ML18044A330
| ML18044A330 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1979 |
| From: | Huston R CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | Zieman D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-10, TASK-RR NUDOCS 7912140415 | |
| Download: ML18044A330 (15) | |
Text
-consumers Power company General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201.
- Area Code 517 788-01550 December 11, 1979 Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation Att:
Mr Dennis L Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No 2 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT - RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING AUxILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMS NRC letter dated October 30, 1979, required Consumers Power Company* to respond within thirty days to NRC recommendations concerning the Palisades Auxiliary Feedwater System.
Consumers Power Company's response to these.recommendations are attached.
Consumers Power Company's re*sponse to the NRC was requested by December 5, 1979.
Work associated with the ongoing refueling. outage necessitated an extension of this deadline.
In a telephone conversation on December 5, 1979, Nat Villalva (NRC) agreed that* the postponement of this response was acceptable.
Senior Nuclear Licensing Engineer Attachment (14 pages)
~912140 ~IS Ao<fl s
1/1
SHORT-TERM ITEM X6.3.l(l) (GS-2)
LONG-AND SHORT-TERM REQUIREMENTS FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMS FOR PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY Recommendation GS The licensee should lock open single valves or multiple valves in series in the AFW system pump suction piping and lock open other single valves or multiple valves in series that could interrupt all AFW flow.
Monthly inspections should be performed to verify that these valves are locked and in the open position.
These inspections should be proposed for incorpora-tion into the surveillance requirements of the plant Technical Specifications.
See.Recommedation GL-2 for the longer term resolution of this concern.
RESPONSE TO X6.3.l(l) (GS-2)
We will lock open the valves that are in series in the AFW system pump suction piping as well as the valves that are in series that could interrupt all AFW flow.
At the present time, we are procuring locks to satisfy this recommendation.
When these locks are installed, monthly inspections will be made to verify that these valves are locked in the open position.
Upon completion of the consulting firm's study and recommendations, the appropriate Technical Specifications will be changed where necessary to implement this type of inspection.
ITEM X6.3.1(2) (GS-4)
Recommendation GS Emergency procedures for transferring to alternate sources of AFW supply should be available to the plant operators.
These procedures should include criteria to inform the operator when, and in what order, the transfer to alternate water sources should take place.
The following cases should be covered by the procedures:
ThQse in which the primary water supply is not initially available.
The procedures for this case should include any operator actions required to protect the AFW system pumps against self-damage before water flow is initiated; and, In case in which the primary water supply is being depleted.
The procedure for this case should provide for transfer to the alternate water sources prior to draining of the primary water supply.
RESPONSE TO X6.3.1(2) (GS-4)
Emergency procedures presen,tly exist and are available to our operators for transferring to alternate sources of AFW supply.
These procedures are not
e Response Letter to Aux Feedwater System, 12-10-79 2
written* in the sequential order referred to in the above recommendation.
This orde'r will be incorporated into the appropriate procedures by the end of February 1980.
ITEM X6.3.1(3) (GS-6)
Recommendation GS The licensee should confirm flow path availability of.an AFW system flow train that has been out of service to perform periodic testing or maintenance as follows:
Procedures should be implemented to require an operator to determine that the AFW system valves are properly aligned and a second operator to independently verify that the valves are properly aligned.
The licensee should propose Technical Specifications to assure that prior to plant startup following an extended cold shutdown, a flow test would be performed to verify the normal flow path from the primary AFW system water source to the steam generators.
The flow test should be conducted with AFW system valves in their normal alignment.
RESPONSE TO X6.3.1(3) (GS-6)
Technical Specification 3.5.la states that both auxiliary feedwater pumps or one auxiliary feedwater pump and one fire pump shall be operable.
This requirement must be satisfied before the primary coolant can be heated above 325°F.
It is also required practice that, when a piece of safety grade equipment is taken out of service, this piece of equipment must be tested prior to being declared operable.
This test verifies that there is flow through the system also.
The* flow is also verified under the answer of X6.3.l(l) (GS-2) by locking open single and multiple valves in series with AFW pump suction or the interruption of AFW flow.
The guidelines of our Technical Specifications and procedures provide adequacy and redundancy for verification of the AFW system.
