ML18019A543
| ML18019A543 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1986 |
| From: | Burris S, Fredrickson P, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18019A540 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-85-49, NUDOCS 8601270455 | |
| Download: ML18019A543 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1985049
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/85-49
Licensee:
Carolina
Power
and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC
27602
Docket No.:
50-400
License No.:
CPPR-158
Facility Name:
Harris Unit
1
Inspection
Co
ed:
4e
ember
20 - Dece ber 20,
1985
Inspectors:~G..
Maxw
Date Signed
~ S.
- . Burri
Approved by:
P.
E. Fredrickson,
Section Chief
Di.vision of Reactor Projects
at
Signed
at
Signed
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
announced
inspection
involved 126 resident
inspector-hours
on site in the areas
of Fire Prevention/Protection,
Preoperational
Test Program,
Comparison of As-Built to
FSAR Description,
and Other Activities.
Results:
Of the
four
areas
inspected,
no violations
or deviations
were
identified in three
areas;
one violation
was
found in one
area
("Failure to
Incorporate
Changes
to System Drawings", paragraph 5.c.)
8gPg270455
860>o9
8
REPORT DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
N. J. Chiangi,
Manager,
QA/QC Harris Plant
J.
N. Collins, Manager,
Operations
G.
L. Forehand,
Director,
QA/QC
J.
L. Harness,
Assistant Plant General
Manager,
Operations
C.
S. Hinnant,
Manager,
Start-Up
L. I. Loflin, Manager,
Harris Plant Engineering
Support
D. A. McGaw, Superintendent
C.
L. McKenzie, Acting Director, Operations
QA/QC
G. A. Myer, General
Manager,
Milestone Completion
R.
N. Parsons,
Project General
Manager,
Construction Confirmation
Completion
N. Thompson, Jr.,
Manager,
Engineering
Management
D.
L. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory
Compliance
B.
Van Metre,
Manager,
Harris Plant Maintenance
M.
D. Vernon, Superintendent
E. J.
Wagner,
Manager,
Engineering
C.
C. Wagoner,
Project. General
Manager,
Construction
R. A. Watson,
Vice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
J.
L. Willis, Plant General
Manager,
Operations
Other licensee
employees
contacted
included
12 construction
craftsmen,
eight
technicians,
ten operators,
and ten engineering
personnel.
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on December
20,
1985, with
the Plant General
Manager.
No written material
was provided to the licensee
by the resident
inspectors
during this reporting period.
The licensee
did
not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided to or reviewed
by
the
resident
inspectors
during this
inspection.
The
licensee
provided
dissenting
comments
concerning
the identified violation during
the exit
meeting.
Fire Prevention/Protection
(42051C,
71302)
The inspectors
observed
the fire prevention
and protection activities
related to containing combustible materials
where the ignition of these
materials
could
damage
safety-related
structures.
The inspectors
also
observed
the ongoing site training activities for the construction fire
brigade.
b.
Some
of the
specific
areas
observed
by the
inspectors
during this
period were:
( 1)
Nonflammable
protective
cover'ings
were
observed
over
various
safety-related
pumps
and components
located throughout the plant.
(2)
During the various tours of the reactor auxiliary building and the
containment
building,
the
inspectors
observed
that
the
accumulation
of combustible
materials
in these
areas
was
being
minimized.
(3)
Flammable
materials
were
stored
to
prevent
or
reduce
the
likelihood of combustion.
(4)
Welding activities
were
observed
in at
least
seven
separate
locations throughout the site
and in each
instance it was observed
that appropriate fire extinguishing
equipment
was available within
close proximity of the welding activities. It was also noted that
the
portable
fire
extinguishers
contained
sufficient
fire
extinguishing
medium,
as
evidenced
by
displaying
current
inspection stickers
and having unbroken
seals.
(5)
The inspectors
observed that at the various elevations
throughout
the reactor auxiliary building and the containment building, fire
suppression
devices
were
strategically
located
and
readily
available for use.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
Preoperational
Test
Program
(71302,
424008,
37301)
a.
The
inspectors
conducted
tours
of
the
various
plant
areas.
The
following items
were
observed
and
assessed
during the tours to assure
compliance with requirements:
(1)
The
inspectors
observed
electrical
personnel
placing
cables
in
their respective
cable trays
and conduits.
Sufficient care
was
being taken
to prevent
damage
to the cables
being
placed
and to
cables
which already
had
been installed.
(2)
The
inspectors
looked for uncontrolled
openings
in previously
cleaned
or flushed
systems
or components.
