ML18025B407
| ML18025B407 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1981 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Chase J, Paulk G, Sullivan R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18025B408 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-81-03, 50-259-81-3, 50-260-81-03, 50-260-81-3, 50-296-81-03, NUDOCS 8103270104 | |
| Download: ML18025B407 (20) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1981003
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.'EGION II
'01
MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303
Report Nos.
50-259/81-03,
50-260/81-03
and 50-296/81-03
Licensee:
Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street
Tower II
Chattanooga,
TN
37401
Facility:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Docket Nos.
50-259,
50-260 and 50-296
License Nos'.'PR-33,
OPR'-52 and DPR-68
'nspection
at Browns Ferry Site near Athens,
Inspectors:
. F. Sulli an,
S
ior Resident Inspector
z-z- P/
Date Signed
J.
W. Cha~
,
Re
dent Inspector
Res dent inspector
1
G. L. Pau
Appr.oved by.- ~~
. S. Cantrell,
Sec-.>o
f, RRPI Division
SUMMARY
~
1
e
'Inspection on'anuary-31',
1'981
Date Signed
Z-3'-Z
Date Signed
ate
Signed
Areas Inspected
This routine inspection
involved
203 resident
inspector-hours
in the
areas
of
operational
safety,
reportable
occurrences,
maintenance,
fuel handling,
plant
physical,'adiation
protection,
surveillance
testing,
emergency
procedures
and scram discharge
header monitoring.
Results
Of the
10 areas
inspected,
no violations or deviations
were found in
7 areas,
five violations were found in
3~ .areas;
(.Violation - Welding performed
on safety
related
equipment
and the welder's qualifications can't
be determined, paragraph
.5; Violation. -. Secondary
containment
not.. maintained,
paragraph
5;. Violation .-..
Radioac
ive contamina.ed,.ladder
found in
a. clean area,.'aragraph
6; Violation-
Personnel
working in
a high radiation
area without
a dose rate meter,
paragraph
6; Violation - Workers
not kept informed of the radiation levels in areas
they
Pp
I
0
I
E
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
H. L. Abercrombie,
Power Plant Superintendent
J.
L. Harness, Assistant
Power Plant Superintendent
(Maintenance)
J.
R. Bynum, Assistant
Power Plant Superintendent
(Operations)
J.
B. Studdard,
Operations Supervisor
R...Hunkapil lar, Assistant Operations. Supervisor
" ":"'A,"'L'.'-Burnett,':Assistant Op'era'ticins'Supervis'or'Outage)
~
'J.-A;-
Teague,'aintenance
Supervisor,
ETectr'ical'.
A. Haney, Maintenance
Supervisor,
Mechanical
J.
R. Pit man, Maintenance Supervisor,
Instruments
R. G. Metke, Results Section Supervisor
R. T. Smith, gA Supervisor
J.
E. Swindell, Outage Director
8. Howard, Plant Health Physicist
R. E. Jackson,
Chief, Public Safety
R. Cole,
gA Site Representative
Office of Power
R. E. Burns, Instrument Engineer
T. L. Chinn, Compliance Staff Supervisor
Other " licensee:
employees'. contacted'nc.luded
.licensed
senior
reactor
'operators
and
reactor
. operators,
auxiliary
operators,
craftsmen,
technicians,
public safety'fficers,- gA personnel
and engineering personnel..
2.
Management Interviews
,-.....-: Site management,interviews
weee, conducted. on.January
9, 16,.23
and .30,
1981,
'with 'the Pow'er'lant 'S'u'perintendent
and/or hi's Assi'stant'Superint'endents
and
'other selected
members of his staff.
The inspectors
summarized
the
scope
,, and,findings of their. inspection. activities..TNe
licensee
was informed of
'he five app'arent violations identified during this report
period.'.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed)
Unresolved
Item (259/77-20-02)
References
in the
nondestructive
examination
procedures
on welds were outdated.
The procedures
were replaced
with new ones.
4.
Unresolved
Items
There were no new unresolved
items identified during the report period.
.'5'.
'pe'rational Safety.:
The inspectors
kept informed
on
a daily basis of the overall plant status
and. any
signi fi cant. safety .matters
rel a ted
to plant;. ooerati ons.
Daily.
.discussions
were held each morning with plant management
and various
members.
of the plant operating staff.'
0
The inspectors
made frequent visits to the control
room such that each
was
visited at least daily when
an inspector
was
on site.
