ML18044A520

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Fowards Completed Assessment of SEP Topic XV-17, Radiological Consequences of Steam Generator Tube Failure (Pwr). Suggested Mods Were Incorporated.Assessment Compares Facility Design W/Criteria for Licensing New Facilities
ML18044A520
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 01/29/1980
From: Ziemann D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Hoffman D
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
References
TASK-15-17, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8002140432
Download: ML18044A520 (8)


Text

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Docket No *. 50-255

  • Docket

-NRC PDR.

lo.ca 1 PDR.

ORB Reading*

NRR RE ad i ng

  • DEi senhut.
  • RVollmer OELD-or &E ( 3)

PLZi emann.

Mr~ *oavi*d P. Hoffman

-JWetmore

  • Nuclear Uc.ensi ng Adm1 n1 strator. '.

. HSmith

  • Consumer$ Power Company*

. NS I c T

  • 212 West. M1 chi gan Avenue Tera
  • JAf!.2* ~ ~@@

~- Jack_sori, M1.chigan~_ ~9201

  • oc.riJtchfie.ld. '(2). *

Dear.Mr._ Hoffman*:

'.: RE:. C~MP~ETlON. OF s;p :top1'c-xv*-1 ]* Ra~1 ol og1ca 1-Conseq~uence~* of Si~ain. -

~ ;~'

~

\\ *-

Ganeratpr Tube Failure lPHR) *. *.

~* *

. -. )'our letter -~ated OecembfJr 7,.:1979* indicated_: that you<have examined our :*draft~'a

. evaluat1on of the. suhj,ect top1:c dated *November 27. J979.

  • You suggest.ad editorial or corrective changes to t~e.assessment ~o.make it more_ accurately*.
    • reflect your fac111 ty" dest gn.

we* have incorporated your* suggest:ed modi fi-cations' 1n the.enclosed a~sessiuerit.* *With these 1i}od1f1ca_t1ons:'OUr review

~~...

"of*.SEP Topi_<; Xv.;17 is.. con,iplet~ an~. will ~be a bas.1~.Jnput to the integrated..... *-.

.,_, :*~

asse~sment of.your facility..

.,. " * ~-

.. The subj.ect asse~~~nt. c~mp~r~~:~you~ fa~1i1ty***cie~1gn~ ~ith.. t6*~ criteria-.:

-~ ";:<_.. *.... (_ ___ :

    • currently. used by ~he staff.1n Hcensfng ne\\'I' fac1Ht1e~'*- *This *assessment
-._, __ ~ '

.**I may.m~ed to be 're-examine<!' if you mod1fy.:<your fac111ty.. or. ff *the cri.~eria:..

.. are changed before.. we co~lete our"integrated asses$ment. *

~--

Enclosure:

.. -:. Completed SEP, -**

, Topic XV-17.

cc w/enclosure:

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See next page

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  • S:1:gn~*a: by: ;.*: *
  • Denni~. L. z*ierua.nh.

[)ennis L.. Z1eri1ann; Chief*

Operat.i ng Reactors Oranch #_2:- **

  • . *OJV1$1on.. of Qperating.R~.actors

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  • -<.;-u.s. GO~ERNME-NT PRINTING.OFFICE: 1979-289-369

ti!... *----......

Mr. David* P. Hoffman*

cc M. I. Miller, Esquire Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite 4200.

One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secretary Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue

  • Jackso~, Michigan 49201 Judd L. Bacon, Esquire Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue

.. Jackson, Michigan 49201 Myron M. Cherry, Esquire Suite 4501 One IBM Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60611 Ms. Mary P. Sinclair Great Lakes Energy Alliance 5711 Summerset Drive.

Midland~ Michigan 48640 Kalamazoo Public Librar.Y 315 South Rose Street

  • Kalamazoo, Michigan 49006 Township Supervisor Covert Township Route 1, Box 10 Van Buren County, Michigan 49043 Office of the Governor (2)

Room 1 - Capitol Building Lansing, Michigan 48913 Director, Technical Assessment Division Office of Rad_iation Programs (AW-459)

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency C ry st al Ma 11 # 2 Arlington, Virginia 20460 January 29, 1980 U. s. Environmental Protection Agency Federal Activities Branch Region V -Office ATTN:

EIS COORDINATOR 230 So:. th Dearborn Street Chicagc, Illinois* 60604 Charles Bechhoefer~ Esq., Chai nnan Atorrr. c Safety and Licensing Board Pane~'

U. s. !l:iclear Regulatory Co11111ission Washi n~on, D. C.

20555 Dr. Ge:rge C. Anderson Depa~t~ent of Oceanography Uni ver~ity of Washington Seat~l~, Washington 98195 Dr.

~.Stanley Livingston 1005 Celle Largo Sant: re, New Mexico 87501 Reside:.t Inspector c/o U. S. NRC.

P. O. Eox 87 South Eaven, Michigan 49090 Palisates Plant ATIN:

Mr. J. G. Lewis

?lant Manager Covert, Michigan 49043 KM C, Inc.

ATTN:

Richard E. Schaffstall 1747 Pennsylvani~ Avenue, Ni W.

Suite l oso Washington, D. C.. 20006

  • ---=- --- -* __:

Complete - January 2, 1980 Pali sades.

