ML18037A470
| ML18037A470 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 09/03/1993 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Patterson C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18037A464 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-93-28, 50-260-93-28, NUDOCS 9309280186 | |
| Download: ML18037A470 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1993028
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199
Report Nos.:
50-259/93-28,
50-260/93-28,
and 50-296/93-28
Licensee:
Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga,
TN
37402-2801
Docket Nos.:
50-259,
50-260,
and 50-296
License Nos.:
and
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Units 1, 2,
and
3
Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near Decatur,
Inspection
Conducted:
July
17 - August 20,
1993
Inspector:
att
t
ns ect
e
en
p
or
at
1gne
Accompanied
by:
J.
Hunday,
Resident
Inspector
R. Musser,
Resident
Inspector
G. Schnebli,
Resident
Inspector
Approved by:
'a
~
Reacto
s,
Sec ion 4A
Division of
eactor Projects
SUMMARY
e
)gne
Scope:
This routine resident
inspection
included surveillance
observation,
maintenance
observation,
operational
safety
verification, measuring
and test equipment,
Unit 3 restart
activities, reportable
occurrences,
action
on previous inspection
findings,
and site organization.
One hour of backshift coverage
was routinely worked during the
work week.
Deep backshift inspections
were conducted
on
July 25,
1993,
and August 8,
1993.
9309280186
930917
ADOCK 05000259
8
2
Results:
One violation was identified by an
NRC inspector for failure to
control measuring
and test equipment,
paragraph
5.
Four examples
were identified of equipment
not being tracked
as required
by
plant procedures.
The licensee
conducted
an inventory and
identified an additional
73 items not properly tracked.
A similar
violation, 92-21-03,
was identified for failure to adequately
disposition nonconforming measuring
and test equipment.
The site
quality assurance
organization
has
had several
findings in this
area
over the past several
years but deficiencies
continue to
exist.
One violation was identified by a
NRC inspector for failure to
control transient
combustible material required
by the Fire
Protection
Program,
paragraph
4.
Six electrical
cable reels
were
moved into the Unit 2 reactor building without the required permit
and
a fire watch.
This violation is similar to
a violation in
inspection report 92-37.
One noncited violation was identified by the licensee for failure
to have
an operable radiation monitor during
a radioactive
release,
paragraph
3.
The monitor was unknowingly inoperable
because
the monitor probe
was not properly reinstalled after
a
surveillance
procedure.
The licensee
conducted
an incident
investigation of the event with comprehensive
corrective action.
REPORT DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees:
- 0. Zeringue,
Vice President
- J. Scalice,
Plant Manager
J. Rupert,
Engineering
and Modifications Manager
- R. Baron, guality and Licensing Manager
D. Nye, Recovery
Manager
H.
Her rell, Operations
Manager
J.
Maddox, Engineering
Manager
- H. Bajestani,
Technical
Support Hanager
A. Sorrell, Chemistry
and Radiological Controls Manager
C. Crane,
Maintenance
Manager
P. Salas,
Licensing Manager
- R. Wells, Compliance
Manager
J.
Corey, Radiological
Control Manager
J. Brazell, Site Security Manager
Other licensee
employees
or contractors
contacted
included licensed
reactor operators,
auxiliary operators,
craftsmen,
technicians,
and
public safety officers;
and quality assurance,
design,
and engineering
personnel.
NRC Personnel:
P. Kellogg, Section Chief
- C. Patterson,
Senior Resident
Inspector
- J. Munday, Resident
Inspector
- R. Husser,
Resident
Inspector
- G. Schnebli,
Resident
Inspector
- Attended exit interview
and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
Surveillance Observation
(61726)
The inspectors
observed
and/or reviewed the performance of required SIs.
The inspections
included reviews of the SIs for technical
adequacy
and
conformance to TS, verification of test instrument calibration,
observations
of the conduct of testing,
confirmation of proper removal
from service
and return to service of systems,
and reviews of test data.
