ML18038A174
| ML18038A174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1986 |
| From: | Mangan C Niagara Mohawk Power Corp |
| To: | Adensam E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18038A175 | List: |
| References | |
| (NMP2L-0761), NUDOCS 8607070061 | |
| Download: ML18038A174 (63) | |
Text
O'8 p
'e!
9 I
REQ ATORY IflFORNATION DISTR IB ON SYSTE>l (R IDS)
ACCESSION NBR: S60707006i DOC. DATE: S6/06/30 NOTARIZED: YES DOCKET F*CIL:50-410 Nine Ni le Point Nuclear Station! Unit 2i Niagar a f'foha 050004i0 AUTH. NAIIE AUTHOR AFFILIATION f'fANQAN>C. V.
Niagara Nohawk Power Corp.
RECIP. NAf'fE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION ADENSANp E. Q.
8 ~~q5
SUBJECT:
Advises that addi secondary containment bypass leakage paths identiFied as result oF Final verification oP pipe whip studies> changing accident analysis for o&Fsite doses. W/eight oversize encl Zc 27 oversize drawings.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
BOOiD COPIES RECEIVED: LTR i ENCL )
SIZE:
TITLE: Licensing Submittal:
PSAR/FSAR Amdts Zc Related Correspondence NOTES:
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAf'fE BWR EB BflR FOB BWR PD3 PD BWR PSB INTERNAL: ACRS 4i ELD/HDS3 IE/DEPER/EPB 36 NRR BMR ADTS N
REQ FILF 04
'fI /NI8 EXTERNAL: BNL(ANDTS ONLY)
LPDR 03 NSIC 05 COPIES LTTR ENCL i
i i
i i
6 6
0i 0i 0
REC IP IENT ID CODE/MANE BWR EICSB BWR PD3 LA HAUQHEYif'f Oi BWR RSB ADN/LFl'fB IE FILE IE/DGAVT/GAB 2i NRR PWR-B *DTS NRR/DHFT/NTB RQNi DNB/DSS (ANDTS)
NRC PDR 02 PNL CRUEL> R COPIES LTTR ENCL 2
2 2i i
0 i
0i 3
3 i
i i
TOTAL NUblBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 36 ENCL 3i
1
>>5 V
V II)
Ifl 1
"I '!-"i>>SV c
) "',! P S',, f5) Sll
~ )
~ 1'5 I 5 1 ~
- 1 I
'I>>'f
>><<)i'5
NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARDWEST, SYRACUSE. N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 June 30, 1986 (NMP2L 0761)
Ms. Elinor G. Adensam, Director BWR Project Directorate No.
3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Washington, DC 20555
Dear Ms. Adensam:
Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket'No. 50-410 As a result of the final verification of the pipe whip studies at Nine Mile Point Unit 2, additional secondary containment bypass leakage paths were identified.
This changes the accident analysis for offsite doses.
The changes involve analysis of additional paths, including instrument air, nitrogen system and containment purge system paths.
The results of the analysis show that the totals are still below the allowable values.
- Further, based upon the percentage
- increase, we believe that the staff independent assessment of the offsite doses for these cases will be in conformance with 10 CFR 100.11.
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report pages are provided in Attachment 1
which show the results.
Isometric drawings are also provided for the above-listed systems in Attachment 2.
Proposed Technical Specification changes are provided in Attachment 3.
Refer to Final Safety Analysis Report figures 9.4-8, 9.3-20, 9.3-1, which show the containment purge, nitrogen and instrument air systems piping and instrumentation
- diagrams, respectively.
Our staff is available to discuss these matters or meet on this topic at your convenience.
Very truly yours, C. V. Mang Senior Vice President NLR:ja 1746G Attachment xc: R. A. Gramm, NRC Resident Inspector Project File (2) 860707006l 860630l PDR
- DOCK 05000410 A
PD~
'Soa I
(/]
- APT, CIIIIRO F(<
~
~
h 5
~
~
U'
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
)
(Nine Mile Point Unit 2)
Docket No.
50-410 AFFIDAVIT C. V.
Man an
, being duly sworn, states that he is Senior Vice President of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said Corporation to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the documents attached hereto; and that all such documents are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
Subscribed and swor to before me, a Notary Public in d for the State of New York and County of ~8
, this ~o day of 1986.
N y Public in and for
- County, New York My Commission expires:
JAiVIS M. MACRO tr~ to y Pu'to In thO Stata Of trOW YarR Qu II to 'n Onondaga County Noi478 Srs nl> 4
~, sslon gxplros March SO, 19
Nine Yiile Point Unit 2 CESAR I
Railcar entrance to the reactor building railroad airlock is through an interlocking double door airlock system.
The railroad airlock is completely within and along the northeast side of the reactor building at el 261 ft.
One of the interlocked doors is the exterior railcar door at the north end'f the railroad airlock, and the other is the interior railcar door at the south end of the railroad airlock.
A smaller door for personnel ingress and egress is incorporated into the design of the interior railcar door.
All three doors must 'be closed before any one of them can be opened.
The reactor building pressure control function automatically maintains a uniform subatmospheric pressure of 0.25 in W.G.
by monitoring the differential pressure between the reactor building interior and the external atmospheric pressure.
The differential pressure is monitored by a differential pressure transmitter.
The signal that indicates the differential pressure also controls the position of the recirculation dampers in the HVRS supply fan units.
In the event of reactor building isolation, the reactor building pressure control instrumentation regulates the reactor building pressure by controlling the SGTS recirculation flow.
The reactor building pressure control instrumentation is, designed to eliminate fluctuations in reactor building pressure caused by such factors as wind gusts.
Reactor building pressure is indicated and recorded and loss of negative pressure is alarmed in the main control room.
6.2.3.2.3 Bypass Ieakage Paths Table 6.2-56 presents a tabulation of all primary containment process piping penetrations including the potential reactor building bypass leakage paths.
The potential bypass leakage paths are routed through the reactor building and terminate in the radwaste, standby gas treatment, turbine generator building, or yard.
No guard pipes are used on penetrations and, therefore, guard pipes cannot constitute a bypass leakage path.
All process lines that rely on a
closed system within the primary containment as a leakage boundary terminate within the reactor building.
Therefore, these lines are not considered potential bypass leakage paths.
Bypass leakage is included in the radiological evaluation of design basis events.
This is discussed in Section 15.6.5.5.
Tables 6.2-55a and 6.2.55b
.show the bypass leakage paths considered.
They include four main steam
- lines, two main Amendment 21 6.2-54 September 1985 8607070061"
/
Nine Nile Point Unit 2 Several process lines eliminate bypass leakage by the use of water seals.
These are discussed below and include condensate makeup and drawoff (CNS),
reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and high pressure core spray (HPCS).
Feedwater system (FNS) is also discussed below, but no credit for water seals
=-is applied for that system.
A typical loop seal is shown on Figure 6.2-88.
CNS Nhiie not directly connected to the primary containment, the condensate makeup and drawoff system is used as the alternate fill source to the
- LPCS, and RNCU systems.
Each condensate fill connection to these systems is isolated by means of a normally closed globe valve.
The main supply line into the secondary containment contains a check valve at the low point which, in case of a pipe break outside the containment, is sealed by a 70-ft leg of water.
Although the condensate makeup and drawoff system is not of seismic
- design, any line break within the reactor building would provide a
preferential flow path, for containment atmosphere leakage into the reactor building atmosphere.
Under this condition, gaseous leakage would be collected by the SGTS and thus not be classified as bypass leakage.
6.2-54b 1746G
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR steam drain lines, one reactor water cleanup line, one feedwater line, four post-accident sampling lines, six primary containment purge lines, four drywell floor and equipment vent and drain lines, and six nitrogen/instrumentation lines.
The analysis used to predict the bypass leakage rates is discussed in Section 6.2.3.2.4.
Single failure is included in the analysis in that failure of one division of electrical power is assumed.
This results in all motor-operated containment isolation valves on that division failing as is (assumed open),
thereby reducing the restrictions to bypass leakage.
This is the worst single failure to consider for this evaluation.
All leakage is conservatively assumed to be across isolation valve seats and to remain within the system piping until released to the environment.
Any leakage escaping across outboard isolation valve stem packing would be released to the secondary containment or main steam tunnel.
Any leakage into the secondary containment would be processed by the standby gas treatment system.
Contami nants leaked into the main steam tunnel will be transported to the environment more slowly due to the much larger cross-sectional area of the tunnel and the resulting slower average velocities.
No credit is taken for a reduction in bypass leakage due to water inboard of or trapped between isolation valves, The isolation valves are assumed to leak containment atmosphere instantaneously following the accident.
No credit is taken for the time required to initially pressurize the volume between the isolation valves.
Leakage transport time to the environment is based on 1/2 of the available horizontal and vertically downward flow piping located between the outboard isolation valve and the environment.
Further conservatism is added to the analysis by the assumption that all isolation valves in these
- paths, except the main steam isolation valves (MSIV) and feedwater check valves, leak at a rate equal to the maximum permissible, ASME Section XI, Subsection INV-3426, recommended acceptance level of 7.5 scf/day per inch of nominal valve diameter at functional pressure.
