ML18043A382

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Forwards Verification of Plant Info on Systematic Evaluation Program Safety Topic V-11.A Requirements for Isolation of High & Low Pressure Sys
ML18043A382
Person / Time
Site: Big Rock Point, Palisades  File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/21/1978
From: Ziemann D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Bixel D
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
References
TASK-05-11.A, TASK-5-11.A, TASK-RR NUDOCS 7901100372
Download: ML18043A382 (8)
v • d • e


Text

Dccket Nos, Mr. Dl.!vid Dh:ei Nuclear licensing A&ninistrator Consumers Pow2r Company 212 t,!est ~f.ichigan /\\.venue Jackson. Michigan 4Q201

Dear ~*~r:

1 Bixel:

DEC 2 l 1978 RE:

vr:nFIU.T!Ol'.1 OF PLf.\\1iT Hfff}f.:f'[/\\TIO:*i rn~ SEP T0PIC V-11.A,

'!RD):JFE!*'.Efff.S FOF: ISOLATION Of lHGH N~D LOW PRESSURE SYSTU;s 11 0ur initial rcvie:*1 of SEP Safety Tcpic \\!-11.f1 has been comp1etc:c'.

The enclosed tah le presents docketed information en reactor coo1 ant system interfaces i*tith low pressure syste'!S~

1~1so included is plant infornation obtain2c! dur'ing oui-recent safe shutdown rGview of yvur faci1itiss.

';:11 }' s_ystems th,::t had direct interfaces *;:i th the prir;1ary system \\.';ere considered. These were the water cleanup systems. the ECCS, the Si1rip1 ~j nq s.. ~rste=~s:: and thf-: PHR S.}'ste1~s:2 I!i*gh pressure systerns connected to th:? rr-ir:ary system that indirectly interfaced ~Jith a low pressure systen; (Le., service water or component coolin<J through a heat exch<rnw*r) vere n:;t considered.

Systerns design~d to operate c:;.t high

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t'or the hiah pressure RHR system.on severril m*ms. t>thich i:1ere included

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For PH~s the se~1 injection system was incJuded because* it was id~ntified

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to inaivertent1y over-pressurize the water makeup tank~ For BWRs the reactor vessel heod spray cooling system was incla<led because the potential fnr overpressurizing the condensate storage tank. if not properly vented, may Exist.

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Mr. l'avid Bixel Isolatior. requirene<!tS for the ECCS system injection lines as stated 1*~ ~tan~~r~ 0 eu1*~~ 0 1~11 ISPD)

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On?. or more check valves in series with a ncrma1ly closed

1otor-operated va 1 ve.

The motor-operated va 1 ve is to be opened upon receipt of a safety injection shmal once the reactor coolant pressrire has decreased below the ECCS design pressure.

(2) Three check valves in series.

(3)

T~0 check valves in series, provi~ed that there are design provisions to permit periodic testing of the check valves for leak tightness and the testing is perforri1ed at least a::nua11.Y""

Th2 i so 1 at ion requirements for the RHP.

sy;;ter:~ as stated in ?.ranch Technic~l Position BTP-RSB 5-1 are listed below:

The fo11m*1ing sha11 be prcvided in the suction side of the

~:H~ systei:; to i so 1 ate it fro:;: the RCS.

(a)

(b)

I $0 Lit ion sha 11 be provided by at 1 east two pc~>1er-operated valves in series.

The va1v~ position$ sha11 he indicated in the control room.

The valves shall have indeoendent diverse interlocks to prevent the valves from be.ing opened unless the RCS pressur~

is below the f;i-m systeri1 desisn pressure.

Fcilure of a power suppl_y sha11 not cause any valve to change p0sitions.

The valves shall have independent diverse interlocks to protect as;air.st one or both valves being open during an RCS increase above the design pressure of the RHR system.

(2)

One cf the following shall be provided on the discharge side of the RHR system to isolate it from the HCS:

((!)

The valves, position indicators, ar.d interlocks described in item 1 {a) -

( c),

(b)

On~ or r.io:-e check valves in series with *a normally closed po~:er-operated valve.

