ML18022A551
| ML18022A551 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1987 |
| From: | Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Utley E CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8708100523 | |
| Download: ML18022A551 (64) | |
Text
GU RY INFORMATION DIST UT SYSTEM
< RIDS)
ACCESS?IN NBR: 8708100523 DQC. DATE: 87/08/04 NOTARIZED:
NO FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Powev'lanti Unit ii Carolina AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION REYESi L. A.
Region 2i Office of Director REC IP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION UTLEYiE. E.
Carolina Power Zc Light Co.
DOCKET 0 05000400
SUBJECT:
Fov wards "LER Quality Evaluation fov Sheav'on Harv is iiDuv'ing Pev iod Fv om Aug
- 1. 1986-Jun
- 30. 1987i "as part of SALP pv ogram.
Quality of submittals well below industry average.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE40D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR J ENCL
~
SIZE:
TITLE: Systematic Assessment of Licensee Pev formance (SALP) Report NOTES:Application fov pevmit renewal filed.
05000400 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 LA BUCKLEYiB INTERNAL:
ACRS AEOD/DOA COMMISSION NRR MQRISSEAUi D NRR/DLPG/HFB NRR/DOEA/EAB NRR/DREP/RPB NRR/P MAS/ILRB OGC/HDS1 RQN2 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: LPDR NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 0
1 1
2 2
1 1
5 5
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
REC IP IENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD AEOD BAILEY>B AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/SIB NRR/DLPG/PEB NRR/DREP/EPB NRR/DRIS DIR 0
-EB MANiJ REG IL 02 NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 0
1 1
1, 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
TOTAL NUMBER OF CQP IES REQUIRED:
LTTR 30 ENCL 28
August 4, 1987 Docket No, 50-400 License No.
NPF-63 Carolina Power and Light Company L47N:
Mr.
E.
E. Utley Senior Executive Vice President Power Supply and Engineering and Construction P.
0.
Box 1551
- Raleigh, NC 27602 Gentlemen:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) has recently completed an assessment of your Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for Shearon Harris as part of the NRC's Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program.
This assessment was performed to support a SALP period of August 1, 1986, to June 30, 1987, and is being forwarded at this time for your use and information in order to pattern future submittals.
The summary to the report highlights the findings of the evaluation. 'his is the first evaluation of Shearon Harris LERs and the overall quality is well below the industry average.
Both the texts and abstracts contain significant deficiencies.
For the texts, this includes the discussions of safety consequences, corrective
- actions, and identification of failed components.
For the abstracts, this includes root cause and corrective action information.
Please let us know if you have any questions.
Sincerely, Original Signed by Luis A. Reyes Luis A. Reyes, Director Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
LER guality Evaluation for Shearon Harris 1
cc w/encl:
M A. Watson, Vice President Harris Nuclear Project 4.
L. Tibbitts, Director of Regulatory
~
ompliance L. Willis, Plant General Manager bcc w/encl:
(See page 2)
-8708i00523 5000400
@7080+
@DE pDOCN, 0 pDg
~~ F.cf 0
/i
Carolina Power and Light Company August 4, 1987 bcc w/encl:
~ Barth, OGC ffRC Resident Inspector tA; Upchurch,
- Chairman, Triangle J Council of Governments Document Control Desk c/Q 7e /~4 C~~
BDesai 07/A/87 RII KLend s
07~ /87 RII PF drickson V
~/3 /87 99
ENCLOSURE L'ICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
EQUALITY EVALUATION FOR SHEARON HARfGS 1
DURING THE PERIOD FROM AUGUST 1 1986 TO JUNE 30 1987
pP
\\
l SUGARY An evaluat1on of the content and qual1ty of a representat1ve sample of the L1censee Event Reports (LERs) subm1tted by Shearon Harr1s l dur1ng the per1od from August l, 1986 to June 30, 1987" was performed.
Th1s evaluat1on prov1des an overv1ew of the qual1ty of the LERs by compar1ng the1r contents to the report1ng requ1rements of 10 CFR 50.73(b) and the gu1del1nes conta1ned 1n NUREG-1022 and'1ts Supplements Nos.
1 and 2.
Th1s 1s, the f1rst t1me the Shearon Harr1s l LERs have been evaluated us1ng th1s methodology.
The results of th1s evaluat1on 1nd1cate that the Shearon Harr1s l LERs have an overall average LER score of 7.8 out of a poss1ble 10 po1nts, compared w1th the current 1ndustry average of 8.4.
C The most s1gn1f1cant text def1c1enc1es found 1n th1s evaluat1on concern the requ1rements to adequately d1scuss correct1ve act1ons, safety consequences, and to 1dent1fy fa1led components 1n the text (e.g.,
by manufacturer and model number).
In add1t1on, the root cause and correct1ve act1ons suamar1es are 1nadequate 1n most of the abstracts.
0
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LER EQUALITY EVALUATION FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1
INTRODUCTION In order to evaluate the overall quality of the contents of the Licensee Event Reports (LERs) submitted by Shearon Harris 1 during the period from August 1, 1986 to June 30.
- 1987, a representative saaple of the unit's LERs was evaluated.
This evaluation was performed by comparing the contents of each LER to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(b) and the guidelines contained ln NUREG-1022 and its Supplements Nos.
1 1
2 3
and 2.
The sample consists of a total of 15 LERs, which ls considered to be the maximum number of LERs necessary to have a representative sample.
See Appendix A for a list of the LER numbers ln the sample.
NETHODOLOGY The evaluation consists of a detailed review of each selected LER to determine how well the content of its text, abstract, and coded fields meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.73(b).
In addition, each selected LER ls compared to the guidance for preparation of LERs presented ln NUREG-1022 and Supplements No.
1 and 2 to NUREG-1022; based on this comparison, suggestions were developed for improving the quality of the reports.
The purpose of this evaluation ls to provide feedback to improve the quality of LERs.
It ls not intended to increase the requirements concerning the
'content'f reports beyond the current requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(b).
Therefore, statements ln this evaluation that suggest measures be taken are not intended to increase requirements and should be viewed ln that light.
- However, the minimum requirements of the regulation must be met.
The evaluation process for each LER ls divided into two parts.
The first" part of the evaluation consists of documenting coaaents specific to the content and presentation of each LER.
The second part, consists of determining a score (0-10 points) for the text, abstract, and coded fields of each LER.
1'
The" LER spec1f1c. contents serve two purposes:
(l) they po1nt out what the analysts considered to be. the specif1c, deficienc1es or observat1ons concern1ng the information perta1n1ng to the event, and (2) they prov1de a
bas1s for a count of general defic1enc1es for the overall sample of LERs that. was evaluated.
- L1kew1se, the scores serve two purposes:
(l) they serve to illustrate in numer1cal terms how the analysts perce1ved the content of the informat1on that was presented, and (2} they provide a basis for determin1ng an overall score for each LER.
The overall score for each LER is the result of'omb1ning the scores for the text, abstract, and coded fields (i.e,,0.5 x text score i 0.3 x abstract score
+ O.l x coded fields score overall LE 8 score).
The results of the LER quality evaluation are divided into two
'ategor1es:
(l) detailed informat1on and (2) sundry 1nformat1on.
The detailed informat1on, presented in Append1ces A through D, consists of LER sample information (Append1x A), a table of the scores for each sample LER (Appendix B), tabl'es of the number'f defic1encies and observations for the text-, abstract and coded fields (Append1x C), and consent sheets conta1ning narrat1ve statements concern1ng the contents of each LER (Appendix 0).
Shen referring to Appendix 0, the reader 1s caut1oned not to try to d1rectly correlate the number of ceaoents on a consent sheet with the LER
- scores, as the analysts have flexibility to cons1der the magn1tude of a defic1ency when ass1gn1ng scores (e.g.,
the analysts sometimes.
make contents relative to a requirement w1thout deduct1ng po1nts for that requirement).
A V,
RESULTS A discussion of the analysts'onclus1ons concerning LER qual1ty 1s presented below.