The MSIVs are assumed to leak at 6 scfh, nearly three times the valve design limit.
Leakage across check valves, except the feedwater check valves, is assumed to be at twice the recommended rate of 7.5 scf/day per inch of nominal valve
- diameter, as provided for by ASME Section XI, Subsection INV-3426.
Leakage across the feedwater valves is assumed to be 12 scfh.
6.2-54a 1746G
rp I
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR RCIC The RCIC path from the primary containment to the condensate storage building is protected from bypass leakage.
When RCIC is taking suction from the condensate storage tank (2CNS-TK1A), the tank static head pressure maintains a
23-psig water seal at valve 2ICS*V28 and/or 2ICS*MOV136 (Figure 6.2-81).
Also, the piping arrangement as shown in Figure 6.2-81 provides a
loop seal with a high point at 2ICS*MOV136.
- Thus, any containment atmosphere leakage through this valve during the period that containment pressures exceed water seal pressure would be trapped at this high point.
If a
'place simultaneously and a
condensate line break
- occurs, 2ICS*MOV129 on the condensate tank line will shut automatically, creating an additional barrier to bypass leakage.
HPCS The arrangement of the HPCS suction line from condensate storage tank 2CNS-TKlB provides enough static head pressure to keep a 75-ft (32 psig) water seal at the line-low point (valve 2CSH*MOV101) in Figure 6.2-83.
- Further, the piping arrangement as shown in Figure 6.2-83 provides two intermediate loop seals with high points at valves 2CSH*MOV118 and 2CSH+V59, ensuring that any containment atmosphere leakage occurring during the 20 min that containment pressures exceed water seal pressure would be trapped between these high points.
If a LOCA and an SSE take place simultaneously and a
condensate line break
- occurs, 2CSH*MOV101 on the condensate storage tank line will shut automatically, creating an additional barrier against bypass leakage.
FWS For loss-of-coolant accidents not involving a feedwater line break, sufficient water exists in the vertical feedwater piping between the containment penetration and the reactor vessel to prevent bypass leakage for at least 30 days after the accident.
See Figure 6.2-84.
For a
break in feedwater piping inside containment, bypass leakage through this piping is included in the analysis of Section 15.6.
- However, as discussed
- below, a water seal, restored after the break, will effectively prevent escape of containment atmosphere to the environment after 10 min.
Amendment, 21 6.2-55 September 1985
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR In considering a break in the feedwater piping within the primary containment, credit can be given to the piping arrangement which provides low stress levels along with pipe whip restraints.
Consequently, it can be stated that the containment penetration is a break exclusion area.
Assuming a break in the feedwater line at the end of the break exclusion region inside the primary containment (see Section 3.6A and Figure 3.6A-20), sufficient water will remain in the line, even after flashing due to initial depressurization, to maintain a vertical water seal on the feedwater isolation valves (Figure 6.2-84).
Hater losses due to long-term containment pressure reduction and the associated water vaporization and the backleakage through the two isolation check valves for 30 days will be replenished by reactor water leaking from the break.
Hithin ten minutes after the break, the ECCS injection water will reflood the reactor to above the level of the feedwater sparger.
At that point, water would flood back into the feedwater piping and then into the intact containment penetration piping (Figure 6.2-84),
This would more than make up for any losses due to leakage out the containment isolation valves.
- Thus, a continuous water seal is provided to prevent any bypass leakage through the feedwater lines after the initial ten minute refilling period.
Notwithstanding the above, bypass leakage through a ruptured feedwater line is included in the radiological analysis for the entire 30 day period to ensure conservative analysis results.
In addition to the two isolation check valves, each feedwater line has a
remote-manual gate valve outboard of the isolation valves that may be shut subsequent to a LOCA anytime the operators determine that feedwater flow is unnecessary or unavailable.
The gate valve provides further back leakage control.
However, this valve is assumed to remain open for the purpose of evaluating bypass leakage.
6.2-55a 1746G
P
,t
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR 6.2.3.2.4 Bypass Leakage Rates Bypass leakage rates as a
function of time after the postulated LOCA are predicted for each path by two
- methods, assuming isothermal flow and isentropic flow.
Table 6.2-55a lists the bypass paths considered and their contributions to the total bypass
- leakage, assuming isothermal flow determined with the following equation:
m ~
K (P
- P~)/RT t>/>
u D
u~
(6.2-12)
Where:
P
= Upstream absolute pressure (post-LOCA pressure/
temperature profile per Section 6.2.1)
P
= Downstream absolute pressure D
T
= Upstream absolute temperature R = Gas constant K = Constant (determined from the technical specifi-cation of allowable leak rate) m = Mass flow rate To quantify the sensitivity of the bypass leakage analysis to the flow model assumption, the bypass calculation was repeated considering the leakage flow to be characterized as isentropic flow through an orifice.
Table 6.2-55b summarizes the isentropic flow results determined with the following equation:
m=A p 2 u
PD PD 2 g ~ Y c
Y-x RT u
p (6. 2-13)
Where:
6.2-55b
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 6.2-55a (Cont)
Line t~tessei ties Inst. air to SRV accumulators Inst. air to drywell Inst. air to drywell Termi-nation
~Re ion Yard" yard yard Bypass Leak Rate(3)
Leakage Tech Spec Fraction/
Barrier SCFH(')
~Da
<2>
1-1 1/2" SOV 1-1 1/2" SOV 1-1 1/2" SOV 0-2 hr Containment B
ass Leak Rate (Fraction/Da )(5) 0-8 hl 8-24 hr
~1-4 da
~4-30 da Inst. air to CPS yard valve in supp.
chamber Inst. air to CPS yard valve in supp.
chamber N2 purge to TIP yard index mechanism l-l 1/2" Combined check leakage valve 3.6('>
1-1 1/2" check valve 1-1/2" check valve (8)
.124xlO 3 (9)
.180x10"3 (9)
.163x10 3
(9)
(9)
(9) 1.58x10-3
.141x10-3
.979x10-4
( 1) Std. Conditions:
14.7 psia and 68'F (2) Fraction/Day is defined as fraction of drywel 1 volume leakage/day per line under test conditions
(3) Test Conditions:
Air medium:
40 psig and 80'F (4) The leak rate is based on ASME Section XI (Subsection IHV-3426) applied to each valve, except for main steal lines and feedwater lines.
(5) Fraction/Day is defined as fraction of drywell volume leakage/day under LOCA conditions.
(6) Leak rate is defined as a fraction of entire primary containment volume under LOCA conditions.
(7) All these paths terminate at 2GSN-TK2 within the reactor building and only one line goes out of the reactor building.
(8) Leak Rate (Fraction/Day) is defined as a fraction of the suppression chamber volume under test conditions.
(9) Fraction/Day is defined as a fraction of the suppression chamber volume under LOCA conditions.
2aof 2
1746G
Nine Hile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 6.2-55a (Cont)
Line
~0escrl tice Inst. air to ADS accumulators Termi-nation
~Re )on yard Bypass Leakage Barr(er
'l-l 1/2" check valve Leak Rate(3>
SCFN(~
4>
~Oa b~
.9375
.217xlO 4 0-2 hr
.317xlO-4 0-8 hr
.286x10 4
8-24 hr
.277xlO 4
~1-4 de
.249xlO 4 Containment 8
ass Leak Rate (Fraction/Da
)(5>
~4-30 de
.172x10"4 Inst. air to ADS yard accumulators 1-1 1/2".9375 check valve
.217xlO-4
.317x1 0-4
.286xlO 4
.277xlO-4
.249xlQ-4
.172xlo 4
( 1) Std. Conditions:
14.7 psia and 68'F (2> Fraction/Day is defined as fraction of drywell volume leakage/day per line under test conditions.
(3) Test Conditions:
Air medium:
40 psig and 80'F (4) The leak rate is based on ASHE Section XI (Subsection IHV-3426) applied to each valve, except for main steal lines and feedwater lines.
(5) Fraction/Day is defined as fraction of drywell volume leakage/day under LOCA conditions.
(6) Leak rate is defined as a fraction of entire primary containment volume under LOCA conditions.
(7) All these paths terminate at 2GSN-TK2 within the reactor building and only one line goes out of the reactor building.
(8> Leak Rate (Fraction/Day) is defined as a fraction of the suppression chamber volume under test conditions.
(9) Fraction/Day is defined as a fraction of the suppression chamber volume under LOCA conditions.
2bof 2 1746G
Line
~0eseri ties Inst. air to SRV accumulators Inst. air to drywell Inst. air to drywell Termi-nation
~Re ion Yard yard yard Bypass Leak Rate<3)
Leakage Tech Spec Fraction/
Barrier SCFH<1.4)
~Oa <2) 1-1/2" SOV 1-1 1/2" SOV 1-1 1/2" SOV 0-2 hr Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 6.
(Cont)
Containment B
ass Leak Rate (Fraction/Oa
)<5) 0-8 hr 8-24 hr
~S-4 da
~4-30 da Inst. air to CPS valve in supp.
chamber Inst. air to CPS valve in supp.
chamber N2 purge to TIP index mechanism yard yard yard l-l 1/2" Combined check leakage valve 3.6</>
1-1 1/2" check valve 1-1/2" check valve (8)
.124xlO 3 (9)
.189x10 3
(9)
.175x10"3 (9) 1.70xl0-3 (9)
.160x10-3 (9)
.126xlO-3
( 1) Std. Conditions:
14.7 psia and 68'F (2) Fraction/Oay is defined as fraction of drywell volume leakage/day per line under test cond)tions.