Where
system
openings
were
identified,
cleanness
controls
were
established
during
flushing.
(3)
The
inspectors
observed
three
instances
in which construction
personnel
were working on equipment which had already
been turned
over to the start-up
group.
The work was being accomplished
under
the
proper
administrative
controls
provided
in
the
Start-up
Manual.
b.
The
inspectors
evaluated
the activities
being
conducted
by
CP5L
operations
QA Surveillance
personnel.
QA Surveillance
personnel
were
present
to
observe
the
preoperational
tests
conducted
during thi s
reporting
period.
The results
of their observations
were
promptly
documented
and distributed
to
those
responsible
for the activities
which were observed.
The
inspectors
reviewed
log
books
maintained
by the test
group
to
identify problems
or plant activities that
may
be
appropriate
for
additional
follow-up.
The
inspectors
observed
operations
personnel
deenergizing electrical
components
as required
by the clearance
program
when equipment is being placed out of commission for repairs,
tests
or
rework.
During the
week of
November
25,
1985,
the
inspectors
observed
the
testing of the "B" emergency
diesel
generator
sequencer
circuits.
The
test
was
conducted
to determine if the
sequencer
would function to
allow the correct
sequence
of electrical
loading.
During the
week of December
2,
1985, the inspector participated
in an
inspection
which was
conducted
by regional
inspection
personnel.
The
inspection
included continued observation
of the preoperational
testing
of
"B"
emergency
diesel
generator
sequencer
circuits
(Start-up
Procedure
5095-P08);
testing
system
(Start-up
Procedure
3065-P01);
and testing
the reactor
coolant
pump
seal
water
system (Start-up
Procedure
2060-P04).
(1)
Prior to. starting
the test,
the start-up
and test personnel
made
sure
that
they
were
authorized
to
conduct
the test
and that
current drawings
and procedures
were available for use.
(2)
The inspectors
interviewed the test personnel
and found them to be
knowledgeable
of the applicable test procedure
(Start-up
Procedure
5095-P08).
(3)
The test
personnel
were
aware of the procedures
which allow them
to make
changes
to
a test procedure
during the conduct of testing.
(4)
The test
was
conducted
in accordance
with the
applicable test
procedure
(Start-up
Procedure
5095-P08).
The inspectors
witnessed
selected
portions of section
6, step 6.4.52 of
test
procedure
1-5095-0-03,
Initial
Engine
Run.
The
inspectors
observed
the collection of data
base vibration information from the "B"
emergency
diesel
generator
during partial
load and full,load conditions
in order to verify the following:
(1)
Overall personnel
performance
during the test
was adequate.
(2)
An approved
procedure
was available
and in use.
(3)
Test equipment
being
used
was properly installed
and calibrated
(4)
Personnel
performing
the
test
were
qualified
to
perform
the
evolution.
During the
week of
December
8,
1985,
the
licensee
conducted
test
procedure
1-5145-P-01,
Start-up,
Unit Auxiliary, and
Preoperational
Test
(SAT and
UAT).
While performing section
6,
steps
6.3. 17. 17.6
and 6.4.5,
the
CP&L Cape
Fear Facility noted significant
line current increases
and voltage drops.
This was determined
to be
an
effect
of trying to
charge
and
pick
up
the
Shearon
Harris unit
auxiliary
and
main
transformers,
creating
a
reverse
current
flow
condition, which causes
large current increase
and voltage drops.
This
would only cause
an offsite problem with the nearest grid supply system
(Cape
Fear)
when
CP&L tried to maintain
their
system
in automatic
control at its lowest setting.
CP&L management
has
committed to change
their operations
procedures
to include
a precautionary
note to alert
the dispatcher
of this potential
problem prior to performing this
evolution.
In addition,
the
licensee
has
committed to include this
possible
problem
in their trai ning
program.
This
item will
be
identified
as
an
Inspector
Follow-up Item,
"Transformer Operability
Problems",
400/85-49-05.
1
The
inspectors
witnessed
the
reassembly
of
1A-SA emergency
diesel
generator
intake
and
exhaust
valves
which
were
removed
for the
inspection
program in accordance
with the
Owners
Group
recommendations.
This
activity
was
performed
in
accordance
with
Corrective Maintenance
Procedure
CM-M0150, "Emergency
Diesel
Generator
Cylinder
Head
Removal,
Disassembly
and
Reassembly",
Rev.
0,
section
7.5. 1,
steps
1
through
7.
