ML18019B140

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Forwards Supplemental Info Re Slave Relays.Revised Attachment 1 Includes Equipment Actuated by Slave Relays,Per Request.Addl Justification for Extended Surveillance Intervals Also Encl
ML18019B140
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/29/1986
From: Zimmerman S
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NLS-86-296, NUDOCS 8609050076
Download: ML18019B140 (22)


Text

4 REQU ORY INFORMATION DISTR IBUT SYSTEM (R IDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8609050076 DOC. DATE: 86/08/29 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET ¹ FACIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Planti Unit i. Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ZIMMERMAN~S. R. Carolina Pouter 5 Light Co.

RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTONi H. R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation> Director (post 851125

SUBJECT:

'-Fonuards supplemental info re slave relays. Revised Attachment 1 includes equipment actuated bg slave relagsi per request, Addi justification 0or extended surveillance interva)s aslo encl.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: BOOID COPIES RECEIVED: LTR TITLE: Licensing Submittal: PSAR/FSAR Amdts 8c 2Related JSI ENCL ZE:

Correspondence NOTES: Application for permit renewal f i led. 0'5000400 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIP IENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PWR-A EB 1 1 PWR-A EICSB 2 2 PWR-A FOB 1 PWR-A PD2 LA 1 PWR-A PD2 PD 1 BUCKLEY'S B 01 2 2 PWR-A PSB 1 1 PWR-A RSB 1 i.

INTERNAL: ADM/LFMB 1 0 ELD/HDSi 0 IE FILE 1 1 IE/DEPER/EPB 36 IE/DGAUT/GAB 21 1 1 NRR BWR ADTS 0 NRR PWR-B ADTS 1 0 NRR . L 1 i.

NRR/DHFT/MTB 1 1 04 1 1 RCN2 3 3 I/MIB 1 0 EXTERNAL: BNL(AMDTS ONLY) 1 1 DMB/DSS (AMDTS) 1 LPDR 03 1 1 NRC PDR 02. 1 1 NSIC 05 1 1 PNL CRUEL>R 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REGUIRED'TTR 30 ENCL 25

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CNK Carolina Power & Light Company AUG 2 9 1986 SERIAL: NLS-86-296 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. I - DOCKET NO.50-000 SLAVE RELAYS

REFERENCE:

Letter dated May 19, 1986 (NLS-86-007) from Mr. S. R. Zimmerman (CPRL) to Mr. Harold R. Denton (NRC)

Dear Mr. Denton:

Carolina Power 1!r. Light Company submits supplemental information regarding certain slave relays for which surveillance intervals have been extended. Attachment 1 has been revised in response to the staff's request that it include equipment actuated by the slave relays and not just the equipment that causes testing concerns. Attachment 2 provides additional justification for our extended surveillance intervals.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Gregg A, Sinders at (919) 836-8168.

Yours very truly, S. R Zim erman nager Nuclear Licensing Section GAS/vaw (0000GAS)

Attachments cc: Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC)

Mr. 3. Mauck (NRC)

Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)

Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)

Wake County Public Library 8609050076 8608Z9% tel PDR ADOCK 05000400, A PDR~

411 Fayettevilte Street ~ P. O. Box 1551 ~ Raleigh, N. C. 27602 to NLS-86-296 (4040GAS/vaw )

Normal Emergency Equipment/Valve No. Operating Operating

~Re la No. Train A Train B Condition Condition Service Descri tion Test Concerns K601 DG DG Stop Run Diesel Generator Start The Diesel Generators used on SHNPP are IA-SA I B-SB manufactured by Trans-America DeLaval (TDI).

Due to the number of starts on the diesel as a result of quarterly testing, the maximum number of starts as recommended by TDI and its owners'roup would be exceeded. In the event the maximum number of starts is exceeded, the engine is required to be broken down and refurbished. The Diesel Generators are presently being load tested on a monthly basis by manual initiation.

