ML18010A964
| ML18010A964 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1992 |
| From: | Christensen H, Shannon M, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18010A962 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-92-27, NUDOCS 9212290074 | |
| Download: ML18010A964 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1992027
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
M. Shanno
dent Inspector
Approved by:
H
Chri tensen,
Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
Report No.:
50-400/92-27
Licensee:
Carolina
Power
and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Harris
1
Inspection
Condu
d:
October
24 - November 20,
1992
Inspectors:
J.
Tedrow,
Seni
Resident
Inspector
Licensee
No.:
D
e
i ned
/4
D te Signed
/2 g gz
Da e
igned
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection
was conducted
by two resident
inspectors
in the areas
of plant operations,
radiological controls, security, fire protection,
surveillance observation,
maintenance
observation,
design
changes
and
modifications,
outage activities, refueling activities, safety system
walkdown, licensee
event reports
and licensee
action
on previous inspection
items.
Numerous facility tours were conducted
and facility operations
observed.
Some of these tours
and observations
were conducted
on backshifts.
Results:
One violation with three
examples
was identified:
Failure to properly
establish/implement
plant procedures,
paragraphs
2.c.(2), 3.a,
and 3.b.
Two non-cited violations were identified:
Failure to obey
a radiography
posting,
par agraph 2.c.(1);
and failure to properly move fuel in accordance
with fuel transfer data sheets,
paragraph
8.b.
A weakness
was identified regarding
implementation of the equipment clearance
program,
paragraph
2.a.
92i2290074 92i208
ADOCK 05000400
Q
2
A weakness
was also identified regarding
temporary test procedure
adequacy,
paragraph
3.c and 5.
Another weakness
was identified regarding the reviews performed for the fuel
transfer data sheets,
paragraph
S.a.
,
Persons
Contacted
REPORT DETAILS
Licensee
Employees
- J. Collins, Manager,
Operations
- J. Cribb, Manager, guality Control
C. Gibson,
Manager,
Programs
and Procedures
- C. Hinnant,
General
Manager,
Harris Plant
D. Knepper,
Project Engineer,
Nuclear Engineering
Dept.
B. Meyer,
Manager,
Environmental
and Radiation Monitoring
- T. Morton, Manager,
Maintenance
J. Moyer, Manager,
Project Assessment
- J. Nevill, Manager,
Technical
Support
C. Olexi k, Manager,
Regulatory
Compliance
A. Powell,
Manager,
Harris Training Unit
- W. Seyler,
Manager,
Outages
and Modifications
H. Smith,
Manager,
Radwaste
Operation
- G. Vaughn,
Vice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
W. Wilson, Manager,
Spent Nuclear Fuel
Other licensee
employees
contacted
included office, operations,
engineering,
maintenance,
chemistry/radiation
and corporate
personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
Review of Plant Operations
(71707)
The plant began this inspection period in the defueled condition.
On
October 30,
1992, refueling operations
(Mode 6) were
commenced.
The
core
was reloaded into the reactor vessel
at 5: 19 a.m.
on November 3.
At 10:55 p.m.
on November
12, the reactor vessel
head
studs
were
tensioned
and the plant entered
the cold shutdown
(Mode 5) condition.
The plant remained
in cold shutdown for the duration of this inspection
period.
a ~
Shift Logs and Facility Records
The inspector reviewed records
and discussed
various entries with
operations
personnel
to verify compliance with the Technical
Specifications
(TS)
and the licensee's
administrative procedures.
The following records
were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's
Log;
Outage Shift Manager's
Log; Control Operator's
Log; Night Order
Book; Equipment Inoperable
Record; Active Clearance
Log; Grounding
Device Log; Temporary Modification Log; Chemistry Daily Reports;
Shift Turnover Checklist;
and selected
Radwaste
Logs.
In
addition, the inspector
independently verified clearance
order
tagouts.
The inspectors
found the logs to be readable,
well organized,
and
provided sufficient information on plant status
and events.
Licensee
personnel
identified several
deficiencies related to
equipment
clearances
during this refueling outage.