As stated in the response to X6.3.l(l) (GS-2), Technical Specification changes may be implemented by Consumers Power Company upon completion of the relia-bility ~tudy of the AFW system that is presently being conducted.
ITEM X6.3.1(4) (GS-8)
Recommendation GS The licensee should install a system to automatically initiate AFW system flow.
For the short-term, this system need not be safety-grade; however, it should meet the criteria listed below, which are similar to Item 2.l.7a of NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."
Response Letter to Aux Feedwater System, 12-10-79 For the longer term, the automatic initiation signals and circuits should be upgraded to meet safety-grade requirements as indicated in Recommendation GL-1.
The design should provide for the automatic initiation of the auxiliary feedwater system flow:
The automatic initiation signals and circuits should be designed so that a single failure will not result in the loss of auxiliary feedwater system function.
3 Testability of the initiating signals and circuits should be a feature of the design.
The initiating signals and circuits should be powered from the emergency buses.
Manual capability to initiate the auxiliary feedwater system from the control room should be retained and should be implemented so that a single failure in the manual circuits will not result in the loss of system function.
The alternating current motor-driven pumps and valves in the auxiliary feedwater system should be included in the automatic actuation (simultaneous and/or sequential) of the loads to the emergency buses.
The automatic initiation signals and circuits should be designed so that their failure will not result in the loss of manual capability to initiate the AFW system from the control room.
RESPONSE TO X6.3.1(4) (GS-8)
This recommendation is currently being handled under NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."
Consumers Power Company intends to automate AFW system initiation to control grade by January 1, 1980 and safety grade by January 1, 1981.
ITEM X6.3.1(5)
Recommendation - The licensee should verify that the air accumulator will hold the air-operated valves in the turbine driven pump steam supply line open for at least two hours following loss of all AC power.
RESPONSE *TO X6.3.1(5)
Palisades has the capability of hand jacking these air-operated valves so they would be secured in the open position.
With this option, if for some reason the air accumulators did fail, an operator would have sufficient time to hand jack these valves open..
Operators are instructed to hand* jack the valves to the open position in our emergency procedure, "Plant Cooldown With Total Loss of A-C Power."
Response Letter to Aux Feedwater System, 12-10-79 4
ITEM X6.3.1(6)
Recommendation - The motor driven pump and the pneumatic-operated valve (G) through which AFW flow to steam generator A is controlled receive motive and control power from Division I emergency buses.
Pneumatic valve (F), which supplies steam from steam generator A to the turbine driven AFW pump, receives control power from a Division II emergency bus.
Similarly AFW flow control valve (H) and steam supply valve (E) associated with steam generator B receive power from Division II and I emergency buses respectively.
Upon loss of air or power, the AFW flow control valves (G) and (H) fail open and the turbine driven pump steam admission.valves (E) and (F) fail closed.
It is recognized that the AFW flow control valves are designed to fail open upon loss of air or power so that AFW flow to the steam generators should be assured.
However, it cannot be concluded that all failures will result in opening these valves.
Degradation of Division I buses could potentially result in loss of the entire AFW system.
The iicensee should analyze the consequences of Division I voltage degradation as well as other failures (e.g., restricted air flow) to assure that there is no Division I failure mode that can result in loss of the entire AFW system.
Until this analysis is completed or the AFW system is modified to preclude such an occurrence, emergency procedures should be prepared to retain AFW system capability.
(See long term recommendation 4.b on page 8.)
RESPONSE TO X6.3.1(6)
A consultant is presently conducting a reliability study of the entire AFW system.
This study will include an evaluation of the complete loss of AFW system.
When this is completed, we will propose modifications and, if necessary, interim emergency procedures, to preclude such an occurrence.
A schedule of compliance will be submitted by March 1980.
ITEM X6.3.1(7)
Recommendation - Each steam generator has two pneumatic-operated atmospheric steam dump valves connected in parallel.
These four valves have the same controller which presumably receives power from only one source, and therefore is vulnerable to a single failure event.
Concern was expressed to the licensee as to whether the steam supply to the turbine AFW pump is adversely affected by the potential simultaneous opening of all atmospheric dump valves due to a single failure at the controller or its power source.
