ML18019A806
| ML18019A806 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1986 |
| From: | Buckley B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Utley E CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8605070451 | |
| Download: ML18019A806 (10) | |
Text
April 28, 1986 Docket No. 50-400 Mr. E.
E. Utley, Senior Executive Vice President Power Supply and Engineering and Construction Carolina Power and Light Company Post Office Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
Dear Mr. Utley:
DISTRIBUTION NRC PDR Local PDR PAD¹2 Rdg T. Novak OELD E. Jordan B. Grimes J. Partlow B. Buckley D. Miller ACRS (10)
Tech Branch Gray File
Subject:
Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch Site Audit Report on Shearon Harris A site audit was performed by the staff from the Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch on January 28-30, 1986, at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Station.
The purpose of the site audit was to supplement the staff's prior review of instrumentation and control systems based on electrical schematic/elementary diagrams by evaluating the actual implementation of the design at the site.
Enclosure 1 summarizes the major areas and systems
- observed, and identifies our concerns.
Two concerns were not resolved during the exit meeting.
(1)
Cable separation concern inside the main control consoles and remote shutdown panel.
(2)
Cable separation concern inside Westinghouse 7300 process cabinets with respect to WCAP-8892A generic design.
The followup evaluation and conclusion as stated in Section E of Enclosure 1
has closed out these two issues.
There is no open issue as a result of this site audit.
Enclosure 2 is a list of attendees.
Enclosure 3 is the reference documents provided by the Carolina Power and Light Company.
Sincerely,
Enclosures:
As stated Is/
Bart Buckley, Project Manager PWR Project Directorate ¹2 Division of PWR Licensing-A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc:
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Mr. E.
E. Utley Carolina Power 5 Light Company Shearon Harris CC:
Thomas A. Baxter, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts 8 Trowbridge 1800 M Street, NW Washington, DC 20036 Richard E. Jones, Fsq.
General Counsel Carolina Power 8 Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Mall
- Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Jo Anne Sanford, Esq.
Special Deputy Attorney General State of North Carolina Post Office Box 629
- Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Resident Inspector/Harris NPS c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route I, Box 315B New Hill, North Carolina 27562 Charles D. Barham, Jr.,
Esq.
Vice President E Senior Counsel Carolina Power 8 Light Company Post Office Box 1551
- Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Mr. John Runkle, Executive Coordinator Conservation Council of North Carolina 307 Granville Road Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Mr. Wells Fddleman 812 Yancey Street Durham, North Carolina 27701 Dr. Linda Little Governor's Waste Management Board 513 Albemarle Building 325 North Salisbury Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27611 Mr. Travis Payne, Esq.
723 W. Johnson Street Post Office Box 12643
- Raleigh, North Carolina 27605 Mr. Daniel F.
Read CHANGE Post Office Box 215>.
- Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Bradley W. Jones, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Region II-101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Richard D. Wilson, M. D.
725 Hunter Street Apex, North Carolina 27502 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff - NCUC Post Office Box 991
- Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
ENCLOSURE 1
SHEARON HARRIS SITE AUDIT
SUMMARY
Staff from the Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch (EICSB) conducted a site audit at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Station on January 28 through 30, 1986 to assure that safety related instrumentation and control systems were implemented in accordance with the design criteria specified in the FSAR.
A.
Plant Walk Throu h
The following areas were audited:
1.
Control room main control board instrumentation.
2.
Reactor protection system and engineered safety feature actuation system cabinets and their provision for testing.
3.
Console and panel cable routing and separation.
4.
Cable spreading area'and isolation cabinets.
5.
Instrumentation and control systems vital power supply installation.
6.
Auxiliary shutdown panel and transfer panels..
7.
Electrical penetration area.
8.
Switchgear rooms and safety related motor control centers.
9.
Engineered safety feature equipment and pump rooms.
10.
Instrument sensors and transmitters inside containment.
B.
Circuit Traces From Sensors to Protection Cabinets 1.
The staff traced signal paths from redundant channels of the steam generator narrow range level inputs to the protection system.
The tracing started from the steam generator level measurement instrument taps to the sensing lines to the transmitters, the cable from the transmitter to the cable conduits, the cable trays, the electrical penetrations, the cable spreading room area, and entry into the protection cabinets in the instrument room.
The staff verified that channel separation and channel identification are properly main-tained.
The staff also audited the provisions for testing and did a walkthrough of a typical test procedure for solid state protection system testing.
2.
The staff traced signal paths for four redundant channels of the turbine stop valve inputs to the protection system starting at the turbine building.