These conclus1ons are based solely on the results of the evaluation of the contents of the LERs selected for review and as such represent the analysts'ssessment of the unit,'s performance (on a scale of 0 to 10) in submitt1ng LERs: that meet the criter1a of 10 CFR 50.73(b) and the gu1dance presented, in HUREG-1022 and its suppleeents.
't 0
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Table l presents the average scores for-the. sample of LERs evaluated for Shearon Harris l In order to place the scores provided 1n Table 1
1n perspective, the distribut1on of the latest overall average score for all un1t/stations that have been evaluated us1ng the current methodology is prov1ded on F1gure l.,
Figure l 1s updated each month to reflect any changes in th1s d1stribution result1ng from the inclusion of data for those units/stations that have not been previously evaluated or those that have been reevaluated.
(Xote:
The prev1ous overall average score for those units/stat1ons that are reevaluated 1s replaced with the overall average score from the latest evaluat1on).
Table 2 and Append1x Table B-l provide a
summary of the information that is the basis for the average scores 1n Table l.
For example, Shearon Harr1s 1's average score for the text of the LERs that were evaluated is B.l out of a possible 10 points.
From Table 2
it can be seen that the text score actually results frow the rev1ew and evaluat1on of l7 different requirements ranging frow the discussion of plant operat1ng cond1tions before the event jl0 CFR 50.73(b)(2)(11){A)) to text presentation.
The resultant percentage scores in the text sugary section of Table 2 provide an indicat1on of how well each text requirement was addressed by the unit for the 15 LERs that were evaluated.
Based on similar methodology, the percentage scores for the var1ous sect1ons of the abstract and the items in the coded fields were also coiputed and are shown in Table 2.
As indicated in Table 2, certa1n requ1rements or areas w1th1n the text, abstract, and coded fields are causing the unit d1ff1culty when preparing LERs.
Relatively low percentage scores Nay ind1cate that the unit needs addit1onal guidance concerning these requirewents, or 1t may 1nd1cate that the un1t understands the bas1c requirewent but has e1ther:
(l) excluded certain less sign1ficant inforaat1on frea aany of the discuss1ons concern1ng that requireient or (2) totally fa1led to address the requireoent 1n one or two of the selected LERs.
Those respons1ble for preparing LERs should review the LER spec1fic comments presented 1n Appendix 0 in order to determ1ne why the un1t rece1ved less than a perfect score for certain requirements.
0
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0
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TABIE 1.
SUMMARY
OF SCORES FOR SHEARON HARRIS Text Abstract Coded Fields Overall Average 8.L
- 7. 2.
8.5 7.8 High 9.5 9.0 9.2 8.5 I
ow'.4 6.0 7.5 6.9 a.
See Appendix B f'r a summary of scores for each LER that was evaluated.
Figure 1.
Distribution of LER Scores Shearon Harris 1
7.0 7.5 8.0 Overall Avenge Score 9.0 9.5
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0
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TABLE 2 e R
IREMENT PERCENTAGE ORE R
SHEAROH HARRIS TEXT Requirements
[50.73(b)] - Descriptions (2)(ii)(A) - - Plant condition prior to event (2)(ii)(B)
Inoperable equipment that contributed (2)(ii)(C)
- - Date(s) and approximate time(s)
(2)(ii)(D)
- Root cause and intermediate cause(s)
(2)(ii)(E)
- - Mode, mechanism, and effect (2) (ii)(F)
- EIIS codes (2)(ii)(G)
Secondary function affected (2)(ii)(H)
- Estimate of unavailability (2)(ii)(I)
Method of discovery (2)(ii)(J)(1)
Operator actions affecting course (2)(ii)(J)(2) - Personnel error (procedural deficiency)
(2)(ii)(K)
- Safety system responses (2)(ii)(L) - - Manufacturer and model no. information (3)
- - Assessment of safety consequences (4) - - -
Corrective actions (5) - - - -
- Previous similar event information (2)(i)
- Text presentation Percentage a
Scores
(
)
90 (15) b 87 (15) 91 (15) 100
( 6) 0 (15) b 100
( 3) 97 (15) 100
( 8) 85 (10) 98 (11) 33
( 6) 64 (15) 81 (15) 20 (15) 86 (15)
ABSTRACT Requirements t.'50.73(b)(1)3 - Descriptions Percentage a
Scores
(
)
Major occurrences(immediate cause/effect)
Plant/system/component/personnel responses Root cause information Corrective action information Abstract presentation 97 (15) 98 (11) 55 (15) 41 (15) 75 (15)
I I
TABLE 2. (c~inu~
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CODED FIELDS Item Number(s)
Descriptions Percentage a
Scores
(
)
1, 2,
and 3
5, 6,
and 7'
and 10 12 13 14 and 15 Plant name(unit 0), docket 0,
page Os Title Event date, LER no., report date Other facilities involved Operating mode and power level Reporting requirements Licensee contact information Coded component failure information Supplemental report information 100 (15) 48 (15) 97 (15) 100 (15) 100 (15) 100 (15) 100 (15) 93 (15) 93 (15) a.
Percentage scores are the result of dividing the total points for a requirement by the number of points possible for that requirement.
(Note'Some requirements are not applicable to all LERs; therefore, the number of points possible was adjusted accordingly.)
The number in parenthesis is the number of LERs for which the requirement was considered applicable.
b.
A percentage score for this requirement is meaningless as it is not possible to determine from the information available to the analyst whether this requirement is applicable to a specific LER. It is always given 100'4 if it is provided and is always considered "not applicable" when it is not.
S ec1fic Deficiencies and Observations The more important defic1encies and observat1ons for the text,
- abstract, and coded fields sect1ons of the LERs that were evaluated are discussed separately below.
Text Deficiencies and Observations The discussions of correct1ve actions, Requirement 50.73(b)(h),
are cons1dered to be def1cient for ten of the 15 d1scuss1ons as they lacked certain 1nformat1on necessary to a complete discuss1on.
N1ne of these ten failed to adequately discuss those actions that appeared necessary to prevent recurrence of the event.
Corrective actions, both inaediate and
- planned, should be d1scussed for all causes 1dent1f1ed in an LER.
Nine of the 15 LERs evaluated were cons1dered to be def1c1ent 1n the area of provid1ng an assessment of the safety consequences and 1mplications of the event, Requ1rement 50.73(b)(3).
Four of these nine contained no such statements, even though every LER is required to contain a discussion of the safety consequences of the event.
If the conclusion of this discussion 1s that 'there were no safety consequences",
suff1cient details must be prov1ded to allow the reader to determine how th1s conclus1on was reached.
For example, if it was concluded that there were no consequences because there were other systems (or means) ava1lable to mitigate the consequences of the safety system failure, these systems or means should be discussed in the text.
In add1tion, each discuss1on should 1nclude 1nformat1on as to whether or not the occurrence could have happened under a
set of in1t1al condit1ons that would have made the consequences more severe.
If the occurrence could not have occurred under a more severe set of conditions, the text should so state.
Unique component 1dentif1cation was not prov1ded 1n the text of four of the six LERs that 1nvolved a component fa1lure, Requirement 50.73(b)(2)(11)(L).
Components that fa1l should be identified 1n the text so that others in the 1ndustry can be made aware of potent1al problems.
An event at one station can often lead to the 1dentif icat1on of a gener1c
~
0 D
D problem that can be corrected at other un1ts or stations before they experience a s1milar event.
In addition, although not specif1cally required by the current regulat1on, it would be helpful to ident1fy components whose des1gn contributes to an event even though the component does not actually fail.
Information concern1ng previous sim1lar events was not prov1ded 1n twelve of the 15 LERs [Requirement 50.73(b)(5)].
The Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) component function identifier and system name codes were not provided 1n the text of any of the 15 LERs as is required by 50.73(b)(2)( 11)(F ).
The text presentat1on, while acceptable, could be iwproved by def1ning all acronyms at their first appearance and making use of d1agrams when needed to help the reader better understand the event.