(3) Test Conditions:
Air medium:
40 psig and 80'F (4) The leak rate 10 based on ASHE Section XI (Subsection IHV-3426) applied to each valve, except for main steal lines and feedwater lines.
(5) Fraction/Oay is defined as fraction of drywell volume leakage/day under LOCA conditions.
(6) Leak rate is defined as a fraction of entire primary containment volume under LOCA conditions.
(7) All these paths terminate. at 2GSN-TK2 within the reactor building and only one line goes out of the reactor building.
(8) Leak Rate (Fraction/Oay) is defined as a fraction of the suppression chamber volume under test conditions.
(9) Fraction/Oay is defined as a fraction of the suppression chamber volume under LOCA conditions.
2a of 2 1746G
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 6.2-Cont)
Line
~desert tice Inst. air to AOS accumulators Termi-nation
~Re ion yard Bypass Leakage Barrier 1-1 1/2" check valve Leak Rate(3)
Tech fpec Fracbi~n/
.9375
.217xlO 4 Containment B
ass Leak Rate (Fraction/Da )(5) 0-2 hr 0-8 hr 8-24 hr
~t-4 da
.331xlO-4
.307x10-4
.298xlO-4
.282x10-4
~4-30 da
.221xlO 4 Inst. air to ADS accumulators yard 1-1 1/2" check valve
.9375
.217x10-4
.331xlO-4
.307x10-4
.298xlO-4
.282x10 4
.22lx10 4 (1) Std. Conditions:
14.7 psia and 68'F (2) Fraction/Day is defined as fraction of drywell volume leakage/day per line under test conditions.
(3) Test Conditions:
Air medium:
40 psig and 80'F (4) The leak rate is based on ASME Section XI (Subsection IW-3426) applied to each valve, except for main steal lines and feedwater lines.
(5) Fraction/Day is defined as fraction of drywell volume leakage/day under LOCA conditions.
(6) Leak rate is defined as a fraction of entire primary containment volume under LOCA conditions.
(7) All these paths terminate at 2GSN-TK2 within the reactor building and only one line goes out of the reactor building.
(8) Leak Rate (Fraction/Oay) is defined as a fraction of the suppression chamber volume under test condi tions.
(9) Fraction/Day is defined as a fraction of the suppression chamber volume under LOCA conditions.
2bof 2 1746G
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 6.2-56 (Cont) b.
The system leakage boundary piping/components are designed in accordance with Quality Group B
standards as defined by Regulatory Guide 1.26.
c.
The system leakage boundary is designed to meet Seismic Category I design requirements.
d.
The system leakage boundary is designed to at least the primary containment pressure and temperature design conditions.
e.
The system leakage boundary is designed for protection against pipe
- whip, missiles, and jet forces in a manner similar to that for engineered safety features.
f.
The system leakage boundary is tested for leakage, unless system integrity is demonstrated, to be maintained during normal plant operations.
.'This line/path is excluded from further consideration as a potential bypass leakage
- path, because a
water seal-is provided to prevent leakage from bypassing the secondary containment.
There is sufficient fluid available to maintain the seal for at least 30 days following a loss-of-coolant accident (see Section 6.2.3.2.3 for seal details).
'~~'This line/path is excluded from further consideration as a potential bypass leakage path because (per Branch Technical Position CSB 6-3, Section A) leakage from the primary containment cannot circumvent the secondary containment boundary and escape directly to the environment; that is, leakage cannot bypass the leakage collection and filtration systems of the secondary containment.
Filtration of leakage is assured, because either the piping terminates in the secondary containment or leakage is directly routed to the filtration systems.
'In addition to a swing check valve inside containment and a positive acting check valve outside containment, similar to an Atwood-Morrill boiler feed check valve as described in Catalog 63,Section I, a third valve with high leak-tight integrity will be provided in each line outside containment.
The spring-loaded piston operator of the positive acting check valve will be held open by 24a of 24
RC-PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SC-SECONOARY CONTAINMENT VAPOR OR ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE APPLICABLE H = ELEVATION OSC ISC HI ORC IRC I
I PENETRATION I
v I
I I
I ISOLATION VALVES LOOP SEAL FIGURE 6.2-88 TYPICALWATER LOOP SEAL NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MlLE POINT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
0
b.
Feedwater line c.
Post-accident sampling lines (4) d.
Main steam drain lines (2) e.
Reactor water cleanup line f.
Drywell equipment drain and vent lines (2) g.
Drywell floor drain and vent lines (2) h.
Primary containment purge lines (4) i.
Primary containment purge lines (2)
Instrument air lines (3)
Nitrogen inerting system line (1) j.
Instrument air lines to ADS valve accumulators (2)
Section 6.2.3 describes in detail the two methods used to determine the leak rates through the isolation valve(s) for each path.
These two methodologies, one considering an isothermal flow process and the other considering an isentropic flow process, define the two separate approaches to the flow design basis analysis.
Using the leak rate data from Tables 6.2-55a and 6.2-55b, a prerelease holdup time is calculated for each bypass leakage path using the slug-flow method.
The slug-flow method assuems that the 15.6-12a.l 1746G
I
Nine Nile Point Unit TABLE 15.6-13 (C
AR Isentro ic Case Isothermal Case Desi n Basis Assum tions Real i sti c Basis Assum tions Iodine concentration ratios 0-8 hr 8-24 hr 24-24.37 hr 24.37-96 hr 96-720 hr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.273 0.04 0-8 hr 8-24 hr 24-31.74 hr 31.74-96 hr 96-720 hr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.255 0.047 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Pipe inside diameter (actual/design basis)
Pipe length (actual/design basis)
Deposition surface (actual/design basis)
Temperature transient pipe inside surface c.
Inboard main steam drain line 25.23 in/25.23 in 508 ft/312 ft 3 355 ft2/2,060 ft2 O-l day 450 F
1-2 day 450-350 F
2-3 day 350-250'F 3-4 day 250-120 F
4-30 day 120'F 25.23 in/25.23 in 508 ft/312 ft 3 355 ft2/2 060 ft2 O-l day 450'F 1-2 day 450-350'F 2-3 day 350-250'F 3-4 day 350-120'F 4-30 day 120'F N/A N/A N/A N/A Bypass leakage rates (fraction of drywell volume per day)
(main steam tunnel release) 0-2 hr 0-5.12 hr 5.12-8 hr 8-24 hr 24-96 hr 96-720 hr 0 0(2) 0.0 5.93-5 5.97-5 5.64-5 4.42-5 0-2 hr 0-5.51 hr 5.51-8 hr 8-24 hr 24-96 hr 96-720 hr 0 0(2) 0.0 5.44-5 5.55-5, 4.97-5 3.44-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Iodine concentration ratios Pipe inside diameter (actual/design basis)
Pipe length (actual/design basis)
Deposition surface (actual/design basis)
Temperature transient pipe inside surface 0-5.12 hr 0.0 5.12-720 hr 0.04 5.761 in/5.761 in 84.3 ft/84.0 ft 127 ft2/127 ft2 0-720 hr 120'F 2 of ll 0-5.51 hr 0.0 5.51-720 hr 0.04 5.761 in/5.761 in 84.3 ft/84.0 ft 127 ft2/127 ft2 0-720 hr 120'F 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Oesi n Basis Assum tions Isentro ic Case Isothermal Case Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 15.6-13 t)
Realistic Basis Assum tions d.
Four post accident sampling lines Bypass leakage rates (fraction of drywell volume per day)
(PASS panel release) 0-2 hr 0-8 hr 8-24 hr 3.31-5(2) 3.07-5 2.98-5 0-2 hr 0-8 hr 8-24 hr 3.17-5(2) 2.86-5 2.77-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 2a of 11
0
p.
3 instrument air lines 2
CPS lines 1
GSN line Nine Mile Poi nit 2 FSAR TABLE 15.
(Cont)
Desi n Basis Assum tions(5)
Realistic Basis Assum tions Bypass leakage rate (fraction of primary containment volume per day)
(SGTS building release)
Iodine concentration factor Pipe inside diameter (actual design basis)
Pipe lengths (actual/design basis)
Deposition surface (actual/design basis)
Temperature transient pipe inside surface q.
