ML18036A804
| ML18036A804 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1992 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Patterson C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18036A801 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-92-24, 50-260-92-24, 50-296-92-24, NUDOCS 9208110181 | |
| Download: ML18036A804 (25) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1992024
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-259/92-24,
50-260/92-24,
and 50-296/92-24
Licensee:
Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga,
TN
37402-2801
Docket Nos.:
50-259,
50-260,
and 50-296
License Nos.:
and
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Units 1, 2,
and
3
Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near Decatur,
Inspection
Conducted:
une
17
July 17,
1992
Inspector:
atters
en>or
i
nspector
ate
1gne
l
Accompanied
by:
E. Christnot,
Resident
Inspector
W. Bearden,
Resident
Inspector
Approved by:
a
.
e
R actor
,
ection
A
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
a e
>gne
Scope:
This routine resident
inspection included surveillance operation,
maintenance
operation,
operational
safety verification, Unit 2
preoutage
work, Unit
1 activities, Unit 3 restart activities,
reportable
occurrences,
and action
on previous inspection
findings.
One hour of backshift coverage
was routinely worked during the
workweek.
Deep backshift inspections
were conducted
on June
20,
June
27, July 4,
and July 11,
1992.
A NRC Non-Destructive
Examination
Team conducted
an inspection of
Unit 3 pipe replacement
from July 6 July 16,
1992.
The team
concluded that the program
was adequate for the applicable
code
cycle.
The results of the inspection will be documented
in
inspection report 92-23.
9208110181
920803
ADOCK 05000259
8
Unit 2 continued to operate
at power this period without
significant problems,
paragraph
four.
At the end of the period
the unit had
been
on line 78 days.
This exceeded
the previous
longest period of continuous
operation of 73 days since the Unit
was restarted
May 1991.
Some pre-outage modification and scaffold
staging
has occurred in Unit 2 operating
spaces.
This has
been
closely monitored for impact
on the operating Unit.
Unit 3 recovery activities continued with recirculation
and
reactor water cleanup piping proceeding
on schedule.
Other
activities were control
room design review work, drywell chiller
installation,
and cooling tower refurbishment.
Significant
problems
were encountered
with the cooling tower work.
This work
was being performed
as
a pilot program to demonstrate
usage of the
system turnover process.
Several electrical installation
deficiencies
were identified resulting in three incident
investigation reports
by the licensee.
These
problems indicated
a
more aggressive
quality oversight is needed.
Resolutions of these
issues
and incorporation of lessons
learned is essential
to insure
timely and quality completion of Unit 3 recover efforts.
Unit
1 walkdown started
during this period,
paragraph
six.
These
activities are being performed
on
a limited scope to determine
work activities to be performed during the Unit 2 Cycle
6 outage.
This will be the only scheduled
time all three Units will be
defueled.
These
walkdowns are being monitored daily in the plan
of the day meetings.
One violation was identified for failure to use the current design
pressure
during hydrostatic testing after installation of
corrosion monitors in the residual
heat
removal service water
system piping, paragraph five.
The licensee identified that the
design data
was taken from test data sheets
and not actual flow
diagrams.
A limiting condition for operation
was entered
because
a loop of containment cooling was declared
inoperable until the
correct hydrostatic test
was conducted.
The system
had
been
technically inoperable for 17 days.
One unresolved
item concerning
a missed
Appendix
R firewatch was
identified, paragraph four.
A computer malfunction of the
computerized
hold order process
caused
a tracking item to default
nonconservatively.
The licensee
is reviewing this problem for
other causes
which may have occurred
and correction of the
problem.
One inspector followup item was identified concerning
incorporation of lessons
learned
from the problems with the
cooling tower refurbishment,
paragraph
seven.
REPORT DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees:
- 0. Zeringue,
Vice President,
Browns Ferry Operations
- H. HcCluskey,
Vice President,
Browns Ferry Restart
- J. Scalice,
Plant Manager
J. Rupert,
Engineering
and Modifications Manager
J. Swindell, Restart
Manager
M. Herrell, Operations
Manager
J.
Haddox, Project Engineer
- H. Bajestani,
Technical
Support
Manager
R. Jones,
Operations
Superintendent
A. Sorrell, Special
Programs
Manager
C. Crane,
Maintenance
Manager
- G. Turner, Site guality Assurance
Manager
- R. Baron, Site Licensing Manager
- P. Salas,
Compliance Supervisor
J.
Corey, Site Radiological
Control Manager
A. Brittain, Site Security Manager
Other licensee
employees
or contractors
contacted
included licensed
reactor operators,
auxiliary operators,
craftsmen,
technicians,
and
public safety officers;
and quality assurance,
design,
and engineering
personnel.
NRC Personnel:
P. Kellogg, Section Chief
."C. Patterson,
Senior Resident
Inspector
E. Christnot,
Resident
Inspector
M. Bearden,
Resident
Inspector
- Attended exit interview
and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
Surveillance Observation
(61726)
The inspectors
observed
and/or reviewed the performance of required SIs.
The inspections
included reviews of the SIs for technical
adequacy
and
conformance to TS, verification of test instrument calibration,
observations
of the conduct of testing,
confirmation of proper removal
from service
and return to service of systems,
and reviews of test data.