The inspectors
also verified that
LCOs were met, testing
was
accomplished
by qualified personnel,
and the SIs were completed within
the required frequency.
The following SIs were reviewed during this
reporting period:
SLC Operabil ity Sur veil 1 ance
On July 19,
1993 the inspector
witnessed
portions of the
performance of 2-SI-4.4.A. 1, Standby Liquid Control Functional
Test.
This test verifies the operability of the
SLC pumps in
conformance with the requirements
specified in TS 4.4.A. 1,
4.4.B.l,
and 4.6.G.l.
The results of the surveillance
indicated
that the flow rate of pump
B fell outside the acceptable
range of
43.7 - 50.0 gpm.
The flow rate of the
pump was measured
using two
different methods,
one using
an ultrasonic flow meter
and the
other by measuring
the level decrease
over time in the tank the
pump takes suction on.
The flow meter indicated
a flow rate of
52.0
gpm while the calculated flow indicated 51.7 gpm.
The
inspector questioned
the system engineer
about the increased
capacity of the
pump since the last surveillance.
He stated that
the
pump had
been re-built during the outage
and
new baseline
data
obtained during the performance of the surveillance following the
maintenance.
He indicated that
he suspects
the capacity
had not
actually changed
since the last surveillance
but could not
positively confirm this.
Based
on positive verification of flow
by two methods
on July 19,
1993,
and
no reason to suspect
pump
degradation,
the licensee
again calculated
a new acceptable
range
for flow, 48.6
52.7
gpm.
Based
on the
new flow requirement
the
B pump was acceptable
and the SI was completed satisfactory.
The
inspector referenced
ASME Section XI Subsection
IMP-3000 and
veri'fied this method of establishing
baseline
data
was acceptable.
No other deficiencies
were noted.
Core Spray Sparger
Break Detector Surveillance
On July 19,
1993 the inspector witnessed
portions of the
performance of 2-SI-4.2.B-24(I),
Core Spray Sparger
To Reactor
Pressure
Vessel Differential Pressure
Calibration 2-PDIS-75-28.
This instruction partially satisfies
the requirements
of TS 3.2.B
and 4.2.B.
The surveillance
channel
checks points
on the gauge
with a test
as pressure
is increased
to full range
and then
again
as pressure
is decreased.
The surveillance
has
two ranges
that the points must fall within, one verifies
TS operability and
the other ensures
the point is adjusted
as close
as possible to
the center of the band
and is known as "leave
as is."
The data
taken
was within the acceptable
range to verify operability but
was not in the range to leave the instrument
as found.
Attempts
were
made to adjust the meter to within the "leave
as is" but were
unsuccessful.
Engineering
was contacted
and decided to revise the
procedure to expand the acceptable
"leave
as is" range.
The
procedure
was revised,
the instrument calibrated to within the
appropriate
tolerances,
and the surveillance
completed
satisfactorily.
The inspector
reviewed the safety analysis for
the procedure revision
as well as the vendor manual
and noted
no
discrepancies.
No other exceptions to the surveillance
were
noted.
i
No violations or deviations
were identified in the Surveillance
Observation
area.
Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
Plant maintenance activities were observed
and/or reviewed for selected
safety-related
systems
and components
to ascertain
that they were
conducted
in accordance
with requirements.
The following items were
considered
during these
reviews:
LCOs maintained,
use of approved
procedures,
functional testing and/or calibrations
were performed prior
to returning components
or systems to service,
gC records maintained,
activities accomplished
by qualified personnel,
use of properly
certified parts
and materials,
proper use of clearance
procedures,
and
implementation of radiological controls
as required.
Work documents
were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs
and to assure
that priority was assigned
to safety-related
equipment
maintenance
which might affect plant safety.