Observations
included
instrument readings,'etpoints
and recordings;
status of operating
systems;
status
and
alignments
of emergency
standby
systems;
purpose
of temporary
tags
on equipment
controls
and
switches;
alarms;
adherence
to
procedures;
adherence
to limiting conditions
for operations;
temporary
alterations
in effect; daily journals
and data
sheet entries;
and control
room manning.
This inspection
activity also
included
numerous
informal
discussions with operatoi s and their supervisors.
General..planttours,
were conducted
on at least
a weekly basis.
Portions of
the tu'rbi'ne'building; .each'eactor'ui
l'ding';and outside
areas'were
visited;
Observations
'included
valve" positi'ons
and
system
alignment;
and
'anger
conditions;
instrumen
readings;
housekeeping;
radiation
area
controls;
tag controls
on equipment;
work ac.ivities in progress; vital area
controls; personnel
badging,
personnel
search
and escort;
and vehicle search
and escort.
Informal discussions
were held with selec
ed plant personnel
in
their functional areas during these tours.
On January
8,
1981 at
1:20 p.m., while observing
the 'inspection
of the
control rod drive accumula or level switches
on Unit 3,
an inspector
noted
reactor
building eauipment air lock inside door open while .he outside
air lock door
was
open.
This resulted
in
a loss of secondary
containment
while primary containment
was not being maintained.
The loss of secondary
.-containment'was
due.to.personnel
not adhering to administration.instructi.ons
posted
by the doors which 'requires, that
a
second
person
be. posted
at
one
door to ensure it remains
shut while opening
the other door.
On this date,
no second
person
was posted at the door which was to remain shut.
When the
person
opened
the
outside air'ock door,
the positive
pressure
in the
,,, turbine,,bui1ding...blew ..open..the;:inside.,
door.
On. January.,9,
1981,
.an
inspector
observed that
an indiviBual'n'Unit'Z faiTed to follow the poste'd
administr'ative instructions but on this occasion
did not result in a loss of
secondary
contai'nment.
I
The violation of secondary
containment
while primary containment
was
not
maintained
was identified to
the
Plant
Superintendent
as
an
apparent
violation (296/81-03-01)
of technical specification 3.7.C. 1.
The
Plant
Superintendent
accepted
the apparent violation and stated that
he would take
disciplinary action
on these individuals who did not adhere
to the require-
ments for passage
through the reactor building equipment air lock doors.
On January
15, 1981, prior to startup of Unit 3 after
a refueling outage,
an
inspector
reviewed
work
plan
7779R1,
Enstallation
of
Hydrogen-Oxygen
Monitoring Panel.
At the
time
of. this review,
the
wor k plan
had not yet
been. reviewed
by. the ',plant. quality.,assurance
office..: The review by the
~
.
-.'nspector
indicated'th'at;a
minimum of 70'elds
an thi s safety-relat'ed
system
were made.
The welder
who made these
welds could not be identified in the
work plan. thus his qualifications to do the welding can not be determined.
.. The'icen'see:.i.ssued
.Corrective Action Reports
(CAR) 81-13 and, 81-15 in which
the failure to identify the. welder was addressed
as
a significant condition
adverse to quality;
The 'licensee also reviewed all the weld'od check out
'
7'
. ~
.I
0
- 3
h
forms to ensure that only qualified welders
checked
out weld rods for these
work plans.
No problems
were identified:as a result of these
reviews.
Oye
penetrant testing
and
hydrostatic testing
has been performed
on the welds.
The lack of documentation
to prove that qualified welders
performed
the
welding was'dentified
as
an
apparent
violation of
10 CFR 50 Appendix
8
Criterion IX and Topical Report
TVA - TR75-1, paragraph
17.2.9. to the plant
superintendent
on January
16, 1980. (296/81-03-05).
Health Physics
- '
'-".Bur'ing 'the'"ihspe'cti'on."'p'e'riod
the"'inspectors
made "'frequent- inspections ot
- -;:.;::. ""-
contami'nated 'storage
and work 'areas';. radiation
and high 'radiation areas
a'nd'
='bserved
work in areas
where
a special
work permit
(SWP) was necessary.
This
inspection
was conducted
to assure
that adherence
to the requirements
on the
SWP was being followed and to verifying that the
SWP
was properly filled
out.
On January
29,
1981,
the licensee
informed an inspector that a pile of scrap
which was being readied for transport
to TVA's local
dump, contained
a metal
ladder
which
had
been
cut
up into four pieces
and
was radioactively
contaminated
to levels of 150,000
dpm direct reading
and
2000
dpm smearable.