The pm1er-operated valve posit ion sha11 be indicrJtect in the control room.

If the RHR discharge 1inc is used for an ECCS function, the power-operated valve is t0 be ope:-ied upon receipt of a safety injection signal cnce the reactor coolant pressure has decreased,

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Th~e~ check valves in series. or (d}

Two check va1v:~s in series.. prc1vid0d that there are <lesign n,,.,...,,... iO"S t" p1:;r-"'*1*+.....,;r1'0-l1'r- ""'es""1'** 1** o+ +ho rl-.nc'-' "a1vr.*s +or

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i lea~ tightness and ~he testing is perforoed at least annually.

Isolation reouirenents for t~e cleanup an~ sampling systera are dictate~

by tbe rc:::q11irer,1P.nts of SHF' 6.2.4 :=rnd GDC 5S related to 1in-.=s t:*1at pene-trate the prifndr.Y containrrent houndar~y and are 1 lsted be1oi~*:

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C}ne 1ocke1 closed isolation velve--insicte and one locked closed isol.:itior va1ve 011tside containment. or*

One automatic isolation valve nb8 outsid~ contair.~ent: or

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O:ie !ocked c1os:~d isolatior. valve inside and one {1r;ton~atic isola.tion

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va 1 ve otJtside containr;:~~nt *. nr One autcr.~atic i.so1ation v.::1ve...

1nSF!e and one automatic iso1atior.

valve outside contain~1?~~1t-;

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I testing individuJl valves exists, (3) the hi~h pressure lo~ pressure int;c:~f::Jcps __ (4) n"'tfi..,d of 'if'('<;t::ttrR rPtlurtion ir cloi::fl,-1 1oop <=v~tr:-.r*1s and (5) hc1-: the ~y;t;,;;;~ *;,~e is;lat.;.ri {by ~~1r;~erlure~ ~r ;~tom~tic~l ly)~*

Check valve orientation was included because there has been some recent concern that vertically rnounterl check valves are not as effective as thc.::s mounted hori zenta 11y.

There *.. ;as, r~m-Jev~r; no data in the fS!;Rs an check valve orientation.

For iso1ation of the systens identified to r:ieet current criteria. they must satisfy conditions in the apprcpriate-SRPs, GDC 55 a:t:i Section XI of the PS,1E Code.

These documents establish the combinations of accept-able valves. tl1e testing interval, and the individual valve leak testing requ1re;len;.s.

..... To r.:eet SEP schedule requirei-:i2nts, He need your verification of the correctness of the data presented in the enclosed table and all ctciditional information you r.*1ay have pertaining to Safety Topic V-11.A by January 29, 1979.

Sincerely.

Denni~ L Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Operating Reactors

~,;e;*o:

. G. Case to R. F. Fraley, f~~ecutive Director 1\\CRS~

dated Ju 1 y 11, 1977.

Subject:

11 Iso1 at ion of Lo;-1 Pressure Systems frcxn Peactor Coo1ant System".

~nr:losurc~

.f\\s stated cc v/uiclosure:

DISTRIBUTION Docket NRC PDR Lo ca 1 PDR ORB #2 Reading NRR Reading VStell o DGEi sen hut OELD OI&E (3)

DLZiemann SJNowi cki RDSilver HSmith BGrimes TERA JRBuchanan ACRS (16)

DKDavis

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OFFICE ii>

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... S.JNo.w.i.c.k.i..;.a.b..... RDS.1.1.v..er................... DLZi.emann....................................................................................................................... -............

SURNAME ii>--

DATEi!>...1..2/tJ\\/.Z.8.................. 12/3-..1../..7.8................. 12p~:.L;.1s........

