05000296/LER-1995-003-03, :on 950901,DGs Auto Start Occurred Due to Personnel Error During Performance of Common Accident Signal Logic Surveillance.Secured DGs & EECW Pump & Counseled Electricians to Further Emphasize Need to Be More Cautious

:on 950901,DGs Auto Start Occurred Due to Personnel Error During Performance of Common Accident Signal Logic Surveillance.Secured DGs & EECW Pump & Counseled Electricians to Further Emphasize Need to Be More Cautious

ML18038B444
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	09/26/1995
From:	Hsieh C TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML18038B443	List: 05000296/LER-1995-003, Forwards LER 95-003-00,providing Details Concerning Auto Start of Unit 3 DGs 05000296/LER-1995-003-03, :on 950901,DGs Auto Start Occurred Due to Personnel Error During Performance of Common Accident Signal Logic Surveillance.Secured DGs & EECW Pump & Counseled Electricians to Further Emphasize Need to Be More Cautious
References
LER-95-003-03, LER-95-3-3, NUDOCS 9510030325
Download: ML18038B444 (10)

LER-1995-003, on 950901,DGs Auto Start Occurred Due to Personnel Error During Performance of Common Accident Signal Logic Surveillance.Secured DGs & EECW Pump & Counseled Electricians to Further Emphasize Need to Be More Cautious

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(ii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(v) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
2961995003R03 - NRC Website

text

NRC FORM 366 (5 92)

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(NHIISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

,APPROVED BY (NB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER

RESPONSE

TO

'COHPLY MITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTIOH REQUEST:

50.0 HRS.

FORWARD COHMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATIOH'ND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HHBB 7714), U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, NASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140.0104),

OFFICE OF MANAGEHEHT AND BUDGET NASHINGTOH DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1)

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 3 DOCKET M(ABER (2) 05000296 PAGE (3) 1OF5 TITLE (4) DIESEL GENERATORS AUTO START DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR DURING PERFORMANCE OF COMMON ACCIDENT SIGNAL LOGIC SURVEILLANCE EVENT DATE 5

LED HNIBER 6

REPORT DATE 7

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8

HON'IH 09 DAY 01 YEAR 95 95 SEQUENT IAL NUHBER 003 REVISION HUHBER 00 MONTH DAY 09 '6 YEAR 95 FACILITY NAME NA FACILITY NAHE NA DOCKET NUMBER DOCKET NUHBER OPERATING IHX)E (9)

N THIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT 20.402(b) 20.405(c)

X, 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR Check one or more 11 POMER LEVEL (10) 000 20.405(a)(1)(i) 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(s)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(s)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LED 12 50.73(s)(2)(v) 50.?3(s)(2)(vii) 50.73(s)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(s)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(c)

OTHER (Specify in Abstract below snd in Text,HAHE Clare S. Hsieh, Compliance Li.censing Engineer TELEPHONE HUHBER (Include Area Code)

(205)729-2635 C(NIPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH C(SIPOHENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13

CAUSE

SYS TEM COMPONENT REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTEM COHPOHEHT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO HPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSIOH DATE).

X, NO EXPECTED SUBlllSS ION DATE (15)

HONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

(16)

On September 1,

1995, at 1834 hours0.0212 days <br />0.509 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.97837e-4 months <br />, all four Unit 3 diesel generators (DGs) inadvertently auto started during the performance of common accident signal logic testing.

At 1835

hours, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) pump A3 started as expected to provide cooling water to the DGs.

During this testing, electricians placed. a boot on a relay to inhibit a pre-accident signal to the Unit 3 DGs.

While placing the boot, the electricians made up the relay contacts to start the DGs.

This event was caused by personnel error.

Contributing to the event was the difficulty in performing this task.

Corrective actions

involved securing the DGs and the EECW',pump, and counseling the electricians to further emphasize the need to be more cautious when working on energized equipment.

