ML18019B140
| ML18019B140 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1986 |
| From: | Zimmerman S CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NLS-86-296, NUDOCS 8609050076 | |
| Download: ML18019B140 (22) | |
Text
4 REQU ORY INFORMATION DISTR IBUT SYSTEM (R IDS)
ACCESSION NBR: 8609050076 DOC. DATE: 86/08/29 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET ¹ FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Planti Unit i. Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ZIMMERMAN~S. R.
Carolina Pouter 5 Light Co.
RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTONi H. R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation>
Director (post 851125
SUBJECT:
'-Fonuards supplemental info re slave relays. Revised Attachment 1 includes equipment actuated bg slave relagsi per request, Addi justification 0or extended surveillance interva)s aslo encl.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
BOOID COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 2 ENCL JSI ZE:
TITLE: Licensing Submittal:
PSAR/FSAR Amdts 8c Related Correspondence NOTES: Application for permit renewal filed.
0'5000400 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PWR-A EB PWR-A FOB PWR-A PD2 PD PWR-A PSB INTERNAL: ADM/LFMB IE FILE IE/DGAUT/GAB 21 NRR PWR-B ADTS NRR/DHFT/MTB RCN2 EXTERNAL: BNL(AMDTS ONLY)
LPDR 03 NSIC 05 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 1
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1 RECIP IENT ID CODE/NAME PWR-A EICSB PWR-A PD2 LA BUCKLEY'S B 01 PWR-A RSB ELD/HDSi IE/DEPER/EPB 36 NRR BWR ADTS NRR
. L 04 I/MIB DMB/DSS (AMDTS)
NRC PDR 02.
PNL CRUEL>R COPIES LTTR ENCL 2
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TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REGUIRED'TTR 30 ENCL 25
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CNK Carolina Power & Light Company AUG 2 9 1986 SERIAL: NLS-86-296 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. I - DOCKET NO.50-000 SLAVE RELAYS
REFERENCE:
Letter dated May 19, 1986 (NLS-86-007) from Mr. S. R. Zimmerman (CPRL) to Mr. Harold R. Denton (NRC)
Dear Mr. Denton:
Carolina Power 1!r. Light Company submits supplemental information regarding certain slave relays for which surveillance intervals have been extended.
Attachment 1 has been revised in response to the staff's request that it include equipment actuated by the slave relays and not just the equipment that causes testing concerns. provides additional justification for our extended surveillance intervals.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Gregg A, Sinders at (919) 836-8168.
Yours very truly, GAS/vaw (0000GAS)
Attachments cc:
Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC)
Mr. 3. Mauck (NRC)
Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)
Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)
Wake County Public Library 8609050076 8608Z9%
PDR ADOCK 05000400, A
PDR~
S. R Zim erman nager Nuclear Licensing Section tel 411 Fayettevilte Street
~ P. O. Box 1551
~ Raleigh, N. C. 27602
Attachment 1 to NLS-86-296 (4040GAS/vaw )
~Re la No.
K601 Equipment/Valve No.
Train A Train B DG DG IA-SA IB-SB Normal Operating Condition Stop Emergency Operating Condition Run Service Descri tion Diesel Generator Start Test Concerns The Diesel Generators used on SHNPP are manufactured by Trans-America DeLaval (TDI).
Due to the number of starts on the diesel as a result of quarterly testing, the maximum number of starts as recommended by TDI and its owners'roup would be exceeded.
In the event the maximum number of starts is exceeded, the engine is required to be broken down and refurbished.
The Diesel Generators are presently being load tested on a monthly basis by manual initiation.
ISI-208 Open Open Accumulator IC Discharge Isolation Valve Additionally, the isolation valve to RCS Accumulator IC should not be closed for testing during power operation since it can place the plant in a potentially unsafe condition.
Based on the SHNPP accident analysis, two accumulators are required to mitigate the consequences of a double-ended break in the cold leg. It is assumed that only one accumulator volume is discharged through the break.
There'ore, closing an accumulator discharge isolation valve would isolate a second accumulator, violating the initial conditions of the SHNPP Accident Analyses.