The inspectors
also verified that
LCOs were met, testing
was
accomplished
by qualified personnel,
and the SIs were completed within
the required frequency.
The following SIs were reviewed during this
reporting period:
a.
2-SI-3.7.A.3.a(A),
Reactor Building Suppression
Chamber
Vacuum
Relief Channel Calibration.
This SI is performed quarterly to
b.
C.
check the calibration of the Reactor Building-Suppression
Chamber
Vacuum Relief differential pressure
requirements
of TS 3.7.A.3.a
and 4.7.A.3.a.
The inspector
reviewed the completed
SI package
for the most recently performed testing performed
on Hay 29,
1992.
No discrepancies
were identified.
O-SI-4-11.B.l.b,
High Pressure
Fire Protection
System Valve
Position Verification (Inside Loop).
This SI is performed monthly
to verify proper operation of the
HPFPS, Sprinkler Systems,
Raw
Service Water System,
and
CO< Systems
by verifying proper valve
alignment in accordance
with TS 4. 11.B. l.b, 4. 11.C. l.a,
and
4. ll.d. 1.
The inspector
reviewed portions of the completed
performed from Hay 27-31,
1992.
The inspector
noted that several
test deficiencies
were generated
as the result of this SI.
The
TDs were associated
with several
HPFPS valves that were closed
under hold orders.
In each
case
the closed valves
were tracked
under
an Attachment
F with the proper compensatory
measures
in
place.
No other discrepancies
were identified.
O-SI-4.9.A.l.a(D), Diesel
Generator
Honthly Operability Test.
This SI is performed monthly to verify operability of Diesel
Generator
1D in accordance
with TS 4.9.A. l.a and 4.5.C. l.a.
This
test also
implements the
ASHE Section
XI program of TS 4.6.G. 1 as
it pertains to the fuel oil and starting air systems
and monthly
maintenance
checks
recommended
by the vendor.
The inspector
reviewed the completed
SI package for the test performed
on July
7,
1992
and identified no discrepancies.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the Surveillance
Observation
area.
3.
Haintenance
Observation
(62703)
Plant maintenance activities were observed
and/or reviewed for selected
safety-related
systems
and components
to ascertain that they were
conducted
in accordance
with requirements.
The following items were
considered
during these
reviews:
LCOs maintained,
use of approved
procedures,
functional testing and/or calibrations
were performed prior
to returning components
or systems to service,
gC records maintained,
activities accomplished
by qualified personnel,
use of properly certi-
fied parts
and materials,
proper
use of clearance
procedures,
and
implementation of radiological controls
as required.
Work documentation
(HR,
WR,
and
WO) were reviewed to determine
the
status of outstanding
jobs
and to assure that priority was assigned
to
safety- related
equipment
maintenance
which might affect plant safety.
The inspectors
observed
the following maintenance activities during this
reporting period:
e
b.
c ~
lA DG Outage
The inspectors
followed licensee activities associated
with the
scheduled
outage
on the
1A DG. Outage activities observed
included
replacement
of 3 cells
and interconnectors
on the
DG Battery due
to evidence of copper contamination. Additionally the inspector
reviewed
LCO 0-92-72-3.9.B.3
which was associated
with this work.
The
LCO was entered
at 4:35
am on June
23,
1992,
and exited at
1:00
pm on June
24,
1992.
No problems
were identified.
Thermocouple
Recorder
The inspectors
observed
ongoing activities associated
with
52031-00 which was issued to troubleshoot
Point Number
2 on the
2B
Recirc
Pump Hotor Winding and Bearing Recorder,
2-TR-68-84.
This
point was associated
with thermocouple,
2-TE-68-73E,
which ap-
peared to be open.
,The inspector
observed
work and reviewed the
uncompleted
work package.
The work instructions
were of
sufficient detail to allow for adequate
performance of the work
activity.
No problems
were identified.
P.H.
on Recirculation
Pump
The inspectors
observed activities associated
with WO 92-55507-00
which was issued to perform routine preventive maintenance
on the
2B Recirc
Pump Hotor Winding and Bearing Recorder,
2-TR-68-84.
This work was performed with the work activity described
in
52031-00.
A mechanical
alignment in accordance
with IHSI-3016,
Leeds
and Northrup Recorders
Hodel
257 was to be accomplished
on
this recorder after completion of troubleshooting.
The inspector
reviewed the uncompleted
work package.
The work instructions
were
of sufficient detail to allow for adequate
performance of the work
activity.
No problems
were identified.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the Haintenance
Observation
area.
Operational
Safety Verification (71707)
The
NRC inspectors
followed the overall plant status
and
any significant
safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions
were held
with plant management
and various
members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors
made routine visits to the control rooms.
Inspection
observations
included instrument readings,
setpoints
and recordings,
status of operating
systems,
status
and alignments of emergency
standby
systems,
verification of onsite
and offsite power supplies,
emergency
power sources
available for automatic operation,
the purpose of tempo-
rary tags
on equipment controls
and switches,
alarm status,
adherence
to procedures,
adherence
to LCOs, nuclear instruments
operability, temporary alterations
in effect, daily journals
and logs,
stack monitor recorder traces,
and control
room manning.