TVA is also.

reviewing the present methodology of placing a boot on energized relay contacts to determine if other methods can be used during testing.

At the time of this event, Unit 3 was defueled and in a long-term outage.

Unit 2 was operating at 100 percent

power, and Unit 1 was shutdown and defueled.

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) as a condition that resulted in automatic actuation of an engineered safety feature.

uor un'(

)

95i0030325 950926 PDR ADO(.K 05000296 S

PDR

ii(5-92)

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY Q(B NO. 3150-0104 EXP IRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER

RESPONSE

TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:

50.0 HRS.

FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN 'ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714),

U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,

'WASHINGTON, DC 20555.0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),

OFFICE OF HANAGEHENI'ND

BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503 FACILITY NAME '(1)

DOCKET HINIBER (2)

YEAR LED HIRIBER (6)

SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE (3)

Browns Ferry Unit 3

05000296,

'95 003 00 2 of 5 TEXT If more s ce is r uired use additional co ies of NRC Form 366A (17)

I ~

PLANT CONDITIONS

'Unit 3 and Unit 1 were shutdown, and defueled.

Unit 2,was operating at 3291 megawatts thermal (approximately 100 percent power).

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

A ~

Event At 1834 hours0.0212 days <br />0.509 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.97837e-4 months <br /> on September 1,

1995, all four Unit 3 diesel generators (DGs)

[EK] inadvertently auto started during the performance of Common Accident Signal (CAS) logic surveillance instruction (SI) 1/2-81-4.9.A.3.a.

At 1835 hours0.0212 days <br />0.51 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.982175e-4 months <br />, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) [BI) pump A3 started as expected to provide cooling water to the Unit 3 DGs.

At the time of the event, electricians (utility, nonlicensed) were conducting tests on the Division I CAS logic and were placing a boot on a Unit 3 pre-accident signal'elay [RLY).

The boot was being placed on the contacts of relay 14A-K35A (General Electric (GE) type HGA located in,Panel 3-9-32 in the Auxiliary Instrument Room) to inhibit a pre-accident signal to the Unit 3 DGs.

B.

C.

When the Unit 3 DGs auto started, the Shift Operations Supervisor (SOS) [utility, licensed) notified the personnel in the Auxiliary Instrument Room to stop activities associated with the surveillance on the CAS logic.

At 1901 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.233305e-4 months <br />, the DGs were stopped and at 1907 hours0.0221 days <br />0.53 hours <br />0.00315 weeks <br />7.256135e-4 months <br /> EECW pump A3 was stopped.

The DGs were returned to standby readiness at 1914 hours0.0222 days <br />0.532 hours <br />0.00316 weeks <br />7.28277e-4 months <br />.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) as an event or condition that resulted in an automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).

Ino erable Structures Com onents or S stems that Contributed to the Event:

None.

Dates and A

roximate Times of Ma'or Occurrences:

September 1,

1995 at 0813 hours0.00941 days <br />0.226 hours <br />0.00134 weeks <br />3.093465e-4 months <br /> CAS SI began

i+i

NRC FORH 366A (5-92)

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQOIISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY (N(B NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER

RESPONSE

TO COHPLY NITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECT'ION 'REDUEST:

50.0 HRS.

FORNARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714),

U.S.

'NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, NASHINGTON, 'DC 20555.0001, AND TO THE PAPERLlORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),

OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGETS NASHINGTON, DC 20503 FACILITY NAHE (1)

Browns Ferry Unit 3 DOCKET NINIBER (2) 05000296

'LED NUHBER (6)

