ML18011A516
| ML18011A516 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1994 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18011A515 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9408010172 | |
| Download: ML18011A516 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O.C. 2055&000I SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT N0.49 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
NPF-63 CAROLINA POWER
& LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-400
- 1. 0 INTRODUCTION By letter dated February 4, 1994, Carolina Power L Light Company (the licensee) submitted a request for a change to the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
(SHNPP),
Technical Specifications (TS).
The requested change
'ould increase the time in the Limiting Condition For Operation (LCO) with one containment vacuum relief system (CVRS) inoperable from 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The proposed change is related to the LCO Action Statement of Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.5 with one CVRS inoperable.
The Action Statement of TS 3.6.5 currently states, "With one containment vacuum relief system inoperable, restore the system to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />."
The proposed TS change will increase this LCO time from 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to conform with Section 3.6.12, of NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants" (STS), dated September 1992.
- 2. 0 EVALUATION The licensee states in its submittal that the CVRS for SHNPP is not an engineered safety feature
- system, nor does it provide protection features for any accident analyzed in Chapter 15 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
The staff pointed out during a telephone call with the licensee on March 15, 1994, that while the CVRS is not discussed in Chapter 15, Chapter 6
does discuss the postulated event that the CVRS is design to mitigate.
The valves and penetrations which make up a portion of the CVRS also perform as containment isolation valves during a positive pressure event.
The licensee agreed with the staff's comments during the phone call and confirmed that the containment vacuum relief valves are considered a part of the plant's containment isolation system.
The staff reviewed the CVRS system design basis and the system description contained in Chapter 6.2. 1. 1.3.4 of the SHNPP
- FSAR, and finds that the CVRS is designed to provide vacuum relief for the containment as well as containment isolation for maintaining containment pressure integrity during a postulated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or main steam/feedwater line break.
The containment isolation function of the CVRS is performed by the system's vacuum relief check valves and the pneumatically operated butterfly valves which have been designed to Safety Class 2 and Seismic Category I criteria to withstand 9408010172 940727 PDR ADQCK 05000400 P
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the full containment design pressure.
The design basis event for this system during the vacuum relief function is an accidental initiation of the containment spray system with two'fan coolers in operation, one of two CVRS systems assumed to be operable and the containment initial temperature at 120'F.
For an accidental initiation of containment sprays with the above-mentioned assumptions, the licensee calculated a negative differential pressure across the containment wall to be 1.93 psid (pounds per square inch differential) which is within the containment vessel's external design pressure of 2.0 psi.
When one of the required vacuum relief lines is inoperable, the present technical specifications require that the inoperable line'must be restored to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; the licensee proposes to increase the allowed outage time to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The staff considers this change acceptable based on a quantitative judgment of the low probability that the system will be called upon to perform its design basis function with one train inoperable.
This time period is also consistent with other LCOs for the loss of one train of a system required to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA or other design basis accidents.
Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the licensee's TS change request is consistent with the STS LCO and, therefore, is acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
'n accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of North Carolina official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.
The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes the Surveillance Requirements.
The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released
- offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a
proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 14886).
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
- 5. 0 CONCLUSION The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed
- above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed
- manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission s regulations,
'I i and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
A. D'Angelo Date:
July 27, 1994
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