ICS-210 Open Close Charging Pump IC Miniflow Isolation Valve Note I ICS-196 Open Close Charging Pump IB Miniflow Isolation Valve Note I (3348GASA/crs )
=
~Re la No.
K601 (Cont'd)
Equipment/Valve No.
Train A Train B 1CS-182 ICS-210 Normal Operating Condition Open Open Emergency Operating Condition Close Close Service Descri tion Charging Pump 1A Miniflow Isolation Valve Charging Pumps Miniflow Isolation alve Test Concerns Note 1
Note 1
IBD-05 Open Close SG 1C Blowdown Isolation Valve Note 1
1SI-1 1SI-2 1SP-227 1SP-226 Open Close Close Open SG 1C Sample Isolation Valves Boron Injection Tank Isolation Valves Note 1
Note 1
(3348GASA/crs )
~Reia No.
K602 Equipment/Valve No.
Train A Train B 1CS-165 1CS-166 1CS-291 1CS-292 Normal Operating Condition Open Close Emergency Operating Condition Close Open Service Descri tion VCT to CSIP Suction RWST to CSIP Suction Test Concerns Actuation of the relay causes addition of borated-water to the RCS during power operation.
This results in unnecessary rod movement and can result in a violation of Axial Flux Difference limits. There is also some small possibility of a reactor trip due to the h I penalty to the OP4 T trip setpoint.
Boration also increases the amount of liquid radwaste to be processed and could cause an unnecessary plant shutdown at the end of a
.core cycle. Switching of the CSIP's suction can result in thermal cycles to RCP seals and possible clogging of the seal injection filters.
1SP-220 1BD-09 1BD-39 Open Open Close Close SG IC Sample Isolation Valve SG 1C Blowdown Isolation Valves Note 1
Note 1
1CC-300 1CC-305 Open Close CCW to Gross Failed Fuel Detector Isolation Valves Note 1
1CC-110 1CC-115 Open Close CCW to Sample Heat Exchanger Note 1
Isolation Valves (3348GASA/crs )
~Re la No.
K603 Equipment/Valve No.
Train A Train B 1CS-233 1CS-235 ISI-206 ISl-207 Normal Operating Condition Open Open Emergency Operating Condition Close Open Service Descri tion Charging Pump Discharge to RCS Isolation Valves Accumu)ator IA and IB Discharge Isolation Valves Test Concerns Actuation of this relay causes isolation of the charging flow to the RCS and would decrease significantly the capability of the CVCS system to provide proper boration ratio. The isolation would only allow a flow path through the RC pump seal which would provide a insufficient boration path.
Additionally, this relay should not be tested at power for the same reason as the Relay K601.
ISI-0 ISI-3 Close Open Boron Injection Tank Isolation Valves Note 1
1BD-11 1BD-1 Open Close SG 1A Blowdown Isolation Valves Note 1
Control Room Isolation Control Room Isolation Provides Safety Injection Signal Component to Control Room Isolation Valves Note 1
1SP-1 Open Close SG IA Sample Isolation Valve Note 1
(3348GASA/crs )
~Re la No.
K608 Equipment/Valve No.
Train A Train B ISW-270 1SW-271 Normal Operating Condition Close Emergency Operating Condition Open.
Service Descri tion Emergency Service Water Header A/B Return to Auxiliary Reservoir Valves Test Concerns This relay should not be tested at power due to the potential of discharging chlorinated water from the normal service water/cooling tower system to the reservoirs.
This could potentially violate the EPA/State effluent discharge permit for chlorine limitations. Additionally, in the event that either of the cooling tower make-up pumps are not operational, the opening of these valves could cause the lowering of the cooling tower basin level. This could potentially affect the normal service water pump capability and the plant would have to reduce load or shutdown.
1BD-7 Open Close SG lA Blowdown Isolation Valve Note 1
IBD-30 1BD-26 Open Close SG 1B Blowdown Isolation Valves Note 1
1SP-217 ISP-210 ISP-222 ISP-219 Open Open Close Close SG IA Sample Isolation Valves SG 1B Sample Isolation Valves Note 1
Note 1
(3348GASA/crs )
.~
~Reia No.
