ML18029A483
| ML18029A483 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1985 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18029A482 | List: |
| References | |
| TVA-BFNP-TS-208, NUDOCS 8504170449 | |
| Download: ML18029A483 (35) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE 1
PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (TVA BFNP TS 208)
~DR
~~O49 65040a 8504i7044 CK 0500025i9 PDR~
N
PROPOSED CHANGES UNIT 1
0 1
TABLE i.l.A
~
REACTOR PROTECTION STSTEH (SCRAh)
IK~aUHBtTATION FUNCTIONAL TESTS HINOSH FUNCTIONAL TEST "FREQUENCIES POR SAPETT INSTR.
AND CONTRDL CIRCUITS Hode Svitch fa Shutdova Hanual Scraa IRH Nfgh Plux Inoperative Punetfonal Teat Place Hode Svitch fn Shutdovn Trip-Channel and Aiara '
'rip Chanael and Ala+a (4)
Trfp Chaanel.
and Alara (4)
HinfauaL Pre uency (3)
Each Refueling Outage Every 3 Hontha Oace Per Veek Durfng kefueltn aad Before Each Startup Once Per Meek Durfng kefuelfa and Before Each Startup APRH High Flux (ISI acraa)
IIigh Flux (Flow Biased)
High Piua (Fixed Trip)
Inope ra tfve Dovacca le PIav Biaa B
Trip Output Relaya (4)
Trip Output Relays (4)
Trip Output kelayc (4)
Trip Output Relaya (4)
Trip Output Relays (4)
(6)
Before Each Startup and Meekl Mhea Required to be Operable Once/(elk Once/Meek Once/Meek (6)
Rfgh Reactor Preaaure Sigh Dryvall Preeaure Reactor Lov Voter Level-High Mater Level in Scram Discharge Tank Float Switches (LS-85-45C-F)
High Mater, Level in Scram Discharge Tank Electronic Level Switches (LS-85-45A, B, G, H)
Turbine Condenser Low Uacuu*m Main Steam Line High Radiation A
B Trip Chaaael aad AIana Trip Channel and Alan Trip Channel and JLLara Dace/Hoath (1)
Dace/Hoath (I)
Dace/Hoath (I)..
Trip Channel and Alarm Once/Month Y
Trip Channel and Alarm Once/Month Trip Channel and Alarm Once/Month (1)
Trip Channel and Alarm (4) 'nce/3 months (8)
li t
I
TABLE 0 1
B REACTOR PRQTECTXO)s STSTEM (SCRAM)
INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION MINIMUMCALIBRATIOOI PREQUESCIES FOR REACTOR PROTECTION INSTRUMENT CHANNELS Instrument Channel
~ IRM'igh Flux Qroup '(1)
Calibration Comparison to APRN on Control-
'ed scarcups (6).
Minimum Frequency (2)
Note (a)
APRN High Flux Output Signal Floe Bias signal LPRM Signal B
B B
Heat Balance Calibrate Flow Bias Signal (7)
TIP System Traverse (8)
Once every 7 days once/operating cycle Every 1000 Effective Pull Pcwer Hours High Reactor Pressure High Brinell Pressure Reactor Iav Water Level Standard Pressure Source Standard Pressure Source Pressure Standard Every 3 Months Every 3 Months Every 3 Months High Water Lovel in Scram Discharge Volume Float S~itches (LS-85-45 C-F )
Calibrated Water Column (5)
Note (5)
High Water Level in Scram Discharge Volume Electronic. Level Switches (LS-85-45-A, B,
G, H)
Turbine Condenser Lar Vacuum Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closuro Main Steam Line High Radiation' Turbine First Stage Pressure Permissive (PT-1-81A and B, PT-1-91h and B)
,A B"
Calibrated Water Column (5)
Standard Vacuum Source Note (5)
Standard Current Source (3)
Standard Pressure Source Note (5)
Every 3 Months Note (5)
Every 3 Months Once/Oper a ting Cycl e (9)
Turbine Cont.-Valve Fast Closure or Turbine Trip Turbine Stop Valve Closure Standard Pressure Source Note (5)
Once/Operating Cyc]e Note, (5)
a CS
HOTES F0R TASLE 3.7.A 1.
Mbcnever the respective functions are re shall be tuo operable or tripped trip sy, the first colu>>>n cannot bc met for on trip system or logic for that function
~
appropriate action listed belcw shall be be met for all trip systems
~ the approp be taken.
uired to be operablc, ther> ~
te>>>s for each function.
of the trip systems, t)>at lI be tripped (or the taken).