This
inspection activity also included
numerous
informal discussions
with
operators
and supervisors.
General
plant tours were conducted.
Portions of the turbine buildings,
each reactor building,
and general
plant areas
were visited.
Observations
included valve position
and system alignment,
and
hanger conditions,
containment isolation alignments,
instrument
readings,
housekeeping,
power supply and breaker alignments,
radiation
and contaminated
area controls,
tag controls
on equipment,
work
activities in progress,
and radiological protection controls.
Informal
discussions
were held with selected
plant personnel
in their functional
areas
during these tours.
a 0
Plant Status
b.
C.
During this period, the unit operated
at power without any
significant problems.
At the
end of the period, the unit had
been
on-line for 78 days.
This exceeded
the previous longest
run of 73
days since the unit was returned to operation.
Operator Overtime
During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed the
licensee's
work and overtime log for the operating shifts.
This
review as well as discussion
with Operations staff indicate that
overtime is regularly worked but is not excessive.
Operations
overtime remained within the guidelines established
in SSP 1.7,
Overtime Restrictions.
No discrepancies
were identified.
Hissed Appendix
R Fire Watches
On June
12,
1992
a hold order was placed
on
DG 3C, battery charger
A.
2-SSP-1,
BFNP Unit 2 Appendix
R Safe
Shutdown
Program,
requires
the charger to be restored to service within seven
days
or a firewatch be established.
The firewatch was not established
until July 4,
1992, twenty-two days later.
The hold order process
is computerized
and certain attributes of a component
are
automatically completed
on the hold order forms and
abnormal
configuration log sheets
when the component is identified.
One of
these is
a question
about Appendix R.
A computer malfunction that
occurred earlier apparently
caused
the system to default non-
conservatively
and indicated that this component is not
an
Appendix
R component.
An Incident Investigation is being
conducted.
The item will remain
open
as
UNR 260/92-24-01,
Hissed
Appendix
R Required Firewatch,
pending review of the licensee's
evaluation of this issue.
d.
Firewatches
An inspector
selected
several
active
LCOs associated
with fire
protection requirements
from the licensee's
tracking list for
0
review.
Specific requirements
included continuous or roving
firewatches
in the Unit 2 Reactor Building, Control
Bay, or Unit
1/2
DG Building.
LCOs reviewed included the following:
LCO
Action Re uired
0-92-044-3. 11.C
Maintain hourly roving firewatch in Unit 1/2
Building due to scaffolding blocking sprinkler
heads.
0-92-066-3. 11.A
Maintain hourly roving firewatch in Unit 1/2
Building due to covered
smoke detectors.
1-92-034-3. 11.G
Maintain hourly roving firewatch in Unit 1/2
Building due to inoperable fire door.
2-92-159-3. 11.C
Maintain continuous firewatch in Unit 2 Reactor
Building elevation
565 due to blocked sprinkler.
2-92-160-3. 11.G
Maintain hourly roving firewatch in Shutdown
Board
Room
C due to breached fire barrier.
2-92-161-3.11.C
Maintain continuous firewatch in Unit 2 Reactor
Building elevation
593 due to blocked sprinkler.
2-92-163-3. 11.A
Maintain hourly roving firewatch in Unit 2
Reactor Building elevation
565 due to covered
smoke detectors.
2-92-164-3. 11.G
Haintain hourly roving firewatch in Unit 2
Reactor Building due to inoperable fire door.
2-92-165-3. 11.A
Maintain hourly roving firewatch in Control
Bay
due to covered
smoke detectors.
3-92-063-3. 11.G. 1 Maintain hourly roving firewatch in Unit 3
Computer
Room due to breached fire barrier.
During the review of Attachment
F Number 92-0201 associated
with
LCO 2-92-159-3.11.C
the inspector noted that no continuous fire
watch was present at the elevations
565 and
519 southeast
quadrant
of the Reactor building as specified
on the Attachment
F.
On
further investigation the inspector determined there
was
no need
for a fire watch in that quadrant
and the required fire watch was
actually
on the 565 elevation in another quadrant
where
scaffolding was blocking
a section of sprinkler piping. This
discrepancy
appeared
to be
known by personnel
in the field
performing fire watch duties but no effort had
been
made to
correct the Attachment
F.
The inspector discussed
this issue with
operations
management
personnel
and the Attachment
F was
immediately corrected to specify the correct area.
The inspector
noted that in spite of the administrative error present
on the
licensee's
form to control this required
compensatory
measure
the
actual
requirements
were being met due to the efforts of personnel
in the field.
Additionally, the inspector
reviewed all available copies of round
sheets
hourly roving fire watches for personnel
assigned
to the
control
bay and compared
them to the respective
LCO and Attachment
F.
These
sheets
are normally left at permanently installed
boxes
at several
locations in the various buildings.
The inspector
reviewed the forms to verify that recent tours
had
been
performed
at the required times
and that all roving fire watches
required
by
outstanding
LCOs for the Control
Bay were being satisfied.
The
inspector
also selected
several
locations that required routine
checks
and waited at those locations to verify that the roving
fire watch did visit the area
when due.
One roving fire watch was
accompanied
on
a complete tour of.all areas
to verify that the
tours could be made
as required.