Abstract Oeficiencies and Observat1ons While there are no specif1c requirements for an abstract, other than those given 1n 10 CFR 50.73(b)(l),
an abstract
- should, as stated in NUREG-1022, Supplement No. 2, summarize the following 1nformat1on from the text:
l.
Cause/Effect What happened that made the event reportable.
2.
Responses ih)or plant,
- system, and personnel responses as a result of the event.
3.
Root/Interied1a te Cause The underlying cause of the event.
What caused the component andlor system fa1lure or the personnel error.
0,
...0 4..
Corrective Act1ons 0
0 Mhat was done: inmed1ately to restore the plant to a safe and stable condit1on and what was done or planned to prevent
. recurrence of the event.
Numbers 1 and 2 above were adequately addressed in the abstracts of the LERs'eviewed;, however, Numbers 3 and 4 are def1c1ent in most of the LERs.
Although the abstract suamaries are part1ally deficient because the text is defic1ent in correct1ve.- actions, a s1gn1f1cant 1eprovement could be made by ensur1ng that the root cause and corrective action 1nformation.that 1s conta1ned 1n the text, gets sunmar1zed in the abstract.
N1ne of the abstract presentations were short.,
Improvement in the abstract presentat1on score could probably be obtained by us1ng more of the space available (i.e., the l400 spaces).,;-,
'J.jg Coded Fields Oefic1encies and Observations The main deficiency 1n the area of coded f1elds involves the t1tles, Item (4).
All f1fteen of the titles failed to provide adequate cause informat1on, six failed to adequately ind1cate the result (1.e.,
why the event was required to be reported),
and five fa1led to 1nclude the link between the cause and the result.
awhile the result 1s cons1dered the most important part of the title, the lack of cause 1nformation (and 11nk, if necessary) results in an incomplete title.
Example t1tles are prov1ded 1n Appendix D (Coded Fields Section) for many of the t1tles that are considered to be defic1ent."
'QNARY i
Table 3 provides a sugary of those areas of the Shearon Harr1s l LERs that requ1re the most improvement.
For add1t1onal and more spec1fic information concerning def1cienc1es, the reader should refer to the information presented in Append1ces C'nd D.
General guidance concern1ng requirements.
can be found 1n NURE6-1022, and NUREG-l022 Supplement No.
1 and 2..
- lo
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TABLE 3.
AREAS HOST NEEDING IHPROVENEMT FOR SHEARON HARRIS l l
Areas Coarsen ts Correct1ve actions Safety consequence 1nformation All act1ons planned or taken to address the various causes (problems) mentioned in the text should be discussed, especially those actions considered necessary to prevent recurrence of the event or similar events.
All LERs should include a detailed safety assessment.
The text should d1scuss whether or not the event could have been worse had it occurred under d1fferent but probable circumstances and provide information about backup systems which were available to lim1t the consequences of the event.
Jhnufacturer and model number Prev1ous sim1lar events Component ident1f ication information should be included in the text whenever a
component fa1ls or (although not specifically required by the current regulat1on) 1s suspected of contribut1ng to the event because of its design.
Previous s1milar events should be referenced (e.g.,
by LER number) or, as stated in NUREG-1022, Supplement Mo. 2, 1f none are 1dentified, the text should so state.
EIIS code Text presentation EIIS codes should be prov1ded for each component or system referred to 1n the text.
All acronyms should be defined on f1rst usage and the use of diagrams should be considered for certain events so as to help the reader better understand the event.
Abstracts Coded fields a.
Tities Cause and corrective action information from the text should be wentioned 1n the abstract.
Use of the ent1re ll00 spaces available 1s suggested.
Titles should be wr1tten such that they better describe the event.
In particular, cause information should be prov1ded 1n each title.
REFERENCES l.
Off1ce for Analysts and Evaluat1on of Operat1onal
- Oata, Licensee Event Eg-1 22, ".E.
1 2 2 y
Septeaber 1983.
2.
Off1ce for Analys1s and Evaluat1on of Operat1onal
- Oata, L1censee Event 1-22 Ceau1ss1on, February 1984.
3.
Off1ce for Analys1s and Evaluat1on of Operat1onal lhta, Licensee Event 22-222
. 2... >>
y Cea31ss1on, Sept@aber 1985.
12
APPENDIX A LER SAMPLE SELECTION INFORMATION FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1
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TMKE A-1.
IZR SAMKZ S1ZZX.'XXCÃ PGR SHEAR% KQQKS 1 Sample Humber LER Mmber 10 86W08&0 86W0~1 86&1~
87WOl~
87W03~
87~~
87~~
87~~
87W1~
87Wil~
87M13~
87W14~
87W16~
87M17~
87W18~
SCRAM SCBAM SCBAM, ESF SCBAM, ESF SCBAM, ESF SCRAM, ESF SCBAM, ESF
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APPENDIX 8 EVALUATION SCORES OF INDIVIDUALLERS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1
, TABLE B-1.
LOTION SCORES OF INDIVIDl L+i FOR SHEARON HARRIS a
LER Sample Number Text 8.3 Abstract 6.3 Coded Fields 8.9 8.7 6.5 9.0 8.1 8.2 8.0 2
3 9.2 6.5 9.0 5
6 9.5 6.4 6.3 9.0 9
2 5
6
~ 0 7.9 6.3 8.7 7
8 8.0 Overall 7.8 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.5 7.4 7.4 7.4 10 a
LER Sample Number 11 12 13 15 Average Text 8.0 Abstract 8.7 Coded Fields 9.0 Overall 8.3 8.1 8.0 8.5 8.1 7.8 7.1 9.2 7.8 8.3 7.9 7.5 8.1 8.2 7.5 8.2 8.0 7.4 7.0 7.5 7.3 6.8 6.4 9.0 6.9 8.1 7.2 8.5
'.8 a.
See Appendix A for a list of the corresponding LER numbers.
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APPENDIX C
DEFICIENCY AND OBSERVATION COUNTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1
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1 3
3 TABLE C-1.
TEXT DEFICIENCIES ANO OBSERVATIONS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1
Descri tion of Oef1cienc1es and Observat1ons conditions before the event were not included or vere 1nadequate.
~5.7 2
-.51 I
3 of the structures, components, or systems that were 1noperable at the start of the event and that contr1buted to the event vas not included or vas inadequate.
~5.73>>
7 71 I
sufficient date and/or time information.
Number of LERs with Oef ic1enc1es and Obser va t1ons Sub-paragraph Paragraph a
b 4 (15) 0{7) 7 (15) a.
Date informat1on was insuff1cient.
b.
Time informat1on vas insufficient.
~5.73>>>> ih 7
intermed1ate cause of the component or system failure was not 1ncluded or was 1nadequate.
a.
Cause of component failure was not included or was 1nadequate.
b.
Cause of system fa1lure was not 1ncluded or was inadequate.
~55.73 7
I 5 ih 7
11 aechanism (immediate cause),
and/or effect (consequence) for each failed component vas not included or vas 1nadequate.
a.
Failure mode was not included or vas inadequate.
b.
mechanism (iaaediate cause) vas not 1ncluded or vas inadequate.
c.
Effect (consequence) was not 1ncluded or was 1nadequate.
2 6
5 (15) 0 ( 6)
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TABLE'-l.
(cont1nued)
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Oescri t1on of Oef ic1encies and Observations I
I I"
1dentif ication System component function identif1er for each component or system was not 1ncluded.
Number of LERs w1th Def icienc1es and Observat1ons Sub-paragraph Paragraph a
b 15 (15)
I component with mult1ple funct1ons, a 11st of systems or secondary functions wh1ch were also affected was not included or was inadequate.
2~2--I I
Ih rendered a tra1n of a safety system inoperable, the estimate of elapsed time from the time of the fa1lure unt1l the tra1n was returned to service was not included.
2 I.-Fh 11 d
d1 I
of each component fa1lure, system fa1lure, personnel error, or procedural error was not 1ncluded or was inadequate.
a.
Method of discovery for each component failure was not included or was 1nadequate.
b.
