ML18033A938
| ML18033A938 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/1989 |
| From: | Wilson B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033A937 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-89-27, 50-260-89-27, 50-296-89-27, NUDOCS 8909080293 | |
| Download: ML18033A938 (4) | |
Text
e ENCLOSURE 1
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Tennessee Va 1 l ey Authority Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3
Docket Nos.
50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 License Nos.
DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on June 16 - July 15, 1989, violations of NRC requirements were identified.
The violations involved failure to comply with Technical Specification requirements to maintain a minimum number of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loops operable and fai lure to submit required 10 CFR 50.73 reports within 30 days of the discovery of the event.
In'ccordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
Appendix C
(1988), the violations are listed below:
A.
Technical-Specification (TS) 3.5.B.9 requires that at least one RHR loop with two pumps or two loops with one pump per loop be operable when the.reactor vessel pressure is atmospheric and irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.
Contrary to the
- above, during the period of June 18 22,
During this, period, Loop II of the RHR system was inoperable due to an inoperable testable check valve while Loop I was inoperable due to maintenance.
This is a
Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I) and is applicable to Unit 2.
B.
10 CFR 50.73 requires that a
Licensee Event Report be submitted within 30 days after the discovery of the event.
Section (a) (2)
(ii) (B) requires a report for any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant being outside the design basis of the plant.
Section (a)
(2) (v) requires a report for any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:
(A) shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a
safe shutdown condition; (B) remove residual heat; (C) control the release of radioactive material; or (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Contrary to the
- above, a report was not submitted 30 days after the discovery of the event for the following three examples:
1.
On September 16,
- 1988, the Unit 2
and on June 14,
- 1989, the Unit 1 fuel pool anti-siphon check valves were found stuck
Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3
2 Docket Nos.
50-'259, 50-260, 50-296 License Nos.
This could result in draining the fuel pool with the loss of the ability to remove residual heat from the fuel stored in the pool.
2
~
On March 22,
- 1989, the licensee made a
4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72 of an unanalyzed condition where the A,
B, and C
Diesel Generators could be overloaded during the first few minutes of an accident due to the single failure of the lockout relay which prevents the three motor driven fire pumps from sequentially starting during an accident condition.
A voluntary LER was submitted on May 31,
- 1989, which stated that an additional lockout relay would be installed prior to Unit 2 startup.
3.
In May 1989, the licensee determined that all four Unit 2 RHR room coolers (2A, 2B, 2C and 2D) and the core spray room coolers (2B and 2D) tested 'ess than the design flow requi rement of 10,000 cfm
+
10% with a
range from 8,786 to 7,415.
The core spray room coolers (2A and 2C) tested less than the design flow of 12,700 at 8,328.
This condition alone could have prevented the low pressure ECCS from functioning in an accident condition.
The licensee did not report this item because of an acceptable post modification test in March 1988 after motor replacement with new Eg motors.
- However, the cause of the flow discrepancy has not been discovered.
- Also, no procedure existed to periodically measure and determine if previous air flow was acceptable.
The licensee was only able to obtain values greater than 9000 cfm by adjusting the variable pitch sheaves and adding into the total flow a small duct line, for the cooler motor itself, which was previously not counted.
The above instances are examples of a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I) and is applicable to all Units.
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control
- Desk, Washington, DC
- 20555, with 'a copy to the Associate Director of Special Projec'ts, Office of Nuclear'. Reactor Regulation, and a
copy to the NRC Resident Inspector, Browns Ferry, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice.
Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3
3 Docket Nos.
50-259, 50-260, 50-296 License Nos.
DPR-33, DPR-52, DPR-68 This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include:
( 1) admissionor denial of the violation, (2) the reason for the violation if admitted, (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results
- achieved, (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
Where good cause is
- shown, c'onsideration will be given to extending the response time.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Bruce Wilson, Assistant Director for Inspection Programs TVA Projects Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this 8th day of Aug 1989
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