ML18011A678

Discusses Enforcement Conference on 941021 Re Violations Involving Single Failure Vulnerability in Esws & Failure to Provide Accurate Info on SW Reviews.Review of Issues Ongoing to Determine Ea.List of Attendees & Slides Used Encl

ML18011A678
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	10/28/1994
From:	Boger B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Robinson W CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
EA-94-204, NUDOCS 9411210061
Download: ML18011A678 (51)

Text

October 28, 1994 EA 94-204 Carolina Power Il Light Company ATTN:

Mr.

W.

R. Robinson Yice President Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. 0.

Box 165, Mail Code:

Zone 1

New Hill, NC 27562-0165

SUBJECT:

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE

SUMMARY

(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-400/94-21)

Gentlemen:

This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on October 21, 1994.

This meeting concerned activities authorized for your Harris facility.

The purpose of the conference was to discuss the apparent violations involving a single failure vulnerability which existed in the Emergency Service Water System and the failure to provide complete and accurate information regarding service water reviews.

A list of attendees and a copy of your slides are enclosed.

We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the appropriate enforcement action.

At the enforcement conference, you provided the following clarifying comments on NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/94-21:

Paragraph 4.c(l), first bullet - both CSIPs would have been available prior to the failure, and both would have been impacted; Paragraph 4.c(1), fourth bullet -

CP&L evaluated the, integrity of ESW piping and elected not to pursue failure in the case of pump failure; and Paragraph 4.c(l), sixth subparagraph CPRL had evaluated "B"

ESW header vulnerability and found a high pressure/reverse flow gradient, but due to system geometry, heated flow did not reach the CSIP oil coolers.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's Rules of Practice,"

Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

r 94ii210061 941028 PDR ADOCK 05000400 9

PDR

CP&L Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely Docket No.:

50-400 License No.:

NPF-63 Bruce A. Boge

, Acting Director Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosures:

1.

List of Attendees 2.

Licensee Slides 3.

Licensee Photographs 4.

Enforcement Conference Agenda 5.

Inspection Report Comments Provided to NRC from CP&L cc w/encls:

cc w/encls:

H.

W. Habermeyer, Jr.

Vice President Nuclear Services Department Carolina Power

& Light Company P. 0.

Box 1551

- Hail OHS7

Raleigh, NC 27602 J.

W. Donahue Plant Manager Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. 0.

Box 165, HC:

Zone 1

New Hill, NC 27562-0165 David HcCarthy, Manager Regulatory Affairs S. Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. 0.

Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 H.

Ray Starling Manager - Legal Department Carolina Power and Light Co.

P. 0.

Box 1551

Raleigh, NC 27602 (cont'd - See page 3)

0

CP&L cc w/encls:

(cont'd)

Dayne H. Brown, Director Division of Radiation Protection N.

C. Department of Environmental Commerce

& Natural Resources P. 0.

Box 27687

Raleigh, NC 27611-7687 Karen E.

Long Assistant Attorney General State of North Carolina P. 0.

Box 629

Raleigh, NC 27602 Public Service Commission State of South Carolina P. 0.

Box 11649

Columbia, SC 29211 Admiral Kinnaird R.

HcKee 214 South Norris Street

Oxford, HD 21654 Robert D. Hartin 3382 Sean Way Lawrenceville, GA 30244 The Honorable Hugh Wells Chairman of the North Carolina Utilities Commission P. 0.

Box 29510

Raleigh, NC 27626-0510 Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff NCUC P. 0.

Box 29520

Raleigh, NC 27626 Distribution:

(See page 4)

CP&L Distribution w encls:

H. Christensen, RII N. Le, NRR G. A. Hallstrom, RII PUBLIC NRC Resident Inspector U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5421 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562-9998 SEND OFC RI I:DRP RI I:DRP RII:DRP TO PDR?

JStarefos:tj 10/ ~/94 NAME ATE Yes No COPY?

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY No HChriste n

10/ l/ /94 SEIrod 10/ VX/94 Yes No DOCUMENT NAME:

PtiHARRI F

/

/94 Yes No

/

/94 Yes No

LIST OF ATTENDEES Nuclear Re ulator Commission:

S.

D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)

A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), RII J.