Method of discovery for each system fa1lure was not included or was inadequa te.
c.
Method of d1scovery for each personnel error was not 1ncluded or was inadequate.
d.
Method of discovery for each procedural error was not included or was inadequate.
0 0
0
( 0) 0(>)
(15)
C-2
0 ~
TABLE-1'con t1nued)
Qescri tion of Deficiencies and Observations
- 50. 73 b 2
11 3
1 Operator act1ons that affected the course of the event including operator errors and/or procedural def ic1enc1es were not 1ncluded or were inadequate.
Number of LERs w1th Def icienc1es and Obser va t ions Sub-paragraph Paragraph T
a b
0
( 8) 50.73 each inade b.
C.
b 2
11 3
2 The discussion of personnel error was not 1ncluded or was quate.
OBSERVATION:
A personnel andlor procedural error was ioplied by the text, but was not explic1tly stated.
50.73 b
2 11 3
2 1 D1scussion as to whether the personnel error was cognit1ve or procedural was not included or was inadequate.
50.73 b
2 11 J
2 11 D1scuss ion as to whether the personnel error was contrary to an approved procedure, was a direct result of an error 1n an approved procedure, or was associated with an act1vity or task that was not covered by an approved procedure was not 1ncluded or was inadequate.
50.73 b
2 11 3
2 111 Discuss1on of any unusual character1stics of the work 'locat1on (e.g., heat, no1se) that d1rectly contr1buted to the personnel error was not 1ncluded or was inadequate.
50.73 b
2 11 3
2 iv D1scussion of the type of personnel 1nvolved (i.e., contractor personnel, ut111ty 11censed
- operator, ut111ty nonlicensed
- operator, other ut111ty personnel } was not. 1ncluded or was inadequate.
0 (lo)
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TABLE C-l.
(continued)
Number of LERs with Oef ic1enc1es and Observat1ons Sub-paragraph Paragraph Oescri t1on of Oef1cienc1es and Observations Totals a
--A safety system responses were not included or were inadequate.
4
( 6) model number of each failed component was not 1ncluded or was 1nadequate.
y consequences and 1mpl1cations of the event was not included or was inadequate.
a.
OBSERVATION:
The availabil1ty of other systems or components capable of mitigating the consequences of the event was not discussed.
If no other systels or components were available, the text should state that none existed.
b.
OBSERVATION:
The consequences of the event had it occurred under more severe conditions were not d1scussed.
If the event occurred under what were cons1dered the most severe cond1tions, the text should so state.
~5..-5 5
1 5
y actions planned as a result of the event including those to reduce the probab111ty of s1m1lar events occurring 1n the future was not 1ncluded or was 1nadequate.
9 (15) 10 (15)
. 0 ~
'0 0 TABLE-1..
(con t 1 nued) h Oescr1 t1on of Oef1cienc1es and Observat1ons a.
h discuss1on of act1ons required to correct the problem (e.g., return the component. or system to an operational cond1t1on or correct the personnel error) was not included or was inadequate.
b.
A d1scuss1on of actions requ1red to reduce the probabil1ty of recurrence of the problem or similar event (correct the root cause) was not included or was 1nadequate.
c.
OBSERVATION:
A discuss1on of actions required to prevent similar fa1lures in similar and/or other systems (e.g.,
correct, the faulty part 1n all components with the same manufacturer and model number) was not included or was inadequate.
5 I f similar events was not included or was inadequate.
Number of LERs w1th Oef1cienc1es and Observat1ons Sub-paragraph Paragraph a.
0 12 (15)
C-5'-
0 TABLE C-l.
(cont1nued)
Descr1 t1on of Def1c1enc1es and Observat1ons
~T>>
T p
1nadequac1es.
a.
OBSERVATlON:
A d1agram would have a1ded 1n understand1ng the text d1scuss1on.
b.
Text conta1ned undef1ned acronyms and/or plant spec1f1c des1gnators.
.c.
The text conta1ns, other spec1f1c def1c1enc1es relat1ng to the readab111ty.
Number of LERs w1th Def1c1enc1es and Obser va t1ons Sub-paragraph Paragraph b
6 (15) a.
The 'sub-paragraph total's a tabulat1on of spec1f1c def1c1enc1es or observat1ons w1th1n certa1n requ1rements.
S1nce an LER can have more than one def1c1ency for certa1n requ1rements, (e.g.,
an LER can be def1c1ent 1n the area of both date and t1me 1nformat1on),
the sub-paragraph totals do not necessar1ly add up to the paragraph total.
b.
The "paragraph total's the number of LERs that have one or more requ1rement def1c1enc1es or observat1ons.
The number 1n parenthes1s 1s the number of LERs for wh1ch the requ1rement was cons1dered appl1cable.
C-6
0 ~
TABLE C-2.
ABSTRACT OEFICIENCIES ANO OBSERVATIONS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1
Descri t1on of Oeficienc1es and Observat1ons A sundry of occurrences (iaeediate cause and effect) was not included or was inadequate.
A summary of plant,
- system, and/or personnel responses was not 1ncluded or was inadequate.
Number of LERs with Oef1cienc'ies and Observat1ons Sub-paragraph Paragraph 3 (15) 1 (15) a.
Sundry of plant responses was not included or was 1nadequate.
b.
Suaeary of systew responses was not included or was inadequate.
c.
Seminary of personnel responses was not included or was inadequate.
1 A summary of the root cause of the event was not 1ncluded or was inadequate.
A su+nary of the correct1ve act1ons taken or planned as a result of the event was not included or was 1nadequate.
0 ll (15) 13 (l5)
C-7
I ~
TABLE C-2. '(continued)
Descr1 tion of Deficiencies and Observations Abstract presentat1on inadequacies.
a.
OBSERVATION:
The abstract conta1ns 1nformat1on not 1ncluded 1n the text.
The abstract is intended to be a sundry of the text, therefore, the text should discuss all information sunearized in the abstract.
b.
The abstract was,greater than 1400 spaces.
c.
The abstract contains undefined acr onyms and/or plant spec1 f 1 c des1gnators.
d.
The abstract contains other specific deficiencies (i.e., poor suamarization, contradictions, etc.}.
Number of LERs with Oef iciencies and Observations Sub-paragraph Paragraph a
b 10 (15) 0 a.
The "sub-paragraph total" is a tabulat1on of specific def1c1encies or observations within certain requirements.
Since an LER can have more than one def1c1ency for certa1n requirements, the sub-paragraph totals do not necessarily add up to the paragraph total.
b.
The 'paragraph total" is the number of LERs that have one or more deficiency or observat1on.
The number 1n parenthesis 1s the number of LERs for which a certa1n requirement was considered applicable.
C-8
0 ~
A,~
~
Q Q
~(,
I TABLE'-3'..
COOED FIELDS DEFICIENCIES AND OBSERVATIONS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1
Oescr1 tion of Deficiencies and Observations Fac.111ty Kame a.
Unit number was not 1ncluded or 1ncorrect.
b.
Name was not 1ncluded or vas 1ncorrect.
c.
Additional un1t numbers were included but not required.
Docket Number was not 1ncluded or'as incorrect.
Number of LERs with Oef1cienc1es and Observations Sub-paragraph Paragraph 0 (15) 0 (15)
.3 I
'3.
i3
>3 i
.I 3
ii Page Number was not included or vas incorrect.
Title vas left blank or was inadequate.
a.
Root. cause vas not given or vas 1nadequate.
b'.
Result (effect) vas not g1ven or vas inadequate.
c.
Link vas not given or was inadequate.
Event Date a.
Date not 1ncluded or vas incorrect.
b.
Discovery date given instead of event date.
LER Number vas not included or vas incorrect.
Report Date a.
Date not 1ncluded.
b.
OBSERVATION:
Report date vas not w1thin thirty days of event date (or d1scovery date 1f appropr1ate);
Other Fac111t1es 1nforaation 1n field 1s inconsistent with text and/or abstract..
Operating Node was not 1ncluded or was incons1stent.
v1 th text or. abstract.
15 0 (15) 15'15) 2 (15) 0 (15) 0 (15)
- 0. (15) 0'15)
C-'9
TABLE-C-3.
(cont1nued)
~
Oescr1 t1on of Oef1c1enc1es and Observat1ons Power level was not 1ncluded or was 1ncons1stent w1th text or abstract.
Number of LERs w1th Oef1c1enc1es and Obser va t1ons Sub-paragraph Paragraph a
b 0 (15)
Repor t1ng Requ1rements a.
The reason for checking the "OTHER" requ1rement was not spec1f1ed 1n the abstract and/or text.
b.
OBSERVATION: It may have been more appropr 1ate to report the event under a d1fferent paragraph.
c.
OBSERVATION: It may have been appropr1ate to report th1s event under an add1t1onal unchecked paragraph.
L1censee Contact 0 (l5) 0 (l5) a.
F1eld left blank.
b.
Pos1t1on t1tle was not'ncluded.
c.
Name was not 1ncluded.
d.
Phone number was not 1ncluded.
Coded Component Fa1lure Informat1on a.
One or more component fa1lure sub-f1elds were left blank.
b.
- Cause, system, and/or component code 1s 1ncons1stent w1th text.
c.
Component fa1lure f1eld conta1ns data when no component fa1lure occurred.
d.
Component fa1lure occurred but ent1re f1eld left blank.
0 0
0 (15)
C-l0
e
'I TABLE, C-3. 0 ~
(continued)
Oescri t1on of Deficiencies and Observations Supplemental Report a.
Neither "Yes "I"No" block of the supplemental report f1eld was checked.
b.
The block checked was 1nconsistent with the text.
Number of LERs with Deficienc1es and Obser vat1ons Sub-paragraph Paragraph T~
l (15) 0 Expected submission date 1nformat1on is 1nconsistent with the block checked 1n Item (14).
0 (15) a.
The 'sub-paragraph total's a tabulation of specific defic1enc1es or observations within certain requ1rements.
Since an LER can have more than one deficiency for certain requirements, the sub-paragraph totals do not necessarily add up to the paragraph total.
b.
The 'paragraph total" is the number of LERs that have one or more requ1rement deficienc1es or observat1ons.
The number in parenthes1s 1s the number of LERs for which a certa1n requirement was considered appl1cable.
APPENDIX 0 LER COMMENT SHEETS FOR SHEARON.HARRIS 1
~
f
<<j
'.:.;:..O:.:
~
TABLE D-1.
SPECIFIC LER. CONENTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1 (400)
Sect1on Contents 1.
LER Number:
86-008'-00 35 Scores:
Text'.3 Text 5.
Abstract 6.3 Coded F1elds 8.9 Overall 7.8
~5.1>>
--3 p
the procedural changes were lade would be helpful.
50.73 b
2 11 F The Energy Industry Ident1f1cat1on System code for each component and/or system referred to 1n the text 1s not 1ncluded.
5553 3 I II:
event had 1t occurred under Nore severe cond1t1ons were not d1scussed.
If the event occurred under what are cons1dered the most severe cond1t1ons, 1t would be helpful to state so 1n the text.
Is there a set of poss1ble/probable temperature and boron concentrat1on cond1tions where there could be some safety consequences?
g 5~3--3
!I I 3 1gll I I
were strengthened were not 1ncluded.
5~3.13 5 --I I It 3 5 events 1s not 1ncluded.
If no prev1ous s1a1lar events are known,, the text should so state.
~.
a 3
-I 1
s Abstract Coded F1elds 3
~5.3 I
I f
I P.
g~t>>
--3 I
I planned as a result of the event 1s not 1ncluded.
Pf hdd1t1onal space 1s ava1lable w1th1n the abstract f1eld to prov1de acre informat1on but 1t was not ut111zed.
~Iten
~
Title:
Cause and link are nnt inctuded.
A more appropr1ate t1tle N1ght be 'Techn1cal Spec1f1cat1on Requ1red manual Reactor Tr1p dur1ng Surve1llance. Test1ng due to Procedural Oef1c1ency'.
5 pe I
I I'
TABLE O-l.
SPECIFIC LER CONENTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1
(400)
Section 2.
LER Number:
86-009-01 Ceanents Scores:
Text 8.7 Abstract 6.5 Coded Fields 9.0 Overall 8.1 Text
~5.>>
2
1 f
7 the second SI signal and the restorat1on of all systems 1s not 1ncluded.
Oate for the 1mplementat1on of the human factors defic1ency correct1on is not 1nc luded.
2.
3.
4.
2>>
1 7
cause d1scuss1on concerning the implementat1on of PCR-174 is inadequate.
Is it noraal to evaluate a
Plant Change Request for over five months2 50.73 b
2 11 F The Energy Industry dent1 1cat1on ystem code for each component and/or system referred to in the text is not 1ncluded.
~5.
d 1
7 0
t reduce the probability of recurrence
( 1.e, correction of the root cause) is inadequate.
Is the
'appropr1ate modification'o correct the huaan factors deficiency the same as that proposed in PCR-1742 Mere any temporary tags/warnings placed on the manual SI control sw1tch and the reset control sw1tch to alert personnel until the permanent mod1ficat1ons were implemented?
Mere other operators warned of th1s potential confusions Abstract 5.
~50.>>
5 --1 1 t1>>
0 events 1s not 1ncluded.
If no previous similar events are known, the text should so state.
~50.70
0 y
5 d
t cause(s) and effects(s)j 1s inadequate because Train A of SI is not ment1oned as actuating subsequent to the Tra1n B actuation.
~50.7 0
1 0
y 7
0 7
inadequate.
The procedural def1c1ency, the momentary loss of the block signal, the personnel
- error, and the human factors def1c1ency are not mentioned.
~
~
0 0
D
~
TABLE O-l.
SPECIFIC'LER COIOEHTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1 (400)
Section Comaents 2.
LER Number:
86-009-01 (Continued) 3.,
4.
Coded F 1el ds 1.
5~ S P
planned as a result of the event 1s inadequate.
The procedural rev1sion and the 1mplelentation of the human factors defic1ency are not mentioned.
OBSERVATION:
The abstract is 1ntended to be a
suranary of the text; therefore, the text must include all-informat1on sunmarized 1n the abstract.
This abstract contains information that was not 1ncluded 1n the text.
The time of the start of the second SI signal 1s not included in the text.
~Item a Tttle:
Cause tnfornatton ts tnadequate.
A better title might be:
'Inadvertent Safety In]ection Signals (Twice) Because of Procedural Oef1ciency and Personnel Error Our1ng Test1ng'.
0-3
~
0
-~
~
s5 TABLE O-l.
SPECIFIC LER COlOENTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS l (400}
2 Sect1on Comnent s 3.
LER Number:
86-010-01 Scores:
Text 8.1 Text 2.
3.
Abstract 8.2 Coded F1elds 8.0 Overall 8.2 IY
~5.>>
I I
I I
I Iden t1f1ca t1on System code for each component and/or system referred to 1n the text 1s not 1ncluded.
I I
d1scovery of the m1ssed sample 1s 1nadequate.
Qhat was the act1v1ty 1n progress that led to the d1scovery (e.g.,
records rev1ew)2 f
safety consequences and 1mpl1cat1ons of the event 1s 1nadequate.
Had th1s event occurred at a later date, when there was a poss1b111ty of rad1oact1ve
- releases, was there another mon1tor (or backup system) that m1ght have prevented a release?
~55.15 51 I
f I
t1 or planned 1s 1nadequate.
How were the superv1sory rev1ews enhanced?
Abstract 5.
5 I f events 1s not 1ncluded.
If no prev1ous s1m1lar events are
- known, the text should so state.
~5.>>>> I I
I t1 planned as a result of the event 1s 1nadequate.
Those act1ons taken to prevent recurrence are not men t1oned, Coded Fields 2.
Add1t1onal space 1s.ava1lable w1th1n the abstract f1eld to prov1de more 1nformat1on but 1t was not ut111zed.
~Itaa a Titte:
Cause and result tnrornatton ts not 1ncluded.
A better t1tle m1ght be 'Techn1cal Spec1f1cat1on V1olat1on Results Mhen Techn1c1an Fa1led to Take a Requ1red Effluent Srab Sample'.
0-4
- ~ "I
~ ~,I,ar s,, tnY, rs
.,5~
ff s
~
2
'w e>w~'gj, tw, 2 2sfntYsfs
~XI" 55, '"n Yr
~
w.;'"," I
'55
~ 2'
'"uzf te,
~ e
~
~
TABLE D-l..
SPECIFIC LER COMMENTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1 (400)
Sect1on Counts 4.
LER Number:
87-001-00 Scores:
Text 9.2 Abstract 6.5 Coded F1elds 9.0 Overall 8.4 Text Abstract Coded F1elds 2
-2 1
operat1ng mode number referred to 1n the text was not 1nc luded.
2.~ 2 2
1 Ident1f1cat1on System code for each component and/or system referred to 1n the text 1s not 1ncluded.
- 3. ~-.
1d<<
1f the connectors fa1led under more severe operat1ng cond1t1ons7 If the event occurred under what are cons1dered the most severe cond1t1ons, 1t would be helpful to state so 1n the text.
~73 1
y 1
1 3
12 manufacturer's error and lack of 1nstallat1on 1nstruct1ons weren' ment1oned.
2.
~5.>>
.2 y
11 1
planned as a result of the event 1s 1nadequate.
Replacement of the connectors wasn't ment1oned.
3.
Add1t1onal space 1s ava1lable w1th1n the abstract f1eld to prov1de more 1nformat1on but 1t was not ut111zed.
1.
~Item a TSt'le:
Cause 1s net tneluded.
~ ~
TABLE 0-1.
SPECIFIC LER COfOENTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1
(400)
Sect1on 5.
LER Number:
87-003-00 Ceanent s Scores:
Text 9.5 Text 2.
3.
Abstract Abstract 6e3 Coded F1elds 9.2 Overall 8.5
~5.>> >>
I >>
t f
Node numbers (e.g.,
hot standby, hot shutdown, etc.).
'I I
I Ident1f1cat1on System code for each component and/or system referred to 1n the text 1s not 1ncluded.
f events 1s not 1ncluded.
If no prev1ous s1m1lar events are known, the text should so state.
~5.>>
I I
f t
I "t 1nc luded.
2.
3.
~5.>> I I
I tt planned as a result of the event 1s 1nadequate.
The "correct1ve act1ons'aken to repa1r the pump are not ment1oned The test frequency change and the acceptance cr1ter1a 1n operat1onal surve1llance test changes are not 1ncluded.
Add1t1onal space 1s ava1lable w1th1n the abstract f1eld to prov1de more 1nformat1on but 1t was not ut111zed.
Coded F1elds
~Item a --Tttie:
Root cause tnformat ton ts not 1ncluded.
A better t1tle m1ght be 'In1t1al Assembly Error of Pump Internals Causes Unacceptable Aux1l1ary Feedwater Pump Flow Our1ng Test and Un1t Shutdown".
D-6
~ ~
~
0 TABLE D-l.
SPECIFIC LER COJSENTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS l (400)
Sect1on Coneent s 6.
LER Number:
87-004-00 Scores:
Text 6.4 Abstract 9.0 Coded F1elds 8.5 Overall 7.4 Text 0
stab111ze at nominal cond1t1ons7 2.
3.
4.
5.
0 cause d1scuss1on concern1ng the b1stable setpo1nts 1s 1nadequate.
Shen (date) was the 2'ated thermal power data collected'ould the b1stables have been set us1ng th1s new data pr1or to th1s event?
~50.>>>>
I 70 0
gyt y
Ident1f1cat1on System code for each component and/or system referred to 1n the text 1s not 1ncluded.
50.73 b
2 11 3
2 01scuss1on of the personnel error/procedural def1c1ency 1s 1nadequate.
Was the fact that the operator d1d not note the b1stable status on the aa1n control board a cogn1t1ve or procedural error?
50.73 b
2 11 3
2 1v 01scuss1on of the type of personnel 1nvolved (e.g., contractor personnel, ut111ty l1censed
- operator, ut111ty nonl1censed
- operator, other ut111ty personnel) 1s not 1ncluded.
~50.>>
0 safety consequences and 1mpl1cat1ons of the event 1s not 1ncluded.
Abstract 6.
7.
~0.73
--Ilt f
t t
or planned 1s 1nadequate.
Sere the operators counseled to note the status of the b1stables dur1ng future such power reduct1ons?
~50.73 5 --I I t1 I
g 0 events 1s not 1ncluded.
If no prev1ous s111lar events are known, the text should so state.
Root cause and correct1ve act1on 1nforsat1on 1s def1c1ent for the same reasons d1scussed 1n the text.
Coded F1elds
~ttee a Tttle:
Cause and ltnk are net secluded.
A better t1tle a1ght be, "Ieproper Interoed1ate Range Channel B1stable Setpo1nt Caused Reactor Tr1p Shen Perm1ss1ve P-10 Reset'.
D-7
L
~ ~
TABLE O-l.
SPECIFIC LER CONTENTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1 (400)
Section Ceanents 7.
LER Number:
87-005-00 Scores:
Text 8.0 Abstract 6.0 Coded F1elds 7.9 Overall 7.4 Text 2.
3.
4.
..1 d>>
cause discussion concern1ng the fa1led components 1s inadequate.
Ny was the a1r 11ne brokenl A
supplemental report appears to be needed to report the results of the invest1gat1on into the CBP problem.
50.73 b
2 11 F --The Energy Industry Ident1fication System code for each component and/or system referred to in the text 1s not 1ncluded.
50.73 b
2 11 L --Ident1f1cat1on (e.g.,
manufacturer and model no.) of the fa1led component(s) discussed in the text 1s not 1ncluded.
50.73 b
4 A discussion of actions required to re uce e probability of recurrence (1.e, correction of the root cause) 1s 1nadequate.
without know1ng why the air supply fa1led (see text coaauent l) 1t 1sn't obv1ous if simply replacing the 11ne will prevent recurrence.
A supplemental report appears to be needed to report the results of the investigation into the CBP problem.
5.
50.73 b
5 Informat1on concern1ng prev1ous s1m1lar even s
s not included.
If no previous s1milar events are known, the text should so state.
Abstract 6.
2.
OBSERVATION:
A d1agram or figure would aid 1n understand1ng the event.
~5.15
--5 y
5 1
t1*1d
~55.5
5 y
1 1
t t
planned as a result of the event is not included.
3.
Addit1onal space is available with1n the abstract field to prov1de more informat1on but 1t was not ut1lized.
Coded Fields l.
~Itaa a
Title:
Cause ls not Included.
2.
~Iten la The block checked appears to be incons1stent w1th 1nformation prov1ded in the text; see text coaaent numbers 1 and 4.
D-8
~
~
TABLE D-l.
SPECIFIC LER COMMEHTS FOR SHEAROH HARRIS 1 (400)
Sect1on Cement s 8.
LER Humber:
87-008-00 Scores:
Text 7.8 Text 2.
Abstract 6.3 Coded F1elds 8.7 Overall 7.h A supplemental report would be appropriate to describe the results of the further testing and ongo1ng investigat1on of the feedwater and condensate trans1ent responses if these results sign1f1cantly change the reader's percept1on of the event and/or require addit1onal correct1ve act1ons be taken.
~5. >>
2
5 5 tr1p, the stabilization in Mode 3, the return to serv1ce of LCV-llSB, and the compensating voltage ad)ustment made follow1ng a subsequent reactor tr1p is not included.
3.
5.
6.
50.73 b
2 11 0 The root and/or intermediate cause d1scuss1on concerning the problem d1scovered during test1ng of the turbine governor valve that
'was 1dentified and corrected's 1nadequate.