ISI-208 Open Open Accumulator IC Discharge Additionally, the isolation valve to RCS Isolation Valve Accumulator IC should not be closed for testing during power operation since it can place the plant in a potentially unsafe condition. Based on the SHNPP accident analysis, two accumulators are required to mitigate the consequences of a double-ended break in the cold leg. It is assumed that only one accumulator volume is discharged through the break. There'ore, closing an accumulator discharge isolation valve would isolate a second accumulator, violating the initial conditions of the SHNPP Accident Analyses.

I CS-210 Open Close Charging Pump IC Miniflow Note I Isolation Valve ICS-196 Open Close Charging Pump IB Miniflow Note I Isolation Valve (3348GASA/crs ) =

Normal Emergency Equipment/Valve No. Operating Operating

~Re la No. Train A Train B Condition Condition Service Descri tion Test Concerns K601 1CS-182 Open Close Charging Pump 1A Miniflow Note 1 (Cont'd) Isolation Valve ICS-210 Open Close Charging Pumps Miniflow Note 1 Isolation alve I BD-05 Open Close SG 1C Blowdown Isolation Note 1 Valve 1SP-227 1SP-226 Open Close SG 1C Sample Isolation Valves Note 1 1SI-1 1SI-2 Close Open Boron Injection Tank Isolation Note 1 Valves (3348GASA/crs )

Normal Emergency Equipment/Valve No. Operating Operating

~Reia No. Train A Train B Condition Condition Service Descri tion Test Concerns K602 1CS-165 1CS-166 Open Close VCT to CSIP Suction Actuation of the relay causes addition of borated-water to the RCS during power operation. This 1CS-291 1CS-292 Close Open RWST to CSIP Suction results in unnecessary rod movement and can result in a violation of Axial Flux Difference limits. There is also some small possibility of a reactor trip due to the h I penalty to the OP4 T trip setpoint. Boration also increases the amount of liquid radwaste to be processed and could cause an unnecessary plant shutdown at the end of a

.core cycle. Switching of the CSIP's suction can result in thermal cycles to RCP seals and possible clogging of the seal injection filters.

1SP-220 Open Close SG IC Sample Isolation Valve Note 1 1BD-09 1BD-39 Open Close SG 1C Blowdown Isolation Note 1 Valves 1CC-300 1CC-305 Open Close CCW to Gross Failed Fuel Note 1 Detector Isolation Valves 1CC-110 1CC-115 Open Close CCW to Sample Heat Exchanger Note 1 Isolation Valves (3348GASA/crs )

Normal Emergency Equipment/Valve No. Operating Operating

~Re la No. Train A Train B Condition Condition Service Descri tion Test Concerns K603 1CS-233 1CS-235 Open Close Charging Pump Actuation of this relay causes isolation of the Discharge to RCS charging flow to the RCS and would decrease Isolation Valves significantly the capability of the CVCS system to provide proper boration ratio. The isolation would ISI-206 I Sl-207 Open Open Accumu)ator I A and IB only allow a flow path through the RC pump seal Discharge Isolation Valves which would provide a insufficient boration path.

Additionally, this relay should not be tested at power for the same reason as the Relay K601.

ISI-0 ISI-3 Close Open Boron Injection Tank Note 1 Isolation Valves 1BD-11 1BD-1 Open Close SG 1A Blowdown Isolation Note 1 Valves Control Control Provides Safety Injection Note 1 Room Room Signal Component to Isolation Isolation Control Room Isolation Valves 1SP-1 Open Close SG IA Sample Isolation Valve Note 1 (3348GASA/crs )

Normal Emergency Equipment/Valve No. Operating Operating

~Re la No. Train A Train B Condition Condition Service Descri tion Test Concerns K608 ISW-270 1SW-271 Close Open. Emergency Service This relay should not be tested at power due Water Header A/B to the potential of discharging chlorinated water Return to Auxiliary from the normal service water/cooling tower Reservoir Valves system to the reservoirs. This could potentially violate the EPA/State effluent discharge permit for chlorine limitations. Additionally, in the event that either of the cooling tower make-up pumps are not operational, the opening of these valves could cause the lowering of the cooling tower basin level. This could potentially affect the normal service water pump capability and the plant would have to reduce load or shutdown.

