior to testing.

4.2.2 Establish air flow through the bank.

4.2.3 Con~ect the sample lines to u-stream and downstrc3m snmple points, establish detector operating conditions used in their calibration>

establish .upstream dilution-~ir ratio to produce an upstream c9n- .

cent ration at the tracer gas detector which is within tl1e linear:

  • .response range~ .

~

.l** 2.4 Take upstream background samples and downstream background samples

/*?.* '.. ..

,CS minimum for noncontinuous detectors). If these show no back- ;*

ground contaminants that might interfere with the tes"t results, "'; ~

continue with the test.

  • If downstream interference. is too great _to .

.,**.; obtain a base line, purge. the bank at rated system air flow fer 8 .

.... ;_-.**. to .12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />s> or change tracer gas. _ _,; * ., .

..... ..- ., .. **~, *: . ' .. - .. ' .* *_::~,_*. ....

.... ~ .'; *.*** .**.

._, 4.2.5 Estimate the tracer gas b;ansit time from the generator on through 1 the injection port and system to the detector. Start the injection and after the estimated transit time, monitor the upstre~1m concen-tration. *The tiiue when the initial tracer gas is detected is des-ignated as time zero tracer gas R-11. - '* . , ..

. ' *. ~* 7' :- ..

4.2.6 Calculate the leakage f~r each time interval from the cqu~tion:

J. *. % ~

I ,eaKage

' . '.Where L = 100 Cd

  • ... . : ' . .
  • with L ::: % lc.:i.k:1.ge * * *  ; .*
    • .* .. Cu Downstn.~;.1m coi1c~ntration

... Cd ' .:. *, .* " . -~ .*: . .

,/

.. .. . *Cu - Upstret:!m concentration Plot peri~tration vs. time and extrapolate curve to. time zero *

  • . - ~. . .: . ~ . . ... . ~ . . . :

4.2.7 If the.leakage obtained from step_6 is greater than the value

'specified in section 5.0 of this procedure, leaks, then retest. - -" , .. ,:;

~" . :: ' .*

4. 2. 8 Close ~ystem after t~sting. '* *,
a. Disconnect all snmplc _lines. ... **

.  ;, ~

b. Seal all injection nnd sample ports. .;.::
c. ~fotify designated plant personnel that test ls completed and system may be put in nonnal ope:1~1tion.

4.2.9 Conplete a test revLn*t for each *tc!soeh\:.!r bank, on ~CS Form* i:-ro. 3, att.::chcd to this prucedure, pngc. 8 .

.**co~-rn.ou..tn co-PY,

--.~. -~ ; . .,. )"'~ . Rev. l

~ '* --.

. .'~

ACCEPTA--;i.CE CRITERIA c: 5. 1 Each HEPA filter bank, exccp t for thos~ specified in s tcp 5. 3, shall have a mixi"1um leakage of O. 05~~ (efficiency of 99. 95%) cir as specified by the Contractor., based on the actu2.l num!>er of ,particules that pen-etrate the filter when using the polyrlispersc nerosol, generated_ from a licp1id DOP having a particle diali!eter of 0. 75 +/- O. 50 micron.

5.2 Each iodine adsorber bank shall have an in-place nw.xi1;mm leakage of

1. 0% (efficiency of 99. 0%), or *~s specified by the Contractor, based on the differential zero time concentration of the upstream and elm-m-s tream sa:nples. It is unders toad that the test shows only mechanical leak and does no~ represent actual elemental iodine of methyl iodide rer:\Oval efficiency. * .. * .* . '*.
  • s. 3 1'he Sample Rack filters and Fume Hood filters shal 1 have a maximum
4. leakage of 5% (efficiency of 95%) as specified *by the DOP test in Step 4. L . . *. . -**...

~ ', : :_ . .._.;

' .. .... ~- : .

.; .  : ~:~

.. -. ' *.. ~~ .'\

  • .-<."l'

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    • . *! ., ~, .
  • .. t',.'

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..., ., .....,:* Rev.].

i: <"

r-;o.