Khy was the compensating voltage for the intermediate range neutron detectors not correct7
~5.>>
2>>
2 --yl 5
ly I y
Ident1f1cation System code for each component and/or system referred to in the text 1s not 1ncluded.
50.73 b
2 11 L Ident1f1ca t1on (e.g.,
manufacturer and model no.) of the fa1led component(s) discussed in the text is inadequate.
More informat1on 1dentifying LCV-115B would be appropriate (e.g.,
model
- number, motor size, etc.).
~M.7 5d\\
1 5
5 5
I dl correct the insuediate probleo and return the appl1cable systems/component(s) to an operable status is inadequate for the turb1ne governor valve.
A discuss1on of actions required to reduce the probability of recurrence (1.e, correction of the root cause) is not 1ncluded concerning the test1ng engineer's inadvertently shorting the terainals wh1ch closed the governor valve.
D-9
~ 0 TABLE D-l.
SPECIFIC LER CNHENTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1 (400)
Section Coarnen t s 8.
LER Number:
87-008-00 (Cont1nued) 5.
~5.>>
5 5
5 events 1s not included.
If no previous s1milar events are known, the text should so state.
8.
Acronym(s) and/or plant spec1fic designator(s) are undefined for LCO, CPSL and RCS.
Abstract
~5.>>>>-.
y 5
cause(s) and effects(s))
is not included for the va1 ve CCV-1158.
5.
~55.>>
f included.
3.
~53.>>
--5 5
5 t
t planned as a result of the event is not 1ncluded.
The statement,
'the cause of the event w'as identif1ed and corrected
. 'oes not adequately summarize the cause and corrective actions taken as descr1bed 1n the text.
Coded Fields l.
~item a
Title:
Cause tttnadvertent shorting of term1nals dur1ng testing personnel error) 1s not included.
2.
~item 13 Component failure occurred but entire f1eld 1s blank.
0
~
'0 0
1
~
c TABLE Q-l.
SPECIFIC LER CONEMTS FOR SHEAROM HARRIS 1 (400)
Sect1on Caaaents 9
LER Mumber:
87-010-00 Scores:
Text 8.0 Abstract 8.7 Coded F1elds 9.0 Overall 8.3 Text Abstract 2.
3.
4.
5.
I operat1ng cond1t1ons before the event 1s 1nadequate.
A def1n1t1on for Node 3 vould be helpful (e.gf e hot standby).
50.73 b
2 11 F --The Energy Industry Ident1f1cat1on System code for each component and/or system referred to 1n the text 1s not 1ncluded.
~I>>
I manufacturer and model no.) of the fa1led component(s) d1scussed 1n the text 1s not 1ncluded.
0~00 I
I f t<<
or planned 1s 1nadequate, Those act1ons necessary to prevent recurrence of the event are not d1scussed (e.g., placed smoke detectors on scheduled clean1ng 11st).
~0.
I If tt <<
I events 1s not 1ncluded.
If no prev1ous s111lar events are knovn, the text should so state.
~0.0>> I I
f 0>> t cause(s) and effects(s)]
1s 1nadequate.
The 1mpl1cat1ons concern1ng the tvo Techn1cal Spec1f1cat1ons 1nvolved 1n th1s event should have been ment1oned.
2.
3.
~5.0>> I f
- tt planned as a result of the event 1s 1nadequate for the same reason prov1ded 1n text ceaeent nuaber 4.
Add1t1onal space 1s ava11able vlth1n the abstract field to prov1de IIore 1nforaat1on but 1t was not ut111zed.
Coded F1elds
~Iten a T1tle:
Cause tnfocnatton 1s not 1ncluded.
A better t1tle a1ght be 'Faulty Seoke Oetector Caused Inoperab111ty of Both Control Room Eaergency F1ltrat1on Systeas and a Techn1cal Spec1f1cat1on 3.0.3 Cooldovn'.
0-11
'~ssp "ee 'e
+."'fwf "i ':,
00,c'I;).0 tasit e
i 'u
- a+ +"
TABLE D-l.
SPECIFIC LER CONTENTS FOR SHEAROH HARRIS 1
(F00)
Sect1on Contents 10.
LER Number:
87-01 l-00 Scores:
Text 8.1 Abstract 8.0 Coded Fields 8.5 Overall 8.1 Text 2.
3.
operating mode referred to in the text was not included (e.g.,
hot shutdown}.
I
/
when corrective actions were taken) would be helpful.
71
<</
cause discuss1on concerning the d1ode failure 1s not included.
5.
6.
8.
9.
7>>
I I
5 I
Identificat1on System code for each component and/or system referred to in the text is not 1ncluded.
50.73 b
2 11 3
2 It 1sn't clear why the breaker tr1pped 1n th1s event.
Has the breaker supposed to be closed when the pedal was checked and/or did the AO depress the pedal too far w1th his foot while check1ng it?,
~53. 3>>
I I
t manufacturer and model no.} of the failed component(s) d1scussed in the text 1s not included.
In addit1on, although not requ1red, it would be helpful to identify the breaker and release
- lever, since their des1gn appears to have been a
contributing factor in causing the event.
~53.73 I 3d1 I
/
t1 5
I d I reduce the probabil1ty of recurrence (1.e, correct1on of the root cause) 1s inadequate.
Without a root cause discussion (see text candent
- 3) it 1s not obv1ous 1f siwply replacing the diode 1s sufficient to prevent recurrence.
~bll.73 5
5 --I I t1 I
5 5 events is not included.
If no prev1ous s1a1lar events are known, the text should so state.
Acronym(s) andlor plant spec1f1c des1gnator(s) are undefined (OST wasn't defined).
D-12
~
~
~
0 TABLE D-l.
SPECIFIC, LER CONHEHTS FOR SHEAROH HARRIS 1 (400)
Sect1on lOe LER Humber:
87-011-00 (Cont1nued)
Contents Abstract Coded F1elds
~D.>>
AO's use of h1s foot and the fa1led po~er supply weren' ment1oned.
- 2. ~
Y planned as a result of the event 1s 1nadequate.
Replac1ng the d1ode wasn't ment1oned.
l.
~Item a Tit'le:
Cause and 1Snk are nut Secluded and the result 1s vague.
A more appropr1ate t1tle m1ght be 'multiple Eng1neer1ng Safety Feature Actuat1ons dur1ng Surve1llance Test1ng due to Personnel/Procedural Error".
0-l3
0
~
0
~
TABLE 0-l.
SPECIFIC'*LER CONNENTS FOR SHEAROH HARRIS l (400) 5E Section Cement s ll.
LER Number:
87-013-00 Scores:
Text 7.8 Abstract 7.1 Coded Fields 9.2 Overall 7.8 Text'-1 in Node 3
1s not included.
2.
3.
5 1
1 Identification System code for each component and/or system referred to in the text 1s n'ot 1ncluded.
~tt.
safety consequences and implicat1ons of the event is not included.
Abstract Coded Fields 2.
~5
5 or planned 1s inadequate.
Mere the feedwater system dynam1c response tests which vere completed Narch 27, 1987, performed under sim1lar cond1t1ons to those that led to th1s event?
~tty>>
1 5
y 1 <<1 t1 concerning pump tr1p time delays 1s not included.
5 y
1 t1 t
planned as a result of the event is not included.
~Item 4
Title:
Cause information (feedwater system hydraul1c instabilities) 1s 1nadequate.-
I s
y.
5 55 A
yy, yte Sv','+A't+P '5~% J 0 Hyeh~ Neyjtg 0 9 <e ry>At y5a" 5 ic 1
a (
ye cist e'n e '+ 4
'X S
J'l,y ~. " '
rr.
'6
"5
~ r, ".,I r 5
TABLE D-1.
SPECIFIC LER COPOENTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1 (400)
Section Contents 12.
LER Number:
87-014-00 Scores:
Text 8.3'bstract 7.9 Coded Fields 7.5 Overall 8.1 Text cause discussion concerning the loose hanger ls inadequate.