1BD-7 Open Close SG lA Blowdown Isolation Note 1 Valve I BD-30 1BD-26 Open Close SG 1B Blowdown Isolation Note 1 Valves 1SP-217 ISP-210 Open Close SG IA Sample Isolation Valves Note 1 ISP-222 ISP-219 Open Close SG 1B Sample Isolation Valves Note 1 (3348GASA/crs )

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Normal Emergency Equipment/Valve No. Operating Operating

~Reia No. Train A Train B Condition Condition Service Descri tion Test Concerns K610 DG DG Stop Run Diesel Generator This relay should not be tested at power for IA-SA 1B-SB Start (Secondary the same reasons as discussed for Input) Relay K601.

RAB HVAC RAB HVAC Open Shut RAB Nodal HVAC Additionally, this relay should not be tested Isolation Isolation Branch Isolation at power because it will isolate equipment Dampers areas that contain both safety and non-safety-related equipment. Although those areas do have back-up cooling, it is available only when the associated service water header is in operation.

Therefore, there could be adverse temperature excursions that could affect the safety- related equipment qualification and non-safety related equipment operation.

IBD-20 Open Close SG 1B Blowdown Isolation Valve Note I

=

ICH-109 I CH-IOS Open Close ESF Chilled Water System Note I I CX-197 1CX-196 Open Close Isolation (to non-safety related air handling units)

(3348GASA/crs )

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Normal Emergency Equipment/Valve No. Operating Opera ting

~Re la No. Train A Train B Condition Condition Service Descri tion Test Concerns K615 lAF-137 1 AF-129 Open Close Auxiliary Feedwater Testing of the items on Relays K615, 616, lAF-09 1 AF-55 Open Close to Steam Generator lA and 617 at power requires the closing of the Isolation Valves valves isolating AFW to one steam generator at a time during staggered testing. This contradicts K616 I AF-103 1AF-130 Open Close Auxiliary(Feedwater the commitment made in Section 7.3.2.2.10.7 of 1 AF-51 I AF-93 Open Close to Steam" enerator lB the FSAR to have systems lined-up in their Isolation Valves safeguards positions as a result of testing.

K617 1AF-109 I AF-131 Open Close Auxiliary Feedwater 1AF-50 1 AF-70 Open Close to Steam Generator IC Isolation Valves (3348GASA/crs )

Normal Emergency Equipment/Valve No. Operating Operating

~Re la No. Train A Train B Condition Condition Service Descri tion Test Concerns K622 1SW-231 I SW-231 Open Close Non-safety Fan Coils Testing of this relay at power will significantly SW Isolation reduce or terminate cooling air flow to the RC pump motor. This will cause damage to the motor 1SW-200 I SW-202 Open Close Return Isolation Valves in a short time which would force the plant to r reduce power or shutdown.

Fan Coil Fan Coil On Off AH-37, 3, 39 Trip Tr Ip Trip 1CS-11 Open Close Letdown Line Isolation Valve Note I; meets single failure requirement in conjunction with valve 1CS-9.

1SI-179 Close Close Accumulator Fill Line Note 2 Isolation Valve 1SI-287 Close Close Accumulator Nitrogen Supply Note 2 Isolation Valve ISI-263 Close Close Accumulator Test Line Note 2 Isolation Valve ISI-260 Close Close Accumulator Test line Note 2 to RWST Isolation Valve 1CS-9 Open Close Letdown Orifice Isolation Note 1; meets single failure cirteria in Valve conjunction with valve I CS-1 l.

(3348GASA/crs )

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Normal Emergency Equipment/Valve No. Operating Operating

~Re la No. Train A Train B Condition Condition Service Descri tion Test Concerns K636 1CS-706 1CS-752 Close Open CVCS Auxiliary Mini flow Testing of this relay at power requires Isolation Valves closing of valves ICS-705 and ICS-753 to prevent lifting the CVCS mini flow relief valves (ICS-700 and ICS-755) during the test. This contradicts the commitment made in Section 7.3.2.2.10.7 of the FSAR to have systems lined up in their safeguards position during testing.

