ML18024A977

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IE Insp Repts 50-259/79-14,50-260/79-14 & 50-296/79-14 on 790521-25.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Follow Plant Procedures Re Locking of RHR Pump Seal Heat Exchanger Valves
ML18024A977
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 06/25/1979
From: Moon B, Ruhlman W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18024A973 List:
References
50-259-79-14, 50-260-79-14, 50-296-79-14, NUDOCS 7908270209
Download: ML18024A977 (10)


See also: IR 05000259/1979014

Text

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UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-259/79-14,

50-339/79-14

and 50-260/79-14

Licensee:

Tennessee

Valley Authority

818 Power Building

Chattanooga,

Tennessee

37401

Facility Name:

Browns Ferry Units 1,

2 and

3

Docket Nos. 50-259,

50-339,

and 50-260

License

Nos.

DPR-33,

DPR-52

and DPR-68

Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near Athens,

Alabama

Inspector:

B.

.

oon

.,.d.,IW A

W. A. Ruhlman, Acting Section Chief,

RONSB

Date Signed

<

7$

Da

Signed

sumev

Inspection

on Hay 21-25,

1979

Areas Inspected

This routine,

unannounced

inspection involved 46 inspector-hours

on-site in the

areas of plant procedures

for Units 1,

2 and

3 and

a review of valve/breaker/

switch alignments for all accessible

components

in all ESF systems

for Unit 3 to

verify the licensee

actions

taken in response

to IE Bulletin 79-08.

Results

Of the two areas

inspected,

no apparent

items of noncompliance

or deviations

were identified in one area;

one apparent

item of noncompliance

was found in one

area {infraction-failure to follow procedures,

paragraph

6),

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hf rq

l

DETAILS

1.

Persons

Contacted

Licensee

Employees

  • J.

G. Dewease,

Plant Superintendent

-R. Cole,

OP/A Resident

="J. L. Harvess,

Staff QA Supervisor,

BFNP

-R. Hunkpillar, Assistant Operation Supervisor

Other licensee

employees

contacted

included four operators

and

one office

personnel.

NRC Resident

Inspector

+R. F. Sullivan

-Attended exit interview.

2.

Exit Interview

The inspection

scope

and findings were summarized

on May 25,

1979 with

those

persons

indicated in Paragraph

1 above.

During the inspection,

seven

items were identified which require further action by the licensee

manage-

ment for acceptable

resolution.

These

items are contained in paragraphs

5.(l), 5.(2), 5.(3), 6., 6.(l), 6.(2),

and 6.(3).

The licensee

acknowledged

the inspectors'omments

on these

items.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous

Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4.

Unresolved

Items

Unresolved

items are matters

about which more information is required to

determine

whether they are acceptable

or may involve noncompliance

or

deviations.

New unresolved

items identified during thjs inspection are

discussed

in paragraph 5.(3).

5.

Unit 1,

2 and

3 Procedures

The inspector

conducted

a review of procedures

and documentations

as follows:

EOI-1, "Recirculation

Pump Trip"

EOI-5, "Electrical System Failure"

EOI-8, "Reactor Water Level High/Low"

EOI-36, "Loss of Coolant Accident"

EOI-44, "Suppression

Chamber Water High Temperature"

NOI-65, "Standby Gas-Treatment

System"

NOI-68, "Reactor Water Recirculation System"

NOI-71, "Reactor

Core Isolation Cooling System"

NOI-73, "High-Pressure

Coolant Injection System"

NOI-74,

"RHR System"

NOI-91, "Pressure

Suppression

Pool Level Control"

NOI-92, "Neutron Monitoring System"

GOI-100-1, "Integrated Plant Operation"

GOI-100-5, "Process

Computer"

SI-2, "Instrument Checks

and Observations"

Technical Specification

Amendment Nos.

9,

11,

12,

13,

14,

16,

17,

18,

19,

31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46,

and

48

TVA Operational

equality Assurance

Manual

The above procedures

were reviewed to verify that:

Reviews,

approvals

and changes

covering the activities were in accor-

dance with Technical Specifications

Procedure

changes

were

made to reflect changes

required

by selected

Technical Specification revisions

Procedure

changes

were in conformance with 10 CFR 50.59(a)

and (b) re-

quirements.

Procedure

contents

were in accordance

with Technical Specification

and

applicable

standards

Selected

procedure

contents

were adequate

to control required safety

related operations

Controls were established

to prevent

the freezing of functional fluid

systems

during maintenance

The inspector

used

one or more of the following acceptance

criteria for

evaluating the above

items in the procedure

review:

Technical Specifications

Topical Report TVA-TR75-1A/TVA equality Assurance

Manual

FSAR, Section 13.6,

Appendix D and Response

to AEC questions

dated

March 25,

1971

(BRNP 24)

ANSI N18.7

(1976)

Regulatory

Guide 1.33 (1978,

Rev.

2)

10 CFR 50, Appendix

B

Within the areas

inspected

no items of noncompliance

or deviations

were

identified.

The following items are

open pending corrective action by the licensee

and

verification by NRC at subsequent

inspections:

Technical Specification 3.7.f requires that reactor shall be scramed

when suppression

chamber water temperature

reaches

110 degrees

Farenheit.

(2).

This scram requirement is not currently incorporated in the procedure

EOI44 "Suppression

Chamber

Water High Temp".

Th'is appears

to be

a

typographical error made at the time of the procedure

revision (2/28/78).

The licensee

committed to incorporate

the requirement in the procedure

by June

25,

1979

(259/260/296/79-14-01).