Although the
deficiencies
were all minor, they involved several different
aspects
of generating
and removing equipment clearances
including:
miscommunication,
improper clearance
tag installation,
improper
initial positioning of tagged
components,
subsequent
operation of
tagged
components,
removal of tagged
components
from a system,
and
premature
clearance
removal prior to work completion.
Although
none of these deficiencies resulted
in safety-related
equipment
damage
or personnel
injury, they indicated
a potential
problem
which could have serious
consequences if not corrected.
The
inspector identified six different ACR's related to equipment
clearance
problems
and questioned
licensee
personnel if an adverse
trend
had
been identified.
Although an adverse
trend
had not
previously
been identified, licensee
personnel
reviewed the ACR's
identified by the inspector
and agreed that
an adverse
trend
was
indicated.
During the previous refueling outage
an adverse
trend regarding
equipment clearance utilization was also identified.
An
evaluation of this trend identified
a lack of verbatim compliance
with the clearance
procedure
as the root cause.
The licensee
implemented corrective actions,
such
as procedural
revisions
and
training, in an effort to reverse
the trend.
These actions
were
not sufficient to preclude the events
which resulted
in the ACR's
identified during this assessment
period.
The licensee
has
concluded that additional
measures
are
needed to prevent
recurrence
of these
types of problems.
The licensee is presently
investigating these
events to determine appropriate corrective
action.
The inspector will review the licensee's
corrective
action regarding
equipment clearance
problems
under violation
400/92-27-02,
(paragraph 2.c.(2)).
Since the inspector
had to prompt the adverse
trend declaration
by
the licensee,
the corrective action trending program
was
considered
to be weak in this case.
Facility Tours
and Observations
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted
to
observe
operations,
surveillance,
and maintenance activities in
progress.
Some of these
observations
were conducted
during
backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee
meetings
were attended
by the inspectors
to observe
planning
and
management activities.
The facility tours
and observations
encompassed
the following areas:
security perimeter fence;
control
room;
emergency diesel
generator building; reactor
auxiliary building; reactor containment building; waste processing
building; turbine building; fuel handling building; emergency
service water building; battery rooms; electrical
switchgear
rooms;
and the technical
support center.
During these tours,
the following observations
were made:
(4)
Monitoring Instrumentation
- Equipment operating status,
area
atmospheric
and liquid radiation monitors, electrical
system lineup, reactor operating
parameters,
and auxiliary
equipment operating
parameters
were observed to verify that
indicated parameters
were in accordance
with the
TS for the
current operational
mode.
Shift Staffing - The inspectors verified that operating
shift staffing was in accordance
with TS requirements
and
that control
room operations
were being conducted
in an
orderly and professional
manner.
In addition, the inspector
observed shift turnovers
on various occasions
to verify the
continuity of plant status,
operational
problems,
and other
pertinent plant information during these turnovers.
Plant Housekeeping
Conditions
- Storage of material
and
components,
and cleanliness
conditions of various
areas
throughout the facility were observed to determine
whether
safety and/or fire hazards
existed.
Radiological Protection
Program
- Radiation protection
control activities were observed routinely to verify that
these activities were in conformance with the facility
policies
and procedures,
and in compliance with regulatory
requirements.
The inspectors
also reviewed selected
radiation work permits to verify that controls were
adequate.
The licensee
started early boration of the
RCS during plant
shutdown to lower the
PH chemistry.
This action
was
intended to dissolve corrosion products
so they could
be
removed
by the purification system.
Hydrogen peroxide
was
then
added to aid in corrosion product removal.
This
process
was effective in lowering the dose rate in several
RCS pipe locations
and resulted
in approximately
700 curies
of corrosion products
being removed.
Security Control
- The performance of various shifts of the
security force was observed
in the'conduct of daily
activities which included:
protected
and vital area
access
controls;
searching of personnel,
packages,
and vehicles;
badge
issuance
and retrieval; escorting of visitors;
patrols;
and compensatory
posts.