En addition,
the metal scaffolding in the bed of a truck being readied for
transport to the cooling water towers
had radioactive contamination
levels
...of. 800,dpm smearable.
,These
items, were. in a clean
zone
and were discovered
,during,.the.,required
radiation
survey, made. before
,the material. leaves
the
.
plant protected area.
The levels of contamination
on these
items are below the limits listed in 10
. CFR .20, however.plant. procedure .Radiological. Control Instruc .ion (RC1)-1,.
"-"requ'ir'es"th'at'TT i'tems'eavi'ng'
'i egulated'rea
to a"clean"'zone
"sha'1T
be
surveyed
by the plant health physics
personnel
and shall not be released
to
'a
clean
zone if the
item
has
greater
than
.200
dpm contamination.
On
January
30,- 1981,
inspector'nformed
the
Plant
Superintendent
that'his
incident was
an apparent violation of technical specification 6.3.A.7 which
requires that radiation control procedures
shall
be adhered to.
The Plant
Superintendent
stated
that
this
incident
would
be
discussed
with all
personnel
in the
outage
organization
by February
4,
1981.
(259/81-03-01,
260/81-03"01, 296/81"03-02).
On January
14,
1981, while observing
the installation of the scram discharge
header,transducers
for monitoring water level
on unit
3 east
an
inspector
observed
three
TVA personnel
and one
GE representative
working in
a high radiation area without a dose rate meter.
The inspector
determined
tilat;the.'special;workpermit
(SMP) required" that
a dose. rate, meter
be used
..
because
the general: area survey,'ndicated'adi:ation
level. of 300 mr/hr.
A .
radiation
survey of the area
where the personnel
were working was determined
to be
100 to 500 mr/hr.
The inspector
informed TVA's instrument
engineer
who.was.at-the:job.site
of..the, requirements-
on the.SWP:
The, engineer
had
~
~
8
4
the
personnel
in the high radiation area
leave the area until
a dose rate
meter
could
be obtained.
The engineer
stated
he
was
aware
of the
the
requirements,
and
had used
a dose rate meter at
a previous job site but had
forgotten to have the dose rate meter at this job site.
Radiological Control Instruction (RCI) - 10 requires that for any work in a
high radiation
area (greater
than
100 mr/hr),
a dose rate meter will be with
the individual or group of individuals who enter
the area.
The Plant Super-
intendent
was
informed
on January
16,
1981, that failure to follow the
requirements
of the
SWP and RCI-10 was
an apparent
violation of Technical Specification 6.3.A.0.7 which requires that radiation control procedures
be
~ .'- "--adhered:to:'(296/81-03'-'03).'-
':.
- -., - - *;
-".'
': .
" '
~
While making
a tour of unit
3 reactor building
on January
15,
1981,
the
inspectors
observed
carpenters
on the west
scram discharge
(SOH)
north
end
removing scaffolding.
The inspector
questioned
the
foreman
in
charge
of the job as
to the requirements
of his
SWP
since
the
area
the
workers were in was posted
as
and
no dose rate meter
was
observed
in the
area.
The
foreman
stated
that
the
health
physics
technician did not require
a dose rate meter
nor did the
SWP which
he
was
told to use.
The inspector
reviewed the
SWP No. 01-3-37187
and found that
it had
been
issued
for general
work and cleanup.
The general
area
was
t
documented
at
40 mr/hr and that
no rate
meter
was required.
The health
physics technician
who authorized
the
use of that
SWP by the workers stated
that tpe. job was .only 5 or, 10 minutes. long,
so
he cautioned
the workers. to,
. stay clear. of the,SDH pipin'g,and that
he also
was "keeping
an eye"
on them.
The
general
area
where
the
workers
were
removing
the
was
surveyed
by plant health physics
personnel
and found to vary from 60 mr/hr
to
150 mr/hr.
The inspector
noted also that the health physics technician
was approximately
200 feet from the work area
and his view of this area
was
'
obstructed
by equi'pment.'The'- two"worker'nthis area received'an
exposure,'s'registered
by their dosimeters of 7mrem and
10 mrem.
The Plant. Super intendent
was
informed
by the
inspector
that failure to
inform workers of the radiation
levels
in which they were working was
an
apparent violation of 10 CFR 19. 12 which requires that workers
to
be kept
informed of radiation
in portions of restricted
area
in which they are in
(296/81-03-04)
.
