ML18025B458
| ML18025B458 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 02/10/1981 |
| From: | Chase J, Dance H, Sullivan R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18025B451 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-80-43, 50-260-80-40, 50-296-80-39, NUDOCS 8104220990 | |
| Download: ML18025B458 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1980043
Text
1PS AECy
+
0
Cy
A
O
lA
0
Cy
+**++
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303
Report Nos 50-259/80-43,
50-260/80-40,
and 50-296/80-39
Licensee:
Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street
Chattanooga,
TN
37401
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260,
and 50-296
License Nos. DPR-33,
and DPR-68
Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near Athens, Alabama
Inspectors:
R. F. Sulliv
. C. Dance, Section Chief,
RONS Branch
2 -]p- 8/
Date Signed
2. -/e"
Date Signed
<- d -1'/
Date Signed
SUMMARY
Inspection
on November 1-30,
1980
Areas Inspected
This routine inspection
involved
196 resident
inspector-hours
in the
areas. of
operational
safety,
reportable
occurances,
IE bulletin followup,
IE Circular
followup, plant physical protection and reactor trips.
Results
Of the six areas
reviewed,
one
apparent
'violation
was identified in
one
area
(failure to submit
a
30 day report;
paragraph
5) and
one apparent deviation
was
found in a second
area (failure to revise administrative instruction;
paragraph 3).
0
s z 0,43 S999qI
Persons
Contacted
DETAILS
2.
Licensee
Employees
H. L. Abercrombie, Plant Manager
J.
L; Harness, Assistant Plant Manager
J.
B. Studdard,
Operations Supervisor
R. Hunkapillar, Assistant Operations Supervisor
J. A. Teague,
Maintenance Supervisor, Electrical
M. A. Haney, Maintenance Supervisor,
Mechanical
J.
R. Pittman, Maintenance Supervisor,
Instruments
R. G. Metke, Results Section Supervisor
R. T. Smith, gA Supervisor
J.
E. Swindell, Outage Director
B. Howard, Plant Health Physicist
R. E. Jackson,
Chief, Public Safety
R. Cole, gA Site Representative
Office of Power
T. Chinn, Compliance Staff Supervisor
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
licensed
senior
reactor
operators
and
reactor
operators,
auxiliary
operators,
craftsmen,
technicians,
public safety officers, gA personnel
and engineering
personnel.
Management Interview
Management interviews were conducted
on November 7,
14,
21 and 26,
1980 with
the
plant
Manager
and
selected
members
of
his
staff.
The
inspector
summarized
the
scope
and
findings of their
ins'pection
activities.
The
licensee
was
informed of the
one
item of
apparent
violation which
was
acknowledged
and
one
item of apparent
deviation.
Regarding
the deviation
the
licensee
stated
verbal
instructions
had
been initiated by November 3,
1980.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Infraction (259/80-34-01) Failure to post'a
continous fire watch in
the
cable
spreading
room with the
carbon dioxide
system
The
licensee
stated in the response
to the item of noncomp]'iance
th'at-"administrative
instructions
were
changed
on
November 3,
1980
to prevent
recurrance.
On
November
14,
1980
the
inspector
found that
no
changes
to administrative
procedures
were
made
on
November 3,
1980 which dealt with fire protection.
The inspectors
did find a pending
change to the Standard
Practices
which is
under review.
The licensee
states
that this
change
is in response
to the
apparent
item
of
noncompliance.
When
the
inspectors
presented
plant
management
with the
problem,
the plant
manager
stated
that
the
Standard
- Practice
are
not
his
sole
means
of
administrative
instructions.
The
licensee
presented
to the
inspectors
one letter
from the Chief of Public
Safety to his shift Lieutenants
discussing
corrective action to be taken in
regards to issuing key cards to fire watches,
dated August 5, 1980 and a
-2-
memo,
with
no
date,
from Operations
di scussing
the
assignment
of fire
watches.
The failure to
have
admini strative
instructions
implemented
by
November 3,
1980
in
regards
to fire
watches,
as
committed
to
in
the
licensee's
letter to the Director of Region II dated
November 5,
1980,
was
identified to the
licensee
on
November 26,
1980
as
an apparent
deviation
from a commitment (259/80-43=01).
(Closed)
Infraction (296/79-27-01).
Transfer of the
steam
separator
from
the reactor
to the storage pit contrary to procedure.
The procedure
NMI-1,
was
revised
to clarify the
use
of water
as
shielding
during
transfer
operations.
(Closed)
Infraction
(259/79-27-02).
Unauthorized
individuals
in
the
protected
area
without
an
escort.
An escort
was
assigned
and
personnel
involved were reinstructed
on escort requirement.
(Closed)
Infraction (259/79-10-01).
High radiation
ar eas
where intensity
was greated
than
1000 mrem/hr were not locked.
Locks were repaired,
alarms
were modified and
procedures
were
implemented
to routinely check doors
in
this category.
Unresolved Items
There were no unresolved
items identified during this report period.