Other than the above mentioned
administrative error no discrepancies
were identified during this
review.
e.
Spent
Fuel
Pool Inventory
The licensee
videotaped
and identified the contents of the spent
fuel pool.
This was in response
to
a commitment
made in an
Enforcement
Conference
which was held to discuss
discrepancies
in
the control of SNM.
The results of this effort identified three
areas of concern that were presented
to
PORC for resolution.
These
items
and their resolution
are
as follows:
Three pieces of LPRN were found located in
and could not be easily removed.
Two of these
pieces
were
LPRN "cold ends" with the remaining piece being
a "hot end".
The licensee
removed the pieces,
verified they contained
no
SNM,
and shipped
them offsite.
A bucket containing miscellaneous
components
and three
channel
fasteners
was found on the pool bottom.
The
contents of the bucket were inventoried
and all components
were shipped offsite.
The area
underneath
the spent fuel racks contains
a large
amount of sediment that cannot
be reached with the
conventional
pool
vacuum
on site.
Currently there
are
no
plans to remove this material.
This c'ompleted the licensee
actions to resolve
SNH problems.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the Operational
Safety
Verification area.
0
5.
Unit 2 Pre-Outage
Work (37700)
During this period, the inspectors
noted
a significant increase
in Unit
2 modifications work.
This was being performed using
a licensee
task
managed
approach of contractor activities.
Examples of the work are
as
follows:
Modify Miscellaneous
Steel - Units
1 and
2
RB Crane
Integrated
Computer System
Emergency Lighting in the Spreader
Room
Installing new Telecommunication
Equipment
Small
Bore Supports
(COz System)
Evacuation
Alarm Upgrade
Small
Bore Supports
(HVAC System)
New HVAC System for Control
Bay
Radwaste Air Compressors
Samll
Bore Supports
HVAC Duct and Supports -
DG Bldg. Units
1 and
2
The inspectors
discussed
with licensee
management
the increase
in
scaffolding in the plant
and the potential for modifications work or
scaffolding to affect operating
equipment.
Plant management
reviewed
the reason for each scaffold in the field and ways to minimize the time
the scaffolding was in place.
The inspector will continue to monitor
these activities.
'a ~
Improper Hydrostatic
Test Pressure
The inspectors
were informed by licensee
personnel
that
a portion
of the Unit 2
RHR System
had
been unintentionally rendered
inoperable for 17 days
due to an incorrectly specified hydrostatic
test pressure
used during post modification testing.
This
licensee
determination
was based
on the identification by a
licensee modifications engineer that
a lower than required
hydrostatic test pressure
had
been
used.
This resulted
in the
determination
by operations
personnel
that the piping downstream
of RHRSW Check Valve, 2-23-530,
associated
with the 28
RHR HXCH
did not meet
ASME Section
XI requirements.
The affected
components
were isolated
from Loop II of the
RHR System
on June
20,
1992,
and
Loop II of Containment Cooling was declared
as required
by TS 3.5.B.5.
This
LCO allowed continued
reactor
operation of Unit 2 for a period not to exceed
30 days
provided the remaining
RHR Pumps,
associated
heat exchangers,
all
D/Gs,
and all access
flow paths of the
RHR System for Containment
Cooling are operable.
While Loop II was out of service
a plug was
welded in place to perform hydrostatic testing at the correct test
pressure.
A hot-tap tool was
used to redrill the plug and the
2B
RHR HXCH returned to service at 12:00
pm on June
22,
1992.
Upon further evaluation the licensee
found that several different
sets of corrosion monitors were affected
by this problem which
appeared
to be due to failure of the licensee's
program to
adequately
define the required
source of hydrostatic test
information.
The effects of this problem"can
be placed in one of
three categories.
- The first category consists of components
that
were hydrostatically tested
using
a design pressure
of 185 psig
while the system flow diagram only specifies
150 psig
as the
design pressure.
This problem affects three corrosion monitors
and
one sample valve located in the
EECW System.
The inspector
was informed that Nuclear Engineering
had evaluated this potential
problem and determined that
no damage to system piping had
occurred.
The next category includes
components hydrostatically
tested to requirements
of ASHE Section
XI (1. 1 times design
pressure)
instead of USAS B31. 1 (1.5 times design pressure)
as
required
by HAI 4.7A.
The
G29 Process
Specification
allowed the
use of ASNE Section
XI instead of USAS B31.1.
This problem
affects ll corrosion monitors
and four sample valves located
on
RHRSW piping on all three units.
The inspector
was informed that
these
components
did not impact plant operations
since the piping
was actually B31.1 rather than
ASHE and the hydrostatic pressures
used in these tests did demonstrate
structural integrity although
a licensee
procedure
(HAI 4.7A) had
been violated.
The final
category includes
components hydrostatically tested
using
a design
pressure
of 185 psig while the system flow diagram
shows
450 psig.
This includes six corrosion monitors
and two sample valves
installed in the Units 2 and
3
RHRSW lines.
One of the sample
valves
and three of the corrosion monitors are those
components
associated
with the
2B
RHR HXCH.
The remaining components
had no
direct impact
on plant operations
since hot-tap drilling had not
yet occurred.
The corrosion monitors were installed
under
DCNs W17010
and
W17046.