The inspectors
observed
the following maintenance
activities during this reporting period:
HSIV Limit Switch Failure
On July 25,
1993, at approximately 4:55 a.m., the Unit 2 operating
shift noted that the valve position indicating lights for the
'D'utboard
HSIV were both lit.
At the time of the discovery Unit 2
was operating at
100 percent
power with steam flow being equally
distributed
among the four steam lines.
Because
steam flow in the
'D'ine was approximately the
same
as the other three
steam
lines, the operators felt assured
that 'D'utboard
MSIV was still
in the full open position.
Additionally, the operating
crew
verified that the
RPS relays associated
with the involved HSIV
were in their normal energized state
which further lended
credence
to the valve having not changed position.
A malfunctioning limit
switch was thought to be the cause of the double light indication.
The HSIVs were tested
on July 24,
1993, in accordance
with
procedure 2-SI-4.1.A-ll(I), MSIV Closure-RPS Trip Functional Test.
This test "slow closes"
each
HSIV approximately
10 percent
and
ensures
that the
RPS relays associated
with the valve de-energize
and that the valve position indicating lights demonstrate
valve
movement.
No deficiencies
were noted during this surveillance
related to valve position lights.
On July 26,
1993, the licensee
issued
WO 93-09611-00 to cycle the
'D'utboard
MSIV in accordance
with applicable portions of 2-SI-
4. 1.A-11(I).
This effort was to be performed in order to
hopefully "free up" what was thought to be
a stuck or
malfunctioning limit switch.
Prior to the performance of the
evolution, the
ASOS briefed the involved personnel
to ensure that
the evolution was thoroughly understood.
The operators
"slow
closed" the 'D'utboard
HSIV for approximately
30 seconds
(approximately equal to
10 percent closed).
As expected,
the
b.
associated
RPS relays de-energized
during the valves closure
and
re-energized
as the valve was returned to the full open position.
However, the position indicating lights never changed
state
throughout the entire evolution.
The valve's position indicating
limit switch is thought to be malfunctioning
and will be repaired
or replaced
during
a future power reduction/forced
outage.
Inoperable Liquid Radwaste Effluent Radiation Monitor
On July 13,
1993, the contents of the Floor Drain Sample
Tank were
released
to the Tennessee
River while the radiation monitor for
this release
path,
O-RM-90-130,
was inoperable.
On July 12,
1993,
the detector
was
removed from service for a setpoint
adjustment
in
accordance
with
WO 93-09182-00.
Following completion of this
work, O-SI-4.2.D. 1, Liquid Radwaste
Monitor Calibration/Functional
Test,
was performed satisfactorily
as post maintenance
testing.
Operations
declared
the monitor operable
at 0230
on July 13,
1993.
At 2200
on July 13,
1993, the floor drain sample tank was released
via this pathway;
however, following the release, it was
discovered that the detector
had not been reinstalled
in the
detector
housing during performance of the setpoint
adjustment,
as
required.
With the detector not installed in the detector
housing
the release
path would not have automatically isolated in the
event the radiation levels of the release
were to increase
to the
trip setpoint.
With the monitor out of service,
TS Table 3.2.D,
allows radwaste
discharges
to be made via this pathway,
provided
two independent
samples of the tank are analyzed in accordance
with the sampling
and analysis
program specified in the
REM and
two qualified station personnel
independently verify the release
rate calculations
and valve lineup before the discharge.
Because
the monitor was thought to be operable,
these
compensatory
actions
were not performed.
However, the release
was not unmonitored,
O-SI-4.8.A. 1-1,
Release
Procedure
Liquid Effluents,
was
performed in conjunction with the release
and serves to verify
that the
MPC limits required
by TS 3.8.A.l, are not exceeded.
Upon discovery of this condition, the detector
was reinstalled
and
the surveillance re-performed.
Failure to place the detector
back
into the detector
housing during the performance of the
surveillance is
a violation but will not be subject to enforcement
because
the licensee's
effort in identifying and correcting the
violation met the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the
This matter is identified as
NCV 259,
260,
296/93-28-01,
Radwaste Effluent Radiation Monitor.