If the column cannot tate action listed beloM shall A.
Initiate an orderly ahutdovn and hav the reactors in Cold ShutdoMn onditlon in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
1nitiate sn orderly load reduction a d have Main Steam 1,ines isolated vithin ~ ight hours.
C.
Isolate Reactor Water Cleanup Syste>s.
D.
Isolate Shutdovn Cooling Initiate pri>>>sry containment isolati n vithin 21> h>>urs, P,
The handling of spent fuel vill be pi ohibited anal ni1 operation>".
over spent fuelo and open reactor vo lo olmll be prohibf ted.
G.
Isolate byste>a, the reactor building and stadt the standby gaa treatment H ~
Itataediately perform a logic system functional test on the logic in
- the other trip estesLsond daily thereafter not to exceed 7 days.
1.
No action required.
Reactor zono uallo and ceiling designed above auction pressure of the SCT5 ~
d.
Withdraw TIP.
K.
Manually isolate the affeoted lines.
Refer to seotion 4.2.E for the requirements of an inoperable system.
L. If one SOTS train is inoperable take 'actions H or action A and F. If two SGTS trains are inoperable take aotions A and F.
2.
When it is determined that a channel iq failed in the unsafe condition, the other channels that monito1'he same variable shall be functionally tested immediately before the trip system or logio for that function is tripped:
The trip system or the logic for that function may remain untripped for short periods of time to allow functional testing of the other trip system or logic for that function.
3.
There are four sensors per steam line of whioh at least one sensor per trip system must be operable.
4.
Only required in Run Mode (interlooked with Mode Switch).
5.
Not required in Run Mode (bypassed by mode switoh).
6o
TABLE 3. 7. B T STABLE PENETRATIOMS HITH DOUBL O-RZ.'!0 SEA' Penetration No.
Identification X-1A X-1B f x-~
X-6 X-25 X>>25 X-25 X-25 X-26 X-26 X-35a X-35B X-35c X-35d X-35e X-35f
)
X 3S.
X-47 X-200A, X-200B X-205 X-205 X-205 X-205 X-205 X-205 Equipment Hatch Equipment Hatch
'Head Access, Drywell CRD Removal Hatch Flange on 64-18 Flange on 64-19 Flange on 84-8A Flange on 84-8D Flange on 64-31 Flange on 64-34 TIP Drive TIP Drive TIP Drive TIP Dr ive TIP Dr ive TIP Indexer Purge Spare Po~er Operation Te"t Suppression Chamber Ac Supp. ession Chamber Ac Dry~ell H ad Shear Lug No.
1 Shear Lug No.
2
'hear Lug No.
3 Shear Lug No.
Shear Lug No.
5 Shear Lug No.
6 Shear Lug No.
7 Shear Lug No.
8 Flange on 64-20 Flange on 64-21 Flange on 84<<8B Flange on 84-8C Flange on 76-19 Flange on 76-18 cess Hatch cess Hatch X-223 X-231 X-231 Suppression Chamber Access Hatch F'ange on 64-29 Flange on 64-32 256
3.11 4.11 operating status of the applicable fire suppression and/or detection systems for the reactor building, diesel generator buildings, control bay, intake pumping station, cable tunnel to the
)i'ntake pumping station, and cable trays along the south wall of the turbine building, elevation 586.
~
Applies to the surveillance requirements of the appli-cable fire suppression and/or detection systems for the reactor building, diesel generator buildings, control bay, intake pumping station, cable tunnel to
)the intake pumping station, and cable-trays along the south wall of the turbine building, elevation 586 when the corresponding limiting conditions for operation are in effeot.
Qgy~Cee QQy~t~e To assure availability of Fire Protection Systems.
To verify the operability of the Fire Protection Systems.
A.
A.
i essu e
e s e 1.
The High Pressure Fire krotection System shall have:
1.
High Pressure Fire Protection System Testing:
a.
Two (2)'igh pressure fire pumps operable and aligned to the
,high pressure fire header.
-b.
Automatic initiation logic operable.
Once/year a.
Simulated automatic and manual actua-'ion of high pressure pumps and autanatic valve operability b.
Pump Once/month Operability c.
Deleted d.