2 instrument air lines to ADS accumulation Bypass leakage rate (fraction of primary containment volume per day)
(SGTS building release)
Iodine concentration factor 0-1 hr 1-8 hr 8-24 hr 24-96 hr-96-720 hr 0-1 hr 1-720 hr 2.469"/2.469" 223'/223'44 ft2/144 ft2 120'F 0-.64 hr
.64-8 hr 8-24 hr 24-96 hr 96-720 hr 0-.64 hr
.64-720 hr 0.0 1.71-4 1.70-4 1.60-4 1.26-4 0.0 0.04 0.0 6.06-5 5.96-5 5.64-5 4.42-5 0.0 0.04 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA B
ass Path Pen Z53A 8
ass Path Pen Z53B Pipe inside diameter (actual/design basis)
Pipe lengths (actual/design.basis)
Deposition surface (actual/design basis)
Temperature transient pipe inside surface 1.049"/1.049" 225I/225'2 ft2/62 ft2 120'F 9 of ll 1.049"/1.049" 219'/219'0 ft2/60 ft2 120'F 1746G
.Nine Hiie Poi Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 15 (Cont)
Desi n Basis Assum tions(5)
Real i sti c Basi s Assum tions
- r. Containment leakage rate (main stack release)
Transfer incore probe leakage rate (main stack release from t = 129s to t = 720 hr) (radwaste/reactor building vent release from t = 0 to t = 129s) l.l'X per day of primary containment volume for duration of accident 0.21k per day of primary containment volume for duration of accident 1.1'X per day of primary containment volume for duration of accident N/A
- t. Reactor building leak rate (main stack release)
- u. Percentage mixing in reactor building air 3,500 cfm through standby gas treatment (SGTS) 50'L 3,500 cfm through SGTS 50K
- v. Reactor building pressurization time 129 sec (radwaste/reactor building vent release) 129 sec w.
SGTS halogen filtration efficiency x.
ESF leakage to-reactor building (main stack release)
(1) Leak rate (2) Iodine partition factor (air/water) 99K 1
gpm 0.1 99'L 0.0 0.0 3.
All other pertinent data
- a. Primary containment (1) Drywell free air volume 2.85+5 ft3 (2) Primary containment free air volume 4.73+5 ft3 (3) Suppression pool volume 1.45+5 ft3
- b. Reactor building N/A 4.73+5 ft3 N/A (1) Free air volume 3.88+6 ft3 9a of 11 3.88+6 ft3 1746G
Nine Nile Poi TABLE 15.
nit 2 FSAR (Cont)
- c. Control room Desi n Basis Assum tions(5)
Realistic Basis Assum tions (1) Free air volume (2) Intake rate (3) Recirculation rate (4) Intake/recirculation halogen filtration efficiency 4.
Dispersion data (s/m3) a.
Stack 0-2 hr FAB 0-8 hr LPZ 8-24 hr LPZ 24-96 hr LPZ 96-720 hr LPZ 0-8 hr control room 8-24 hr control room 24-96 hr control room 96-720 hr control room
- b. Radwaste/reactor building vent(4) 0-2 hr FAB 0-8 hr LPZ 8-24 hr LPZ 24-96 hr LPZ 96-720 hr LPZ 0-8 hr control room 8-24 hr control room 24-96 hr control room 96-720 hr control room 3.81+5 ft3
- 1. 50+3 cfm 7.50+2 cfm 99%
2.97-5 1.03-5 8.85-7 3.66-7 1.03-7 8.10-5 2.44-8 2.10-8 1.69-8 1.90-4 1.78-5 1.19-5 4.93-6 1.40-6 2.13-4 1.66-4 9.88-5 4.70-5 3.81+05 ft3 1.50+3 cfm 7.50+2 cfm 99%
1.16-7 4.32-7 3.21-7 1.69-7 6.73-8 8.10-5 2.44-8 2.10-8 1.69-8 2.19-5 6.48-6 N/A N/A N/A 2.13-4 N/A N/A N/A 10 of 11
C>
Nine Mile Poi nit 2 FSAR TABLE 15 (Cont)
Desi n Basis Assum tions<5>
Realistic Basis Assum tions c.
Main steam tunnel 0-2 hr FAB 0-8 hr LP2 8-24 hr LP2 24-96 hr LP2 96-720 hr LP2 0-8 hr control room 8-24 hr control room 1. 90-4 1.78-5 1.19-5 4.93-6 1.40-6 1.29-3 9.90-4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1746G 10a of ll
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 15. 6-15b LOSS-OF"COOLANT ACCIDENT (DESIGN BASIS ANALYSIS)
ACTIVITY RELEASE TO ENVIRONMENT* (ISENTROPIC APPROACH)
(Ci)
~Ieoto e
I-129 I-131 I-132 I-133 I-134 I-135 I-136 Br-83 Br-84 Br-85 Br-87 Kr-83m Kr-85m Kr-85 Kr-87 Kr-88 Kr-89 Xe-131m Xe-133m Xe-133 Xe-135m Xe-135 Xe-137 Xe-138 Total
~Activit 2.60-2 2.88+5 2.57+3 6.30+4 2.11+3 1.31+4 4.44+2 2.18+2 1.72+2 1.50+2 1.62+2 4.05+4 8.44+4 3.94+5 9.69+4 1.74+5 1.17+5 1.88+5 4.28+5 2.20+7 1.35+6 8.76+5 2.62+5 2.98+5 2.67+7
- Total release for 30 days.
1 of 1
Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 15.6-16b LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT (DESIGN BASIS ANALYSIS)
RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS (ISENTROPIC APPROACH)
Exclusion area (2 hr)
Low-population zone (30-day)
Control room (30-day)
Whole-Body Dose (rem) 5.0 2.5 1.6 Thyroid Dose (rem) 90.2 74.4 29.5 Beta Dose (rem) 3.6 1.9 21.8 1 of 1
1746G
t I.
ATTACHMENT 2 1769G
1 E
C
ATTACHMENT 3 T3.6.1.2-1 (continued)
Allowable Leak Rates Through Valves in Potential B
ass Leaka e Paths Line Descri tion Inst. Air to ADS Valve Accumulator Inst. Air to ADS Valve Accumulator N2 Purge to TIP Index Mechanism Inst. Air to SRV Accumulator Inst. Air to Drywell Inst. Air to Drywell Inst. Air to CPS Valve in Suppression Chamber Inst. Air to CPS Valve in Suppression Chamber Valve Mark No.
IAS*SOV164 IAS*V448 IAS*SOV165 IAS*V449 GSN*SOV166 GSN*V170 IAS*SOV166 IAS*SOV184
~
IAS*SOV167 IAS*SOV185 IAS*SOV168 IAS*SOV180 CPS*SOV132 CPS*V50 CPS*SOV133 CPS*V51 Term)nation Re ion Yard Area Yard Area Yard Area Yard Area Yard Area Yard Area Yard Area Yard Area Per Valve*
Leak Rate SCFH 0.9375 0.9375 Test Conditions Air Medium, 40 PSIG The combined leakage of these six penetrations shall not exceed 3.6 SCFM.
The leakage through each penetration shall be that of the valve with the highest rate in that penetration.
1769G
l s
'wvq i
1 S
r
Due to the design of the Posi-Seal butterfly valve with the disc being asymmetrical, flow in the preferred direction tends to close the valve.
In the nonpreferred direction the.
disc tends to stay in the open position until it reaches an angle of approximately 75 degrees
- open, then tends to close.
The preferred direction is with the stem side of the disc upstream and the retaining ring downstream.
See Figure 1
on Page 2.
Per Reference (1) all the subJect valves will be installed in the preferred direction based on the flow going i'rom containment to outside containment'f a
Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) does
.occur, the scenario given below describes what effect the large flows resulting from the LOCA will have on the subJect valves.
A.
All the valves will close.
- However, for valves AOV 105, 107
> 109, 110 and 111 due to the torque r esulting fr om a
- LOCA, the disc pins will be over str essed, possible resulting in the valve not properly seating.
It should be noted that all the valves except AOV 104 and 105 will partially close prior to receiving the signal to close.
1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
)
(Nine Mile Point Unit 2)
)
Docket No. 50-410 AFFIDAVIT C. V.
Man an
, being duly sworn, states that he is Senior Vice President of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said Corporation to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the documents attached hereto; and that all such documents are true.
and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
Subscribed and swor to before me, a Notary Public in nd for the State of New York and County of
, this /Q~
day of 1986.
No ary Public in and for
- County, New York My Commission expires:
JANIS M. MACRO Notary Public In tbo Stato of t(ow Yotk QuallHed in Onondaga County Ho. 4784555
,) y s t 0 Ilt
.'-) <Ji):I
'(OII GDC or Bog.
C>i irlr=
P.S)P 5 y.'-t I u
!:SAB Ar. anrle-Sime eel>[.
Plui rl
[1 ii)
Fi iui Location EE.'I !. V. '
n S I. i I ( /
D >i i. !> I
- I e Pr 'i<>>i y (r>>II << II
'Ii t 1, O>l El t i 0'i Cr)n.
I iii<.'
'I i
! i> 10>i V:Iii f'E; to n t.ia 1 i ypr.
Uynii. s I a 'r>9<'
I t)it[,
Number 3[IF.C GP Type Oper-at oi Ar.tnat.nr Norlr.
Prim ir:I
'lee nriila y Valve<<)
Pn Mnr.mal (3)
Shutdnvn Nine Hil.<
Th tl[
Iso siti on Li Post-Rover.
S 1<J Arcirlent Fai fur<><<n>
Point Unit 2
1'SAR Ei O'. I?u 56
[Cont)
I o'n C'l.osure '(>uer I I Ii1
'I'. ui.'!0i> I.E.t.
)
(v t)
(rr I i!