Operational
Safety
The inspectors
kept informed
on
a daily basis of the overall plant status
and
any
significant
safety
matters
related
to plant
operations,
Daily
discussions
were held each morning with plant management
and various
members
of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors
made
frequent visits to the control
room such that each
was
visited at least daily when
an inspector
was
on site.
Observations
included
instrument
readings,
setpoints
and recordings;
status of operating
systems;
status
and alignments
of emergency
standby
systems;
purpose
of temporary
tags
on equipment controls
and switches;
alarms;
adherence
to
procedures;
adherence
to limiting conditions
for
operations;
temporary
alterations
in effect; daily journals
and data
sheet
entries;
and control
room
manning.
This inspection
activity also
included
numerous
informal
discussions with operators
and their supervisors.
General
plant tours were'conducted
on at least
a weekly basis.
Portions of
the turbine building, each reactor building and outside
areas
were visited.
Observations
included
valve
positions
and
system
alignment;
and
hanger
conditions;
instrument
readings;
housekeeping;
radiation
area
controls; tag controls
on equipment;
work activities in progress; vital area
controls; personnel
badging,
personnel
search
and escort;
and vehicle search
and escort.
Informal discussions
were held with selected plant personnel
in
their functional areas during these tours.
0
-3-
On November
13,
1980 while reviewing the refueling floor logs for unit 2,
an
inspector
noted
that
at
5:40
p.m.
on
October 4,
1980,
the
Refueling
Interlock Surveillance
Instruction (SI).4.10.A.1
was
stopped
because
of
a
limit switch failure.
The limit switch is part of
a refueling interlock
which prevents
the refueling platform from being
moved over the core
when
the reactor'ode
switch is
in the Startup position.
After reworking the
switch,
SI 4.10.A.l was
resumed at
10:30
p.m.
and
completed satisfactorily
at
10:35
p.m.
October 4,
1980.
As of
November
13,
1980
the limit switch
failure
had
not
been
reported
to
the
NRC
as
required
by
Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.
Failure
to
report
was
identified
to
the
Plant
Manager as an apparent violation on November
14, 1980.
(260/80-40-01)
Circular Review
r
Licensee action
on the below listed circulars
was reviewed to determined if
the
licensee
evaluation
and
action
taken
was
appropriate
to satisfy
the
concerns described in the circulars.
The review by the inspectors
consisted
of records review, procedure review and discussions with plant personnel.
J
78-13
78-14
78-16
78-17
79-08
79-10
79-12
- Operability of Service Mater Pumps
HPCI Turbine Reversing
Chamber Hold Down Both
Limitorque Yalve Actuators
- Inadequite
Guard Training/Qualification and Falsified Training
Records
Attempted Extertion Low Enriched Uranium
Possible Defects in the 4-inch Elbows Distributed by Tube
Turns Company
- Potential Diesel Generator Turbo Charger Problem
No violations or deviations
were identified by the inspectors
in the areas
inspected.
Bulletin Review
I
A followup review was
made of the litensee's
response
Possibl e
Mal functi on
of
Namco
Model
180
Limit
Switch
at
El evated
Temperatures.
The review consisted of an examination of records
as well
as
discussions
with electrical
and
power store
personnel.
The inspectors
had
no questions
and consider
IEB 79-28 closed.
An in-office review was
made of the licensees
response
of August 6,
1980 to
IE Bulletin
79-03A.
Based
on
the
results
of this
review this
item is
considered closed.
Reportable Occurrances
Licensee event reports
(LERs) were reviewed to determined if the information
provided
met
NRC
reporting
requirements.
The
determination
included
adequacy
of event
description
and
corrective
action
taken
or
planned,
existance
of potential
generic
problems
and the relative safety significance
of each event.
During this review, several
LERs were reported to the
e
l icensee
as
needing
either
addi tional
information,
cl arification
or
corrections.
These
LERs are listed below with the action needed to be taken
by the licensee.
a.
b.
LERs 259/80-65,
80-73,
80-74,
and 80-76 did not reflect in the event
discription that the failures were common to all three units.
LERs 260/80-34,
296/80-08,
80-15, 80-16, 80-31, 80-33, 80-36,
and 80-40
did not reflect that all the equipment which was
needed
to be operable
for the
degraded
condition
specified
in the
LER
was
The
inspector
reviewed the operating
logs and surveillance test results to
ensure
that the required
equipment
was tested
and was operable
and
no
descrepancies
were identified.
c.
LER 296/80-30 specified the wrong technical
specification limit for the
, setpoint of,the Turbine First Stage. Pressure.
d.
e.
LER 296/80-38 stated that the surveillance instruction was performed at
99% power when actually it was done at 75% power.
LER 259/80-51 discussed
the failure of the
scram discharge
volume float
switches
which failed to function.
The licensee
committed to changing
procedures
to allow flushing of the
switches,
On
November 6,
1980
procedures
had
been
changed
which required flushing of the
switches.
On November 7,
1980 Surveillance
Instructions
were
changed
to require
the
flushing.
The
following
LERs
were
reviewed
by
the
inspectors.
Additional inplant
reviews
and
discussions
with plant
personnel
as
appropriate
were conducted for those .reports indicated by an asterisk.
LER No.