Each channel has a dedicated conduit from sensor to the protection cabinet.
The conduit and its supports are designed to safety system requirements.
The staff verified that channel separation and channel identification are properly maintained.
C.
S ecific Items Discussed Durin the Audit Cable separation inside the main control board console and the remote shutdown panel.
During the audit of main control room control board consoles, the staff found numerous instances where redundant safety train's flexible conduits were in direct contact with opposite train's cable or in direct contact with non-safety related cable.
The flexible conduits were also in direct contact with Belden Braid (armored cable for non-safety related signals).
A similar situation was found during the audit of the remote shutdown panel.
The staff expressed the concern that main control boards contain redundant circuits which are required to be physically separated from each other.
Based on IEEE Standard 384-1974, the minimum distance between these redundant circuits shall be one inch if a barrier was installed; the minimum separation distance shall be six inches air space if no barrier was provided.
The applicant stated that this concern was also raised by the integrated design inspection (IDI) team from the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
A copy of IDI team's supplement report (References I and 2) and the applicant's justification documents (References 3,
4 and 5) were provided to the staff.
2.
3.
Cable separation in solid state protection system input cabinet.
During the audit of the solid state protection system (SSPS) input
- cabinets, the staff found different color coded cable in two input cabinets.
The different color cables represent signals from two independent channels.
In accordance with separation criteria, these cables should be separated by a barrier.
The applicant stated that corrective action has been initiated and a barrier will be installed inside the'SSPS cabinets.
A copy of the field change request (Reference
- 6) was provided to the staff.
Cable separation inside process control system cabinets.
During the audit of the NSSS 7300 process control system cabinets, the staff found some yellow color coded cables in the green color coded cabinets and some blue color coded cables in the orange color coded cabinets.
These different color coded cables did not have any
separation barrier.
There were also some black cables in the cabinet without proper color coding identification.
The staff expressed the concern that the channel separation criteria may be violated in these cabinets.
The applicant showed his design basis by a color coded sketch and stated that green and yellow cables are for train 8 signals and orange and blue cables are for train A signals.
The NSSS vendor (Westinghouse) has performed a test to demonstrate that electrical faults, including application of maximum credible ac or dc poten-tials, or interference, on cables connected to the protection racks do not prevent the protection system for meeting performance require-ments.
The NRC has approved this design under a topical report review of WCAP-8892-A, "Westinghouse 7300 Series Proc'ess Control
-System Noise Tests."
The black cables were only temporary cables whi'ch are used during hot functional test.
These temporary cables will be removed after the test is completed.
4.
Color coded nameplate on RVLIS instrument rack.
The staff observed that two instrument racks for the reactor vessel level instrumentation system (RVLIS) do not have a proper color coded nameplate on the rack for identification as a safety related instru-ment rack.
The applicant stated that a corrective action has been initiated.
A copy of the field change request (Reference
- 7) was provided to the staff.
5.
Shunt trip modification.
The staff has reviewed the drawings and verified that reactor protec-tion system shunt trip modification has been installed in accordance with Generic Letter 83-28 requirements.
6.
P-4 interlock test provision The staff has reviewed the drawings and verified that a permanent voltmeter and a selection switch per each train was installed on reactor trip switchgear.
This satisfies the P-4 interlock test provision as stated in the safety evaluation report.
7.
Remote shutdown operation The staff inspected the remote shutdown panel, transfer panels, auxiliary transfer panels, and the instrumentation on the remote shutdown panel.
A copy of the remote shutdown panel layout was provided to the staff.
Six instruments were added since the last FSAR Amendment was submitted to NRC.
The staff will verify the changes when the next FSAR Amendment updates this information.
The applicant will perform a remote shutdown operation test in
8.
accordance with R.G. 1.68.2 during his startup test program, and will report to the NRC on successfully completing the test.
The resident inspector will witness the test and will include the results in his monthly inspection report.
The staff will address this confirmatory item in a supplement to the SER after receiving the applicant's confirmation that this test has been successfully completed.
Isolation device for SPDS.
The staff discussed the concerns on isolation devices used for SPDS.
The applicant provided clarification of his design.
The SPDS isola-tion is an open item.
The staff will address this item in a supple-ment to the SER.
D.
Exit Meetin Summar During the exit meeting on January 30, 1986, the staff expressed the following concerns:
The staff observed the cable separation problem inside the main control board consoles and the remote shutdown panel.
The staff will look into the IDI report and'onsult with the Office of Inspection ar d Enforcement review team so that a conclusion could be drawn in the audit report.