BPV Ro I ~1',
?
t OE 1>i sir!0 2'-
2['M S+V 1 >h 0 2? - I' 1 0 A 2FO SVAOV23-0 >2-P032A S u it>(f Cl<<)cfi
.'I II 1 i> <:f C [i oct(
AOV M/A P 'c 0 c (.'s 'I S f) I' li If
[ I. ii '
0 i 1 '[)
Pr 0 c 0 s s kt/ A 0[i< n OPE' Closed Closed C 1 os(! Ei (llosed R ('.V t I 0 f<<. v I [I>
(tr se Tht.
I<,
11 E'c
<>c u
v>lv v 0 in
(.0 p
- t. fir E')
t hI/I
>[Et>S 0'I E'ii
('.
u <11) v,if v(!
Mate>I
- 6. 2-vn Sh.
0 (I t.(i 1.(I
?Pti'S+HOV21A 8
2-P065A
- >R(.S>.
r>i>2DD G33-RD<(0 Gate HOV Plec
![annal Open Closed I Closed
, F'AI 0> obr'OV Pl ec.
ttauu il.
Open Op< n Clos<>d I)I',1'IN i
M/1 Rrt M/h Div I Di Peeduater liuo 0 to BPV 55 Rater 24 6 2-70 Insid Sh.
'f O i>t i
Out: ide 16>'-'in C
I[ster 8
6.2-70 O>>tsidr.
65'-8>>
C Sh.
3 PMSVV12R 8??-P0108
?I'll SVAOV?38 R22-P03?
B 2 P R.S v H 0 V? 1 B R 2 2-t> 0 6 5 8 2'PCS<i(DV?00 G33" POI(0 Svin9 C tie 0 k.
.'.I u 1 4
< 1 C f!E.'C!(
M/A Process M/h Open Closed
'- Closed M/A 0 ate HOV I?lee.
Manual Open Closed Globe NOV Elec.
tlanu<>1 Open Open Closed IAI Closed FAI AOV PI ocoss I f)1 i.n9 Of>kn Cl.osed Closed M/h
[t E)st. O)ly)
P eve c s(i I h>>. tiim o M/h t:lov 11 l.)k(!s n 0 v E' s(.'
E) 1' ii0 t'uu valve v 0 1 U Iiie.
I.o P iss 1 fir<)ii Ef fi t.ho v,live tf tt Div II M/A Div T.
2-58 PHS Pump A
suction fcorn suppression pool RHS Pump 8
suction from sut>pcnssion ponl 56 Yes Rater 24 6.2-70 Outside 5'-t["
sh.
4 Yes Mater 24 6.2-70 Outside 20'-9>>
S ti.
."R Hsu>>DV1 I,
'E 1?-P00(t A
."!n>>
28<HSVNOV10 E12-F0048 Tricen-NOV t.r 1. c butter-fly Tri cen-HOV trio iiut ter>
t l.y Bloc.
Elec.
ttanual ttanual Open Open Closed Closerl Open PAI Open PAI BN 45 Div I 13 RN 45 Div II 13 BHS Pump C
suctinn from supprossion pool 56 Yes Mater 24 6.2-70 Dnt. ide 9'-9u Sh.
4 2BHS+Hoytc E12-F004C Tricen-t[OV t I. 1. C buttec-fly Elr)c.
t!anual Open Closed Open PAI BH It 5 Dim Il 13 T-61 RI[S tost line loop R to sup pr:assi.on ponl Yes Mater 18 6.2-70 Outsiile
-3" Sh.
i!O( vv >
2R ff SmNOV308.
E12-P201B Tricen-HOV tri.c butter-I [y Elec.
Manual Open Cl,oned Open jTI XpzaTII'ARD I'AT BN 05 Div T.
[5
[
860~0VODS 1 - ~/
2 of 24
Pr.,
ion 2 '1A S Ystn Ilt De ->rSnfit inn
,))team to ICS turl>inL and Bl[S fit>a t.
r> I' I i
- i. I< (J (.'
':CS turbi st.(. a<!<:
1 y h Yfi a s s
).Mh 0 am f[
- t. Cn J a I..l. 0 n
..1 1<(-
GDC or B orf.
( n 1.(le 55 Size g i]ig S tea 10 Yo' t P. r< fil BSF Svst c'm T'1u fd rshB Art. nfl <Jo litt 1 i1 I F 1.) i, (
< )
6.2-70 1(i Locltion OL valv('n:.,i li>/
0 u t., i rl c.
- i
'/
(.Olit i.li
!it I '> i' i< t.'
i'I T.tin) (IP.
Lnnsth nt Pi]i Con-
<', i<i'('at.
i n (ii L' l.
'i)('-<
I i!
.>i I
L
('>
0.
0 No('9) 2TCS<<NOV121
'>.I ('. S " M () V I 2 fl
[',51-F064 F5 1-1" 063 No<2">
?TCS<<MOV170 R5 1-P076 not i nt.ia1 Y
I'.<')
~ li i>
I '
i) !Ill)P.II
.", ]IF.c Gr.
T Y[>OL G ati..
Gut u MOV MOV Oper-1! Of Globe NOV N.Li r:.
Ii I.<>c Minn <1 M if)ital I:lee.
Na n u ().L Actitltor Nndi valve. (9 >
nn L t.).o n OpLN 0 pp. >i Post-hccidi at Clot r'.d 01 t'n Cl.osud 0 I><i n
() I n 1<
<1 Normal Shut it nu;Pd Close<1 I>AI FI< I I oupr I tl1 i>L<
(<9>
I'A 1
'I'AD I.I
6 2-5 0 n).t.
2 I'S AB 6>
(Cont[
I en 1.,<
L ) i>ii
'IiL]>i <1 (1) hf,lu),('(',
I ll),I(, I I, I(M I"Ir I!I I, ( '( ',
I >! ), I',ll, Iml C10
'I'
!it <>
i
(
I if I'l,lilt,('<',
I >I >, !1, I I, Iel urf Iioui r i.i < > <i I' P
<,r )
nl v DLv I[
Dl.v il[
Mini
- "I)le Pofat 7..
)Spar.o TCS I o BPY BI[M L'etlctoc:
h<1<<d Spf a Y No 55 Yes Water 6
Water 6
6.2-70 Sh 1]
- 6. 2-'I 0
'ih.
17 0 utsirle I I <
.' I 0 I '.
()
< I L." 1 rl i" nnLsi <Ii' I
(iii
(
C TC. <<AOV \\ 57 C'" lt () V I 2 (>
>IIII."<<>IOV 10'I N5 1-1'0 6 t>
11?-I'013 N12-F023 Chr ck a t.<.!
>>o <2 o-'ICS<<AOV] 56 r51-P065 Check nOV Proce~s proc('u
<<fee
.' (>c.
Air (Test on Y] Closed Open Ai.r.
(Tost nt'l.y'losLd OPPM f(anu;i I i".]osn'il L1ni:r.d llano i I.
close.'rl 01>t n Open 0 fit>li 0 [lt ii clot,ed Closr.d C1 n i!t.'0 1>h I
YAI Bov f lou N/Jf Nev t I nw N/A B i"I 1?
I<, I., I'I,('L.'
M, I>l>
125VDC 125vuc l)LV I 7-II.
WCS supply from BCS 6
RPV Spare 55 No Writ:ef Water 6>. 2-70 Sh 10 In side:
0 it 'L s 1. <1 n C('MCS<<NOV102 "WC'i<<MOV112 G3 3-I'001 0 3 3-1> 0 0!I Globe G l.o Lc'OV MOV Elec.
I!T.ec.
Manual Mufti><11 Open Opeu Open 0pc>ll Closed t: I nsi'(1 FAI I'h L' 0,, BM,l)O, 1 3 B,.J, LI,S, IV, Iml,Ill)'ivII Dfv I BDS lines to If I V 53 Insr'.1:t 5 3 ff.i. I. 1<< 1 r. a u a 1 Yos Water 1
N/A 3/(I Outsir[p 1 "5'-0n OuLsiito
')25>'
0" No(
9)
Soe Nnte 17 7,-26i 7,-27 BDS lines to tip Y 3 9 T. n se r. t 39 Withdrawal BDS linus to If PV 54 InserL.
54 Uithrlraval YP.S Yes Wa.ter 1
N/h Outside 125i-Oii 3/4 0utsid<I 125'-0<'ater 1
If/A
~
Outsirln 125'-Oii 3/4 Outsi(fi>
125<
Oa No(29)
No <"- '>>
See Note 17 See No te 17 8BOVOVOOB]- <)Z.
Tl 6 of APERTVaZ CHID
Nine Mil.e noi'nt ((nit 2
FSAB I
'I'AB[.E 6. 2-56 (Cont)
T.ocat ion
<i f v live T li = 1 <1 <>/
0 u t. i ). de P c l.<rial.'f
( o Ii t. i
< fi I<< i ii
'I'"
SAB ALL i)i<J>>
<<I ci.n t I'i <in r>> <<)
GDC or Beef Gii t cle Pene-tc<<tl on
- Ilo,
[t SF S 1 I.c.'
ystem De,lt gnat ion RDS lines i.o F(PV 39 I.us>>et 39 llith-CI I!3 'll <I1 1
N/A Outside 3/4 Outside Water 1
1/2
- 6. 2-70i Sh.