The inspectors
reviewed activities associated
with the below listed reactor
trips during this report
period.
. The
review included
determination
of
cause,
safety
significance,
performance
of personnel
and
systems,
and
corrective action.
The inspectors.examined
instrument recordings,
computer
.:pr'intouts, opera ion..journal en'ies,
scram. reports. arid had discussions
with
operations,
maintenance
and engineering
support personnel
as appropriate.
0
5
On January
3,
1981,
Unit 2 tripped at 11:24 a.m.
from 100.o power due to
a
turbine trip caused
by failure of the generator
bus tie breaker.
Four
main
steam relief valves actuated
to relieve reactor high pressure.
No emergency
core cooling was initiated.
Systems
performed
as designed.
Inspector Followup Items
The inspectors
followed up on the Confirmation of Action letter
issued
on
November
10,
1980,
as
a result of the Health Physics Appraisal
inspection
performed
on
October 20-31,
1980.
The
Confirmation
of Action letter
addressed
four
items
in
which
.TVA was
to
take
action
to alleviate
defici'encies:"'i:n'- the.'-'p'ersonnel'.."contamination"
monitoring
program.'-'-- The '.
'*
~ '
.
" inspectors"rev'iewed'ach
-area:-to
ensure:that" the proper action
had
been'aken.
a.
Plant
instructions
were
revised
on
November 7,
1980,
to
require
individuals exiting
a contamination
zone to have
a whole body contami-
nation survey performed prior to donning personal clothing.
b.
On November
5, 1980, the Plant Superintendent
informed all employees
by
memorandum
tha
they must
use the hand
and foot monitors
when exiting
regulated areas.
c.
TVA has
increased
the
frequency
of functional
checks
on
personnel
,friskers to,.three. times..per. week.
P
'I ~ S
d.
equality
Assurance
has
performed
and is performing
surveillance
of
personnel
contamination monitoring to evaluate the effectiveness
of the
actions taken.
" No v'iolation"or'eviations wer'e ide'ntffied
within
'the areas
inspected.
9.
Reportable Occurrances
The below listed licensee
event reports
(LER's) were reviewed to determine
if the information provided
met
NRC reporting
requirements.
The determi-
nation included adequacy of event description
and corrective action taken or
planned,
existance
of potential
generic
problems
and
the relative
safety
significance of each event.
Additional inplant reviewed and discussion with
plant personnel
as appropriate were conducted for those reports
indicated
by
an asterisk.
LER No.
"259-8025
"259-.8057.
259-8073
259 8074
t
~'259.-8079
Gate
4/11/80
8/80/80 .::....
10/9i80
10/23/80
11/21/80-.'vent
.
RHR injection valve failed to close
- .Technical Specification 4.6.G.6 testing not..
performed..
River delta T exceeded 5'.
Seismic monitor inoperable.
Electric'al ground in HPCI oumo
'-6
11/12/80
12/30/80
12/31/80
1/8/81
FSV-84-19 solenoid coil not environmental ly
qualified.
POIS-75-28 was found at outside technical
specification limits.
1C diesel generator tie br eaker tripped
Reactor water level switch was found set out
of technical specification limits.
Continuous air monitor was inoperable.
Drywell hydrogen monitor was inoperable.
"259-8081
259-8087
-'259-8088
259-8089
"259-8090
259-8091
1/8/81
1/15/81
4/8/80
"260"8016
, "260-8037
"260"8040 '." ""'IO/14'/80
10/21/80
10/27/80
11/6/80
Loaded fuel with control rod withdrawn
MSIV's exceeded
allowable leakage rate
"260"8041
260-8042
"260-8043
260-8044
Scram accumulator level switches inooerable
Refueling zone inboard isolation time delay
relay was out of tolerance.
Instrument line was missing internals for
excess
flow check valve.
Inadequate dilution of water to environment
Drywell pressure
transmitter not qualified
Leak rate testing exceeded
technical
specification
Intermedi.ate:-range
monitors did not respond
during initial startup..
11/10/80
11/24/80
"260-8046
- 260"8047
260-8048
260-8049
"260-8050
1)/20/80
11/28/80
12/3/80
-12/-IZ/80
12/12/80
260-8051
Level switch did not operate within technical
specification limit
3 gallon SOIV level switch did not operate
..,Leak-,in.ZC.RHR heat. exchanger
'Main 'st'earn'relief,valves
did 'not'i'ft within
IX of set pressure.
CS discharge
pressure
switch was found set
outside technical specification limits.