Pump
'capability Once/3 year 315
0
~ I l
n
PROFOSED CHANGES UNIT 2
0 0
14
> ~
H<)TFS FOR Thbhg
- 3. ~.A L.
whc<<ever the respective funct fons
~ re re<fufred t<> bc operal>1<,
th< r>.
shall be tvo operable or tripped trip synte<><s for each function.
I I
I f the ffrat colo<an cannot bc
<aet for one of tf<>> trip syste< n. tha(
trip systc<a or logic for that function sfIa11 f>e trfppe<f (or the appropriate action listed belov shall ba token).
lf the column cann<>t be
<let for all trip systous, the appropgfate action lfate<f belov shaf f be taken.
fnitfate an orderly ahutdovn and hav ln Cold Shutdovn I:
the reactors onditlon ln 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
fnftfate an orderly load red isolated vfthin
~ ight hours.
8,'ctfon aq>f have Mafn St>>a<<< Lfncs C.
isolate Reactor Water Cleanup Systee<.
0.
Isolate Shutdovn Cooling f
V..
fnltiatr prfc>ary tnntafn<<>ent iaolat fr n vfthf<<
21> l<<<urn F.
The handf fnp of spent fuel vf11 be p< ohibftr<f.anal nfl op< ratio<>'.
over spent fuels and open reactor vo lo sf<all b>> prohfbf ted.
c." fsolate the reactor building and
~tadt tho standby ga ~ treat<<<>>nt sys te<e
~
ll.
1<<<n<ediately parfor<a a logic syste<s functfonal tent on the logfc the other trip q(ate<<<sand dally thsreaf ter not to exceed 7 days.
f.
Ho action required.
Reactor tono uallo and cellf.ng dc<<igned above
~uction praaouro of the SCT5 ~
vf<f<drav Tfp.
K.
Manually isolate the affeoted lines.
Refer to section 4.2.8 for. the requirements of an inoperable system.
H L. If one SGTS train is inoperable take actions H or action A and F. If two SGTS trains are inoperable take actions A and F; 2..
When it is determined that a ohannel is failed in the'nsafe condition, the other channels that monitor the same variable shall be funotionally tested immediately before the trip system or logic for that function is tripped.
The trip system or the logic for that function may remain untripped for short periods of'ime to allow functional testing of the other trip'system or logic for that function.
3.
There are four sensors per steam line of whioh at least one sensor per trip system must, be operable.
4.
Only required in Run Mode (interlocked with Mode Switch).
5; Not required in Run Mode (bypassed by mode switch}.
a
operating status of the applicable fire suppression and/or detection systems for the reactor building, diesel generator buildings, control bay, intake pumping station, cable tunnel to the Lintake pumping station, and cable trays along the south wall of the turbine building, elevation 586.
l surveillance requirements of the appli-cable fire suppression and/or detection systems for the reactor building, d1esel generator buildings, control bay, intake pumping station, cable tunnel to the intake pumping station, and cable trays along the south wall of the turbine building, elevation 586 when the correspond1ng 11miting conditions for operation are in effect.
Llkt~za To assure availability of Fire Protection Systems.
To verify the operability of the F1re Protection Systems.
n.
A.
A.
e u
1.
The High Pressure Fire Protection System shall have:
1.
High Pressure Fire Protect1on System Testing:
a.; Two (2) high pressure fire pumps operable and aligned to the high pressure fire header.
b.
Automatic initiation logic operable.
Z~~eaz Once/year a.
Simulated automatic and manual actua-tion of high pressure pumps and automatic valve operability b.
Pump Once/month Operability c.
Deleted d.
Pump capability Once/3 year 315
0
PROPOSED CHANGES UNIT 3
3 ~
0 4
There are four sensors per steam line of whioh at least one sensor system must be operable.
one sensor per trip 4.
Only required in Run Mode (interlocked with Mode Switch).
5.
Not required in Run Mode (bypassed by mode switoh).
6.
Channel shared by RPS and Primary Containment 4 Reactor Vessel Isolation Control System.
A channel failure may be a channel failure in each system.
7 ~
8.
A train is considered a trip system.
I"
'wo out of three SGTS trains required.
A failure of more than one will require. action A and P.
9.
There is only one trip system with auto transfer to two power sources.
10.
Refer to Table 3.7.A and its notes for a listing of Isolation Valve Groups and their initiating signals.
A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to four hours for required surveillance without plaoing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.
12.
A channel contains four sensors, all of which must be operable for the ohannel to be operable.