43 ln. ide ouLst.de Boron solu-
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
19 1
1/2 Note 19 TIP 3ri ve
<luide,tube io !IPV outsi de Outside
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
19 1
1/'2 57 TIP d 1'J. ve
<J ii 1. cl <'
U f> e Lo BPV Note 19 No OUtslde outside
- 6. 2-70 6 Ii.
19 1 1/2 Note 19 No 57 i'IP drive guide tube to BPV Z-31C 0 Ut Side.
Outside
- 6. 2-70 Sf). 19 1
1/2 t(ote 19 57 No Z-31D TIP dcive
<tui.de
.tube to BPV
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
19 1
1/2 57 TIP drive
<luide tube to
<'P V Note 19 Z-31E Outside Outs1dr.
Z-32 56 Nm purge to TIP i.n (le)c
<iic el<a n1.
<(<i No
- 6. 2-70
!Jti. 4?
Outside Inside Z-33A CCP supply 56 No Water it
- 6. 2-70 Inside to BCS
.'i ii 2 0 0 it t sid e PUI<I fl A
I
< firll fi of Pip>> - (on-ta ) <1<ii>><i t I.o 0 i< I.'I i I'
i 'i. t.
tv 1 2 5>'
0"
?
5>
7< 10<<
f
< 10<<
')
4 <<
5
~
4 <<
2 I -It<<
\\
4<<
7 I 7<<
7'-2" T y p<.
I r
(
C C
C C
c C
c
['otontral ny[>
3".'.r.
a k
<<Jr'al:ti Number St, Era GF, t(o< Iv >
t(o( 3l )
C<I 1-P007 CN 1-1'00 6A 2SLS¹V10
? S I. S ¹ t(OV 5A 2SLS< MOV5B Cf(1-P006B C51-J004 C5 1-Jon
<I No ( 3 <)
N/A N /Ji C51-1004 C5 1-J004 f(o<>>)
N/A N/A No<3)>
C.i 1 J 004 C51 J004 C5 1" J 00'I C 5 1-J 00 'I No(3<)
N/A N/A No (3<)
C5 1-J00 4 C51-0004 N/4 N/A 2GSN*SOV166 2GSN*V170 No<3<>
2CCP¹MOV94A 2CC P¹MOV 17A Actua.tor Moil(.
Pr i t(.ir y
'r. r ond iry Opec-
<< L <15 Check
< top c h()ck
<J [.obo SLofr c fir!<1k g 1 Oi>L N/A Proces, '/A M inual El>>c, Mov Manual Elec MOV N/A N/4 Elec.
N/h Ball Shear Sov N/h N/Ji N/A Elec.
N/h Ball S Ii e a1'ov N/h N/A N/A Ball Shear Sov tl/A Elec.
N/A N/A N/h
- Elec, SOV N/A Ball.
Shear Ball She ir Sov N/A
- Elec, N/A N/h N/A N/Ji Globe SOW I;lec N/A Process N/A Check I'lanuac tl3 liU <if Elec.
L>l.ec.
MOV MOV Gate Gate Valyo(o)
Po, i tion IOU< 1 t'i 1 i. I) c (1
( <0)
Ts<>l<<-
I Lr>n S 1 rJ a <I [,
(4)
<!I>>nil <'>>
'I'. <3
.'< )
noviir.
So<ice<.
itot:
Post-Acci.<li nt Nocmal S }<ilt. d 0 v <1 Se>>
Note 17 Closed
- Closed, Clo;ed Closed C lo<>ed, N/h Closeri O'Lobed f
Bov <.'ca<
Lfon',
I('i v <.L',J
, tfov tl/<A li<.V<.r.!<r." N/fi tlov Cl o" r d CJ'o: erl Closed Closed
, tt/A ll, I',B M BM N/A
,N/ 4 Closed 0 fr en 120 VAC I '>
ifn(,
Clos<Ad'pen Cl.osed f3 pc.>. >> <I Closed Open 120 vhc 10,19 125 vn<?I<,34 Closed 0 [>()I'I Closed 0]>e ti B, F,BM BM N/4 N/4 120 VAC 'IP,,19 I 2 5 V DC
! t'I, 3 'I Closed Open tl/A N/4 EJ, F,B tl B i'I Closed Oi> <'. ll Close..d open Closed Of)< n Closed Open Closed Open Closed Open Closed Otic n B,F,RM BM N/'A t(/ A 120 vhc 14,14, 12<>
V DC
?(<,1 4 1?0
<?J)c 13, l', Iit I N/h Closed N/A Open Closed Closed N/A B>>v<"t s<
N/h ti.ov Open Closed N/A niv FI 6
niv l YAI Yh[
li, P,l( M 20 li, Y,NM 20 Closed C l,o! <)<l Open Open Open 0 p <'. n TI APERTURE
';:::..]MRD 1 of 24 8607070061 -QD
Nine Mile Point unit 2
YSJ[tf Pene-tration No.f.
System Dos i <1 nn 2 ion GDC or R c.'
0 <lit[ f ESF 5 litem Pl.uicl SL fe f [B) rsn<<
Ar 1.
1 1 1 ( J(
ill(! n I.
11 1<< <11 <!( i )
T. o c a Lio n OL v!1 vii Tns.[.c[i /
Outs[di J.) L 1.)llai'J Cue Ld L<i l<I '.<1L T.ongth of Pape Con-t i[.nmi.nt. to Ou t side Pype
>sol <Lion t'()st V f1 I vi.
rotont.ia1 Dyp 1
J,u ikiigi.
r;l I h ( 2 )
.': Vr;c Numher
'l'IJ)B 0 per-d I ui'rtuator.
Mo(le l'. ) is 1 i. v
.fr c. o n 0 1< y v)lve< >>
I'o
) t. L on Norisal P
(J)
ACC rnuf 1 so Ll ost-Pone r Si 9 1(lf',nt Ydtl <<Lf!(
- 6. 2-<56i
[Con t) f Id-(i I 1 ii 'ii
)
Closury rover.
'lf <sf!
f l(o'urea
('
)
('i )
f Lo t
~'"
Z-330 CCP, to RCS Pump No Water 6 2-70 S fi Inn i<le!
0 u t.'1 I 0 e Ii))!Lf le 7
1 [J ff C
I v/n II<<> C ')
2CCJ! 2 HOV 9 DB 2C(
MOV 17 tl
?CCL'" RV 1 7 0 Get.e 0 at<.!
[telief MOV HOV N/A Elec.
l.[,li!c.
Auto Manual IIdnuill tt/A OPLn OJ)i rl
(.1 o!,u d 0 p(.'
Op<!n CJ.o ied Clos<) d Clue<>d Clu'ud Ifh 1 i ni N/A ll, Y,<<tt t!, I', << tl N/A 20 20 It/n I'li v TT Div l N/A Z-3 (IA 7.-3 tiB CCP return from RCSump A
56 No Wat.er.
Water il
'6.2-70 Sh.
?;
6.2-70 Sh.
21 I Il s.Lite Ont" [.de Inside Outside s J. d e 7
1 0 It 71 011 C
C l/A t(o<a i >
No(a()
2 CC P + HOV 1 6 h 2cc r+Nov 'I SA 2CCP+HOV)60 2CCPVHOV)50 2CCPVBV171 cate Cate Gate Gate Relief MOV HOV MOV t(OV N/A l.[,ier..
Elec.
Elec.
Elec.
A u L. 0 Hiinual M iin it a l.
Manual H f1 n 1[ii1.
N/h 0 pi'.n Open 0 [) i. '
0[el C toned Op( n 0pi'n Open 0 l)e n
(-[osed Clo! ed Closed Close d Closed Cl.onset PAI D,Y,RM FAI 0, L', N M rhI D, I', R 0 1AI D,J',RM N/n ft/A 20 20 20 20 N/A lnl. V II Div I Di.y Ir.
Div 'T.
,N/A'-35 Z-3 t>
Z-30A Spare Sei:vice air to dryuell Droathinq air.
to ([ryvell RDS to recirc puslp h seal 56 55 No Wa ter 3/JI
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
22
- 6. 2-7 0 Y[h.
2?
6.2-70
'Iih.
23 Outside Inst([e Outside Tns ide Ill s >. (Ie t)utside Outside p I
'J 11 Q
1 7<f pf pn
) 3 1 P 11 A
C No() 1) 2 6 A S 2 I ICY 1 6 1 2SAS2((CV163 No(ul) 2A<< IJ
'" IJCV 1 3 1[
2 n A I C V 1 3 6 No < 2 v>
2RCS
<1 V60A B3 5-P 013A
? ((CS v VDQA 035-F 009((
2[tCS s V 59[i 035-J:017n Glohe Glohe Gl o t!e (Ilo t)e Manual.
Manual Jtunuill.
Hanual Check N/A Check N/h Check N/h Piiocess PLoccfss Process Manual ttanual Hanuiil Manual N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/n N/A N/A Closed Cl o >ed Closed Clo (ud Ori
.1 0 I)L O[fi!fi Dye n Dpi. n Opi.)n 0 f>el<
Op<-n Closed Clu: ed Closed Closei[
Closed Clo,ed
(.'l.o ied N/A N/A
- 1. t[C, J.C LMC, I.c Closed N/A
- Closed, N/A Closed l(i)vif L S(.