In addition, the inspector
observed
the operational
status of closed circuit television
monitors,
the intrusion detection
system in the central
and
secondary
alarm stations,
protected
area lighting, protected
and vital area barrier integrity,
and the security
organization interface with operations
and maintenance.
(6)
Fire Protection
- Fire protection activities, staffing and
equipment
were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing
was appropriate
and that fire alarms,
extinguishing
equipment,
actuating controls, fire fighting equipment,
emergency
equipment,
and fire barriers
were operable.
The inspectors
found plant housekeeping
and material condition of
safety related
components
to be good.
The licensee's
adherence
to
radiological controls, security controls, fire protection
requirements,
and
TS requirements
in these
areas
was satisfactory.
Review of Nonconformance
Reports
Adverse Condition Reports
(ACRs) were reviewed to verify the
following:
TS were complied with, corrective actions
and generic
items were identified and items were reported
as required
by
(1)
ACR 92-529 reported that two licensee
employees
had violated
the radiological
boundaries
established
for radiography.
One employee
had intentionally crossed
the radiography
posting
and boundary rope to access
a stairwell.
The other
individual
had attempted to warn the first employee to exit
the area
when they were noticed
by health physics personnel.
The two individuals were then escorted
from the area
and
an
investigation
conducted.
The investigation determined that
the radiography
source
was retracted
during this time frame.
This was confirmed by measuring
the personnel
exposure of
the two individuals (less
than
20 millirem).
The inspector reviewed the licensee's
procedure
governing
this activity, AP-507,
Radiography Guidelines,
and the
training provided to the two individuals before this event.
The inspector determined that appropriate training and
administrative controls
had
been
implemented
before the
event occurred.
The inspector also reviewed radiation
survey records of the radiography
boundary
and found it to
be satisfactory.
The licensee's
corrective action following
the event included terminating
employment of the individual
who intentionally violated the radiography
boundary
and
counseling of the second individual.
The event
was further
discussed
between
the inspector
and regional health physics
experts.
This violation will not be subject to enforcement
action because
the licensee's
efforts in identifying and
correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in
Section VII.B of the Enforcement Policy.
NCV (400/92-27-01):
Failure to obey
a radiography posting.
(2)
ACR 92-570 reported that
on November 6,
1992, the "A"
emergency diesel
generator
experienced
a generator
differential trip when it was started following maintenance.
The licensee's
investigation into this event disclosed that
electrical
grounding straps
were still installed
on the
generator
from previous work.
A review of equipment
clearances
and the grounding device log indicated that the
grounding straps
had
been installed in accordance
with
procedures
AP-024,
Grounding Device Control,
and AP-020,
Clearance
Procedures.
However,
when the equipment clearance
was authorized to be removed,
the grounding straps
had
inadvertently
been left in place.
Procedure
AP-020, step
5.7. 1, requires that installed ground devices
be removed
following maintenance.
Section
6 of the clearance
form had
been
signed indicating that electrical
grounds
had
been
removed
on November 6,
1992,
even though the grounds
were
still in place.
Failure to properly implement procedure
AP-
020 is contrary to the requirements
of TS 6.8. l.a and is
considered
to be
a violation.
(3)
Violation (400/92-27-02):
Failure to properly
establish/implement
plant procedures.
ACR 92-596 reported that
on November ll, 1992, the licensee
discovered
the tubing between
the governor oil booster
and
the "A" emergency diesel
governor
was installed incorrectly.
The governor oil booster provides oil pressure
to fully open
the diesel
generator
fuel racks
on
a diesel start signal,
which helps to decrease
the starting time of the diesel.
Although the "A" diesel
had longer starting times than the
"8" diesel, it was still able to meet its maximum starting
time of 10 seconds.
The tubing was subsequently
connected
to the correct governor port and the diesel
was tested
satisfactorily.
It appeared
that the incorrect tubing
connection
was
made during initial factory installation.
A
review of starting data indicated that with low starting air
flask pressures
the diesel
may not have
been
able to meet
its
10 second starting time requirement
and it appeared
that
previous
slow start valid failures were probably caused
by
the incorrect tubing connection.