The LPCI loop selection logics are

no longer functional for Unit

1 and

2 as

a result of current design modification.

The procedure

EOI8

"Reactor Water Level High/Low" still lists this action

as

an automatic

action to verify.

The licensee

committed to revise the procedure

by June

26,

1979

(259/260/79-14-02).

(3)

Technical Specification 6.3.A.l and

4 require that detailed written

procedures

covering normal operation

and emergency

condition shall

be

prepared.

Browns Ferry is committed, by FSAR Responses

to AEC (}ues-

tion 13.11 dated

March 25,

1971, to have

an abnormal

and emergency

operating procedure titled "Reactor Water Level High/Low".

The Pro-

cedure

EOI 8 "Reactor Water Level High/Low" does not contain appro-

priate procedures

for LO-LO-LO water level setpoint.

The licensee

stated that they will review to determine if the LO-LO-LO

level situation is covered

somewhere

else.

This item will remain

unresolved

(259/260/296/79-14-03).

-4-

6.

Onsite Inspection of Engineered

Safety Features

(ESF) - Unit 3 Only

The inspector

conducted

an independent

examination

on actions

taken by the

licensee in response

to IE Bulletin 79-08 for the following ESF systems:

- High Pressure

Coolant Injection System

(HPCI)

- Reactor

Core Isolation Cooling System

(RCIC)

- Core Spray System

(CS)

- LPCI Mode of RHR System

(LPCI)

- Automatic Depressurization

System

(ADS)

- Standby Liquid Control System

(SLCS)

- Emergency

Equipment Cooling Water System

(EECW)

- RHR Service Mater System

(RHRSW)

- Diesel Generator

System

(DG)

The inspector

reviewed the following licensee

procedures

and drawings to

verify safety valve/breaker/switch

alignments

to ensure

the

ESF systems

are

operable

and that licensee's

procedures

and administrative controls provide

adequate

assurance

of continued operability.

Control Room Panel Checklists for HPCI, RCIC, LPCI,

CS,

SBLCS,

ADS and

EECW per OI-73, -71, -74, -75, -63, -1 and -67

RHR System

VLV Checklist per OI 74,

"RHR Systems"

Browns Ferry Flow Diagram Drawings

(Nos.

47M859-1,

47M858-1,

47W859-2,

47W854-1,

47W811-1,

47W814-1,

47W813-1,

and 47W812-1)

The inspector also verified the standby

readiness

of four diesels

by

checking control room indications

and local panel switch alignment

as well

as the breaker positions.

The inspector

used

one or more of the following acceptance

criteria for the

above items:

- Technical Specifications,

Section

6

- Topical Report TVA-TR75-lA/TVAQuality Assurance

Manual

- Operating Instruction 74,

"RHR Systems"

- Browns Ferry Drawing No. 47W811-1,

"Flow Diagram

RHR Systems"

- Browns Ferry Drawing No. 47W859-1, "Flor Diagram

EECW"

- 10 CFR 50, Appendix

B

The above

systems

were inspected

to verify that:

Valve/breaker/switch

alignments

were aligned in accordance

with plant

procedures

and drawings

The alignment procedures

are adequate.

0

-5"

Comparison of alignment procedures

for the above

systems with current

PAID's and single-line diagrams

Standby

readiness

of Diesel Generator

System

was established

Within the areas

inspected,

one apparent

item of noncompliance

was iden-

tified.

The inspector identified that two outlet valves

(HCV 74-33 and

HCV

74-44) at the discharge

side of RHR Heat Exchangers

3B and 3D, were not

locked nor controlled during the Unit 3 operation

on May 24,

1972.

This is contrary to the requirements

in Technical Specification 6.3.A.1 and

operating Instruction

74

"RHR Systems"

which state in part that "Detailed

written procedures

including applicable checkoff lists covering normal and

shutdown operation shall be prepared,

approved

and adhered to" and that the

valves shall be "locked open" respectively

Another example of ESF valves not locked during the operation

were the

throttle valves

Nos.

561,

572 and

614 which are located at the

EECW flow

path for RHR pump Seal Heat Exchangers

3B and

3D.

These

examples

are designated

as

an item of noncompliance

(296/79-14-04).

The licensee

acknowledged

the inspector's

findings immediately and instruc-

ted the operator to lock the

NCV 74-33 and 74-44 during the inspection.

The inspector stated that the

EECW throttle valves

must be re-examined

by

the licensee

and locked after the flow is adjusted.

The following items remain open pending corrective action by the licensee

and verification by NRC at subsequent

inspections:

(1).

The

EECW RHR Pump Seal Heat Exchanger

Valves

(Nos. 561,

572 and 614)

on Drawing No.

47W859-1 "Flow Diagram Emergency

Equipment Cooling

Water" are required to be locked while Procedure

OI 74

"RHR Systems"

does not require locking.

This appears

to be

an inconsistant

procedure

requirement

(296/79-14-05).

(2). The

EECW RHR Pump Seal Heat Exchanger

Valves

605 and 616 are miss-

tagged

(interchanged)

with respect

to the

RHR pumps

3B and

3D and not

in accordance

with the Drawing No.

47W859-1 "Flow Diagram Emergency

Equipment Cooling Water".

The licensee

stated

they will correct the tags by June

24,

1979

(296/79-14-06).

(3). The RCIC System

Panel Checklist

(OI71) does not include FCV71-10

(Turbine Governing Valve) for position verification, although the

valve is in major flow path

as

shown

on Drawing No

~ 47W813-1,

"Flow

Diagram RCIC System".

This valve is normally open

and its position

must be verified with a Panel Checklist (296/79-14-07).

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