63
operating status of the applicable fire suppression and/or detection systems for the reactor building, diesel generator buildings, control bay, intake pumping station, cable tunnel to the intake, pumping station, and cable trays along the south wall of the tur bine building, elevation 586.
surveillance requirements of the appli-cable fire suppression and/or detection systems for the reactor building, diesel generator buildings, control bay, intake puaping station, cable tunnel to the intake puaping station, and cable trays along the south wall of the turbine building, elevation 586 when the corresponding limiting conditions for operation are in effeot.
2hLmdMa 2hh~~a'o assure availability of Fire Protection Systems.
To verify the operability of the Fire Protection Systems.
e o ton A.
s em A.
s em 1.
The, High Pressure Fire Protection System shall have:
1.
High Pressure Fire Protection System Testing:
a.
Two (2) high pressure fiie pumps operable, and aligned to the high pressure fire header.
b.
Automatic initiation logic operable.
g~ue~nc Once/year a.
Simulated automatic and manual actua-tion of high pressure pumps and automatic valve operability b.
Pump Once/month Operability c.
Deleted d.
Pump capability Once/3 year 347
ENCLOSURE 2 DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION (TVA BFNP TS 208)
Units 1 and 2 page 60 Unit a
e 65 The proposed change clarifies the note for technical specification table 3.2.A regarding the main steam line high flow sensors.
The revised specifications require that the high flow detection trip function contain at least one operable sensor per trip system in place of requiring simply any two sensors to be operable as is the present specification.
The proposed revisions are needed to limit the possibility of having' situation where only one trip system is operable.
In such a condition, if a steam line break occurred, only a half isolation would result..
The'roposed change ensures that a full isolation will occur.
2.
Unit 1 -
a e 248A Page 248A of the unit 1 technical specifications contains provisions which were added to 'allow continued operation of the unit with FCV 84-8B in System A of the Containment Atmosphere Monitoring (CAM) System inoperable.
These provisions were approved and added to the unit 1
technical specifications on August 15, 1984.
Those provisions were needed only for a short duration.
Because those provisions contained on page 248A are no longer needed it is proposed that the page be removed from the technical specifications.
3 ~
Units 1 and 2 - page 315 Unit a e 47 The proposed change clarifies fire protection system technical specifications with respect to actual plant configuration, thereby alleviating confusion.
The proposed change does this by removing specific r eferences to high pressure
- water, C02, and fixed spr ay fire protection systems.
The reference to a specific system is replaced by a r efer ence to the "applicable" fire suppression and/or detection system(s) for a particular plant location.
Current technical specification wording could be interpreted as implying that an automatic fire suppression system is installed in. the cable tunnel leading to the intake pumping station, and for all cable trays along the south wall of the turbine building.
A thorough review of commitments to the NRC has revealed no such r equir ements.
A plant walkdown has confirmed that the as-built configuration of these two areas satisfy all NRC commitments.
I
Page 37, Table 4.1.A and page 40, Table 4.1.B - Change the "Group" designation'rom "B" to "A" for the electronic level switches on the scram discharge tank.
Page 256, Table 3.7.B - Add 15 new penetrations.
Revise the Talent cat on 'n two penetrations and delete penetration X-213A.
The proposed revisions on pages 37 and 40 are being made to correct an error discovered in the "Group" designation for the electronic level switches on the scram discharge 'tank.
These switches were installed on unit 1 during the reload 5 cycle 6 outage, and changes were made to the technical specifications in the reload submittal;
- however, they were incorrectly designated as group B switches, analog devises coupled with bi-stable trips.
The switches are on-off sensors which are group. A.
The notes associated with the functional test and calibration of these switches have also been revised accordingly.
The frequencies for these tests remain the same.
The change, therefore, is administrative and does not affect the safety of the plant in any way.
The revisions to table 3.7.B,:"Testable Penetrations with Double 0-Ring Seals,"
are being made to reflect modifications per formed during the unit 1
cycle 6 outage.
Technical specifications (TS) for these modifications were inadvertently omitted from the reload package.
The flange side of 14 valves was made testable, resulting in testable penetrations.
Also, minor corrections are being made to the table.
Penetration X-35g was listed in the table for "T.I.P. Drives" and is being revised to reflect that it is a "Spare."
The description for the drywell head was changed slightly and penetration X-213A was removed. It was previously removed from unit 1.
Penetration X-223 was, added to the table to reflect that it is to be tested.