The specified hydrostatic test boundaries
were limited to
the access fittings and sockolets to the outside face of the
associated
piping. After weld inspections
and testing is performed
to verify structural integrity of the welds
and installed
components
a hot-tap tool is used to drill through the piping to
place the corrosion monitor in service.
System integrity is not
affected until this drilling occurs.
In both
DCNs the
modification criteria required testing of fitting welds to 185
psig prior to hot-tap drilling of holes.
Workplan 0136-91
had
been
performed to install three corrosion
monitors,
2-SUCH-023-5109A,B,
and
C,
and sample valve,
2-SNV-023-
5109, in the
RHRSW inlet to the
2B
RHR HXCH.
An inspector
reviewed the Unit 2 ASOS
Log and
LCO Log for June 5-
22,
1992, to determine
the impact of any redundant
equipment that
may have
been
removed
from service during the time that operations
personnel
were unaware that
Loop II was inoperable.
Three
examples of redundant
components
were identified as follows:
On June 8,
1992, at 4:00
am the
1C
DG was tagged
out for
scheduled
outage work.
This placed Unit 2 in a
7 day
LCO
provided all
CS,
RHR, systems
were operable.
However, since
Loop II was inoperable
the unit should
have
been in cold
shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
(TS 3.9.B.3).
This
LCO was exited
at 2:00
am on June
9,
1992
(22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />).
On June
15,
1992, at 5:00
pm 2-SI-4.2.B-45A(a) I, Functional
Testing of RHR Loop I Automatic Initiation Logic and
Injection Valve Opening Pressure
Permissive
Logic, started.
This SI resulted
in Loop I of RHR and Containment
Cooling
not being operable.
This would have normally placed the
unit in
a
7 day
LCO provided
Loop II was operable
(TS 3.5.B.6).
Since
Loop II was not available then
TS 3.5.B.8
applied
and the unit would have
had to be in cold S/D in 24
hours.
The
LCO associated
with the SI was exited at 8:00
pm
on the
same
day
(3 hrs).
On June
17,
1992,
at 4:31
pm 2-SI-4.2.8-45A(c) I, Functional
Testing of RHR Loop I Valve Logic and Interlocks, started.
This SI resulted
in Loop I of RHR and Containment
Cooling
not being operable.
This would have normally placed the
unit in
a 7 day
LCO provided
Loop II was operable
(TS 3.5.B.6).
Since
Loop II was not available then
TS 3.5.B.8
applied
and the unit would have
had to be in cold S/D in 24
hours.
The
LCO associated
with the SI was exited at 10:00
pm on the
same
day (5 1/2 hrs).
These
examples
represent
three
cases
where the licensee
would have
placed the operating unit in a condition that required licensed
personnel
to commence
an orderly shutdown
and
be in
a cold S/D
condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Although each
example represented
short system outages
of less
than
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in length they still
represent
entry into a condition which would require
an immediate
plant shutdown.
These failures to prevent
usage of an incorrect
hydrostatic test pressures
in approved workplans constitutes
usage
of inadequate
procedures
and is
a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix
B Criterion V.
This is Violation 259,
260, 296/92-24-02,
Incorrect Hydrostatic Test Pressures.
RHR Interlock
The inspector
reviewed
and observed
design activities
and
identified
a weakness
involving the Unit 2
RHR system.
This
weakness
dealt with pre-field activity work.
One involved
installation problems with DCN W17065A, issued to install
interlocks
on certain Unit 2
RHR valves to preclude
an inadvertent
drain down of the reactor vessel.
The inspector
reviewed
an
incident investigation performed
by the licensee
on the
installation problems
associated
with DCN W17065A.
The II stated
that problems
occurred in the section of the
DCN that called for
the installation of wiring on internal limit switches in
RHR valve
e
10
2-FCV-74-57.
When personnel
opened
the valve electrical
connection
box it was discovered that the required limit switches
were not present.
Additional reviews indicated:
the design
engineer
interpreted
schematic
drawing,
2-45W799-11,
as indicating
the valve contained
the necessary limit switches;
the electrical
connection
diagram,
2-45N2749-8,
did not depict the limit
switches;
the limit switch development
drawing,
2-47A370-74-52,
also did not depict the necessary limit switches;
the design
engineer relied on verbal
information from the
TVA/HOV group to
confirm the existence of the limit switches;
and additional
information such
as the
EQ binder was not used
by the design
engineer to confirm the verbal information.
One violation was identified in this paragraph.
6.
Unit
1 Activities
7.
A limited number of walkdowns occurred in Unit
1 spaces
necessary
to
obtain information to support Unit
1 work during Unit 2 Cycle
6 outage
that must
be accomplished
with all three units defueled.
These
activities were tracked in the
POD and discussed
at the
POD meeting.
Unit 3 Restart Activities
(30702)
The inspector
reviewed
and observed
the licensee's
activities involved
with the Unit 3 restart.
This included reviews of procedures,
post-job
activities,
and completed field work; observation of pre-job field work,
in-progress field work,
and
QA/QC activities; attendance
at restart
craft level, progress
meetings,
restart
program meetings,
and management
meetings;
and periodic discussions
with both
TVA and contractor
personnel,
skilled craftsmen,
supervisors,
managers
and executives.
a
~
Work Activities
b.