P. Jaudon, Acting Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII H. 0. Christensen, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Branch I, DRP, RII C.

F.

Evans, Regional

Counsel, RII L. J.

Watson, Enforcement Specialist, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff, RII S.

D.

N.

M.

T.

J.

J.

K.

G.

A. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector

- Harris, DRP, RII J. Roberts, Resident Inspector

- Harris, DRP, RII B. Le, Project Manager, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

A. Satorius, Enforcement Specialist, Office of Enforcement, NRR A. Peebles, Chief, Operations

Branch, DRS, RII E. Tedrow, Senior Resident Inspector

- Grand Gulf, DRP, RII L. Starefos, Project Engineer, DRP, RII M. Clark, Public Liaison Officer, RII T. Dentel, Reactor Engineer (Intern),

NRR Licensee Attendees:

W.

W.

W.

J.

G.

D.

W.

G.

R.

S.

C.

Orser, Executive Vice President, Nuclear Generation Group

Campbell, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering

Robinson, Vice President, Harris Nuclear Plant

Donohue, Plant General

Manager, Harris Nuclear Plant

Rolfson, Manager, Harris Engineering Support Services, Harris Nuclear Plant McCarthy, Manager, Regulatory Affairs, Harris Nuclear Plant Peavyhouse,

Manager, NSSS Design, Harris Nuclear Plant Adams',

Manager, Site Communications, Harris Nuclear Plant

Rogan, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Sewell, Shift Supervisor, Harris Nuclear Plant Brown, Manager, NSSS, Harris Nuclear Plant ENCLOSURE I

S NUCLEARPLANT Enforcement Conference Service Water Issues

".?'P&L October 21, 1994 ENCLOSURE 2

SERV(GE WATER ~SSUES Presentation Agenda o Introduction o ESW Technical Issue o Response Accuracy Issue o Concluding Remarks

SERVlllCE WATER ISSUES Apparent Violations o 10GFR50, Appendix A, Criterion 44 {Cooling Water}

10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III {Design Control)

+ Failure to establish adequate design control measures to preventlidentify single failure vulnerability associated with ESW valve 1SW-270.

e 10CFR50.9 {Completeness and Accuracy of Information}

+ Failure to provide complete and accurate information regarding service water reviews.

SERVICE WATER ISSUES CP&L Position e10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 44 10 CFR 50, Appendix 8, Criterion III e An unanalyzed single failure scenario existed that would have required operator action.

e We recognize the significance of the failure to identify this condition in the initial design and subsequent reviews.

o'Analysis and scenario demonstration validated the adequacy of design features and existing procedures to mitigate this single failure, therefore e The safety significance of the event is minimal.

CHAL

SERVICE W ER ISSueS CP8 L Position e 10 CFR 50.9 {Completeness and Accuracy)

I

~ The single failure review was technically complete but administratively deficient.

e Although the review failed to identify the problems associated with this single failure, the analysis was complete, therefore e We do not feel a violation of 10 CFR 50.9 exists for the Single Failure Review.

e We are continuing to review other aspects of compliance with GL 89-13

ES% TECHMlllCAL)SSUE Outline 6 Basics of SHNPP ESW System e Causal Factors e How Problem Was Identified e Safety Significance e System Specific Actions e General Actions 6 Summary CHAL

ES% TECHMlCALISSUE Basics of SHNPP ESW System e Safety Related Raw Cooling Water System o In Accident Lineup - Circulates Water From the Ultimate Heat Sink Through Safety Related Loads e During Normal Operation - ESW Loads Supplied From Cooling Tower via Normal Service Water System (NSW) o Upon ESF Actuation

+ ESW Pumps Start

+ NSW Supply & Return Valves Close

+ ESW Return Valves Alignto Auxiliary Reservoir

Shearon Harris Emergency Sevlce Water System Flow Path ln Accident Une-up w/No Failures Pre July

$ 994 Uneup ee>>

aasarvof~r Matn Rooofvotr Aux Reeertfctr +

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~assed Cool Water

~

Heated Water

Shearon Harris Emergency Sevlce Water System Flow Path ln Accident Une-up w/"A" Train Aux Reservoir Return Valve (1SW-270)

Failed Closed Pre July f994 Uneup Aux Reoervotr 7~

Mafn Reeervofr Aux Reservoir Main Reeervofr A

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~ Heafed Wafer

Shearon Harris Emergency Sevlce Water System Flow Path In Accident Une-up w+A" Train Aux Reservoir Return Valve (1SW-270)

Failed Closed Current Valve Lineup Aux Resorvotr~

ttaftt Reservoir

~reap Aux Reservotr Nattt Roeorvo A

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~

Heated Water

ESW TECHNICALISSUE Causal Factors e System designed with this line-up to increase availability; passive failures were emphasized.