Reactor water level switch was found set out
side technical specification limits.
MS line low pressure
switches were found set
outside technical specification limit.
SOIV level switches,
25 gallon inoperable
SOIV level switch was inoperable
Cooling water flow to 30 diesel
was
inadequate
Turbine first stage pressure
switch setpoint
drifted
.'
"-3A diesel generator would not trip .
~'B diesel generator
lube oil circulating jump
Orywell high pressure
setpoint drifted
Flow-bias circuitry for APRM's was inoperable
3-PS-1-76 setpoint drifted
260-8052
12/12/80
,,260-8053.
- ,, 1/2/81 -:.,
"260-8054'
'
.12/10/81
I/6/81
1/6/81
1/13/81
260-8055
260"8056
260-8057
260-8058
260-8101
"296-8016
1/19/81
1/15/81
6/11/80
9/5/80
296-8030
"296"8036 ;;,'
'9/29/80
"296-.8040,
'
1/7/80
11/14/80
11/17/80
, 12/1/80
296-8042
~296-8043
296-8045
MS line sensing
1 ine blocked
9/26/80, Fuel. assemblies
mi sorientated
" ma'in'team'rel i'ef valves* fail'ed 'to actuate
within '1%. '-'. "
It
4 '
I
'I t
7;.
296-8046
11/28/80
- 296-8047
12/1/80
296-8048
12/5/80
"296-8049
296-8050
296-8051
296-8052
"296-8054
12/11/80
'2/11/80
12/15/80
12/15/80
1/8/81
'"296-'8055. -'"""I/8%81'".':
'-'296"8057'
" .
1/1G/81'96-80581/6/81
SLC pump inoperable
3B&D core spray
room cooler had inadequate
cool ing flow.
heat exchanger
had
inadequate
flow.
3D RHR pump tripped
3B SLC pump breaker tripped
Orywell H2 sensor would not calibrate
3-PS-68-95 setpoint drifted
8 MSRV's failed to actuate within 1:o of
setpoint.
CAM-3"RM'-90-:250'as'noperable
CAM-3-'RM-90-.251'as inoperable
'SIV's
exceeded
leakage criteria
Within the areas
inspected
no violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Scram Discharge
Header Monitoring
Efforts
to
make
the
G.E.
supplied
continuous
monitoring
system
(CMS)
operational
continued into January with G.E. engineers
on site.
Testing of
the
new
system
was
performed
on unit
3 which was
in cold
shutdown for
refueling.
The original monitoring system which required
30 minute
checks
of the local
sensor
recording strip charts
were maintained
in service for
aperating
uni.ts. 1.and.2,
When. unit. 3..resumed .,operati.on,
the. old. system
was
pl.aced in. sery.ice.
As
a result of the
on site effort,
an
improvement in sensor
response
was
attained by optimizing transducer
locations
The vendor further decided that
changes
..to. the circuit design. were desirable..
The, vendor.
committed to TVA
.
"
. tiiat thpdate'd
drawings"and'pa'res "required"for'he modified'yste~ would
'e
provided by January
30, 1981.
TVA notified the
NRC by l'etter to the Director, Region II, dated January
20,
1981, that problems were encountered
and the revised
schedule for having the
The schedule
showed that the
system would be operable
on unit
3 within three
days of receipt of material
from the vendor.
Modifications
to units
1
and
2 would then
be completed
in another
week.
Region II found
the'revised
schedule
accepta'ble.
Aside
from
the
vendors
efforts,
TVA pursued
another
approach
toward
providing
a monitoring system with alarms
in the control room.
TVA utilized
'the
same
type
UT monitor
used
in 'the'reviously
installed
system
in
combination with the .vendor
supplied
transducer
and equipment to transmit
~
.and annunciate'information.in
the: control. room..'he. control
room operator
was. pr'ovided: with .an
alarm 'for'.high'ater
level
and another for loss of
'ocal
power
to the
UT monitor.
By the
end of the
month
TVA had design
approval of their system
and
had installed
and tested
the system
on unit 3.
,Plant
Operations
Review
Committee..'s..approval.
of the test results
and the
procedures
is needed to declare the system operable.
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No violations or deviations
were ident,ified during the review of the above
activities.
Scram Accumulator Level Switches
'n
November
6,
1'980,
TVA reported
to the
NRC that
17
level
switches
out of
185 would not operate
on unit
2
and
the
same
number
was
reported
on January
27, 1981, for unit 3.