C. NCS FORM Rev. 0 1

  • .. *, VISUAL INS:;:>ECTION OF FILTER SYSTEH

','.LOCATION o*, *

' SYSTEM

>::\killIBER OF FILTERS

  • .:' '.*1
  • . FILTER TYPE

,I*~. '1;:~!.' *

.'DATE OF INSPECTION

'(***

~ '

.~ , ':

    • INSPECTED BY

. '* NUCLEAR CO.NTAIN"i'-IENT SYSTE~iS' Hifo~rmtATED

.;; -~:. :; . '":*;~ -~- - *,,

-~.;.\'.f_~i' :~.~~::**,.,. ; *<"[ >.

.:; .* /~I-~~CK ... LIST FOR VISUAL INSPECTIO~
_:1 };')§;':;. :,*:*.y*?*!our:.:1:...t::._:_i:...t:...1.:..g,__F_r_a_n_.1_e_s . -*:.-,

c ~:~;'~*,;~i;:~;*'-,:.~\ 'Jc';" .

Continuous sE:al weld between nGmbers*of frr'.me etnd hoas ing. .., .' .-\ *.~. :' : '** ..

Structural rigidity

  • I I c. Squareness of racmbers, flatness an<l condi.tion of component seating surfaces. .... - ..

I I 'd. Dnmage to fra~~s.

  • c** I a. Proper adjus~~cnt (50 to 80% gnsket co~prcssion all aro~uJ)

(tighten if le<:>s).

  • ~-

Rev. 1

. \:

  • /,I,-*' * *:.,*.

I I b. Sufficient num"!:ier of aderru.'.1.te size to produce 50 to 80/o.

( gasket compression.

r,.' I J c. Individual clamping of fil te:c (adsorber) cells.

I I d. Proper condition of clamping devices (cg., ~11 nuts in place

  • and tightened).

. "*.' ~ : '*. . "

j / _ e. Adequate clearances between filter (adsorber) elements to tighteff clamping devices ~:p. all sides

  • I I f. Full penetration and freedom from cracks in welds of cla;nping devices. ..

,..*** . HEPA Filters

.a

  • Damage 'te:> fil°ter ~edia (tears, cr~cks etc. *- so.me* damage

. separators is permissi?le), case, case corners, on both faces  :; ... ..

. 'of f1" l ters*.* * * " ,: .;' -~~*.--, . *:~. _.,

~.
. .

.,,* *._.,,* '.'; **'.I'; '.*::... ; * * *****

pamage to or improperseating

  • ..  : * *,:, .' .. ~ .  :* ..
  • I l ,* c. Bu~ns of rr.edia or case from cutting of filters. * . ;:. .
d. Excessive dirt loading (check gage showing pressure drop across
  • fi" l ters). . *, . '  : *.: --~** ',:.. *. . *. ***' * *

. *~ *-

~ *,:_

  • ' ,* Prefil tcrs *

~-;cl ding

....... , '* ~-.

, . .: . .*. .. ~ *. .. ~

~. *. '

. .* '"* , ......... .  : . ?~ ' ' ; .* ';r*

.. ' ~

l~*

Rev. J.

. .. .. .~  :-::

I I c. Penetration of mounting frame by power or control conduits.

( I I d. Vapor-tight globe 1 guard to protect globe from physical da:nage *

. Housing .. *,* '

I I - a. Adequate spnce for personnel and equipment for maintenance, testing.

~.',I ' ... .*

I I b. Reasonable access to housibg. .

I I c. Space adjacent to housing amenable to isolation as a contam.-

... * ,:. ination zone, adequate space* for temporary storage of clean and conte.minated filters during filter change. *.. ***

-* I I d. Doors of rigid constr~ction *with adequate seal between door

,and casing; doors opening outward on negative-pressure housings *

'* -. ": ~:). *.; :** ' .... ;' . ~ *. '. *.' ' . ". '* * ; ,J ~' . *i"**

...-I. : I e *.. _Adequate latches on doors, with provision fo~ .opening from

', /

'*. .*.-inside and outside of ~ousing and provision for locking.

Adequate sills.  ::. - , , . .-.