I Later CSlP Cooler Piping reviews addressed passive failures and check valve failures.

e Single Failure Review for GL 89-13 also addressed 1SW-2701271 failure - concluded only one ESW header lost and other header operable.

e Difficultto visualize all effects together as credible scenario:

+ High supply and return header pressures

+ Recirculation flowfrom Booster Pump

+ Heat addition from Diesel

+ CSIP Cooler cross connect flowsource

ESW TECH GAL ISSUE How Problem Was Identified e 6/27/94: "A"CSIP oil cooler failed the ESW check valve flowtest.

e 6/28/94: Self-identified backpressure at the cross connect concerns if1SW-270 or 1SW-271 failed to open.

e 7/1/94: Isolated cross-train return valves from the CSIP coolers.

e 7/5/94: Determined that sufficient flowwas available to the CSIP coolers.

Review continued.

e 7/18/94: Determined that flowto CSIPs could be heated due to recirculation flow path {"A"train only}.

Valve lineup changed to eliminate cross connect.

4-hour report made to NRC.

CARL

ESW TECHMICALISSUE Safety Significance 0 Operators would have terminated heated backflow before CSIP failure.

+ Multiple alarms and procedural action guides and verifications were in place to diagnose event.

+ All6 simulator crews terminated heated backflow successfully without prompting during Sl and 1SW-270 failure simulator scenarios.

e Two CSIPs would therefore remain available due to cooling flowfrom the operable header.

ESW TECHNICALISSUE Safety Significance (continued)

Indications of 1SW-270 FailUre o Annunciations

+ "SERV WTR HEADER A HIGH-LOWFLOW"

+ "ESW HDR A RTN TO AUXRSVR BLOCKED OR MISALIGNED" IIndications

+ ESW Header Flow {Fl-9101A1)

+ ESW Header Pressure (Pl-9101A1)

+ Valve Control Switch Status Lights

+ Monitor Light Box "RTN RSVR OPEN 1SW-270" o Computer Alarm

+ 1SW-270 Shut with "A"ESW Pump Running

/ NOATC EIOMIESIIIO EY ESS IICAI ShlTTT UIIClNSI lf*IUS T$tCX5 MllAIXQOsaIESITIO M tAL IKTWt%8l AT EIIlÃT~IE EIIETOI TO PCS<<IOII AUTO OIE IIO IIIMJALOTACTESE TIIII SUCCEXFUL IIO FRP

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ESW TECHNICALISSUE Safety Significance (continued}

e NRC Precedent for Acceptance of Operator Action

~ Steam Generator Tube Rupture

~ Steam Line Break o Satisfied Requirements of ANSllANS 68.8, Time

Response

Design Criteria for Nuclear Safety Related Operator Actions

~ Event Specific Approach

~ Simulator Performance Data Collected

~ Statistical Analysis

~ Specific Time Test Criteria Derived

+ 95% Confidence that Operators would use less than 58% of available time to restore normal cooling to CSIPs.

ESW TECHMICALISSUE Safety Significance {continued}

I Extremely Low Probability of Occurrence 6.6E-9 CARL e Minimal Impact on Overall Core Damage Frequency - Even Without Operator Action IWorst Case Analysis Assumptions

+ Maximum ESW Temperature

+ Minimum Transit Time

+ Instantarieous Diesel Jacket Water Heat Up

+ Instantaneous GSIP Failure

+ Availabilityof Third CSIP Neglected

+ Assume GSIP failure prior to EDG failure

E8% TECHNICALISSUE System Specific Actions 6 Valve Lineup Changed

- Headers Separated e Updated Single Failure Review of ESW is Complete I Self SWSOPI Planned for 4th Quarter, 1994 CPRI