The
inspectors
questioned
the
craft
personnel
performing this activity and reviewed the procedure
to verify
that personnel
were
trained
and
knowledgeable
on
reassembly
of the
valves.
An approved
copy of the
maintenance
procedure
was available
and in use
by the personnel
and hold points were identified, witnessed
and signed
as required
by the procedure.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
Comparison of As-Built Plant to
FSAR Description
(37301)
The inspectors
evaluated
the installed condition of Loop "B" of the
Safety Injection System (SI).
The evaluation
was to determine if the
as-built plant
conforms
to the
commitments
contained
in the
FSAR.
Specifically, the inspectors verified that the physical installation is
in
agreement
with simplified
flow diagrams
(SFD)
and
with the
applicable
FSAR figures.
The following
SFD
and
FSAR figures
were
compared
to the most recent
EBASCO design drawings.
SFD:
CPL-2165-S-1309
Sheet
2 (Rev
~ 7)
EBASCO Design Drawing:
CAR-2165-G-809
(Rev.
10)
EBASCO Design Drawing:
CAR-2165-G-810
(Rev.
14)
FSAR:
Figure 6.3.2-2
The
FSAR figure 6.3.2-2
was found not to be the most current revision
of the
EBASCO Site Design Drawing (CAR-2165-G-809).
The
FSAR Revision
is
shown
as
Rev.
7 whereas
the site document control center
shows
Rev.
10 as being the most current revision for CAR-2165-G-809.
The inspector
also
found that there
are
two outstanding
Design Field
Change
Requests
( FCRs)
which
may
have
an
impact
on
the as-built
condition of the nitrogen
for this
system.
These
design
changes will affect drawing CAR-2165-G-809
and will require tracking to
determine
adequacy
of the
system
for operation.
The
FCRs
were
identified as
FCR-SI-711
and
FCR-J-2691.
The above condition will be identified as
an Inspector
Follow-up Item,
"As-Built Condition of SI System",
400/85-49-02.
While conducting
a walkdown of the SI System,
the inspector
observed
the
following items:
(1)
Valve 2SI-V554SB-1
The valve position
scale
was missing.
CPCL
documented this condition
on Deficiency Report tag
number 06329.
(2)
Valves
and 4SI-V210-1
Handwheels
cannot
be operated
due to interference
with adjacent
pipe
hangers.
CPAL start-up
personnel
notified
construction
about
this
concern.
Field
modifications will be required to allow the proper
operation
of
these
valves.
(3)
The
instrumentation
air valve for valve
cannot
be
operated
due to interference with an adjacent
structural
support.
CP5L
documented
this condition
on Deficiency Report
tag
number
06330.
The
above
three
items will be collectively identified as
an Inspector
Follow-up Item, "Operability of SI Valves", 400/85-49-03.
b.
The
inspectors
performed
a
walkdown
and
review
of
the
auxiliary
system
(AF) loops "A", "B", and
"C" to
determine if the
as-built plant configuration
conforms to the
commitments outlined in
the
FSAR.
The inspection
was
performed
to verify that the
physical
conditions
agree with those identified on the simplified flow diagrams
(SFD)
and applicable
FSAR requirements.
The identified
SFD
and
figures were compared to the most current
EBASCO design drawings.
SFD:
CPL-2165-S-0544
SFD:
CPL-2165-S-0545
FSAR:
Figure
10. 1.0-3
FSAR:
Figure 10. 1. 0-4
EBASCO Design Drawing:
CAR-2165-G-044
EBASCO Design Drawing:
CAR-2165-G-045
The inspectors
informed the licensee that the
FSAR figures 10.1.0-3
and
10. 1.0-4
were
not the
most current
revisions
of the
EBASCO design
drawings
(CAR-2165-G-044
and
CAR-2165-G-045).
The
FSAR revisions
are
e;
shown
as
Rev.
10,
whereas
the site document control center
shows
Rev.
14 as being the most current revision for CAR-2165-G-044,
and
Rev.
13
as the most current revision for CAR-2165-G-045.
During the walkdown the inspector
noted the following items:
(1)
Va1 ves
lAF-146
and
were
mi ssing
any
type
of
identification,
and therefore
were not clearly identifiable.
(2)
Valve
were tied back with metal
wire due to
what appeared
to
be
an interference
problem with the mechanical
operator.
(3)
Pipe
strap
temperature
sensors'ocations
need
to
be correctly
identified on drawings.
All of these
concerns will be identified
as
an Inspector
Follow-up
Item, "As-Built Condition
and Operability of the Auxiliary Feedwater
System",
400/85-49-04.
c.