One noncited violation was identified in the Maintenance
Observation
area.
Operational
Safety Verification (71707)
The
NRC inspectors
followed the overall plant status
and
any significant
safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions
were. held
with plant management
and various
members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors
made routine visits to the control rooms.
Inspection
observations
included instrument readings,
setpoints
and recordings,
status of operating
systems,
status
and alignments of emergency
standby
systems,
verification of onsite
and offsite power supplies,
emergency
power sources
available for automatic operation,
the purpose of
temporary tags
on equipment controls
and switches,
alarm
status,
adherence
to procedures,
adherence
to LCOs, nuclear instruments
operability, temporary alterations
in effect, daily journals
and logs,
stack monitor recorder traces,
and control
room manning.
This
inspection activity also included
numerous
informal discussions
with
operators
and supervisors.
General
plant tours were conducted.
Portions of the turbine buildings,
each reactor building,
and general
plant areas
were visited.
Observations
included valve position
and system alignment,
and
hanger conditions,
containment isolation alignments,
instrument
readings,
housekeeping,
power supply and breaker alignments,
radiation
and contaminated
area controls,
tag controls
on equipment,
work
activities in progress,
and radiological protection controls.
Informal
discussions
were held with selected
plant personnel
in their functional
areas
during these tours.
a ~
Unit Status
b.
Unit 2 operated
continuously at power during this period without
any significant problems.
The unit was online for 78 days at the
end of the period.
Combustibles
On July 29,
1993, the inspector identified six partial reels of
electrical
cable located in the unit 2 reactor building without
the required transient
combustible permit and continuous fire
watch.
The inspector contacted
the Fire Protection
group who
posted
They stated
they had not been
informed that cable
was placed in the building.
The cable
was
used to implement
DCN W7728A.
TS 6.8.l.l.f, requires that written
procedures
be established,
implemented,
and maintained covering
implementation of the Fire Protection
Program.
Section
I-C of the
Fire Protection
Report Volume 2, step 5. l. 1, states
that in
critical areas,
any combustible material that is not permanently
installed shall
be designated
as
combustible.
Furthermore,
combustible permit shall
be initiated and
compensatory
measures
taken
as required.
Failure to initiate the
required transient
combustible permit and post
a continuous fire
watch is
a violation of these
requirements
and is identified as
VIO 259,
260, 296/93-28-02,
Failure To Control Transient
Combustibles.
A similar violation was issued
November 27,
1992,
in IR 92-37, for failure to adequately
control transient
combustibles.
One violation was identified in the Operational
Safety Verification
area.
Heasuring
and Test
Equipment
On July 27,
1993, the inspector
noted
an instrument cart containing
electrical test equipment left unattended
in the
1A DG room.
On July
28,
1993, the inspector noted another cart containing electrical test
equipment left unattended
in the Unit 3
DG building.
The equipment
on
both of the carts
was controlled under the Heasuring
and Test Equipment
program.
The licensee
determined
the equipment
belonged to the Customer
Group
and was
used during
DG testing.
The inspector reviewed the
H&TE
usage
logs for the equipment which indicated it had been
checked
back
into the control area.
The inspector questioned
the licensee
about
maintaining positive control of the equipment
and storing the equipment
in a suitable environment,
as required
by the
H&TE program.
Mhile the
DG buildings are not the designated
control
areas for this equipment,
the licensee
stated that occasionally it will be left there if the
equipment is to be used to test
more than
one
DG.
The licensee
moved
the equipment to the designated
control area.
The inspector
reviewed
the vendor documents
describing the environment the equipment
was to be
stored in and verified the
DG building was suitable.
Further discussion
with the licensee
concerning the environment of the storage facility
indicated that while the environmental
conditions required for each
piece of H&TE was not specifically verified they believe that no
problems exist in this area.