L.Lo v R f! Vi!I t lou Ri. ver J iuv N/A r,nc, l.c N/A JM(
I <
N/fl N/n N/A N/A N/n N/A N/A Jliv I DJ!v IT Div T.
['! [ v I'.
N/n RDS to recirc pump JL seal 55 No Wator 3/N 6.?-70 Sh.
23 Insi(lc.
Out.side Outside Q ~
Q 11
'f 1
1 - P If No<au>
2RCSvy600 035-t'013B 2BCSVV900 035-P0090 2[tCS(V590 035-110170 Check N/h Check N/A Check N/A Process Process Process N/A N/h 0 [) u n Ofen Cl o seel Cl o od 0 lusud Closed Clo'.ed Cle
<'d N/n N/A
<<i! VOL ri'.
Lluv Ri'v ~!
L'si'liiv
<<<! 2 i L'= i.
L I f> v N/A N/A 7.-39 I"lour clrains from dry<veil 56 No Air 6.2-70 Sh.
2<[
T.nside Outside 1 6 11 C
C 20['RvHOV121 2DP<<+MOV120 Gate Gate HO V MOV Elec Elec.
Manual Manual 0 [. (' I 0 J.en Closed Closed Closed Close<[
YAI I AI Ll,t',<<M tt, Y,l(M 20 2fl 0 i.v IT.
Div T
Z-(l 0 Equipment drain - from dry v (! 11 No Water.
N 6.2-70 Sh.
2N Inside OOLs) dc (ti 2<1 C
C yes 2 D Y. J( 4 H 0 V 1 'I 9 20<<J<<vt(OV) 20 Gate Gdte ilp V MO'J Elec.
Elec.
0 f> 11 u d 1 M il,II u fi1
,0[un 0[.i!n Cl.osud C] osed Closed Cl.used PA1 I'AI Ll, Y,<<tt 22
<<,Y,<<H 22 DLv L I Dtv
.[
0 of:
2(J 8<JQVDVyO"SI-<DP C.
Nine Mile Point lrnit 2
PSAB Tnflrr> 6.2-56 (Cont) pene-tx. at ion NQ,
'Z - 4 1 System Designation Br.actor coolant rocirc to sample cooler GDC ot Beef
~
Guide 5 <3 ESP Svstem No Fluid Sine tiflL Water 3/4 PSAB Acr a age'.
ment.
ricr u r. e < 1 )
6.2-70 S h.
Location of valve
- rnside/
Outside P rl.a<icy Contain-Iile I i t Inside 0 ut "-. I. d e I.ength of Pipe contain-RIE'nt t.o out l ).de I lola.tl.on
'I/a I.vc Q
1 P II Potential Dy nims I, c, 1lr. <erie i,'r) C 3 1)
C 2flcs¹sov104 2BCS¹SOV105 835-F019 835-F020 Number.
.Si WEC Cl Globe Globe Oper-at. or SOV SOV r',l.e c.
Elec.
N/A N/h Actuator Hodh'rimary Seconddry Normal (3>
closed Closecl Valve(v>
Position Pos own Accid Cl ose Close Ihutrl Cl.os Clos ed P. d, d
Closed cl Closed tI Power ent Pail.are<1 Isola-t.ion Signal Cl)
Closuce T l,min (s *)
L Power S o u 'llc P.
())
Not<.
B,I;,IBN, N/n I
Dlv TI B,C,BH N/n Div I Z-42A
, Fire protection for. ceactor recirc pullp 56 Water 2
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
26 Ins idc.
Out.sirl c.
Sl Qll C
No< 31>
C 2PPW¹SOV219 2PPW¹SOV218 Globe Globe SOV SOV Elec.
Llec.
N/A N/h Closed Closed closed Closed Closed Closed Closed'losed B<F<BN IS, F, B H N/A N/n Div IT.
Div I Z-428 I3 Z-44A I'ire protection water foc reac-toc recirc pump Drywall floor drain tank vent Cap pe d spare 56 56 No Water 2
Water 3
6.2-70 Sri.
26 6.2-70 Sh.
27 Inside 0 ut sIcl P.
Inside Outside 3<
Qll 2OR-1pii No( 11)
C C
yims C
2PPW¹SOV221 2PPW*SOV220 2DPB¹HOV140 2DF8 ¹ NOV 139 Globe Globe Gate Gate SOV SOU NO V MOV L'lee .
Elec Elec.
Bloc.
Manu<hi H clllmill Closed Closed Open Open Closed Closed Closed Closed Close d Closed Closed Cl.osed Closed Closerl PAI r:nI B,P,B N N/A B,P,BN N/A B,F,B N 1'3 B,F,BN 13 Dl.v II i
I Div I Dl. v TI Div I Z-448 Capped spare Z-44C clipped spare III 4 D C a.p p e d s p a r e Z-448 Z-44F Service air to dcywell.
Brr athing air to dcy well 56 56 No No Aic hir 6.2-70 Sh.
22 6.2-70 Sh.
22 Outside Inside Outside Inside P ~
5 tl Pl 51<
C No< 31>
C C
No< 31)
C 2SAS¹HCV160 2SAS¹HCV162 2nns¹flcv135 2AAS¹BCV137 Globe Globe Globe G lobe Manual Manual Manual Manual Nanual Hanual
- llanual, Manual N/n N/n N/A N/A Closed Closed Clo.,ed Closed.
Open Open open Orion Closed Closed Closed Closed N/n N/n N/h N/h LMC ~ LC LNC, LC L NC, I.E LNC,LC N/A i
N/A N/hil, N/A
- 0) vi Div Dav Div g)I, TI I
'i
'T, Eguipmont dca'in, 56 tank,(2DEB-TKI) vent to drywell'o Air 6.2-70 Sh.
27 Inside outside 0'-0" C
YEs C
2DEB¹ NOV130 2 DEB ¹ NOV'I 3 1 Globe Globe Mov NOV Elec.
Elec.
Nanual Jranual Open 0 pEll Closed Closed
,Closqd Closed FAI PAI 8, P', P H 8, F,B;I 9
Div TT Ill.v I Z-46A CCP supply to drywell space cooler':
56 No Water 8
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
28 Inside Outside 71 Qll C
No(3'>
C 2CCP¹MOV273 2CCP¹MOV265 Gate Gate NOV ll0v Elec.
E1r.'C Nanual Manual open '.
Open OpP.D 0 p p. n Closed Closed FAI YAI B,P,BN B,F,BN 36 Dxv II 38 Div I gX XPIRTURS CARD 9 of 24 I I 'I'
,BNOVOVOOSA -OW
Nine Nile Point Unit 2
FSAR TABLE 6. 2-56 (Cont)
Pene-tration No, S ystem no.ign)htion GDC or Reg.
GEI id(2 ESP.
System Fluid Size fin)
FSAR Arr au(]e ment FI oui Location o f valve In.'.ide/
outside primary C on t.a in-ment.
Length of.
Pipe Con tainment to Outside Tyl>e Isolation TiIst Valve Po(.ential Dypa s LI akage II a t l I Number SNEC GE TIpe
'Oper-a.tor Actuator Node Primary Secondarv Valve< v)
Position Normal Post-Power
(>)
Shutdown Accident Failure<< o>
Isola-tion I
Signal
(>>)
Closure Title (s>>)
Power Source
(>)
Notes Z-I)68 Capped spare Z-ll 6C Pire: protection water for con-tain)lent hose roI 1 standpipe Soe Note 20 No(al) 2-46D 2- (37 2-q8 Capped
- spare, CCP return from drywell
'space co'oler Purqe exhaust from drywell 2-qg Purge inlet to drywell 57 56 Air No Air/Nz 14 No< a1> Rater 8
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
28
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
29
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
29 Inside outside',
Inside 0 utside Inside Outside 7I 3IT 7I (ill ll I 0 II No() \\)
2CCP¹HOV122 2CCP¹HOV 124 Yes 2CPS¹AOV106 2CPS¹AOV104 NO<1 1>
2CPS>> AOV108 2CPS¹AOV110 Gate Gate Butter-fly 13 ut ter fly Butter-fly Butter-fly Hov HOV AOV AOV AOV AOV L'lec.
Elec.
Pneu-matic Pn e-
ulll.>.C Pneu-ltlat).C Pneu-tlla tiC Hanual
- Hanunl, Hanual Hanual Hqnual Hanual Open Open Open Open Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Close,d Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
, Closed Closed Closed I"AI PAL Closed Closed Closed Closed B,P, Y,RH 5
B,P,Y,RH 5'
H 5
B,F, Y,R B,P, Y,R lDiv 1 Div II Div II Div I I
B~PIRH 38 Div II B,X',RM 36 l
Dxv I 21 21 2
51 Purqe exhaust from wetwe11 2-50 Purqe inlpt to wetwell 56 56 No Air 12 Air/Nz 12 6.2-70 Sh.
29 6.2-70 S)1.