, *\ ~ *, . '.i '-~: :.: :. . .

~: *. '.

I *.. I '

,f~ 'Adequate structural rigidity to resist undue flexure - rein-

_forcing memb~1.-s on outside, preferably. . _ *.... _

I I g. Acces"s to upper tiers with permanent service platform at approx-

.. .- .. :.. .. _*.

  • imHtely the 6-foot level - adequate, perma1iently installed
      • .*. ~*<::~>>-.:"l*adders. ..-~.:-* .~
  • I I *h. Adequate clearances between banks of co:nponents 1 *with door on
    • >**.*each side of each ba11k. _ .* "*.r**

' r

  • I.:* . . I.;;.*'","

.*.. ... **r**:;***,*:* .*:

    • J *.

~.., ' . ;*.

  • I I , i. * * ~\o back.:.: to-back banks of_ components.

,;'.,: */'. // j.

'* ' .*'.-t***'-.\* . . . . **-*, *.

1' roper location of* tracer* injection and sample ports. * *

/ _/ ~~~ Ad~quate guards on fans located inside of housing.

-~ ' '.;

-**:. . -*... *1*.

_.-.I I m. - :*condition of flexible conncc tion between housing -and fan extern~l

_*.*.-:=,.

I I *11

  • Fan-shaft seal.

I I o. "*Adequate *cfo.i11pers to p1*cvent intake of .'.lir frcra <!.djacent housing

. *';*.. ~or plenum during test, and to prevent bypassin~ of system

  • I I
  • p. F1.-ee~~om from corridors, plenur:is, COJ:'.duits, electrical_, connections,

.~ (_ plu::'!bir-.. g, drains or other conditions that could result in bypn.ssing

. *of the sy~:;tem, r..any of ~-!hi.ch o.rc not i;i::n~di.:ttcly appareut.

l

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comuou.rn c6PYi

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D.:i.mners

.-* Rev. 1

(. I I a. Damage to or distortion of frame or blad~s.

I I b. ~ent pivot pins, operator.

I I c. ~issing seats or blade edging.

I I d* Condition of resilient seats or edging.

.:* -~ -

  • J Drains I I a. Each section. has a drain.

.. ~~ .

I I b. Shut-of£ valves for each drain~ c. . .

~.

'*':,1'

";i I I c. No two sections with common pipe connection. .'

  • 1.  ::* .....

I I d. All drains closed during in-place testing of filter banks.

.1*,

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.l1V.J Rev. 1 JI J NCS FORM NO. 2

( ~ev. 1 PARTICULATE FILTER IN-PLACE LEAK TEST REPORT CUSTmfER Purchase Or.der No

. *~' .; ' .'. . .. . .

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... , '. *~.' .. "~...

SYSTEM *.!'

  • NUNBER **

~ .

      • \:  :*,.  ;\;-,_ ... ' * *t * ' ., : .
    • .>.*FLOW  :, _:;
  • h.P

.* *1 -

j I,;

FILTER TYPE

-c f ' .

DATE OF TEST

'l'E.ST RESULT

  • ~--------
  • % I.EAKAGE

% EFFICIENCY(DOP AEROSOL)

,1'  :.. * ..

RENARKS .*...

. TEST PERFO:E'~*:ED BY

~UCLEAR CONTAB~\U;T SYSTE:-ts, T.NCO!~POrlt\Tr-:D

{ DATE

NCS FORH NO. 3

  • ()

( . REV. 1 IN-PI.ACE CHARCOAL ADSOR3ER FILTER T.EAK TEST REPORT CUSTm-1ER Purchase Order No 1:  ::

LOCATION

~*  ; . .: ~ . . . . ~ :-' .

SYSTEM NmIBER OF FILTERS '.  : *.. ' .

-FLOW FILTER TYPE DATE OF TEST TEST RESULT --% LEAKAGE .% EFFICIE~CY REN.ARKS ------------*--

  • .; ::*.* .. ~*

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TEST PER~ORMED BY NUCLE.\R co:,:rxr ~;~*i :-:~iT SYSTEMS, T :~CO:{T'OR,\Ttm D.-\TE

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