This is based
on the room being kept at
a
controlled temperature
and low humidity which the licensee
stated is
generally the limiting factor for storage of equipment.
The inspector
randomly selected
various
HLTE and verified this was accurate.
On August 4,
1993, the inspector
noted
a thermometer,
labelled
E10120,
being used in the plant which was under the control of the
HLTE program.
The procedure for which the thermometer
was needed,
listed this
thermometer
as well as another,
labelled
542968,
as being
used to
support the procedure.
The inspector questioned
the
H&TE issue
personnel
about the status of these
two thermometers.
E10120
was
identified in the usage
log as having been
checked
out on Hay 8,
1993,
but did not indicate
when it would be returned.
However, the inspector
was later informed that the log was wrong and that the thermometer
had
actually been lost.
The inspector
informed the
H&TE coordinator of the
location of the thermometer
and it was retrieved
and dispositioned.
The
usage
log indicated that thermometer
542968
had
been returned to the
control
area but could not be immediately located;
however, it was found
in the. control
area
some time later.
In addition, the inspector
also
noted three other instruments,
E10258,
E10595,
and
E10647,
had
been
checked
out for long term use without indicating the dates
they would be
returned.
The HLTE coordinator later informed the inspector that while
two of the instruments
were still being used,
E10595
was actually
located in the control area.
The usage
logs for these
instruments
were
also corrected
and the discrepancy dispositioned.
In addition, the
licensee
performed
an inventory of all the
H&TE and out of approximately
four thousand
items, seventy-three
could not be accounted for.
The
0
licensee
intends to generate
out-of-tolerance
investigations for these
items.
SSP-6.7,
Control of Measuring
and Test Equipment,
section 3.9, states
that
H&TE is allowed to be checked
out on
a shift by shift basis.
If
the equipment is needed for a longer period of time it can
be kept
longer but the user must provide
an expected return date
on the usage
log.
Section 3. 11 states
that the user of M&TE shall provide the work
document the equipment will be used for, the organization responsible
for the equipment,
the expected duration of use,
and information
concerning
each individual use of the equipment.
It further states
that
control of the
H&TE will be maintained while it is being used.
If the
equipment will be left unattended it must
be tagged to identify the
controlling document
and the responsible
individuals.
When the
equipment is returned,
the procedure
states that all usages
shall
be
documented
on the usage log.
Contrary to these
requirements,
electrical
H&TE was found in the plant which was left unattended
and not tagged
as
such
and
was kept for greater
than
one shift without the proper
documentation.
In addition, the usage
log identified this equipment
as
having been returned to the control area.
Four pieces of M&TE were
checked
out and kept for periods of one to three
months without the
proper documentation.
Of these four, one of the items
was also
identified as lost and
one was actually found in the control area.
The
lost H&TE was found by the inspector
and secured
by the licensee.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XII requires that measures
shall
be
established
to ensure that tools,
instruments,
and other
measuring
and test devices
used in activities affecting quality are
properly controlled, calculated,
and adjusted to maintain accuracy
within specified limits.
SSP-6.7,
Control of Measuring
and Test
Equipment
implements
these
requirements.
Collectively, these
items
indicate
a lack of control of H&TE and is identified as
VIO 259,
260,
296/ 93-28-03, Failure to Control
H&TE.
Additional examples for failure to adequately
control
M&TE include,
a
audit conducted
in July,
1991, which identified examples of H&TE usages
that were not logged in the usage logs.
This was documented
as
CAQR
BFSCA910168107.
In November,
1991, additional
examples
were identified
and the
CAQR was revised to include them.
In June
1992
a violation was
issued for failure to adequately disposition
M&TE found to be out of
tolerance.
Unit 3 Restart Activities
(30702,
37828,
61726,
62703,
71707)
The inspector
reviewed
and observed
the licensee's
activities involved
with the Unit 3 restart.