ESW TECHNICALISSUE General Actions o Performed General Review of other Decay Heat Removal Systems for Cross Connections:

+ High and Low Head Safety Injection

+ Component Cooling Water

+ AuxiliaryFeedwater 6 Single Failure Training and Guidance to be provided 1st Quarter, 1996 for appropriate Nuclear Engineering Personnel

ES% TECHMllCAEISSUE Summary e Plant was always in a Safe Condition e Scenario has been Eliminated e DifficultScenario to Identify 9 Low Probability Event e'Self-Identified Through Aggressive and Thorough Investigation e Self SWSOPI Planned CRATE

I RESPONSE AC URACY ISSUE Outline

~ Chronology I Regulatory Analysis

~ Evaluation COL

RESPONSE ACCURACY ISSUE Chronology e Generic Letter 89-13 Issued July 18, 1989 e Cp&LResponse (3-plant) submitted January 26, 1990

+ Single failure reviews committed for SHNPP

+ To be completed and documented prior to startup from next refueling outage

+ Nuclear Engineering Department {NED}assigned single failure review Action Item

RESPONSE A CURACY ISSU Chronology (continued) e Single Failure Reviews Completed by NED I

!May 7, 1991 NED Memorandum

~ "NED has completed the single failure reviews required by the NRC Generic Letter 89-13." (emphasis added)

~ No problems that would require a configuration change.

~ After editorial cleanup, reviews to be transmitted to the site for NRC inspection package.

~ Action item was closed.,:

o SHNPP Completion Letter Submitted June 17, 1991

+ Completion of initial actions referenced in January 26, 1990 Commitment Letter COL

RESPONSE ACCURACYISSUE Regulatory Analysis (continued}

o NED completed assigned single failure reviews.

+ No problems of significance that would require a configuration change to the plant were identified.

+ "Draft"notation utilized for ease of future comment incorporation.

+ No additional review work was planned by NED.

o Did-not rely on an incomplete review to close Generic Letter.

+ Technical work was completed prior to end of outage.

RESPONSE AC URACY ISSUE Evaluation

~ Issuance from the initiating organization {NED) should have been Ret.

Q instead of "Draft"

~ NED completed the Service Water System single failure review, concluded that it would perform its intended function per the licensing basis, and documented as such.

~ Administrative close-out was incomplete.

~ Identification of the CSIP Oil Cooler Issue was not affected by this Response Accuracy Issue.

CP&L

SERVICE WATER ISSUES Concluding Remarks

SERVICE WATER ISSUES Concluding Remarks o Harris Plant was always in a safe condition.

e The Single Failure Issue was self-identified.

e Other Decay Removal Systems have been reviewed for similar issues.

o Response to the NRC that the Single Failure Review was complete was accurate in all material respects.

SERVICE WATER ISSUES Concluding Remarks (continued) e Complete review of other GL 89-13 actions in process.

e Self SWSOPI planned.

e Review of Corrective Action Program closeouts

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ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE AGENDA U. S-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY October 21, 1994; 2:00 PM INTRODUCTION AND OPENING REMARKS S. Ebneter, Regional Administrator DISCUSSION OF THE ENFORCEMENT POLICY L. Watson, Enforcement Specialist Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff OVERVIEW S. Ebneter, Regional Administrator EXAMPLES OF APPARENT VIOLATIONS AND NRC CONCERNS J.

Jaudon, Deputy Director Division of Reactor Projects LICENSEE PRESENTATION W. Robinson, Vice President Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant 8REAK/NRC CAUCUS NRC FOLLOWUP QUESTIONS CLOSING S. Ebneter, Regional Administrator ENCLOSURE 4

SERVICE WATER ISSUES Inspection Report Comments Paragraph 4.c.(1), first bullet - Both CSIPs would have been available prior to the failure, and both would have been impacted.

Paragraph 4.c.(1), fourth bullet - CP&Levaluated the integrity of ESW piping and elected not to pursue failure in the case of pump failure.

Paragraph 4.c.(1), sixth subparagraph

- CP&L had evaluated "B" ESW header vulnerability and found a high pressure/reverse fiow gradient, but due to system geometry, heated flow did not reach the CSIP oil coolers.

ENCLOSURE 5

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