K610 Equipment/Valve No.
Train A Train B DG DG IA-SA 1B-SB Normal Operating Condition Stop Emergency Operating Condition Run Service Descri tion Diesel Generator Start (Secondary Input)
Test Concerns This relay should not be tested at power for the same reasons as discussed for Relay K601.
RAB HVAC RAB HVAC Open Isolation Isolation Shut RAB Nodal HVAC Branch Isolation Dampers Additionally, this relay should not be tested at power because it will isolate equipment areas that contain both safety and non-safety-related equipment.
Although those areas do have back-up cooling, it is available only when the associated service water header is in operation.
Therefore, there could be adverse temperature excursions that could affect the safety-related equipment qualification and non-safety related equipment operation.
IBD-20 Open Close SG 1B Blowdown Isolation Valve Note I
= ICH-109 ICH-IOS ICX-197 1CX-196 Open Open Close Close ESF Chilled Water System Isolation (to non-safety related air handling units)
Note I (3348GASA/crs )
, ~
~Re la No.
K615 K616 lAF-137 lAF-09 1 AF-129 1 AF-55 IAF-103 1AF-130 1AF-51 IAF-93 Equipment/Valve No.
Train A Train B Normal Operating Condition Open Open Open Open Emergency Opera ting Condition Close Close Close Close Service Descri tion Auxiliary Feedwater to Steam Generator lA Isolation Valves Auxiliary(Feedwater to Steam" enerator lB Isolation Valves Test Concerns Testing of the items on Relays K615, 616, and 617 at power requires the closing of the valves isolating AFW to one steam generator at a time during staggered testing.
This contradicts the commitment made in Section 7.3.2.2.10.7 of the FSAR to have systems lined-up in their safeguards positions as a result of testing.
K617 1AF-109 1AF-50 IAF-131 1 AF-70 Open Open Close Close Auxiliary Feedwater to Steam Generator IC Isolation Valves (3348GASA/crs )
~Re la No.
K622 Equipment/Valve No.
Train A Train B 1SW-231 ISW-231 1SW-200 ISW-202 Fan Coil Fan Coil TrIp Trip Normal Operating Condition Open Open On Emergency Operating Condition Close Close Off Service Descri tion Non-safety Fan Coils SW Isolation Return Isolation Valves r
AH-37, 3, 39 Trip Test Concerns Testing of this relay at power willsignificantly reduce or terminate cooling air flow to the RC pump motor. This willcause damage to the motor in a short time which would force the plant to reduce power or shutdown.
1CS-11 Open Close Letdown Line Isolation Valve Note I; meets single failure requirement in conjunction with valve 1CS-9.
1SI-179 Close Close Accumulator Fill Line Isolation Valve Note 2 1SI-287 Close Close Accumulator Nitrogen Supply Isolation Valve Note 2 ISI-263 Close Close Accumulator Test Line Isolation Valve Note 2 ISI-260 Close Close Accumulator Test line to RWST Isolation Valve Note 2 1CS-9 Open Close Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve Note 1; meets single failure cirteria in conjunction with valve I CS-1 l.
(3348GASA/crs )
,~
~Re la No.
K636 Equipment/Valve No.
Train A Train B 1CS-706 1CS-752 Normal Operating Condition Close Emergency Operating Condition Open Service Descri tion CVCS Auxiliary Mini flow Isolation Valves Test Concerns Testing of this relay at power requires closing of valves ICS-705 and ICS-753 to prevent liftingthe CVCS mini flow relief valves (ICS-700 and ICS-755) during the test.
This contradicts the commitment made in Section 7.3.2.2.10.7 of the FSAR to have systems lined up in their safeguards position during testing.
1SP-16 ISP-916 Open Close Containment Atmosphere Sample Isolation Valves Note I 1SP-939 ISP-918 Containment Atmosphere Saniple Isui~ tion Valves Note 1
(3348GASA/crs )
~Rela No.