This included reviews of procedures,
post-job
activities,
and completed field work; observation of pre-job field work,
in-progress field work,
and
QA/QC activities; attendance
at restart
craft level, progress
meetings,
restart
program meetings,
and management
meetings;
and periodic discussions
with both TVA and contractor
personnel,
skilled craftsmen,
supervisors,
managers
and executives.
The licensee is still working on the Unit 3 Recovery Schedule
which
should
be finalized this month with a meeting scheduled
on September
7,
1993,
between licensee
and
NRC management
to discuss
the schedule
and
long range plans.
The inspectors will continue to follow the progress
of the schedule.
Currently, the work is being scheduled
and tracked
by
a Summer Semester
Schedule
which provides
a three
month look ahead for
both maintenance
and modifications.
Progress
on the three month
schedule will be used
as input to more accurately project work duration
on the long range schedule.
Construction activities continue to increase
with the completion of the
Unit 2 cycle
6 refueling outage.
Major activities in progress
include:
CRDR work in the control
room panels; fire protection systems;
seismic
upgrades;
and pipe supports.
Reportable
Occurrences
(92700)
The
LERs listed below were reviewed to determine if the information
provided met
NRC requirements.
The determinations
included the
verification of compliance with TS and regulatory requirements,
and
addressed
the adequacy of the event description,
the corrective actions
taken,
the existence of potential generic problems,
compliance with
reporting requirements,
and the relative safety significance of each
event.
Additional in-plant reviews
and discussions
with plant
personnel,
as appropriate,
were conducted.
a ~
(CLOSED)
Unplanned
Engineered
Safety Feature
Actuation During Maintenance Activities Due to Proximity of
Components.
On May 7,
1991,
an initiation of the
CREV system occurred
when
maintenance
personnel
performing work in panel
25-165
inadvertently
bumped relay CR-A, which is associated
with
radiation monitor 0-RM-90-259.
The bumping of the relay caused
its contacts
to close
and initiate the
CREV system
and
a high
radiation alarm in the main control
room.
In response
to this event,
the licensee
evaluated
the need for a
design
change to relocate the components
in panel
25-165
and to
provide
a cover for the
CR-A relay.
Since this matter
was
an
isolated event,
the licensee
determined that no design
change
nor
any covers would be provided for the
CR-A relay.
A second
proposed corrective action involved adding
a caution statement
to
the System Instrument Maintenance
Index, O-SIMI-31B, to inform
personnel
of the potential
ESF actuation in the event that the
relays
are
bumped.
This action was performed.
The final proposed
corrective action was that of labeling the involved relays.
This
action
was verified by the inspector.
(CLOSED)
LER 50-296/92-004,
Chemical
Release
In Unit 3 Reactor
Building Forced
An Evacuation
Of Compensatory Action Fire Watches
Leading To A Violation Of Technical Specifications.
On November 4,
1992, all compensatory fire watches,
required
by
TS, were evacuated
from the Unit 3 reactor building due to a
chemical
release.
The release
was caused
by an unexpected
exothermic reaction
from an epoxy grout compound.
Following
removal of the remaining grout and ventilating the area,
the fire
watches
were returned to their posts.
The epoxy is supplied
as
a 30 pound kit with premixed parts
and
mixing only part of the kit was not recommended
by the
manufacturer.
The craft performing the work mixed the entire kit
but put the unused portion in a closed container which prevented
heat dissipation
and caused
the release of smoke
and vapor.
The
licensee
determined
the root cause of the event to be inadequate
warning information and proper instructions
from the manufacturer.
Corrective actions
included the manufacturer of the grout
providing hands-on training to the personnel
using it.
Additionally, following this training, MNI-172, Chemical
Grouting
To Fill Voids To Rotating And Stationary
Equipment
Base Plates,
was revised to include
a precaution
concerning
epoxy grouts
and
a
requirement to contact the manufacturer for instructions for
handling when instructions
are not adequately
provided.