The inspectors
evaluated
the installed configuration of Loop
1 of the
system
(RCS).
The following SFD
and
FSAR figure were
compared to the most current
EBASCO design drawing.
SFD:
CPL-2165-S-1300
(Rev.
3)
EBASCO Design Drawing:
CAR-2165-G-800
(Rev.
11)
FSAR:
5.1.2-1
(Rev.
7)
The
FSAR figure 5. 1.2-1
(Rev.
7) was found not to be the most current
revision of the
EBASCO design
drawing,
CAR-2165-G-800
(Rev.
11).
In
addition, the inspectors
identified the following discrepancies:
(1)
Three
(one
on each
loop) 3/4" capped
and valved (2) lines .tapping
off of the reactor
coolant
system
RTD lines.
These
lines
are
identified
on
EBASCO
design
drawing
CAR-2165-G-800
as
2RC
3/4-200SN-1,
2RC
3/4-201SN-1
and
2RC
3/4-202SN-1,
but
are
not
included
on
FSAR figure 5. 1.2-1
(Rev. 7).
(2)
Pressure
transmitter
¹1-PT-441
was
. identified
on
EBASCO design
drawing CAR-2165-G-800,
and is physically installed in the plant,
but is not identified on the most current revision of FSAR figure
5.1.2-1
(Rev. 7).
(3)
The inspectors
noted that the
high point vent lines
and valves
were not identified on any of the identified drawings.
(4)
There are three outstanding
Field Change
Requests
(FCRs) which may
have
an
impact
on the as-built condition of the reactor
coolant
system,
and these
changes will require modifying the
EBASCO design
drawing to reflect the actual plant conditions.
The above identified items will be identified as
an Inspector
Follow-up
Item, "As-Built Condition of the Reactor Coolant System",
400/85-49-06.
Additionally,
the
inspectors
identified
to
licensee
personnel
a
discrepancy
between
the
EBASCO design
drawing
CAR-2165-G-800
and the
actual
as-found
condition
of
the
plant
as
follows:
during
a
hand-over-hand
inspection
of the
piping
using this
EBASCO site
design
drawing,
the inspector identified
a 3/4" pipe
tapped
from the
RCS hot leg.
This line was traced
to
a valve,
1-8016A/2RC-U296SN-1
which
was identified
as
the isolation valve for the reactor
vessel
level instrumentation
system
(RVLIS).
The inspector obtained
a current
copy of the
RVLIS drawing,
EBASCO design drawing CAR-2165-G-844
(Rev.
1) which
shows
the
cross
connection
from the
RVLIS to the
reactor
coolant
system.
The
RVLIS was installed
using
FCR
M-873
and
DCN
530-1199.
Neither of these
documents
referenced
CAR-2165-G-800
as
requiring
updating
due to the
RVLIS addition.
This drawing is pre-
sently used
by the control
room operators
for
RCS reference
and will
be
used
in the control
room as
a controlled copy reference after unit
startup.
Discussions
with licensee
management
identified that
the
RVLIS (TMI Action Item II.f.2) was
added
to the plant to allow for
vessel
level indication during
an
inadequate
core cooling event.
The
Harris Plant Engineering
and Systems
(HPES) organization
has generated
a
new
FCR
$3P-4854 to correct the missing drawing details.
The
inspectors
informed
CPRL
management
that failure to revise
the
currently
approved
copy of CAR-2165-G-800
to reflect
the as-built
condition of the plant is contrary to
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion
III and
Section
1.8.5.3.
This
is
a violation "Failure
to
Incorporate
Changes
to System Drawings" 400/85-49-01.
Other Activities
(71302)
During
the
week of
December
2,
1985,
personnel
from the office of
Nuclear
Reactor
Regulation
(NRR) visited the site.
The visit was
a
part of
an
evaluation
which is
being
conducted
by
NRR concerning
seismic qualifications
and operability of pumps
and valves.
On
December
9,
1985
the
Region II Director of the
Reactor
Projects
Division and the Harris Site Region II Reactor
Projects
Section
Chief
visited
the
Harris Site.
Their
agenda
included
a briefing by
CPAL
concerning
the status
of the project overview, construction,
start-up
(status of systems,
procedures
and tests),
and readiness
for operations
(staffing, training,
INPO evaluations
and
key milestones).
Following
the briefing
a tour was
made throughout the plant site,
concluding with
a visit to the
CP5L off-site training facilities.