1SP-16 ISP-916 Open Close Containment Atmosphere Note I Sample Isolation Valves 1SP-939 I SP-918 Containment Atmosphere Note 1 Saniple Isui~ tion Valves (3348GASA/crs )

Normal Emergency Equipment/Valve No. Operating Operating

~Rela No. Train A Train B Condition Condition Service Descri tion Test Concerns K-739 The relays control the automatic switchover to ICT-105 1CT-102 Close Open Containment Spray the Containment Sump on lo-lo RWST level K-700 Sump Recirculation coincident with a Safety Injection signal. If Isolation Valves tested at power, manual valves would have to be (Sump Suction) closed to prevent draining the RWST to the to/amp Containment Spray Sumps. This would be in contradiction to the commitment made in Section 7.3.2.2.10.7 of the FSAR concerning safeguards testing. Also, this testing will drain the Containment Spray Header into the Containment Sump. This problem. can be minimized if the testing is permitted during COLD SHUTDOWN.

IS I-310 ISI-311 Close Open Containment Sump to Note 1 RHR Isolation Valves K-700 -1CT-105 1CT-102 Close Open Containment Spray The relays control the automatic switchover to Sump Recirculation the Containment Sump on lo-lo RWST level K-701 Isolation Valves coincident with a Safety Injection signal. If (Sump to Pump Suction) tested at power, manual valves would have to be closed to prevent draining- the RWST to the Containment Spray Sumps. This would be in contradiction to the commitment made in Section 7.3.2.2.10.7 of the FSAR concerning safeguards testing. Also, this testing will drain the Containment Spray Header into the Containment Sump. This problem can be minimized if the testing is permitted during COLD SHUTDOWN.

ISI-300 ISI-301 Close Open Containment Sump to RHR Note 1 Isolation Valves These relays are tested in pairs as shown, with one test switch per train. Each pair of relays actuates the valves shown.

Note 1: No testing concern; these devices are part of a redundant system design that meets single failure requirements in that if one of the safety-related devices fails to perform its intended safety function, there is a redundant train safety device to accomplish that function.

Note 2: The valves are in a normally closed position, which is the desired emergency position.

(H48GASA/cr s )

to NLS-86-296 (4040GAS/vaw )

The following information is supplied as further justification for extending the surveillance test interval on the subject slave relays.

I. Hardware and Software Im act In order to perform testing as recommended by the Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-0052) on the subject slave relays, significant hardware and software changes would be required to add "no-go" circuitry and redistribute the loads on existing relays.

a. Approximately 50 cables would be affected, including 23 cables that would need to be rerouted, 23 new cables, and 0 reterminations. Many of the devices affected are several hundred feet from the Solid State Protection System (SSPS), and the SSPS itself is in a very congested area of the plant making routing access very difficult.
b. Approximately 23 test light circuits, 6 relays, and 2 test switches with accompanying interval panel wiring would have to be added to the Safeguard Test Cabinets and Solid State Panels in the SSPS.
c. Dozens of drawings, manuals, and procedures would have to be revised, including control wiring diagrams (approximately 30); SSPS internal and external wiring drawings (approximately IO); Safeguard Test Cabinet internal and external wiring drawings (approximately 10); vendor instruction manuals; and plant pre-operational test, operational, and maintenance procedures.

These changes would involve design, procurement, installation, inspection, testing, training, and maintenance activities.

2. Historical Data The slave relays employed at SHNPP are Potter-Brumfield MDR Series Rotary Relays. This type relay is very commonly used not only at SHNPP, but throughout the industry. These MDR Relays meet the most rigorous requirements of military specifications (MILSPEC), used not only in shipboard nuclear reactors, but also missile systems, gunfire apparatus, and computers. They meet the MILSPEC requirements of MIL-R-19523, which includes the rugged requirements of MIL-STD-l67 for vibration and MIL-S-90l for shock. The electrical Iif~.oxpectancy is generally rated at 100,000 operations minimum, with mechanical life expectancy a factor of 10 greater. Indeed, the performance of these relays has been excellent, and a recent survey of NPRDS data indicates that no failures have been reported.

(4040GAS/pgp )

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