(CLOSED)
LER 50-259/93-003,
Engineered
Safety Feature Actuation
Caused
By A Sudden
Pressure
Relay Being Struck
By Tool.
On April 19,
1992, during the Unit 2 refueling outage,
the Athens
161
kV offsite power supply was deenergized
when
a dropped tool
, struck
a sudden
pressure
relay causing it to close.
This loss of
power initiated auto-starts
of diesel
generators
C,
D, 3A,
and 3B,
the
CREV System,
and the Standby
Gas Treatment
System.
The root
cause
was failure to provide adequate
barriers to prevent
dropped
items from contacting sensitive plant equipment.
Corrective
actions
included discussing this event with both management
and
field personnel
stressing
the importance of identifying sensitive
equipment located in the work area
and methods to avoid disturbing
them.
In addition,
SSP-9.3,
Modification and Design
Change Control,
was
revised to require
a walkdown by Operations for work occurring in
the
3C Relay
Room to ensure sensitive
equipment is adequately
protected.
The inspector questioned
the licensee
about what
controls exist to ensure
employees
other than those working on
modifications
do not disturb sensitive
equipment.
The licensee
provided
a copy of the maintenance
planners
guide which contains
information pertinent to this concern
and stated that the guide
was in the process
of being further enhanced.
In addition,
caution signs exist throughout the plant to indicate areas
containing sensitive
equipment.
10
d.
(CLOSED)
ESF Actuation Resulting
From a Lifted
Neutral
on
a HSIV Solenoid Circuit.
On Hay 20,
1993,
an electrician lifted a jumper and the neutral
lead of the power supply to
an ammeter for the HSIV solenoid
circuit.
The neutral
was installed in series
configuration
which caused
several
Division
1 circuits to open
when the lead
was
lifted.
This resulted in a PCIS Division
1 actuation
which
controls
Group 1, 2, 3, 6,
and
8 valves.
All systems
and
components
functioned
as expected.
The licensee
determined
the
root cause for this event
was personnel
error for failing to
recognize
the impact of lifting the neutral
lead when preparing
and reviewing the work plan.
The work plan writer and the
independent
reviewer did not consider that
a procedural
precaution
for lifting the neutral
lead from the power supply was necessary
for the plant configuration at the time of the event.
The
licensee
took the following corrective actions to prevent
recurrence:
1) Work plan writers and independent
reviewers
were
trained
on the individual's responsibilities
pertaining to the
requirements
of the site standard
practice for proper review
criteria for modifications work plans
and the circumstances
of
this event;
2) the Hodifications Training Handbook was revised;
and 3) the responsible
personnel
were trained
on the need to
include necessary
precautions
in future work plans.
The
inspectors
reviewed the licensee's
corrective actions
and found
them to be adequate.
Action on Previous
Inspection Findings
(92701,
92702)
a ~
(CLOSED)
URI 260/93-18-01,
Loss of Primary Pressure
Control.
During the performance of two infrequent surveillance
procedures,
the pressure
indicator used to control pressure
was isolated.
The
NRC conducted
a human performance
study report - Browns Ferry
Unit 2 (5/ll/93) of this event.
The licensee
conducted
an
incident investigation,
ATWS/ARI/RPT Trip Due to Reactor
Overpressure,
of the event.
The inspector reviewed
each of these
reports
and concluded that the problem focused
on miscommunication
between the control
room operator
and the technician.
Procedure
enhancements
were
made to help prevent recurrence.
A digital
pressure
indicator was the primary display because
other displays
lacked the proper scales
necessary
to control pressure within the
required
band for the hydro test, 2-SI-3.3. 1.A,
ASHE Section
XI
System
Leakage Test.
However, the Harotta valve test, SI-
4.7.D. l.d-l, 2, 3, Functional Test of Instrument Line Flow Check
Valves, required the digital display be taken out of service
without written direction
on what alternative pressure
indication
to use.