Topic XV-17 Radiolo'.;I cal Consequences of Steam Generator Tube Failure PWR)

The safety objective of this topic is to assure that the releases from this postulated event will not result in exposures in excess of the established guidelines.

The double ended severance of a steam generator tube is analyzed because the consequences of this postulated event could include the release of significant amounts of radioactive material.

The significance of this accident, as compared to a small loss~of-coolant accident, is due to the path created for the releas~ of reactor coolant via the secondary side of the steam generator, out of the reactor containment structure to the turbine and/or condenser, or if there is a concurrent loss of offsite power, to the environment through the safety and relief valves.

Based on analyses of the types of tube degradation that have been observed at the Palisades steam generators the most likely event would be the gradual increase of the primary to secondary l_eakage over a time period.

To assure that the integrity of the steam generator tubes is maintained through the life of the plant, periodic inspections are performed as specified in the Palisades Technical Specification 4.14.

In addition, Technical Specification 3:1.5 limits the allowable primary to secondary leakage to 0.6 gpm in any one steam generator.

  • r-*t. An analysis of the radiological consequences of a steam generator tube failure at the Pa~ :sades plant has been. performed following the assumptions and procedures indicated in the. S.R.P. 15.6~3, "Radiological Consequences of a Steam Generator Tube Failure (PWR)".

The specific assumptions made regarding the plant conditions prior to the postulated accidents and the expected systems responses are listed in Table XV-1.*

In particular, it has been conservatively assumed that the accident is followed by a compl~te loss of offsite power.

Therefore, the plant is.

cooled down by releasing secondary steam to the environment through the safety and relief valves.

In addition, it has been assumed that prior to the accident the primary and secondary coolant activities were at the maximum levels allowed by the Technical Specifications 3.1~4 and 3.1.5.

The estimated site boundary doses resulting from this postulated accident (see Table XV-2) have been found to be withi~ the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines as specified in the Acceptance Criteria for S.R.P. 15.6.3.

On the basis of these results, we conclude that the_ Palisades plant design is acceptable with respect to the radiological consequences of a possible steam generator tube failure, and that the risk presented by this postulated accident is similar to that of plants licensed under current criteria.

This completes the evaluation of the radiological co~sequences of this SEP topic.

Since the plant conforms to current licensing criteria, no additional SEP review is required.

  • The systems assumptions* made in this review will be confirmed during the DBE reviews for this facility.

y Topic XV-17 (Palisades)

References

.. *3 -

1. Palitades Plant.. PSAR.

Section 14.15

2. Letter from 0. P. Hoffman, Consumers Power Company to the Of rector, NRR.

June 26, 1978 "Palisades Pl ant - Steam Generator Operating History Questionnaire" Docket 50... 255

3.

Consumers Power Company - Steam Generator Repair Report for the Palisades Plant, Docket 50-255 January 1979,

4.

Palisades Plant Technical Specifications

TABLE XV-1 Assumptions Made in Analysis of the Rad1o1ogical Consequences of Postulated Tube Failure, Main Steam Line Failure and Control Rod Ejection Accidents

1. Reactor power* 2650 fi\\iith.
2.

Loss of offsite power following the accident.

3.
4.
5.

Primary coolant activity.2_rior to the accident of l.11Ci/g of Dose Equivalent I-131 and 100/f ~Ci/g of noble gases.

Iodine spiking factor of 500 after the accident.

Primary coolant activity of 40.~Ci/g of Dose Equivalent I-131

  • at time of accident for cases assuming a previous iodine spike.
6. Secondary coolant activ.ity prior to the accident of 0.1 11Ci/g Dose Equivalent 1-131.
7.

Iodine decontamination factor of 10 between water and steam.

8. 0-2 hour X/Q for gro~nd rel3ase at exclusion area boundary boundary
1. Failed steam generator is not isolated during the first 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> following the accident.
2.

98,000 lb. of primary coolant leak to the secondary side of the failed steam generator through the failed tube during the first 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (one hllf during the first 30 minutes), *

3. All releases through the secondary side safety and relief valves.
4.

No additional fuel clad failures as a result of the accident.

For the Main Steam Line Failure Accident

1. Total primary to secondary leak rate of 1. gpm.
2.

No additional fuel clad failures as a result of the accident.

I I I

I I~

  • e
  • For* the Control Rod Ejection Accident Total primary to secondary leak rate of 1. gpm.

0.3:* of' rods suffer clad damage.

o~.l S of rods have at least incipient center line melting.

    • ~-*

TABLE XV-2 ACCIDENT DOSES AT NEAREST SITE BOUNDARY 2-hour Dose 2-hour Whole

. to the Thyroid (rem)

Body Dose (rem)

Tube Failure Accident

12.

0,4 Tube Failure Accident 60, 0,4 with Previous Iodine Spike*

Steam Line Failure

1. 7

< 0.01 Accident Steam Line Failure 2.6

< 0.01 Accident with Previous Iodine Spike*

Rod Ejecti"on Accident**

Case l 3.6 0.05 *,

Case 2 1.0

< 0.01

  • For this accident sequence it is assumed that an iodine spike was initiated some time before the accident resulting in the highest coolant activity allowed by the Technical Specifications.
  • '*Case 1 assumes all releases through the secondary side safety**.

and relief valves.

Case 2 assumes all releases through the containment.