During this report period the recirculation
and
RWCU piping
replacements
were performed
on schedule.
Inspection of these
activities was documented
in a regional
IR 92-26.
Other
activities were cooling tower refurbishment,
drywell chiller
installation,
and
CRDR.
While these activities are proceeding,
the problems
encountered
with the cooling tower work must
be
resolved to insure timely and quality completion of Unit 3
recovery efforts.
Cooling Tower Refurbishment
The inspector
reviewed the work activities associated
with the
cooling tower refurbishment.
The licensee identified moisture in
several
cooling tower fan motors after the motors
had
been
previously refurbished.
The motors meggered
bad
and nine motors
were pulled to be dried.
The cause of this problem was initially
determined to be from water running
down conduit into the motor
lead connections.
The licensee initiated II-B-92-042, Moisture
11
Found in Cooling Tower Fan Hotors, to fully review the problem.
Also,
an electrical splice in cooling tower
1 located
on
a cable
supplying
480V power to
a fan motor had failed under load.
Additional observations
and reviews indicated that
a total of 61
such splices
were identified in towers
1, 5,
and 6.
The inspector
observed
the failed splice,
which came completely apart
under load
causing
a faulted circuit.
Additional splices
were observed
some
of which appeared
to be
on the verge of failing.
II-B-92-044,
Failure of Splices
On Power Supply Cable to Cooling Tower Fan
Hotors,
was initiated to fully review the splice problem.
Identification of these
problems
when fan testing
was in progress
for a scheduled
completion date of June
30,
1992 was alarming.
This problem appeared
to be the cause of the fire that completely
destroyed
the number four tower on Hay 10,
1986.
UNR 259,
260,
296/88-16-02
was closed
in IR 88-27
based
on the actions
taken
and
the cooling towers being deenergized.
The investigation
team
report
on the fire by the U.S.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and
Firearms,
issued July 17,
1986,
determined
the cause of the fire
to be the result of a short to ground in a 440 volt electric power
cable feeding the cooling tower fan motor.
The cooling towers are non-safety related
equipment
and are not
needed to place
an operating unit in a safe
shutdown condition.
The units were originally placed into operation without the use of
however,
cooling towers were later- added
and
operated
to maintain cooling water discharged
into the Tennessee
River within environmental
temperature limits.
Subsequently,
the
environmental
temperatures
were relaxed
and the cooling towers
were not routinely used during plant operation.
There were six
two per reactor.
This year because
of less than
average rainfall and
a river temperature
of 80 degrees,
the
are expected to be needed.
Identification of these
problems with the cooling tower fans
nearing completion of the refurbishment
work is indication of a
lack of quality oversight in the maintenance
and modifications
work.
Since this is one of the first major tasks to be completed
by the construction
contractor, this indicates
a more aggressive
approach to quality workmanship is strongly needed.
Overhaul of
an electric motor and replacement
in a system with the
corresponding
meggar checks,
etc. is basic electrical
maintenance
work.
Later in the report period another
problem was reviewed which
involved the contractors
replacement
of defective cable splices in
the electrical
power feeds to the fan motors.
The splices
done by
the contractor were not installed in accordance
with requirements.
The requirements
indicated that when installing these
types of
splices the connections
were to be torqued
and the torquing
recorded.
The construction craft supervision
apparently
decided
that because
the cooling towers are non-safety related the
0
12
torquing was not required
and that all electrical
connections
could be
made
snug tight.
The inspector
observed
and reviewed the constructor's
corrective
action involving the installation of electrical
connections
in
1, 5,
and 6.
Part of the corrective action
was to
gather,
on
a shift basis, all electrical craft personnel,
in the
contractor's training facility and hold
a class
room session
on
electrical
work at
BFN.
The inspector
attended
a session
and
noted that the contractor's
management
emphasized
to all craft
personnel
the importance of following the licensee's
procedures.
The management
also emphasized
that for electrical
work there
was
no difference
between safety-related
and non-safety related.
The
requirements for making electrical
connections
were the
same for
both.
The inspector will do additional followup in this area
as
more information becomes
available.
This is identified as
an
Inspector
Followup Item IFI 259,
260, 296/92-24-03,
Lessons
Learned
From Inadequate
Cooling Tower Electrical Installation
Activities.
These
are documented
in Incident Investigation
Reports
II-B-92-042, 044,
and 048.
Stop
Work on Electrical Calculations
On June
26,
1992, the site quality manager
issued
a stop work
order for the issuance
and
use of electrical distribution
calculations
prepared
in accordance
with the Unit 3i contract with
Bechtel.
The stop work order was issued after
a series of
corrective actions
by the contractor to address
calculation
deficiencies
were not effective.
The calculations
reviewed
by TVA
corporate
engineering
contained technical
errors although they had
been through the final Bechtel corrective action.
A SCAR was
written to document the problems
and track the corrective actions.
Of four calculations
reviewed three contained deficiencies.
The
three with errors
are listed below:
o
ED-93057-920035,
Diesel Generator
Load Study
ED-(3057-920036,
4 KV Short Circuit Study
o
ED-(3057-910236,
4
KV Short Circuit
For example,
the
DG load study did not document multi-unit
operation
adequately.