Equipment/Valve No.
Train A Train B Normal Operating Condition Emergency Operating Condition Service Descri tion Test Concerns K-739 K-700 ICT-105 1CT-102 Close Open Containment Spray Sump Recirculation Isolation Valves (Sump to/amp Suction)
The relays control the automatic switchover to the Containment Sump on lo-lo RWST level coincident with a Safety Injection signal. If tested at power, manual valves would have to be closed to prevent draining the RWST to the Containment Spray Sumps.
This would be in contradiction to the commitment made in Section 7.3.2.2.10.7 of the FSAR concerning safeguards testing.
Also, this testing willdrain the Containment Spray Header into the Containment Sump.
This problem. can be minimized if the testing is permitted during COLD SHUTDOWN.
ISI-310 ISI-311 Close Open Containment Sump to RHR Isolation Valves Note 1
K-700 K-701
-1CT-105 1CT-102 Close Open Containment Spray Sump Recirculation Isolation Valves (Sump to Pump Suction)
The relays control the automatic switchover to the Containment Sump on lo-lo RWST level coincident with a Safety Injection signal. If tested at power, manual valves would have to be closed to prevent draining-the RWST to the Containment Spray Sumps.
This would be in contradiction to the commitment made in Section 7.3.2.2.10.7 of the FSAR concerning safeguards testing.
Also, this testing willdrain the Containment Spray Header into the Containment Sump.
This problem can be minimized if the testing is permitted during COLD SHUTDOWN.
ISI-300 ISI-301 Close Open Containment Sump to RHR Isolation Valves Note 1
Note 1:
Note 2:
These relays are tested in pairs as shown, with one test switch per train. Each pair of relays actuates the valves shown.
No testing concern; these devices are part of a redundant system design that meets single failure requirements in that if one of the safety-related devices fails to perform its intended safety function, there is a redundant train safety device to accomplish that function.
The valves are in a normally closed position, which is the desired emergency position.
(H48GASA/crs )
to NLS-86-296 (4040GAS/vaw )
The following information is supplied as further justification for extending the surveillance test interval on the subject slave relays.
I.
Hardware and Software Im act In order to perform testing as recommended by the Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-0052) on the subject slave relays, significant hardware and software changes would be required to add "no-go" circuitry and redistribute the loads on existing relays.
a.
Approximately 50 cables would be affected, including 23 cables that would need to be rerouted, 23 new cables, and 0 reterminations.
Many of the devices affected are several hundred feet from the Solid State Protection System (SSPS), and the SSPS itself is in a very congested area of the plant making routing access very difficult.
b.
Approximately 23 test light circuits, 6 relays, and 2 test switches with accompanying interval panel wiring would have to be added to the Safeguard Test Cabinets and Solid State Panels in the SSPS.
c.
Dozens of drawings, manuals, and procedures would have to be revised, including control wiring diagrams (approximately 30); SSPS internal and external wiring drawings (approximately IO); Safeguard Test Cabinet internal and external wiring drawings (approximately 10); vendor instruction manuals; and plant pre-operational test, operational, and maintenance procedures.
These changes would involve design, procurement, installation, inspection, testing, training, and maintenance activities.
2.
Historical Data The slave relays employed at SHNPP are Potter-Brumfield MDR Series Rotary Relays.
This type relay is very commonly used not only at SHNPP, but throughout the industry.
These MDR Relays meet the most rigorous requirements of military specifications (MILSPEC), used not only in shipboard nuclear reactors, but also missile systems, gunfire apparatus, and computers.
They meet the MILSPEC requirements of MIL-R-19523, which includes the rugged requirements of MIL-STD-l67 for vibration and MIL-S-90l for shock.
The electrical Iif~.oxpectancy is generally rated at 100,000 operations minimum, with mechanical life expectancy a factor of 10 greater.
Indeed, the performance of these relays has been excellent, and a recent survey of NPRDS data indicates that no failures have been reported.
(4040GAS/pgp )
~.