29 Inside Outsxde Inside Outside c> I 311 61 liw Yes 2CPS¹AOV107 2cns¹A()V)05 No<)))
2CPS¹AOV109 2CPS¹AOV111 Butter-fly Butter-fly Aov rov AOV AOV Butter-fly Butter-fly Pneu-matic Pne u-matic Pneu-,
matic Pneu-matic Hqnual Hhnual Hanual I
Hanual Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
'losed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closecl Closed Closed Closed
'BE Pry>>R B,F,Y,R B,F, Y,R 13IF,Y,R H'5' 5
H 5
H 5
Div IY 21 Div I Div Ili, 61 Div I 7-52A 2-520 2-53A Capped spare capped spare Instrument air to ADS valve accumulators 56 No Nz 1 1/2 6.2-70 Outside 1'-0w C
2IAS¹SOV16'l Sh.
30 Inside Yes 2IAS¹VNI)8 Globe Check SOV Elec.
N/A N/A Process N/A Open Open Open Open
'pen
'pen' Closod N/A B,)IRH, N/A 'iv I Reverse N/A N/A I flow 10 of 2ll I3ppvPVPP$ $ f>~
nr Nine Nile Point Ilnit 2 FSAR TABLE 6. 2-56 (Cont)
I'enr.-
tzat..ion Ho.
System 0( s l Blla'I:1.0!i GDC oz Bog 0 !la!I(!
ESP System I'luid Siss (inL P SAR.
Arrange-ment Pi Eye<<)
- .(t Location o f value Inside/
Outs> de primary Cont 1).n I!!e n t Length of pipe - Con-tainmentt I.o Outside Isolatl.ou V a I. v 0 Type Tes't Potentral Bypass Leakage Path Number SWI',('E Type Oper-a t.ol:
Actuator Node Primary
'econdarv Valve(v)
P o s.it I. o Normal Shutdown Post-Power Accident Failure( le)
Isola-tion Signal (n )
Closure Tilllo (a
e>
Power Source (v)
Note.,
Z-53B Instrument air to ADS valurl accumulators
'o Ne I 1/2
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
30 Outside Insirlr!
I
~
P I I Yes 2IAS¹SOV165 2IAS¹V449 Globe Check SOV N/A Elec.
Process N/A N/h Opeu Open Open Open Open Open Closed H/A B IF IBM N/A Reverse H/A flow Div II N/A Z-53C Instrument air.,
to HSBV llcculllu 1st oz tank 56 Ho, He 1 1/2
- 6. 2-70 Sh 30 Outside Inside I
PII C
C Yes 2XAS¹SOV166 2IAS*SOV104 Globe Globe SOV SOV Elec.
Elec.
N/A H/A Open Open Open Open Closed Closed Closed Closed B, I", B N B,PeHH N/A H/h D).V I Dl. V 1I Z-55A Hyrlrogen recom-tiner 1A supply to wotwell.
Z-54h'appod sp!are 56 Yes Air 3
'. 2-70 Sh.
31 Inside outside 2 I Pll A,
C A ~
C Ho( 31) 2HCS<<NOV4A
?HCS<<HOV1A Globe Globe HOV Elec.
HOV Elec Manual Manual Closed Closed Closed Closed
'Open Open F.AX PAI B,P,BN 19 BIPr BM 19 Div I 12, Div I 22 Z-56A Z-56B Hydrogen zecom-biner.
1B -upply to wetur;1 i Hydrogen recom-biner 1A return f rom drywell Hydrogen recom-biner 10 return from diywell 56
'56 56 Yes Yes Air h l.r Air
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
31
- 6. 2-70 sh.
31 6.2-70 Sh.
31 Inside Outsirte Inside Outside Inside Outs.ide
? I Pll 2 I PI!
A, C
h, C
I A,
iC h,
C No( 3()
No(3>)
Ho( 3()
2HCS¹MOV4B 2HCS<<MOV1B 2HCS¹MOV6A
?HCS<<HOV3h 2HCS<<HOV6B 2Hcs¹Mov30 Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe Globe HOV NOV HOV NOV'OV NOV
,Elec.
Elec.
Elec.
Elec.
Elec.
Elec.
Nanual Manual Manual Manual Manual,;.
N an ual:"
Closed Closed closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Close(1 Closed Closed Closed Open Open Open Open Open Open PAX i'AI FAI FAI FAX FAI B,P,BM 19 B,F,BM 19 B,P RN 19 B,P,BHI 19 B,P,II N 19 Brl>,BH
'l9 Div XI 12 Div II 22 Div Div I '2r
, 22 D l.'V II.'
2e Div Xli
-'" ?2 Z-57A Z-57B Hyrdoqen recom-
, biner 1A zeturn from wetwell Hyrodqen recom-biner 1B return from, wetwe1.1 56 56 Yes Yes hir Air 3
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
31
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
31 Inside Outside Inside Outside 2 I Ptl 2 I Ptl A,
C A,
C A,
C A,
C Nn(3()
Ho( 3()
2HCS<<HOV5A 2HCS<<HOV2A 2HCS*MOV5B 2IICS¹HOV?B Globe Globe Globe Globe MOV HOV NOV HOV Elec.
Elec.
Ele.c.
Elec.
Manual Manual Manual Manual Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open
" Open Open Open FAI PAI PAI FAI DIFIRH jl9 I,B,F>BH, 19 B, I', R H B,P,BH 19 Div X.
12, D ). V!,I
'iu II 12, D)v II 22 Z-50 Containment puzrlo to dry-well 56, No Air 2
6.2-70 Inside Sh.
29 Outside 3 '
4e C
2CPS<<SOV122 2CPS¹SOV120 Globe Globe SOV Elec.
SOV Elec.
N/A Closed Clos!ed N/A Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed B,P,Y H/h BH BsPiY H/A RM Div II DiV I 11 of 24 O V O'V 0'0 () 1 d'
C I
I
Penr-trat.ion Syst,em No.
Dc lignation Z-83 Capped spare Z-85 Capped spare Z-86 Capped spare z-87 capped spare GDC or Reg.
Esr Ggide System Pluicl Size Lin)
PSAB Arra IiIJe-rne nt.
I'inure ( I )
T.ocation of valve Xn sirle/
Outside Primary Contain-mont.
Length of.
Pipe Con-tainnnnt to Outa I.de Isolati.on V ilvc.
TYPe rest (I) note ntia 1 Byp ISS Leakage P.ath Number Gr.
0 nr-Actuator Mode p
atnr.
, Primarv
'Scondarv I
Ih
, Nine Nile Point 'Unit 2
FSAR TABLFr 6. 2-'56 (Cont[
Valve(v)
L Isola-tion Signal
( I'I J
Cine ure T).me (5 <<)
Pnw...
Source "ntn.l Position I
Normal Post-Power Shutdovn Accident 'ail.urr,( in)
Z-BBA RHS sa.fety 56 valve discharge to suppression pool Yes Steam 12
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
34 Outside 116I?<<
No(zv)
See Note 23 Z-BBB, RHP. safety valve discharge to suppression pool 2-89A Lrls from clry-56 w el.l No 3/4
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
35 Inside Outside 0 I 2rl 56 res Steam 12 6.2-70 Outside 106I-3<<
Sh.
34 No(zv)
Mn(3()
2LNSvSOV152 2LNSmSOV153 Globe Globo SOV Elec I
M/A SJOV Elec.,
N/A See Mote 24 Closed Closed Close(1 Closed Closed Closed
'losed Closed D,F,RN M/h M/A Div II D).v I 2-89D Capped sprare 2-89C LNS from wet-56 well Z-89D Capped spare
- 3/4 Air 3/4 3/4
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
35 Inside Out s),de 0 I -1\\1 C
C No(31) 2LNSvSOV156 2LNS~SOV157 Globe SOV Globe SOV Elec.
Elec.
I/A I/A Closed Cloyed Closed Closed.
I Closed
'Closed Closed
'losed B,P,RN N/JA N/A Div IT, Div I Z-90 z-91A 2-910 ICS vac uum breaker 56 Instrument air 56 to rlrywell Instrument air 56 to drywell Yes Air 1
1J/2 Nz 1
1/'2 No, Nz 1
1/2 6.2-70 Sh.
36
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
37
- 6. 2-70 Sh.
37 0 uts ide
'utside Outside Inside Outside Inside 23 I-10<<
29'-11<<
C C
C C
C C
No(z v)
Yes Yes 2ICSvNOV148 2XCSvHOV164 2I AS +SOV 1 67 2IAS+SOV185 2IASvSOV168 2XASvSOV180 E5 1-P086 E51-POBO Globe Globe Globe Globe 3 lobe Globe NOR HOV SOV SOV SOV SOV Elec.
Elec.
Elec.
Elec.
Elec.
Elc.c.
I'anual
! anual h/A II/h Ri'A I /A Open Open Open Open Open Open Closed Closed Open Open Open Op(in 0 pe)[
Open Closed Clos e'd Closed.
Closed'AI FAX Closecl Closed closed Closed FSH,RN 9
BSH,BN 9
Br Fr BN 'N/A B,F,BN M/h 8, F,BN M/A Br F, RN N/A Div II Div T
Dl.v I Div II Ri.v I niv XI 2-91C Capped spare Z-91D Capped spare 1
1J/2 1
1/2 Tl
'APERTURE, 0) 14 Iof 24 I I, I
r',,
SSOVOTOOSI-E) 5'. ~