The inspector
reviewed revision six of SI 4.7.D. I.d-l, 2,
3 dated
July 30,
1993
and revision three of 2-SI-3.3. 1.A dated July 16,
1993.
Procedural
steps
were
added for use of alternate
11
instrumentation to monitor vessel
pressure
when the digital
display is removed
from service with appropriate
cross reference
between the two procedures.
b.
(CLOSED) VIO 50-259,
260, 296/93-07-02,
Failure to Comply With
Radiation Protection
Procedures
This violation was identified for three specific examples of
failure to comply with radiation protection procedures.
These
examples
were identified by, the inspectors
during routine tours of
the plant during
a single day.
The first example involved an
individual handling the fuel support piece lifting tool without
being signed
on to the appropriate
RWP and without wearing
a face
shield.
The second
example dealt with an individual removing his
anti-c hood
and surgeons
cap while still within the contamination
zone.
The final example involved an individual donning
an anti-c
hood which had
been lying on
a steam line within a contamination
zone.
Corrective actions for these matters
involved issuing radiological
awareness
reports93-026
and 93-028
on the incidents.
The second
and third examples of the violation were combined into one
RAR due
to the incidents occurring within a close proximity and similar
time frame.
Secondly, all involved personnel
were counseled
on
the importance of following radiological work instructions.
In
addition, these matters
have
been incorporated into initial
radiological controls
GET and Radiological Controls
retraining.
Based
on the inspector's
review of these corrective
actions, this matter is considered
closed.
9.
Site Organization
On July 27,
1993, J. Brazell, Acting Site Security Manager,
became
the
permanent Site Security Manager.
Effective July 26,
1993,
Raul
Baron, Site Manager of Nuclear Assurance
and Licensing,
became
the corporate
General
Manager of Nuclear Assurance
reporting to Hark Hedford, Vice President of Technical
Support.
John Maciejewski,
General
Manager of Nuclear Assurance will become
General
Manager of Operations
Services reporting to Dr. Hedford.
Mr.
Haciejewski will be responsible for Nuclear Training, Operations,
and
Haintenance.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection
scope
and findings were summarized
on August 20,
1993,
with those
persons
indicated in paragraph
1 above.
The inspectors
described
the areas
inspected
and discussed
in detail the inspection
findings listed below.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary
any
of the material
provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors
during this
inspection.
Dissenting
comments
were not received
from the licensee.
tern
umber
12
esc
tio
and Refere
ce
259,
259,
259,
260, 296/93-28-01
260, 296/93-28-02
260, 296/93-28-03
Radwaste Effluent
Radiation Monitor, paragraph
3.
VIO, Failure to Control Transient
Combustible Material, paragraph
4.
VIO, Failure to Control
M&TE, paragraph
5.
Licensee
management
was informed that
4 LERs,
1 URI, and
1 VIO were
closed.
ASOS
CAQR
CFR
CRDR
DCN
GPH
IR
LCO
LER
METE
NRC
REH
SIHI
TS
and Initialisms
Alternate
Rod Injection
American Society of Mechanical
Engineers
Assistant Shift Operations
Supervisor
Anticipated Transient Without Scram
Condition Adverse to Quality Report
Code of Federal
Regulations
Control
Room Design
Review
Control
Room Ventilation System
Design
Change Notice
Diesel
Generator
Engineered
Safety Feature
General
Employee Training
Gallons
Per Minute
Inspection
Report
Limiting Condition for Operation
Licensee
Event Report
Maximum Permissible
Concentration
Measuring
and Test Equipment
Noncited Violation
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Primary Containment Isolation System
Quality Control
Radiological Effluent Manual
Reactor Protection
System
Recirculation
Pump Trip
Radiological
Work Permit
Surveillance Instruction
System Instrument Haintenance
Index
Site Standard
Practice
Technical Specification
Unresolved
Item
Violation
Work Order