The licensee has indicated that the pressure drop across the valves is sufficiently large to assure adequate steam supply to the turbine driven pump from the steam generators.
We require that the licensee provide analyses to confirm this assertion.
(See long term recommendation 4a on page 7.)
RESPONSE TO X6.3.1(7)
This analysis, to confirm that the pressure drop across the valves is sufficiently large to assure adequate steam supply to the turbine driven pump from the steam generators, will be conducted as part of our consultant's
Response Letter to Aux Feedwater System, 12-10-79 review.
Consumers Power Company will provide a schedule of compliance by the end of March 1980.
ADDITIONAL SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS ITEM X6.3.2(1) 5 Recommendation - The licensee should provide redundant level indications and low level alarms in the control room for the AFW system primary water supply to allow the operator to anticipate the need to make up water or transfer to an alternate water supply and prevent a low pump suction pressure condition from occurring.
The low level alarm setpoint should allow at least 20 minutes for operator action, assuming.that the largest capacity AFW.pump is operating.
RESPONSE TO X6.3.2(1)
Presently, a low-level alarm exists, the set point of which, allows more than 20 minutes for operator action assuming that the largest capacity AFW pump is operating.
There is no redundant level indication in the control room to date.
Consumers Power Company will install redundant indication during the next refueling outage.
ITEM X6.3.2(2)
Recommendation - The licensee should perform a 72-hour endurance test on all AFW system pumps, if such a test or continuous period of operation has not been accomplished to date.
Following the 72-hour pump run, the pumps should be s.hut down and cooled down and then restarted and run for one hour.
Test acceptance criteria should include demonstrating that the pumps remain w1thin design lim.its with respect to bearing/bearing oil temperatures and vibratio.n and that pump room ambient conditions (temperature, humidity) do not exceed environmental qualification limits for safety-related equipment in the room.
RESPONSE TO X6.3.2(2)
A 72-hour run has been completed on the motor-driven auxiliary feed pump, but the pump was not restarted and run for one hour.* To satisfy this recommendation, the motor-driven auxiliary feed pump will be tested as outlined in Item X6.3.2(2) prior to the start-up of Palisades after this refueling outage.
ITEM X6.3.2(3)
Recommendation - The licensee should implement the following requirements as specified by Item 2.1.7.b on page A-32 of NUREG-0578:
"Safety-grade indiction of auxiliary feedwater flow to each steam generator shall be provided in the control room.
The auxiliary feedwater flow instrument channels shall be powered from the emergency buses consistent with satisfying the emergency power
Response Letter to Aux Feedwater System, 12-10-79 diversity requirements for the auxiliary feedwater system set forth in Auxiliary Systems Branch Technical Position 10-1 of the Standard Review Plan, Section 10. 4. 9."
RESPONSE TO X6.3.2(3) 6 This recommendation will be accomplished in compliance with NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."
ITEM X6.3.2(4)
Recommendation - Licensees with plants which require local manual realignment of valves to conduct.periodic test on one AFW system train,* and there is only one remaining AFW train available for operation should propose Technical Specifications to provide that a dedicated individual who is in communication with the control room be stationed at the manual valves.
Upon instruction from the control room, this operator would realign the valves in the AFW system train from the test mode to its operational alignment.
RESPONSE TO X6.3.2(4)
Under the attached procedure titled, "Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps P-8A and B,"
no manual valve operating positions must be changed to perform this monthly test.
LONG-TERM ITEM X6.3.3(1) (GL-1)
Recommendation GL Licensees with plants having a manual starting AFW system, should install a system to automatically initiate the AFW system flow.
This system and associated automatic initiation signals should be designed and installed to meet safety-grade requirements.
Manual AFW system start and control capability should be retained with manual start serving as backup to automatic AFW system initiation.
RESPONSE TO X6.3.3(1) (GL-1)
This recommendation will be.met as required by NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."
ITEM X6.3.3(2) (GL-2)
Recommendation GL Licensees with plants in which all (primary and alternate) water supplies to the AFW systems pass through valves in a single flow path should install redungant parallel flow paths (piping and valves).