NRC FORM :ns (9-76) NRCM 0240 U; S, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE1 1976 -

626*624

Mr. David Bixel cc M. I. Miller, Esquire Isham, Lineal n & Beale Suite 4200 One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Judd L~ Bacon, Esquire Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Paul A. Perry, Secretary Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Myron M. Cherry, Esquire Suite 4501 One IBM Plaza Chicago, Illinois 50611 Kalamazoo Public Library 315 South Rose Street Kalamazoo, Michigan 49006 Hunton* & Williams George C. Freeman, Jr., Esquire 1 P. 0. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 Peter W. Steketee, Esquire SGS Peoples Building Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503 Charlevoix Public Library 107 i.linton Street C}~- 1 ~v~ix, Michigan 49720 5 -

December 21, 1978

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PLANT:

Big Rock Point Evaluation of Isolation of Low Pressure Systems From Reactor Coolant System

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Direct Interfaces3*4 Isolatio~

of Type Between HP/LP Check Valve Pressure Water Cleanup System Inlet ECCS Discharge Low Pressure Injection Low Pre~sure Core Spray Redundant Core Spray Sampling System RHR System -

Suction Side Discharge Side Criteria Isolation Valves Valves Interface Orientation Reduction Method of Isolation Remarks Yes Yes Yes Yes 2MO (5516 No

& 7010) 2MO (7016 No

&.7005) 2MO (7051 7061) and l check 2MO (7070 7071) and l check No No 2MO (7056 Yes

& 7057) 2MO (7058 Yes

& 7059)

NA Inside containment Inside containment NA NA NA Normally closed, only initiates on RPS signal No isolation valves betw~

non regenerative and regillll'-

ative heat exchangers and primary system Both inlet and discharge valves identified only isolate cleanup deminera-1 izer Fig. 107 FSAR No low pressure injection system High pressure interlock which prevents valves frOll opening when reactor pres-sure higher than core spray system pressure Fig. 123 (FSAR)

No information provided ~

in FSAR NA High pressure Fig. 107 (FSAR) interlock to pre-vent opening*when reactor pressure

> 300 psig NA Autoclosure

>300 psig

PLANT:

Palisades Evaluation of Isolation of Low P1*essure Systems From Reactor Coolant System Direct Interfaces3*4 Meets Redundancy Testable Location of Method of Isolatio?

of Type Between HP/LP Check Valve Pressure Method of Criteria Isolation Valves Valves Interface Orientation Reduction Isolation Remarks Water Reactor System Inlet No MO Outside Containment Orifice Discharge Yes MO, CK Outside Containment NA8 Seal Injection System

  • Controlled seal bleed-off collected & processed by eves.

No specific isolation criteria. Bleed off downstream of orifice in CVCS (DWG 202, G-6).

Pressure reduced from seal used at time reenters eves ECCS

  • Low Pressure Yes lMO, 2CK No Inside containment NA MOV opens on SI sig-Injection

£~~fabJg~oard CK is Accumulators1 Yes 2-Check Yes Inside containment NA NA CK valves testable during (Safety Injection Tanks) operation - chg press. 240 ps1 Sampling System Yes 3 Pneumatic One valve (N/C)

NA Pressure Procedural DWG 219-No specific inside containment reducing isolation criteria and 2 (N/C) outside coil e

RHR System (Shutdown cooling system)

Suction Side Yes 2MO also Inside containment NA NA Each valve powered Visual valve position manual from separate bus indication in control outside and high pressure room.

contain-inter lock with ment common pressure tap for both valves Discharge Side Yes lMO No Inside containment NA NA Separate switch in RHR discharges thru LPSI 2Check control room for 1 ines each valve

  • HPSI design press is 1750 psig.

NOTE:

1. PWRs only
2. BWRs only
3. Only direct interfaces considered--service water and component cooling water systems not evaluated
4. High pressure systems (i.e., control rod drive hydraulic, isolation condenser, standby liquid control, high pressure injection, & Reie) connected to reactor coolant pressure boundary not evaluated
5. Inadvertent overpressurization of makeup tank due to reactor coolant pump seal leak off
6. Reactor water cleanup system for BWRs and eves or Letdown System for PWRS 1.. Isolation requirements for Eees specified in SRP 6.3 (Section Ill), for RHR system in BTP RSB 5-1 attached to SRP 5.4.7 and for water cleanup and sampling system in Goe 55
8. NA - Not Applicable
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