259/80-30
Oate
5/5/80
Event
HPCI steam line space
high tempera-
ture switch failed
"259/80-51
7/28/80
Failure of high level switch to
operate
an scram discharge
volume
- 259/80-60
9/12/80
pump area'cooler
fan
thermostat
set above. limits
259/80-61
"259/80-75
- 260/80-14
9/12/80
11/4/80
3/31/80
1ARHR area cooler fan was found
tripped
RCIC flow control valve FCV-71-3
loss of position indication
RHR procedural
inadequacy during
surveillance instruction
- 260/80-31
9/10/80
Two nodes in fuel assembly
T2396
exceeded
MAPLHGR limits
-5-
"260/80-37
"296/80-11
296/80-22
~296/80-29
296/80-34
296/80-37
"296/80-39
9/14/80
5/15/80
7/16/80
9/2/80
9/29/80
10/9/80
11/12/80
Two fuel assemblies
misorientated
(see Insp. Rpt. 260/80-35)
RWCU isolation valve failed to
close during normal operation
Turbine first stage pressure
permissive pressure
switch exceeded
Technical Specification
Computer terminal valve improperly
set
3A RHR pump overload was set high
H2 monitor would not calibrate
Pressure
transmitter not qualified
for accident environment
9.
The inspectors
reviewed activities associated
with the below listed reactor
trips during this
report
period.
The
review
included
determination
of
cause,
safety
significance,
performance
of
personnel
and
systems,
and
corrective action.
The inspectors
examined
instrument recordings,
computer
printouts,
operations
journal
entries,
reports
and
had discussions
with
operations,
maintenance
and
engineering
support
personnel
as
appropriate.
On
November 21,
1980,
Unit
2 tripped at
3: 18
p.m.
from
8%
power during
starting testing following a refueling outage.
The main
steam relief valves
.
were being test
operated
at
low pressure
and difficulties with controlling
feedwater resulted in an
APRH hi flux trip at
15% while in the startup
mode.
Systems
performed as designed.
0
On
November 23,
1981,
Unit
3
was
manually tripped at 9:44 p.m.
from
40%
power to begin
a scheduled refueling outage.
Systems performed as designed.
No violations or deviations
were identified
by the
inspectors
within the
area inspected.
10.
Plant Physical Protection
During
the
course
of routine
inspection
activities,
the
inspectors
made
observations of certain plant physical protection activities,
These
included
personnel
badging,
personnel
search
and escort,
vehicle search
and escort,
communications
and vital area access control.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas
inspected.
tt
4
0
11.
Design,
Design Changes
and Modifications
During the Unit 2 refueling outage,
a
new hydrogen-oxygen
(H2-02) monitoring
system
for the drywell
was installed.
This new installation increases
the
reliability of the H2-02 monitoring in that all the
sensors
are
now on the
outside
of the containment
whereas
the old systems
had the
sensors
in the
drywell
and torus.
This
now allows the
sensors
to
be
repaired
while the
Unit is operating.
The inspectors
reviewed the Unresolved Safety Question Determination
(USQD)
for
the
new
system.
The
review
consisted
of
records
review,
system
walk-down, discussions
with plant maintenance
and engineering
personnel
and
discussion
with plant operation personnel.
The inspector
had the following
comments
on the USQD:
a.
Revision
4 of the
USQD states
that the solenoid valves are powered from
the reactor protection
system
when they are actually
powered
from the
instrument
and control
bus.
This does
not change
the results
of the
USQD
and plant
management
has
requested
that
a
change
be
made
by
Engineering Design (EnDes).
b.
Revision
4 -of the
USQD also states that the valve position switches are
clearly marked for the "Open/Close"
modes
when actually they are marked
"Torus/Drywell".
This also
does
not change
the results
of the
USQD.
Plant
management
has
requested
that
a
change
be
made
by
EnDes
to the
USQD.
C.
The
original
USQD
required
the
hatches
over
the
torus
to
remain
installed because
the analysis
was based
on the
new equipment operating
in an environment of less
than
120 degrees
F. If the hatches
were off,
and
a
LOCA occured,
the environment
around the equipment would heat
up
to greater
than
120
degrees
F.
The
analysis
goes
on to state
that
supplemental
cooling may be requested to remove the requirement for the
torus
hatches.
The inspectors
noted that there were
no controls over
the torus hatches
and that one hatch
was off after the unit had started
up.
The licensee
was notified and took action to install the hatch
by
issuing
a
memorandum
stating
that
the
torus
hatches
were
to
remain
installed
during plant operation. It was
determined
that
supplemental
cooling was installed;
but,
no
USQD address its,, effect
on the
H2-02
monitor.
This does
not affect the
USQD as written because
the torus
hatches
are administratively controlled.
If the torus
hatches
are to
be
removed
during plant operation
a
USQD will have to
be written to
address
the
supplementary
cooling
now installed
and
releasing
the
requirement
for the
torus
hatches
being
installed.
The
inspectors
requested
that
a
USQD be written to address
the
supplementary
cooling
issue
(Open item 260/80-40-01).
0
The
inspectors
identified
no violations
or deviations
within the
areas
inspected.,