Surveillance
Observation
(61726)
Surveillance tests
were observed to verify that approved
procedures
were
being used; qualified personnel
were conducting the tests;
tests
were
adequate
to verify equipment operability; calibrated
equipment
was
utilized;
and
TS requirements
were followed.
The following tests
were
observed
and/or data reviewed:
~ OST-1013
lA-SA Emergency Diesel
Generator Operability Test
Monthly Intervals
~ OST-1091
Containment
Closure Test Weekly Interval During Core
Alterations
and Movement of Irradiated
Fuel
Inside
Containment
~ OST-1817
Refueling Machine (Manipulator Crane) Operability Modes:
100 Hours Prior to Fuel
Movement in Pressure
Vessel
~ OST-1818
Auxiliary Hoist Operability Modes:
All 100 Hours Prior to
Drive Rod Movement in Pressure
Vessel
~ OST-1833T Temporary Procedure for the Completion of OST-1813
(Remote
Shutdown
System Operability,
18 month) Retest
Requirements
~ HST-I0072 Train A 18 Month Annual
Manual Reactor Trip Solid State
Protection
System Actuation Logic
E Master Relay Test
~ HST-I0127 Hain Steam Line Pressure,
Loop
1 (P-0476) Operational
Test
~ HST-I0163 Nuclear Instrumentation
System
Power
Range
N41 Operational
Test
~ HST-I0169 Nuclear Instrumentation
System Source
Range
N31 Operational
Test
~ MST-I0170 Nuclear Instrumentation
System
Source
Range
N32 Operational
Test
~ HST-H0011
Emergency Diesel
Generator
Crankshaft
Web Deflection
and
Thrust Clearance
Check
~ MST-H0014 Emergency Diesel
Generator
Cold Compression
and
Maximum
Firing Pressure
Checks
~ EST-209
Type
B Local
Leak Rate Tests
~ EPT-032T
Component
Cooling Water System
Pressure
Test
~ EPT-146
Emergency Diesel
Generator
Post-Maintenance
Operation
The performance of these
procedures
was found to be satisfactory with
proper use of calibrated test equipment,
necessary
communications
established,
notification/authorization of control
room personnel,
and
knowledgeable
personnel
having performed the tasks.
The local leak rate
tests
on the
RHR valve chambers
were performed following the removal of
mud and debris which was found to have clogged the chamber drain lines.
The tests
were completed satisfactory indicating the drain valves would
have provided satisfactory
pressure
barriers.
'a ~
Following the measurements
taken in accordance
with procedure
HST-
M011, the "A" emergency diesel
was started.
Shortly after
startup,
licensee
personnel
discovered that the cylinder petcocks
had
been left open.
The petcocks
are generally closed during
7
diesel
operation
and opened to check for cooling water inleakage
into the cylinders
when the engine is barred over.
The inspectors
noted that the system engineer
was assisting
the craft in
performance of the engine inspection
and that steps
in procedure
HST-M011 required the engine
be barred over with a hydraulic
device.
When licensee
maintenance
personnel
encountered
resistance
during the engine barring, the system engineer
directed
the petcocks
be opened.
The maintenance
procedure
did not provide
specific guidance for barring the engine.
Subsequently,
the
petcocks
were not returned to the closed position following the
barring.
The inspectors
noted that operating
procedures
contained
clear guidance
on barring the engine which contained
independent
verification that the petcocks
be closed.
However, the operating
procedure
was not implemented
since the barring
had already
been
performed
by operating
personnel
within the previous four hours.
Furthermore,
the inspectors
found that the scope of work performed
on the diesel
engine,
while under
an equipment
clearance,
was not
discussed
between the craft and operating
personnel
to determine
appropriate testing or valve lineups
needed to restore
the engine
to operable status.
This event is considered
to be another
example of the violation discussed
in paragraph
2.c.(2) of this
report.
On November 8,
1992, during the performance of procedure
EST-212
on penetration
H-7,
CVCS Normal
Letdown, approximately
50 gallons
of contaminated
water was spilled in the reactor auxiliary
building.