It has been tested in accordance with the surveillance program for this table, but was not listed in the TS.
The modifications and administrative changes do not, in any way, reduce the margin of safety.
r E
ENCLOSURE 3 PROPOSED DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION (TVA BFNP TS 208) 1.
Units 1 and
? page 60 Unit 3 a
e 63 The amendment would revise the Technical Specifications (T.S.) of the operating licenses for units 1, 2, and 3'o require that for the main steam lines, high flow detection trip function contain at least one operable sensor per trip system in place of requiring simply any two sensors, to be operable, The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards by providing examples of actions that are likely, and are not likely, to involve significant hazard considerations (48 FR 14870).
One example of an action not likely to involve significant hazards considera-tions is:
"A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the technical specifications:
for
- example, a more stringent surveillance requirement".
The previously described T.S. change is more conservative and constitutes
'n additional limitation on required instrument operability. It is, therefore, clearly encompassed by the above example of an action not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration.
TVA, therefore, proposes to determine that the requested technical specification revisions do not involve significant hazards consideration.
2.
Unit 1 -
a e 248A Descri tion of Amendment Re uest The requested change to the technical specifications is the delet'ion of page 248A which contains provisions for continued operation of unit 1
with FCV 84-8B in CAD System A inoperable.
This is an administrative change.
Bases for Pro osed No Si nificant Hazards Consideration Determination The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards by providing examples of actions that are likely, and are not likely, to involve significant hazard considerations (48 FR 14870).
One example of an action not likely to involve significant hazards consideration is:
(i) A purely administative change to technical specifications:
for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature.
The proposed change is clearly an administrativ'e change since it would delete a specification which is no longer applicable.
.Because the requested change is administrative, TVA pioposes to determine that the change does -not involve a significant hazards con'sideration.
3.
Units 1 a'nd 2 - page 315 Unit a e 47 Descr i tion of Amendment Re uest The proposed changes to the technical specifications are to alleviate confusion between technical specification wording and actual plant configuration.
The change would replace "high pressure water," and "C02 fire protection" and "fixed spray system" with "applicable fire suppreSsion and/or detection systems."
Basis for Pro osed No Si nificant Hazards Consideration Determination The Commission has proyided examples.of license changes which are likely t'o involve no significant hazards consideration (48 FR 14870).
One of the examples of actions likely to involve no significant hazards considerations is:
(i) A purely administrative change to the technical specifications.
For example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature.
P
~'his change is clearly encompassed by example (1,).
Xt is the correction of an ambiguous wording and a change in nomenclature.
Therefore, since the application for amendment involves a proposed change that is similar to the example given for which no significant hazards are likely to exist, TVA has made a proposed determination that the application involves no significant hazards consideration.
4.
Pa es 37 40 and 256 Description of Change The proposed amendment is being made to correct, an error in the "Group" des1gnation for the electronic level switches on the scram discharge tank and to reflect new testable penetrations as a result of mod1fications on the flange side of 14 pr1mary containment isolation valves.
The electronic level switches were listed in the technical specification as analog devices coupled with 'bi-stable trips.
They are on-off sensors.
The revisions are 'being made to reflect this.
No changes are be1ng made to.the frequency of the calibration or functional test for these switches.
\\
The, new testable penetrations are a result of modif1cations to make the flange side of 14 valves testable.
These penetrations are being added to table 3.7.B.
Several administrative changes are also proposed for this table.
The description of two penetrations has been changed.
One penetration was removed from the table and one other was added.
Basis for No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards by providing examples of actions that are not likely to involve significant hazards considerations (48 FR 14870).
Two examples of actions not likely to involve significant hazards considerations are:
"(i) A purely administrative change to technical specifications:
for example, a
change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correct1on of an error, or a change in nomenclature,"
and "(ii) A change that constitutes an additional 11mitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the technical specifications:
for example, a more stringent surveillance requirement."
The proposed rev1sions for the electronic level switches are encompassed by example (i) in that they are being made to correct an error.
The proposed revisions to table 3.7.B are encompassed by both examples (i) and (ii);
The new,penetrations which were added to the table result in added surveillance as described by example (ii).
The remaining changes are being proposed to make administrative corrections, thus enc'ompassed by example (i).
Since the proposed amendments are encompassed by examples in the guidance.
provided by the Commission of actions not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration, TVA has made a proposed determination that the application for amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.
'C