The inspector questioned if the current problem was related to
problems
using the rollover process
in DCN preparation identified
several
months
ago.
A meeting
was held with licensee
management
and the problem was stated to be unrelated.
Previous corrections
related to the rollover process
would not have corrected
the
calculation problems.
13
The inspector
reviewed the three calculations
and the problems
were technical
and not process
type problems.
This was not
related to the rollover process
problems.
In the civil area the
calculation quality was good.
The licensee
developed
an action plan to correct the problems.
No
DCNs were issued that involved these calculations.
The
calculations
were
some of the first ones
issued.
The action plan
will consist of a joint review of ten issued calculation, root
cause identification,
and
a detailed action plan.
The inspector
will continue to followup the licensees
action plan to correct the
identified issues.
Pilot/Prototypical
Program
1.)
Walkdown
The inspector continued to monitor and review the licensee's
pilot/prototypical program involving the
SPOC/SPAE
process
for the cooling towers.
The inspector
accompanied
licensee
representatives
from various departments
on
an electrical
walkdown of cooling towers
1,
5,
and 6,
and the 4160
V
transformers
and switchgear.
The walkdown was performed in
accordance
with approved
procedures
and approximately
50
deficiencies,
the majority being minor in nature,
were
identified.
The inspector reviewed the resul.ts of the
walkdown and noted that
on the spot corrections
were made,
service request,
work requests,
and work orders
were written
to correct the deficiencies.
2.)
Testing
The inspector monitored
and reviewed the licensee's
activities involved with cooling towers
1, 5,
and 6.
The
licensee
stopped testing
on the cooling towers
due to the
electrical installation problems.
The inspector
attended
two JTG meetings
which were conducted
in accordance
with an
approved
procedure.
The main topic of discussion
was pre-
operational test procedure
3-RTP-027C.
The objectives of the test were to satisfy the baseline test
requirements
and additional test requirements
necessary
to
return Cooling Towers
1, 5,
and
6 to service.
Specific
objectives
were:
Design Baseline Test Requirements,
2/3-BFN-BTRD-027, were
Provide
warm water channel
level indication in the
Hain Control
Room,
Hode 027-01.
Provide forebay level indication in the Hain Control
Room for manual
operator actions,
Hode 027-02.
14
o
Provide cooling tower lift pump discharge
water high
temperature
signal to the
4
KV Power Distribution
System
and the corresponding
cooling tower lift pump
trips for Pumps lA, 1B,
5A, 5B,
6A,
and 68,
Modes 027-
03 and 57-5-05.
o
Provide manual
vacuum breaking capability to prevent
backflow of cooling tower warm water discharge
into
the forebay
upon trip of the
CCW Pumps,
Mode 027-04.
o
Provide forebay/warm water channel differential level
indication in the Hain Control
Room,
Mode 027-05.
Additional Test Requirements
were,
o
Verify that Cooling Tower Blowdown flow
instrumentation
indicates flow when valves
1-FCV-27-
148 and 2-FCV-27-148 are
opened during Cooling Tower
system Helper Mode operation.
o
Verify that Cooling Tower system
Gate
lA2 operates
locally and from the Hain Control
Room Panel
0-9-56
subsequent
to deletion of gate automatic controls.
o
Verify the operation of Cooling Tower 5 and
6 Lift
Pumps through the Cooling Tower bypass lines.
The
JTG recommended
approval of the test to the plant
manager.
Construction Activities
The inspector monitored
and reviewed the construction activities
performed
on the
new drywell chiller system.
The
new drywell
chiller system involved
DCN 17913A and implementing
WP 0583-92,
which installed the electrical
equipment,
conduit
and cable for
the two drywell chillers.
The inspector
noted that the work
documents
and support information were present
at the work site,
all work activities were controlled
and supervision
and
engineering
support were present.
The inspector
noted that
a
cable
bend radius
problem was identified by the electrical craft
involving the power feed to the south chiller.
The inspector
observed
a TVA field engineer
and
a construction field engineer
doing field observations
and issuing
a
FDCN to adequately
address
the
bend radius problem.
The inspector will continue to monitor
the field design activities
on the
new drywell chiller
installation.
1 5
8.
Reportable
Occurrences
(92700)
The
LERs listed below were reviewed to determine if the information
provided met
NRC requirements.
The determinations
included the
verification of compliance with TS and regulatory requirements,
and
addressed
the adequacy of the event description,
the corrective actions
taken,
the existence of potential
generic- problems,
compliance with
reporting requirements,
and the relative safety significance of each
event.
Additional in-plant reviews
and discussions
with plant
personnel,
as appropriate,
were conducted.
(CLOSED)
Average
Power
Range Nonitors
(APRNs)
Failure
Due to Flow Converter
Power Supply Which Caused
the
APRN
Output Trip Relays to Fail to Trip.
On February 21,
1992, during
performance of an
APRN functional test it was determined that the
Hi-Hi Flux Thermal
Flow Biased Trip associated
with "A", "C", and
"E" channels of the "A" APRN was inoperable.
The failure was
determined to be due to welded contacts
on the three
K19 relays
which apparently resulted
from chattering.
