ML18017A615

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Final Deficiency Rept Re Failure to post-weld Heat Treat Containment Mechanical Penetration Assemblies.Eleven Penetrations stress-relieved on 790608-09.All Required Documentation Performed
ML18017A615
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/03/1979
From:
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML18017A614 List:
References
NUDOCS 7908100391
Download: ML18017A615 (11)


Text

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 Failure to Post-Weld Heat Treat Containment Hechanical Penetration Assemblies Final Report

'August 3, 1979 Reportable Under 10CFR50.55(e)

Prepared By'; Carolina Power & Light Company

SUBJECT:

10CFR50.55(e) Reportable Item Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP)

  • . Unit 1 Containment Penetrations not Post-Weld Heat Treated (PVHT) .

ITEMS:, Elevation 230'-0" H-.15, 16, 17, 21 (Installed) 245'-0" H-7, 20 (Received Only)

,251 I Ofl H-23, 24 (Received Only) 255'-0" H-22, 51, 52, 53 (Received Only) 2651-8" H-108, 109, 110 (Received Only)

SUPPLIED BY'ube Turns Division of Chemetron Corporation 2900 West Broadway P. 0, Box 32160 Louisville, Kentucky 40232 NATURE OF DEFECT: The code requirements were sufficiently ambiguous that CP&L requested'November 20, 1978) and received (March 18, 1979) a PWHT requirement interpretation from the ASHE.

Tube Turns had a misunderstanding of the intent of code requirements in NE4621.1 and Table NE4622.1-1, Summer 1972 Addenda of the ASME B&PV Code with regard to stress-relieving the sleeve to containment liner insert weld, The weld'n the 15 sleeves were not stress relieved (PWHT).

DATE PROBLEM WAS CONFIRMED TO EXIST:

June 4, 1979, Upon investigation, it was determined, that the stress relief operation (PWHT),

which is required, had not been performed on these sleeves, PROBLEM REPORTED: June 5; 1979 CP&L (L. I. Loflin, L. E, Jones, E. M. Harris) informed NRC Region II office (Hr, Jack Bryant) by telephone that the problem was "potentially reportable" under 10CFR50.55(e).

June 5, 1979 Tube Turns Ol, H. George) informed NRC Region II office (Hr, Jack Bryant) by telephone that the problem was reportable undex 10CFR Part 21, June 7, 1979 - Tube Turns sent a letter to NRC Region,II,

-101 Marietta Avenue, Suite 3100, Atlanta, Georgia, 30303, confirming June 5, 1979 telephone report.

SCOPE OF PROBLEM: On SHNPP, the'misunderstanding existed only on Class 1, Type I penetrations between 4" and 14" in wall thickness. Only thh penetrations fabricated and shipped as identified above were affected. Nationwide Tube Turns determined that they had fabxicated or.~y one other assembly that'included part of the containment liner (as part of the penetration) and it was stress x'elieved,

0

~ ~~ ~

~

SAFETY IhPLICATIONS: The purpose of performing PWHT on the sleeve collar welds is to minimize the residual stresses in the assembly. However, without a detailed and sophisticated stress analy'sis (which has not been performed), it is impossible to determine the exact magnitude and distribution of these stresses. Consequently, it is impossible to determine would have been breeched.

if the containment boundary Appendix J to 10CFRSO requires that preoperational strength and leakage rate tests be performed. If there was unacceptable cracking of the collar weld during normal. operation, these tests and/or'ollar-sleeve wou3d detect this condition. In addition, prior to shipment the welds were subjected to either a liquid penetrant or magnetic particle test and no unacceptable results were noted.

PWHT requirements on penetrations under Section III, Division 2, exceed the requirements for PWHT under Section III, Division 1, Classes 1, 2, or 3. This PWHT requirement, on penetrations is therefore more stringent than on all safety class pipe, REASON(S) PROBLEM WAS REPORTABLE: 'he specification covering penetrations, CAR-SH-M-54, requires conformance to the ASME B&PU Code, Failure of the vendor to meet this requirement was a significant deficiency in fabrication under

,10CFR Part 21. Installation of four of these units could be considered under 10CFR50.55(e) as a "deficiedcy found in design and construction, which, were it, to have remained uncorrected, could have affected adversely the safety of operation of the nuclear power plant.

and which represents:

.(iii) A significant deficiency in construction.

which will require extensive evaluation, or extensive repair to meet the criteria and bases stated in the Safety, Analysis Report or "

construction permit. . . ." (Quotation from 10CFR50,55(e)),

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: M-7, 20,- 23, 24, 22, 51,,52, 53, 108, 109, and 110 were returned to Tube Turns June 6, 1979 (arrived at Tube Turns June 7, 1979), These were the eleven sleeves received, but not installed, M-15, 16, 17, and 21 were removed by CB&I 'cutting the collar to liner weld and.

Daniel cutting reinforcing steel as required to allow removal. These four arrived at Tube Turns June 12, 1979.

Tube-'Turns performed PWHT as required by the code in I

all fifteen penetrations. The eleven penetrations were stress relieved June 8 and June 9, 1979, and received at CP&L June 19, 1979, Two of the group (M-22, 51, 52, 7, 20, and 53)= that are substitutable for H-17 and 21 (H-20 and H-22) were renumbered M-17 and H-21 and installed in their place. H-15 and H-16 were returned July 13, 1979 and the original M-17 and M-21 (renumbered M-20 and M-22) were also returned July 13, 1979, Tube Turns now understands the code requirements under Specification CAR-SII-M-54. The

. otIier specification under wh'ich penetrations are .

purchased, CAR-SH-AS-1, was rewritten to make explicit that PNIT is required.

All required heat treat documentation (charts) have "been received by CPGL, reviewed, and'ound to be acceptable and are on file at the SHNPP site.

~ ~ ~

~

1 a

FOAM~22-SOM l~

~

Carolina Power & Light Company File: SH N-2/18 August 3, 1979 Mr. James P. O'Reilly United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Northwest Atlanta, Georgia 30303 FAILURE TO POST-WL'LD HEAT TREAT CONTAINMENT MECHANICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES

Dear. Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), the Region II office (Mr. J. Bryant) was officially notified of the subject deficiency as being a "potentially reportable" item on June 5, 1979. On July 5, 1979, the Region II office (Mr. N, Economos) was officially notified that the subject deficiency was considered reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

Attached is a final'eport which describes the problem and the corrective action taken to accomplish r'esolution. With this report, Carolina Power

& Light Company considers the matrer closed.

If you,have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours very truly, KVik/gpr (882/356)

Attachment N. J. Chiangi - ilanager Engineering & Construction Quality Assurance

SHEARON MRRXS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 Failure to Post-'Meld Heat Treat Containment Mechanical Penetration Assemblies Final Report August 3, 1979 Reportable Under 10CFR50.55(e)

Prepared By: Carolina Power & Light Company

SUBJECT:

10CFR50. 55 (e) Repor table Item Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plaint (SHNPP)

Unit 1 Containment Penetrations not'ost-Weld Heat Treated (PWHT)

ITEMS. Elevation 230> 0 M-15, 16, 17, 21 (Installed)

-245'-0" ,

M-7, 20 (Received Only) 253."-0" M-23, 24 (Received Only) 255'-0" M-22, 51, 52, 53 (Received, Only) 265 ~

8~ M-108, 109, 110 (Received Only)

SUPPLIED BY: Tube Turns Division of Chemetron Corporation 2900 West Broadway ~ ~

P, O. Box 32160 Louisville, Kentucky 40232 NATURE OF DEFECT: The code requirements were sufficiently ambiguous that CP&L requested (November 20, 1978) and received (March 18, 1979) a PWHT requirement interpretation'rom the ASME.

Tube Turns had a misunderstanding of the intent of code requirements in NE4621.1 and Table NE4622,1-1, Summer 1972 Addenda of the ASME B&PV Code with regard to stress-relieving the sleeve to containment liner insert weld, The welds in the 15 sleeves were not stress relieved (PWHT),

,DATE PROBLEM WAS CONFIRMED TO EXIST: Upon investigation, June 4, 1979, that the stress relief operation (PWHT),

it was determined, which is required, had not been performed on these sleeves, PROBLEM REPORTED'une 5, 1979 CP&L (L. I. Loflin, L. E, Jones, E. M. Harris) informed NRC Region II office (Mr, Jack Bryant) by telephone that the problem was "potentially reportable" under 10CFR50.55(e),

June 5, 1979 << Tube'urns (H, H. George) informed NRC Region II office (Mr, Jack Bryant) by telephone that the problem was reportable under 10CFR Part 21, June 7, 1979 - Tube Turns sent a letter to NRC Region II, 101 Marietta Avenue, Suite 3100, Atlanta, Georgia, 30303, confirming June 5, 1979 telephone report.

SCOPE OF PROBLEM: On, SHNPP, the 'misunders tanding 'exis ted only on Class 1, Type I penetrations between g" and 14" in wall thickness. Only thb penetrations fabricate'd and shipped as identified above were affected. Nationwide Tube Turns determined that they had fabricated ox ~y assembly that included part of the containment one'ther liner (as part of the. penetration) and relieved, it was stress

K~ ~

\

SAF ETY IMPLICATIONS: The, purpose of performing PWHT on the sleeve collar ~

welds is to minimize the residual stresses in the assembly. 'owever, without a detailed and sophisticated,.

stress analysis (which has not been performed)",

impossible to determine the exact magnitude and it is distribution of these stresses. Consequently,'t is impossible to determine would have been breeched.

if the containment boundary

'E Appendix J to 10CFR50 requires that preoperational strength and leakage rate tests be performed. If there was unacceptable cracking of. the collar and/or collar-sleeve weld during normal operation, these tests .

wou3d detect'hi condition. In addition, prior to-shipment the welds 'were subjected to either a liquid.

'penetrant or magnetic particle test and no unacceptable results were noted.

PWHT requirements on penetrations under Section III,

.Division 2, exceed the- requirements for PWHT under Section III, Division 1,,Classes 1, 2, or 3. This PWHT, requirement on penetrations is therefore more stringent than on. all safety c'lass pipe, REASON(S) PROBLEM WAS REPORTABLE: 'he specification covering penetrations, CAR-SH-M-54, requires conformance to the ASME B&PV Code, 'ailure of the vendor to 'meet this requirement was a significant deficiency in fabrication under 10CFR Part 21, Installation of foui of 'these units could'be considered under lOGFR50.55(e) as a "deficiegcy found in design and construction, which, were it have remained uncorrected, could have affected adversely to the safety of operation of the nuclear power plant.

and which rep'resents:

(iii) '. A significant deficiency in construction.

which will require extensive evaluation, or extensive repair to meet the criteria and

  • bases stated in the Safety Analysis Report or construction permit. . . ," '(Quotation from 10CFR50,55(e)).

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: M-7, 20, 23, 24, 22, 51, 52, 53, 108, 109, and 110 were k

returned to Tube Turns June 6, 1979 (arrived at Tube Turns June 7, 1979), These were the eleven sleeves, received, but not installed, M-15, 16, 17, and 21 were removed by CB&I cutting the collar to liner weld and..

, Daniel cutting reinforcing steel as required to allow removal. These four arrived't 'Tube Turns June 12, 1979 .

'Tube Turns performed PWHT as required by the code in.

~ ~

~ 'b ~

all fifteen penetrations. The eleven penetrations were stress relieved June 8 and June 9, 1979, and received at CP&L June 19, 1979, Two of the group (H-22, 51, 52, 7, 20, and 53) that are substitutable for H-17 and 21 (H-20 and H-22) were renumbered H-17 and H-21 and installed in their place, H-.15 and H-16 were returned July 13, 1979 and the original M-17 and H-21'renumbered M-20 and H-22) were also returned July 13, 1979, Tube Turns now understands the code requirements under Specification CAR-SH-M-54. The other specification under which penetrations are purchased, CAR-SH-AS-1, was r'ewritten to make explicit that PMHT is required, All required heat treat documentation (charts) have been received by CP&L, reviewed, and'ound ro- be acceptable and are on file at the SIINPP site.