Licensees with plants in which the primary AFW system water supply passes through valves in a single flow path, but the alternate AFW system water supplies connect to the AFW system pump suction piping downstream of the above valve(s) should install redundant valve(s) from the alternate water supply
Response Letter to Aux Feedwater System, 12-10-79 upon low pump suction pressure.
The licensee should propose Technical Specifications to incorporate appropriate periodic inspections to verify the valve positions.
RESPONSE TO X6.3.3(2) (GL-2) 7 This recommendation will be addressed by the reliability study presently being conducted by our consultant.
This study is to be completed by February 1980 with Consumers Power Company to evaluate its recommendations and submit a schedule of action to be in compliance with this recommendation by the end of March 1980.
ITEM X6.3.3(3)
Recommendation - The licensee should evaluate the following concerns:
- a.
The discharge lines of both AFW pumps combine into a single header through which* all AFW water must flow.
A pipe break in this single flow path could result in the loss of the entire AFW system function.
- b.
The Palisades AFW system design does not meet the high energy line break criteria in SRP 10.4.9 and Branch Technical Position 10-1; namely, that the AFW system should maintain the capability to supply the required AFW flow to the steam generator(s) assuming a pipe break anywhere in the AFW pump discharge lines concurrent with a single active failure.
The licensee should evaluate the postulated pipe breaks stated above and (1) determine any AFW system design changes or procedures necessary to detect and isolate the break and direct the required feedwater flow to the steam generator(s) before they boil dry or (2) describe how the plant can be brought to a safe shutdown condition by use of other systems which would be available following such postulated events.
RESPONSE TO X6.3.3(3)
Again, a consultant is presently conducting a reliability study on our AFW system.
Consumers Power Company will evaluate the recommendation and inform the NRC by the end of March 1980 of any actions which will be taken in response to this recommendation.
ITEM X6.3.3(4)
Recommendation - The licensee should evaluate the following concerns:
- a.
Each steam generator has two pneU111atic-operated atmospheric steam dump valves connected in parallel.
These four valves have the same controller which presumably receives power from only one source.
The consequences of single failures would be reduced by supplying power to the dump valves of each steam.generator from separate power divisions.
(See short-term recommendation 7).
Response Letter to Aux Feedwater System, 12-10-79 8
- b.
This concern is a follow-up to that in short-term recommendation 6, (i.e.,
loss of the AFWS due to a degraded power system division).
Valves (G) and (F) are both in AFWS train A but receive power from different DC divisions as do valves (E) and (H) which are in AFWS train B.
Thus, the effect of degradation of one power division would be reduced by having valves (G) and (F) powered from the same division; similarly for valves (E) and (H).
- c.
Wide range steam generator level instrumentation is not provided in the control room.
Evaluate the need for such instrumentation to facilitate proper operator action considering transients and accident conditions.
Based on the results of the above evaluations, the licensee should (1) determine any AFW system design changes necessary to miiigate the concern or (2) describe how the plant can be brought to a safe shutdown condition by use of other systems which would be available following such postulated events.
RESPONSE TO X6.3.3(4)
This recommendation is also being evaluated by our consultant.
For Part c, if it is feasible to install wide range steam generator level instrumentation, we will provide an installation schedule by the end of March 1980.
Recommenda-tions by the consultant are to be made by February 1980 for Parts a and b.
We will inform the NRC by the end of March 1980 of any actions to be taken in response to these recommendations.
ITEM 6.3.4(1) -
(5)
L The Palisades Plant including_ the AFWS will be reevaluated during the SEP with regard to internally and externally generated missiles, pipe whip and jet impingement, quality and seismic design requirements, earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, and the failure of nonessential systems.
- 2.
The staff will reassess the need for a water level alarm system in the AFWS pump room.
- 3.
The Palisades AFWS is not automatically initiated and the design does not have capability to automatically terminate feedwater flow to a depressur-ized steam generator and provide flow to the intact steam generator.
This is accomplished by the control room operator.
The effect of this provi-sion will be assessed in the main steam line break evaluation for Palisades.
- 4.
A lack of system redundancy exists because the turbine-driven AFWS pump is not seismic Class 1.