These
switches
sense
leakage
from
the water
side of the
to the nitrogen side
and cause
an
alarm to actuate
in the control
room and locally when leakage
is detected.
investigation. by
TVA into. the large failure rate
revealed
no conclusive
"evidence'to"'supp'or't
-why.".'the'"twit'ches'fa'i'led'..".Ihspectio'n
of'ome 'of the ".=
" 'ailedev'el'witches," showed'hatsome
had
an adhesive
type'ubstance
on
the
spring which could
have
prevented
the
switch
from opera.ing;
but it
could
not
be
concluded
that . this
caused
all
34 failures.
Where this
adhesive
substance
came
from could not be determined
other
than
to
assume
from either the lubricant
on the accumulator
"0"ring which separates
the
water
from nitrogen
or
from the lubricant
used
on
the
threads
of the
switches.
The possible
cause
for the large
number of failures
also being
considered
is
an
inadequate
test
procedure.
Electrical
Maintenance
Instruction (EMI)-50 which tests
the level switches did not require venting
the test
pump prior to hookup.
This could allow for the introduction of air
into the level switch housing which would not allow the switch to function
properly.
TVA is continuing their investigation
by revising
EMI-50 to
ensure
the, test, pump is. vented prior-.to, hookup. to .the
scram accumulator:.and..
by,testing, the .accumul:ator
leve)
switches
on .unit
1
as conditions
permit
under
the revised
EMI to
see if the venting of the test
pump
solved the
problem.
., Within.the areas,.(nspected.no..items
of nopcomp1..iance
.were identified.
12.
Plant Physical
Protection'uring
the 'course
of routine inspection activities,
the
inspectors
made
observations
of certain
plant
physical. protection
activities.
These
included personnel
badging,
personnel
search
and escort,
vehicle
search
and
escort,
communications
and vital area access control.
Turnstiles,
one
on either
side of the enclosed
guard station at the west
gatehouse,
were installed
and placed in service
on January
12,
1981.
This
addition provides improved control for access
to the protected area.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas
inspected:
.'. -'3...-.. Maintenance
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The inspector
made direct observation
of the installation of a replacement
water accumulator for rod drive 34-27, unit 2,
on January
8,
1981.
The rod
was declared
inoperahle
as'. required. by: Technical. Specifications.
Within the areas
inspected 'no.violation. or deviati'ons were identified.
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14.
Surveillance Testing
The inspector
observed
the conduct of surveillance testing for the Standby
Liquid Control System, Surveillance Instruction (SI) 4.4.A. 1,
on January
19,
1981,
on unit 3.
The completion of the surveillance satisfied
the require-
ment for monthly loop functional testing.
On January
14,
1981,
an
inspector
observed
the
conduct
of surveillance
testing
on
the
reactor
high
pressure
switches,
Surveillance
Instruction (Sl) 4. 1.A.S.
The surveillance
test
was performed in accordance
with the instruction...All
and
meters. were in calibration, all the
"'Tat'est: revi'si'ons'-were 'entered'n
'the
instruc'ti'on - and" the 'instrume'nt
technician.'ere
"knowledgeable" of the
procedure
and
the 'effects
this
surveillance
had on the plant.
No violations. or deviations were identified within the areas
inspected.
15.
Special
Test
The inspector
on January '2,
1981 observed
the performance of Special
Test
168,
Inspection
for Missing
Tags,
in the unit
1
fuel
pool.
The test
required the movement of fuel bundles,
dechanneling
of fuel assemblies,
and
the
search
of fuel
racks
to locate
missing. identification tags
which had
fallen into the fuel pool in May 1979.
Within the. areas
inspected,.ne violations or deviations were.identi.fied.
16.
Emergency Procedures
on Antisipated Transient Without Scram
(ATWS)
. A review was made of. pl.ant,,operati.ng.,and.emergency
procedures,
to. verify that
condi t'ions of concern relating. t'o"a'n
ATWS event were adequately" addressed
in'he
procedures.
The'eview
included
a
range
of potential
control
rod
problems
from single
rod malfunction to all rods fai ling to scram.
Also
included'i.n the r'eview was, failure of a scram to be initiated when required
and the initiation of the
system
when
needed.
A
total of five procedures
were reviewed.
The inspector determined that the
conditions of interest
were addressed
in the procedures;
however,
some minor
changes
appeared
advisable
to more clearly define desired operator
action.
The licensee
implemented these procedure
changes
on January
27, 1981.
No violations or deviations were identified within the areas
inspected.
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