A previous review of
this
common
mode failure and the licensee
subsequent
investigation
is discussed
in more detail in Inspection
Report 92-05.
As the
result of this unforseen failure the licensee
has revised 2-SI-
4.2.C-7(A-I), Power
Range
Neutron Nonitoring System
Loop A Flow
Bias Instrumentation Calibration
and Functional Test, to require
that the appropriate
relays
be checked for damage if portions of
the SI are performed in Run Node due to degraded
flow channel
output.
Based
on the above review and licensee's
actions
completed in this area the inspector determined that adequate
licensee
actions
have occurred to preclude
a recurrence of this
event.
9.
Action on Previous
Inspection
Findings
(92701,
92702)
a
~
(CLOSED) IFI 259,
260, 296/92-05-01, Activities of the Unit 3
Restart
Review Board
and Unit 2/3 Restart Criteria.
The inspector
identified this item during
a review of the licensee's
management
meetings
involving Unit 3 specific restart
items.
The inspector
noted that during the management
meeting the group was referred to
as the Restart
Review Board.
During the Unit 2 recovery,
the
RRB
was tasked with specific areas
to review and determine restart
status.
In the recovery of Unit 3,
a
RRB was determined
as not
necessary
because
the Unit 3 restart
would have the
same criteria
and the
same corrective actions
as Unit 2.
The inspector
was
informed by the licensee that the meeting
was not
a Unit 3 RRB.
The meetings
were established
to determine
the applicability of
non-programmatic
design
changes
implemented
in Unit 2 to the Unit
3 restart effort.
The inspector
was also informed that in order
to facilitate the reviews the group decided to use the Unit 2
RRB
format.
The inspector
reviewed three licensee
documents,
two from the
licensee to the
NRC,
and
one internal
document.
The two documents
16
from the licensee
were dated January
9,
1991
and July 16,
1991.
Both documents clearly stated
and outlined the criteria and
restart
items required for Units
1 and 3.
The third document
stressed
the need to clarify the process
for controlling
NRC
commitments
down to the working level of the onsite organizations.
This document also stressed
the need to explain the regulatory
frame work for the recovery of all three
BFN units.
The inspector
concluded
from this review that the responsible
onsite
organizations
were aware of the criteria for the restart of Unit
1
and
3 and the meetings
were not for purpose of changing restart
criteria.
b.
(CLOSED) VIO 296/91-26-03,
Fuel Handling Errors.
This item
involved two fuel handling errors in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool
while performing fuel sipping operations.
On June
29,
1991,
a
fuel movement error occurred
due to fuel handlers incorrectly
identifying and moving
a fuel assembly different from the one
identified on the transfer form.
Prior to restarting fuel
movement
second party verification was
added but another error
occurred
on July 6,
1991.
The licensee
conducted
an incident
investigation of the events
and contractor personnel
involved were
given disciplinary action.
Communications
were improved by
placing
a supervisor
on the bridge to monitor fuel handling
activities
and communications.
An operator's
communication aid
(list of questions)
was established
to formalize oral
communications
between the bridge
and the
SRO,
and
a radio was
provided to the bridge
and the
SRO to assist
in communications.
The inspector
had reviewed the events
at the time of occurrence.
A followup review of the licensee's
closure
package
was conducted.
The actions taken
addressed
the violation.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection
scope
and findings were summarized
on July 17,
1992 with
those
persons
indicated in paragraph
1 above.
The inspectors
described
the areas
inspected
and discussed
in detail the inspection findings
listed below.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary
any of the
material
provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors
during this
inspection.
Dissenting
comments
were not received
from the licensee.
Item Number
Descri tion and Reference
260/92-24-01
259,
260, 296/92-24-02
259,
260,
296/92-24-03
UNR, Hissed Appendix
R Firewatch,
paragraph
four.
VIO, Incorrect Hydrostatic Test Pressure,
paragraph five.
IFI, Lessons
Learned
from Inadequate
Cooling Tower Electrical Installation
Activities, paragraph
seven.
0
17
Licensee
management
was informed that
1
LER,
1 IFI, and
1 VIO were
closed.
and Initialisms
ASOS
BFNP
CFR
CRDR
DCN
HPFPS
HXCH
IFI
II
IR
LCO
NRC
Recirc.
SCAR
S/D
TS
American Society of Mechanical
Engineers
Assistant Shift Operations
Supervisor
Auxiliary Unit Operator
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Code of Federal
Regulations
Control
Room Design Review
Design
Change Notice
Diesel
Generator
Emergency
Equipment Cooling Water
Flow Control Valve
High Pressure
Fire Protection
System
Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning,
and Cooling
Heat Exchanger
Inspector
Followup Item
Incident Investigation
Inspection
Report
Local
Power
Range Monitor
Limiting Condition for Operation
Motor Operated
Valve
Maintenance
Request
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Plan of the
Day
Plant Operations
Review Committee
Pounds
Per Square
Inch
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Reactor Building
Recirculation
Residual
Heat
Removal
Residual
Heat
Removal
Service
Water
Significant Corrective Action Report
Shutdown
Surveillance Instructions
Special
Nuclear Material
Site Standard
Practice
Technical Specifications
Valley Authority
Unresolved
Item
Violation
Work Order
Work Request