The staff will consider the need for upgrading the seismic classification of the pump in the SEP integrated assessment of Palisades.
- 5.
The staff will assess the need for increasing the technical specification inventory limit for the seismic Class I AFWS water supply.
Response Letter to Aux"Feedwater System, 12-10-79 9
RESPONSE TO 6.3.4(1) -
(5)
- These items do not require a response from Consumers Power Company.
These are items to be handled by the NRC staff.
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PALISADES NUCLEAR P~ NT MONTHLY PROC NO M0-24 TECH. SPEC. SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE PAGE 1
OF 5
TITLE i AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS P-8A AND B REVISION 10 consumers Power DATE 12-7-78 REVIEWED BY PRC/ Q.C: - DATE 1.0 PURPOSE 12-7-78
. APPROVED BY PLANT SUPERINTENDENT c"
__ J'-. ~,,-£--*--
I 1-z(t*~(q*
DATE 1.1 To verify operability and survey performance of the Auxiliary Feedwater System and its ability td respond properly when required.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 Tech. Spec. Section 4.9.
2.2 Operating Procedure SOP-12, S~eps 6.1 and 6.2.
2.3 ASME B&PV,Section XI, Subsection !WP.
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i 3.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 3.1 Specified in procedure steps 7.4 and 7.19.
4.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS 4.1 Auxiliary Pumps P-8A and B in normal standby status.
5.0 PRECAUTIONS 5.1 Obtain Shift Super.Visors permission prior to runnj.ng test.
Shift Supervisor:
Date:
5.2 Ensure that recirculation line manual valves are open (216FW, 217FW).
5.3 Strobe tachometer requires "' ~ hour warm-up before using.
Check the calibration after warm-up.
6.0 LIMITS None 7.0 PROCEDURE 7.1 Valving in this system shall normally be shown on System Checklist CL-12.
7.2 Check control valves 0736 and 0737 (Flow Control Valves) closed.
7.3 Start and test P-8A according to the following:
(a)
Even numbered months start P8A from Control Room panel C-01.
(b)
Odd numbered months start P8A by closing hand switch on BUS 1-C.
7.4 Run the pump at least 5 minutes at minimum flow and then record the following data.
consumers Power Tl TLE; ISADES NUCLEAR PLAN MONTHLY TECH. SPEC. SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS P8A AND B PROC NO PAGE 2
REVISION DATE M0-24 OF. !>
10 12-7-78 Motor Current (AI-0703)
(Max. = 139; Min. = 58)
Discharge Pressure (PI-0789)
(Max. = 1594 PSIG: Min. = 1393 PSIG)
Vibration Mils (Max. = 4.2 mils; Min. = O)
T-2 Level (LIA-2021)
NOTE:
Measure vibration with a calibrated Vibration Indicator by placing the probe on th~ yellow dot.
Vibration Instrument Used:
Serial No.:
Calibration Due Date:
7.5 Run the pump for a total of 15 minutes.
7.6 Check the pump for proper lube oil, unusual noises, high bearing temperature, and excessive leakage.
REMARKS:
- 7. 7 Supply Auxiliary Feedwater to Steam Generator E-50A bY **o_pening "CV-0737.
Even numbered months use HIC-0737 on C-01 panel.
Odd numbered months use HIC-0737B on C-33 panel.
Observe flow on FI-0737 on C-11 panel.
GPM NOTE:
When adding cold water to the hot Steam Generator, minimize cycling to avoid unnecessary temperature caused stress.
7.8 Supply Auxiliary Feedwater to Steam Generator E-50B by opening CV-0736.
Even numbered months use HIC-0736 on C-01 panel.
Odd numbered months use HIC-0736B on C-33 panel.
Observe flow on FI-0736 on C-11 panel.
7.9 Close CV':""0736 and CV-0737.
7.10 Stop the pump motor.
7.11 To start steam driven P8B, the overspeed trip mechanism is in reset position.
7.12 The two control stations, HIC-0736B and HIC-0737B on Panel C-33 are always in the "AUTO" position unless it becomes necessary to operate from Panel C-33.