TEAR SEQUENtIAL REVISION NUHBER NUHBER 00 003 95 PAGE (3) 3 of 5 TEXT tf more s ce is r ired use additional co ies of NRC Form 366A (17) at 1834 hours0.0212 days <br />0.509 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.97837e-4 months <br /> at 1835 hours0.0212 days <br />0.51 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.982175e-4 months <br /> at 1901 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.233305e-4 months <br /> at 1907 hours0.0221 days <br />0.53 hours <br />0.00315 weeks <br />7.256135e-4 months <br /> at 1914 hours0.0222 days <br />0.532 hours <br />0.00316 weeks <br />7.28277e-4 months <br /> at 2035 hours0.0236 days <br />0.565 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.743175e-4 months <br /> Unit 3 DGs auto started EECW pump A3 started Unit 3 DGs stopped EECW pump A3 stopped Unit 3 DGs returned to standby readiness TVA provided a 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii) notification to NRC Operations Center D ~

Other S stems or Seconda Functions Affected:

None.

Method of Discover F..

This condition was discovered when the Unit Operator [utility, licensed) and the Assistant Shift Operations Supervisor [utility, licensed] in the control room received alarms (ALM] and indications that the Unit 3 DGs (3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D) had auto started.

0 erator Actions:

The operators observed the alarms in the control room.

The SOS immediately notified personnel in the Auxiliary Instrument Room to stop activities associated. with the CAS logic surveillance.

G, Safet S stem Res onses!

The safety systems responded as designed for this type of event.

III'AUSE OF THE EVENT A.

Immediate

Cause

The immediate cause of this event was an inadvertent closure of relay 14A-K35A contacts which resulted in the auto start of the Unit 3 DGs.

i~

I

I'

~

I I

~

~

I

~ '

~

~

~ '

I

'\\

~ '

~ '

I I

I I

~

I I

I

~

~ '

I I

I ~ II

~ 0

~

~

~ I

~

Kh%

~ ~

~ ~

~ 0 0

~

~

0

~ 0 ~

0 0

0

~

~ 0

~ 0 0 0

~

0 ~

0

~

0

~

~ 0 0

~ 0

~ 0

~ ~

0 0

~ ~

0

~

~

0

~

~

0

~

0

~

~ ~-

~

~

0 0

0

~

~ 0

~

~

0

~

~

~

0

~

~

0

~

~

~

~

0

~ ~ ~

~

~

~ ~

~

0

~

0

~

~

~

~

~ ~

0 ~

~

0

~

0

~

~ ~

~ 0

it:

A

NRC FORM'366A (5-92)

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(NIIISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY MS NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER

RESPONSE

TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATIOH COLLECTION REOUEST:

50.0 HRS.

FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT'RANCH (MNBB 7714),

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104),

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AHO

.BUDGETS WASHINGTON, DC 20503 FACILITY NAME (1)

Browns Ferry Unit 3 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000296 TEAR 95 LED MIN(GER (6)

SEOUENTIAL NUMBER 003'EVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3) 5 of 5 TEXT If more s ace is r uired use additional co ies of(17)

TVA has revised the SI to eliminate the need to boot the HGA relay contacts.

TVA is also reviewing the present methodology of placing

.a boot on energized relay contacts for GE HGA relays to determine if other methods can be used during testing.'I

~

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A ~

Failed Com onents:

B ~

None.

Previous LERs on Similar Events:

There have 'been several LERs written to document unplanned DG autostarts.

Five of these LERs (i.e.,

296/87004, 259/89014, 259/91004, 296/94001, and 296/95002) occurred as a result of miscellaneous personnel errors, but none of them involved booting relay contacts.

Accordingly, the corrective actions for these LERs would not have precluded this event (LER 296/95003).

In one LER (296/91003),

the individual did not properly install an inhibiting boot during the performance of an SI.

Corrective actions included training maintenance personnel on the proper installation of boots.

LER 296/91003 is similar to this LER 296/95003;

however, the corrective actions in LER 296/91003 would not have precluded LER 296/95003 since the boot was properly installed on the relay contacts in LER 296/95003.

VII ~

COMMITMENTS

None.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) system and component codes are identified in the text with brackets (e.g.,

[XX].

This action is not a regulatory commitment.

iS

'gl '