Qhy was lt loose2 Abstract 2.
3 ~
5.
6.
2.
~3>>
I 3
I Identification System code for each component and/or system referred to ln the text ls not included.
50.73 b
2 11 3
2 Dlscusslon of the personnel error/procedural deficiency is inadequate.
50.73 b
2 11 3
2 lv Discussion of the type of personnel involved (e.g., contractor personnel, utillty licensed operator, utility nonl1censed
- operator, other ut111ty personnel) 1s not included.
~5.>>
3--11 I
f tk t
t safety consequences and 'implications of the event ls inadequate.
Shat were the implications of the loose hanger2
~5.3 pt I
t1 k
or planned 1s inadequate.
Has anything done to prevent recurrence of a loose hanger2 OBSERVATION:
A diagram or figure would aid ln understanding the event.
5~3 13 5
'1t1 p
would have been good to 1nclude ln the abstract.
5~0.
3 I 5 1 f t\\
k planned as a result of the event ls inadequate.
Those actions taken to prevent recurrence of the event or sllllar events were not eentioned ln the abstract.
3.
Add1t1onal space is ava11able within the abstract f1eld to provide Nore information but lt was not utilized.
0-15
I e
~
II
~
~
~
TABLE D-l.
SPECIFIC LER COHPIENTS FOR SHEAROH HARRIS I (400)
Sect1on 12.
LER Humber:
87-014>>00 (Cont1nued }
Cogent s Coded F1elds l.
~Iten a
Title:
Cause and ltnk are not Included and the result 1s 1nadequate.
A better t1tle m1ght be
'Techn1cal Spec1f1cat1on Conta'inment Integr1ty V1olat1on Oue to Personnel Error Our1ng Gauge Ins ta 1 la t1on".
2.
Item 5 It appears that the event date should be
- the d1scovery date 1s 3-14-87.
3.
~ltea 10 -OBSERVATION: It ls appropriate to put zeroes 1n th1s f1eld any t1me the po~er level 1s less than one percent.
0-'l6
~
0
'4 k
k
~
vs a
i '
TABLE O-l.
SPECIFIC LER COSIENTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS l (400)
Sect1on Ceanents l3.
LER Number:
87-016-00 Scores:
Text 8.2 Text 2.
3.
Abstract 7e5 Coded F1elds 8.2 Overall 8.0 50.73 b
2 11 F
The Ener gy Indus tr y Ident1f1cat1on System code for each component and/or system referred to 1n the text 1s not 1ncluded.
~5.>>
15 rad1oact1ve release occurred
~h11e the mon1tor was valved out7 Were there other mon1tors/systems ava1lable to m1t1gate the consequences7
~5.>>
5 1 f t>>
events 1s not 1ncluded.
If no prev1ous s1e1lar events are known, the text should so state.
Abstract Coded F1elds 2.
Acronym(s) and/or plant spec1f1c des1gnator(s) are undef1ned (e.g.,
EMC, WRY, and SHNPP vere undef1ned).
~5.73
-3 "5
1 1
5 t
1 procedural def1c1enc1es vere not ment1oned.
5~3.
3
3 "1
1 t1 planned as a result of the event 1s 1nadequate.
The procedural changes vere not aentioned.
~Iten a Tttle:
Ltnk (natntenance acttvtty) and cause (procedural def1c1ency) are not 1ncluded and the result (mon1tor 1noperable) 1s vague.
~Iten 5 Otscovery date ts gtven tnstead of event date.
Froo the text 1t appears that the event began on 3/26/&7.
D-17
0 TABLE O<<l.
SPECIFIC LER CONNENTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS l (400}
Section Coarsen t s 14.
LER Number:
87-0l7-00 Scores:
Text 7.4 Text Abstract 7.0 Coded F ields 7.5 Overall 7.3
1 1n Node 3 1s not 1ncluded.
2.
3.
50.73 b
2 11 F The Energy Industry Ident1ficat1on System code for each component and/or system referred to in the text is not included.
~5.>>
5 I
safety consequences and 1mplications of the event 1s not 1ncluded.
5 ff 1>>
5 events is not included.
If no prev1ous sita1lar events are known, the text should so state.
OBSERVATION: It would be helpful to discuss the prior feedwater trans1ent
- events, how they are related to the current event, and how the sequence of corrective actions from previous similar events affect those for this event.
Abs trac t A supplemental report would be appropr1ate to descr1be the results of the further testing of the steam generator water level control system ment1oned under 'Corrective Action" if these results sign1ficantly change the reader's perception of the event and/or requ1re additional corrective act1ons be taken.
~50.7 I 5 5
f 15 15 concerning the pressure differential across the regulating valve and the gains used in the automatic level control system is not 1ncluded.
5~9.i I
5 5 \\15 11 taken as a result of the event is inadequate.
The placing of the feedwater control in Nanual (except dur1ng further test1ng of the steam generator level control systeN} is not included.
~
~
TABLE D-l.
SPECIFIC LER CONENTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1
~COO)
Sect1on 14.
LER Number:
87-017-00 (Continued)
Coaaents Coded Fields 3.
Addit1onal space is ava1lable within the abstract f1eld to provide Nore information but 1t ~as not utilized.
1.
~Iten 4 Tttle ts not secluded.
TABLE O-l.
SPECIFIC LER CONTENTS FOR SHEARON HARRIS 1 (400)
Sect1on Comments 15.
LER Number:
87-018-00 Scores:
Text 6.8 Text 2.
4.
5.
Abstract 6.4 Coded Fields 9.0 Overall 6.9 50.73 b
2 11 C --At what t1me was the plant subsequent y stab1lized 1n ilode 32 50.73 b
2 11 F The Energy Industry dentif1cation ystem code for each component and/or system referred to in the text 1s not included.
50.73 b
2 11 3
2 Oiscuss1on of the personnel error/procedural def1ciency 1s inadequate.
Qho (by type/t1tle) was responsible for connecting and d1sconnecting the test leads in an 'informal manner2 Qho (what organization) was responsible for specifying the 1ncorrect setpo1nt for the turbine f1rst stage pressure permissive2 Mas the second lain feedwater pump tr1p (on low suct1on) cons1dered either a personnel error or a procedural def1c1ency2 3
--05 f
i 5
ff manual safety system responses 1s 1nadequate.
D1d any safety systems actuate after the manual tripl
~5--0 f
safety consequences and 1mpl1cat1ons of the event 1s not included.
Abstract 6.
~50.l
--0 or planned is 1nadequate.
It is not clear what the phrase "as appropr1ate" means in the th1rd sentence of the CORRECTIVE ACTION dtscoss1on.
Nhen eon't an 1ndependent ver1ftcat1on be appropr1atef
~50.'l3b 5
5 f ii 0 00 events is not 1ncluded.
If no prev1ous similar events are known, the text should so state.
~50.73 5 --0 0
0 0
inadequate.
There is no mention 1n the abstract of the probleN concerning the autooatic turb1ne runback.
O-20
r
~
~
~
t
~
~
~
~
TABLE 0-1.
SPECIFIC LER CDNENTS FOR SHEAROH HARRIS 1
(F00}
i Sect1on 15.
LER Humber:
87-018-00 (Cont1nued)
Cement s
- 2. ~--S 1nadequate.
The reasons for the loss of both feedwater pumps are not ment1oned.
The reason for the fa1lure of the automat1c turb1ne runback 1s not ment1oned.
S planned as a result of the event 1s 1nadequate.
None of the act1ons taken to prevent recurrence of the event vere ment1oned 1n the abstract.
4.
Abstract does not adequately sunearlze the text.
Add1t1onal space 1s ava1lable v1th1n the abstract f1eld to prov1de more 1nformat1on but 1t was not uti11zed.
I n
Coded Fields
'I.
~Item a -Title:
Cause infornatton is inadequate.
a better t1tle m1ght be "Personnel Error involv1ng Temporary Hon1tor1ng Equ1pment Results 1n Reactor Tr1p on Loss of Feedvater".
0-21
~
4
~
as