To pressurize
the penetration,
a local leak rate
monitor was connected
through drain valves
and
1CS-13 which
were opened.
Following the completion of the test,
the system
was
refilled with water by opening the isolation valve.
When the
isolation valve was opened,
licensee
personnel
discovered that the
drain valves
had inadvertently
been left open.
Section
6 of
Attachment
1 to procedure
EST-212,
contains specific steps to
restore
the penetration to service following testing
and requires
that the drain valves
be shut before opening the isolation valves
to refill the system.
Failure to properly implement procedure
EST-212 is considered
to be another
example of the violation
discussed
in paragraph
2.c.(2) of this report.
During the performance of procedure
OST-1833T
on November
12,
1992, licensee
personnel
observed
several
transfer relays to be
smoking.
This procedure
was performed to retest
components
which
had failed during the previous test of the auxiliary control
panel.
Licensee
personnel
determined that the cause for the
burned relays
was
an inadequate test procedure
in that power
supply fuses
had not been
removed which caused
the transfer relays
to cycle excessively.
The failed relays
were subsequently
replaced
and
a revised test procedure
performed satisfactory.
The
inspector considered
the procedure
generation
process
to be weak
in this case
as the mistake to remove all the power supply fuses
was not detected
during reviews.
4.
Haintenance
Observation
(62703)
The inspector observed/reviewed
maintenance activities to verify that
correct equipment clearances
were in effect; work requests
and fire
prevention work permits,
as required,
were issued
and being followed;
quality control personnel
were available for inspection activities
as
required;
and
TS requirements
were being followed.
Haintenance
was observed
and work packages
were reviewed for the
following maintenance activities:
~
Inspection of valve
1CS-751 in accordance
with procedure
Kerotest Series
9900 "Y"-Type Globe Valve Disassembly,
Inspection,
Reconditioning
and Reassembly.
Inspection
and non-destructive
examination of the "B" emergency
diesel
generator cylinder block in accordance
with procedures
HPT-
H0030,
Emergency Diesel
Generator Cylinder Block Inspection,
and
Emergency Diesel
Generator
Cylinder Head
Removal,
Disassembly,
and Reassembly.
Inspection of the camshaft
lobes
on the "A" emergency diesel
generator
in accordance
with procedure
HPT-H009,
Emergency Diesel
Generator
Camshaft
Lobe/Bearing
and Tappet Assembly Inspection.
~
Repair of the static inverters in accordance
with procedures
CH-
E0020,
Replace Oil Filled and Electrolytic Capacitors
and/or
Ferro-Resonant
Transformer Assembly in Westinghouse
7.5
KVA Static
Inverters
and PIC-E051,
Class
IE 7.5
KVA Westinghouse
Inverter.
The performance of work was satisfactory with proper documentation
of
removed
components
and independent verification of the reinstallation.
a
~
b.
A routine preventative
maintenance
(PH) task to replace the gate
and synchronization
board
and the gate driver assembly
in all four
vital inverters
was performed during this refueling outage.
'Following the component
replacements,
inverters
I and II began
experiencing
problems.
Inverter II tripped off line after
operating
several
days
and inverter I experienced
a loss of output
following reenergization.
The output
SCRs in both inverters
were
found faulted
and the
SCR supply fuses
were blown.
The licensee
replaced
the damaged
and fuses,
removed the
new gateing
and
synchronization
board,
and reinstalled the old boards.
The
inverters
were subsequently
placed
back into operation with no
further problems.
There
appeared
to be
a problem with the
replacement
boards received
from the spare parts warehouse.
The
licensee
is evaluating the cause of the board failures with the
manufacturer
and will take appropriate
actions.
The "A" emergency diesel
generator
camshaft
inspection
was
performed following identification of spalling
and wear
on the "B"
emergency diesel
generator
camshaft discussed
in NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/92-23.
Very minor surface
spots
were noted which
indicated the potential
beginning of spalling.
The indications
were not serious
enough to require camshaft
replacement,
however.