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PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT MONTHLY M0-24 TECH. SPEC. SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE PROC NO PAGE 3
REVISION DATE OF
- 5 consumers Power TITLE i AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS PBA AND B 7.13. Check CV-0736 and CV-0737 (Flow Control Valves) closed.
10 12-7-78 7.14 Throttle the three drains on the turbine (510FW, 511FW and 512FW).
CAUTION:
Do not open CV-0522B until personnel are out of the Auxiliary Feedpump room.
7.15 Even numbered months (odd numbered months go to Step 7.16):
NOTE:
Should this steam supply source not be available go to Step 7.16 and use that steam source.
Start turbine by turning hand switch 0522B for CV-0522B to "OPEN".
Observe pump discharge pressure to be sure turbine does not trip on over-speed on startup (PI-0789).
Proceed with Step 7.17.
7.16 Odd numbered months:
NOTE:
Should this steam supply source not be available go back to Step 7.15 and use that steam source.
7.16.1 Verify CV-0521 is closed, then open CV-0522A to HS-0522A to pressurize alternate steam supply line and open CV-0525 at HS-0525 to blow Steam Line Condensate out via turbine exhaust line and to heat up steam line.
7.16.2 Close CV-0522A after it has been open for approximately l~ minutes.
CAUTION:
Do not reopen CV-0522A until personnel are out of Auxiliary Pump Room.
7.16.3 After closing CV-0522A wait approximately~ minute and open CV-0521 at RS-0521.
7.16.4 open*~CV-0522A at HS-0522A.
Observe pump discharge pressure to be sure turbine does not trip on overspeed on start.
7.16.5 Close CV-0525 at HS-0525.
7.17 Check the turbine inboard and outboard bearing cooling water inlet water valves (148FW and 147FW) adjusted and sealed so that about 1 GPM is flowing through each bearing cooler.
CAUTION:
These valves must not be opened wide as the bearing boxes are only designed for 75 PSIG and -they may be damaged.
7.18 As the turbine warms, close the drain valves-510FW,.511FW and 512 FW.
PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT MONTHLY PROC NO M0-24.
TECH. SPEC. SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE PAGE 4 OF 5
TITLE j AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS P8A AND B REVISION 10 consumers Power DATE 12-7-78 7.19 Run the pump at least 5 minutes and record the following data:
Pump Speed (Final)
NOTE:
If speed is initially outside the band 3540-3580 RPM, adjust the manual speed changer until speed is within this band.
Record the final speed.
Steam Pressure (PI-0521)
Vibration (On yellow*dot)
(Max. 1.8 mils)
Discharge Pressure (PI-0789)
(Max. 1625 PSIG: Min. 1420 PSIG)
RPM PSIG Mils PSIG T-2 Level (LIA-2021 Vibration Instrument Used:
Serial No.:
Cal. Due Date:
Strobe Tach. Used:
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Serial No.:
Cal. Due Date:
7.20 Run the pump for a total of 15 minutes.
7.21 Check the pump for proper lube oil, unusual noises, high bearing temperature and excessive leakage.
REMARKS: --------------------------------
7.22 Close the turbine drive steam supply valve CV-0522B, or if an alternate steam supply, close CV-0522A and then close CV-0521 after line pressure drops.
7.23 Open the turbine drain valves 510FW, SllFW, 512FW.
7.24 When cool, close the turbine drain valves SlOFW, SllFW, and 512FW.
7.25 Recorded data will be reviewed and verified to be within acceptable limits as listed in the applicable paragraph.
NOTE:
If a parameter >Hi or <Lo Limits, pump is considered inoperable.
Initiate a DR/ER as appropriate, and notify the Technical Superin-tendent or the Project Engineer.
Shift Supervisor Date
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l PALISADES NUCLEAR PL NT MONTHLY TECH. SPEC. SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE consumers Power TITLE i AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS P8A aND B PROC NO M0-24 PAGE 5
OF 5 REVISION 10 DATE 12-7-78 I
- I 7.26 Transferred to graphs and evaluated by:
Engineer:
Date: ~~~~~~~~~-
EVALUATOR REMARKS:
(Include any further action required and reference applicable MO's, DR's, etc.):
Reviewed By:
Technical Superintendent