2.
3.
4, 5.
The staff observed the cable separation problem inside the solid state protection system input cabinets.
The staff recognized that a
corrective action has been initiated to install a barrier in these two cabinets.
The applicant should inform the resident inspector for reinspection after the modification is completed.
The staff observed temporary black cables inside Westinghouse 7300 process cabinets.
The applicant should inform the resident inspector for reinspection after those temporary cables are removed.
The staff observed some different color coded cables inside Westinghouse 7300 process cabinets.
The staff will verify that the Shearon Harris design follows the WCAP-8892A generic design and a
conclusion will be drawn in the audit report.
The remote shutdown operation test is a confirmatory item in the SER.
The resolution of this item will be addressed in a supplement to the SER
~
6.
The SPDS isolation is an open item.
The staff will address this item in a supplement to the SER.
E.
Follow-u Evaluation and Conclusion Two concerns need follow-up action after the site audit.
(I)
Cable separation inside the main control consoles and remote shutdown panel.
(2)
Cable separation inside Westinghouse 7300 process cabinets with respect to WCAP-8892-A generic design.
With respect to first concern, a meeting was held on February 11, 1986 between the NRR staff (S. Weiss, J. Mauck, H. Li) and ISE's IDI team member (L. Stanley) to discuss the justification provided by Westinghouse (Reference 3).
The.NRR staff agrees that Westinghouse has provided a
reasonable approach to analyze the staff concerns.
However, this analysis should be based on tests performed to determine the flame retardant charac-teristics of the wiring and wiring materials internal to the control switch-board.
The NRR staff required additional information on tests performed by the applicant.
In a subsequent telephone conference, the applicant referred to a Wyle Laboratories test report no. 47879-02, "Test Report on Electrical Separation Verification Testing for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant."
That report was submitted on November 21, 1985 to support Shearon Harris plant compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.75.
The report stated that there were no ignitions of the fault cable, in the test area, during the fire control cable screening tests (page I-7 Section 3.0).
Based on the analysis performed by Westinghouse
{Reference 3) and the independent test performed by Wyle Laboratories (Reference 8), the staff concludes that the applicant's justification is acceptable.
With respect to the second
- concern, the staff has reviewed the recommendod design basis of electrical circuit physical separation criteria as stated in the Westinghouse report WCAP-8892-A, "Westinghouse 7300 Series Process Control System Noise Tests,"
and the applicant's commitment to comply with Westinghouse criteria as stated in the FSAR.
The staff concludes that Shearon Harris design satisfies the requirements specified in the Westinghouse test report, and is acceptable.
ENCLOSURE 2
NRC -
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS SITE AUDIT AT SHEARON HARRIS STATION JANUARY 28 THROUGH 30, 1986 LIST OF ATTENDEES hRC Seymour Weiss Joe Joyce Om Chopra Jerry Mauck Hulbert Li George Maxwell (SRO)
Steve Burris (RO)
EBASCO Bill Pehush Dean Shah S. Parikh Paul Gaffney Carolina Power and-Li ht Com an John Eads David McCarthy E.
M. Harris Barry M. Hynos Steven McCoy
'Vickie H. Coble Dan Hardesty L. I. Loflin
'. J.
Wagner A. J.
Howe Kent Russell C. L. McKenzie Mike Jackson N. J. Chiangi G. L. Forhand W. I. Edwards R.
W. Prunty Max F. Thompson, Jr.
ENCLOSURE 3
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY THE APPLICANT 1.
Letter from 18E to CPEL dated December 27, 1985 on "Integrated Design Inspection 50-400/84-48" 2.
Letter from 1&E to CP8L dated October 1, 1985 on "Integrated Design Inspection 50-400/84-48 Supplement 1"
3.
Letter from Westinghouse to CP8L dated May 13, 1985 on "Main Control Board Conduit Air Gap Analysis" 4.
Letter from Westinghouse to CPSL dated March 13, 1985 on "One Inch Separation of Flexible Metallic Conduit in Control Board" 5.
Letter from Ebasco to CPEL dated May 31, 1985 on "MCB AEP-1 and ACP Conduit Air Gap Analysis" 6.
CP8L Field Change Request No. AS-10306 dated December 13, 1985 7.
CPEL Field Change Request No. I-3033 dated January 29, 1986 8.
CPEL submittal dated November 21, 1985, a Wyle Laboratories test report No. 47879-02 "Test Report on Electrical Separation Verification Testing for the Carolina Power and Light Company for Use in the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant"