ML18016A900
| ML18016A900 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1999 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18016A899 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9904140219 | |
| Download: ML18016A900 (6) | |
Text
'P,8 RECC VISITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 Cy
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SAFETY EVALUATIONBY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION CAROLINAPOWER 8 LIGHTCOMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated September 1, 1998, as supplemented on March 19, 1999, Carolina Power 8 Light Company (CP8L, the licensee) requested a revision to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. Specifically, the licensee proposed changing TS 3/4.9.11, Water Level - New and Spent Fuel Pools," by changing the water level requirements of the spent fuel pool (SFP).
Currently, the TS require the licensee to maintain a minimum of 23 feet above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies.
Fuel assemblies from CP8 L's Brunswick and Robinson plants are also stored in the Harris SFP.
The boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel assemblies stored in the SFP have bail handles which extend approximately 6 inches higher than the top of the pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel assemblies.
In order to maintain the required 23 feet of water over the fuel and yet not have to raise the SFP water level, the licensee is requesting that the TS be changed to state that the water level be maintained a minimum of 23 feet above the top of fuel rods within irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks.
The supplemental submittal dated March 19, 1999, contained clarifying information only and did not change the initial no significant hazards consideration determination.
2.0 EVALUATION II 0<
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For a fuel handling accident, the licensee assumed that the damaged fuel bundle was lying horizontally either on top of the spent fuel racks (for a fuel handling accident (FHA) in the fuel handling building (FHB)) or on top of the reactor vessel flange (for an FHA in the containment).
Since a damaged fuel bundle in this configuration would have less than the currently required 23 feet of water over the top of the fuel bundle, the licensee re-analyzed the consequences of an FHA occurring for these conditions. The licensee's analysis in the FHB assumed 21 feet of water over the top of the failed fuel rods.
For an FHA in the containment, the licensee assumed there was 22 feet of water over the top of the damaged fuel bundle.
Safety Guide 25 assumes an overall effective decontamination factor (DF) of 100 (for the inorganic and organic species of iodine) for 23 feet of water over the irradiated fuel. Using the same methodology used by the staff in deriving the DFs in Safety Guide 25, the licensee calculated an overall effective decontamination factor of 72 for an FHA in the FHB (21 feet of water over the fuel) and 85 for an FHA in containment (22 feet of water over the fuel). For an FHA in the FHB, the licensee assumed that 314 fuel pins of fresh (100-hour decay) PWR fuel and all the fuel pins in 52 BWR fuel assemblies (3-year decay) would be ruptured.
For an FHA in containment, the licensee assumed that 264 fuel pins (one PWR fuel assembly) would be
,ruptured.
The staff reviewed the licensee's analysis and performed confirmatory calculations to check the acceptability of the licensee's doses.
In performing these calculations, the staff used the assumptions of RG 1.25, "Assumptions Used For Evaluating the Potential Radiological
Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors."
The parameters which the staff utilized in its assessment are presented in Table 1 (attached).
The staffs calculations confirmed that the thyroid doses at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB),
Low-Population Zone (LPZ), and Control Room from a fuel handling accident meet the acceptance criteria and that the licensee's calculations are acceptable.
For an FHA in the FHB, the staff calculated a dose of 8.27 rem thyroid at the EAB and 1.95 rem thyroid at the LPZ. For an FHA in containment, the staff calculated a dose of 11.78 rem thyroid at the EAB and 2.77 rem thyroid at the LPZ. The acceptance criterion at the EAB and LPZ for these accidents is contained in Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 15.7.4 of NUREG-0800 and is 75 rem thyroid dose (25 percent of 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines of 300 rem). The licensee stated that the FHA dose to control room personnel is bounded by the dose for a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).
The staffs calculated dose to the control room operator verified this'inding. The acceptance criterion for the control room operator is 30 rem thyroid (SRP Section 6.4 of NUREG-0800).
Based on its evaluation, the staff finds the proposed change to the SFP water level TS at the Shearon Harris plant to be acceptable with respect to potential radiological consequences as a result of a hypothetical fuel handling accident.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of North Carolina officialwas notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.
The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTALCONSIDERATION The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding ':hat the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 50935). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibilitycriteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
C. Hinson Date:
April 8, 1999
Attachment:
Table 1
J
Table 1
ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR CALCULATINGRADIOLOGICALCONSE UENCES OF A FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENTAT THE SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Parameters Power Level, Mwt Number of PWR Fuel Rods Damaged FHB: all rods in 52 3-year old BWR assemblies plus Containment:
Total Number of Rods in Core Shutdown Time, hours Power Peaking Factor Fission-Product Release Fractions (%)*
iodine (corrected for extended burnup)
Noble Gases Pool Decontamination Factors FHB: Iodine Overall Effective DF Containment:
Iodine Overall Effective DF Iodine Forms (%)*
Elemental Organic Filter Efficiencies-Elemental/Organic
(%)
FHB Containment Control Room Atmospheric Dispersion Factors, X/Q (sec/m')
Exclusion Area Boundary (0-2 hours)**
Low Population Zone (0-8 hours)**
Control Room (0-8 hours)
Dose Conversion Factors per ICRP 2 2830.5 314 264 41,448 100 1.73 12 30 87 72 107 85 75 25 95/95 90/90 99/99 2.9 x 10~
68 x10~
7.68 x10~
- Staff calculated