The camshaft will be reinspected
during the next scheduled
diesel
inspection in refueling outage
number six.
Design
Changes
and Modifications (37828)
Installation of new or modified systems
were reviewed to verify that the
changes
were approved in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.59, that the changes
were performed in accordance
with technically adequate
and approved
procedures,
that subsequent
testing
and test results
met acceptance
criteria or deviations
were resolved
in an acceptable
manner,
and that
appropriate
drawings
and facility procedures
were revised
as necessary.
This review included selected
observations
of modifications and/or
testing in progress.
~
PCR-2512
Service Air Regulators to Chiller Expansion
Tank
~
PCR-5534
ESCWS Expansion
Tank Improvements
~
PCR-6547
Alternate Mini-Flow Redesign
~
PCR-6575
Reactor
Vessel
Stuck Stud
~
PCR-6584
EDG Starting Air/Control Air Contamination
~
PCR-6605
Pre-Heater
Bypass
Line Replacement
~
PCR-6630
Containment
Closure for AFW Pipe Replacement
While performing the post modification testing for PCR-6547,
on
November 6,
1992,
an
SSPS logic relay actuated
which satisfied the
initiation signal for an automatic
swapover of the
RHR and
CT suction
valves to the containment
sump.
The valves did not reposition
and
dump
the
RWST to containment
because
the shift supervisor
had conservatively
turned off the breaker
power supply earlier.
Although this event did
not actually cause
a spill in containment,
the procedural
controls were
considered
to be weak.
During the removal of reactor vessel
closure
studs in preparation of
core offload,
one stud
was found to be stuck in its reactor vessel
flange hole.
The licensee
performed
an engineering
evaluation to leave
the stud in place during refueling activities.
The stuck stud did not
interfere with the fuel manipulator.
The evaluation
concluded that the
stuck stud could still be tensioned
normally along with the other
closure studs
and not have to be removed until
ASME Section
XI
examinations
were required.
The inspector considered
the licensee's
actions to be appropriate.
Modification PCR-6630
was implemented to allow core alterations
during
auxiliary feedwater pipe replacement.
10
installed
and removed blank flanges
on the
AFW piping for containment
closure requirements.
The inspector
was satisfied that containment
closure requirements
were met during refueling activities.
Modification PCR-6605 replaced
the pre-heater
bypass piping from the
main feedwater
system to the auxiliary feedwater
system.
This piping
showed evidence of accelerated
erosion rates
when tested ultrasonically
for pipe wall thinning.
The
new piping was fabricated
from chrome-moly
material
which should
be less susceptible
to erosion.
The inspectors
reviewed the post-modification testing for this maintenance
and the
maintenance
on the auxiliary feedwater piping which was replaced
in
containment.
Radiography
was performed
on the weld repairs
and
a system
inservice pressure
test performed.
The inspector
checked
the testing
performed to the requirements
contained
in ASME Section
XI and found it
to be acceptable.
Safety Systems
Walkdown (71710)
The inspector
conducted
a walkdown of various safety
systems
in
containment to verify that the lineups were in accordance
with license
requirements for system operability and that the system drawings
and
procedures
correctly reflected "as-built" plant conditions.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Outage Activities (71707)
Major activities performed during this scheduled
refueling outage
included
a 20 percent
eddy current inspection
on the three
steam
generators,
inspection of service water piping and components,
testing
of motor operated
valves,
teardown/overhaul
of the "B" emergency diesel
generator
and reconstitution of fuel rods.
Also, feedwater pipe erosion
inspections
prompted significant pipe replacement/modifications
in the
auxiliary feedwater/pre-heater
bypass
system.
The results of the steam generator
eddy current inspection revealed
no
indications that steam generator
tubes
needed to be plugged.
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
risk assessments
for emergent
work
activities during the outage.
The licensee recently implemented
a
revision to procedure
PLP-700,
Outage
Management,
which required that
all outage activity additions receive
an initial risk assessment
to
determine if the activity potentially affected
key safety functions or
the planned defense-in-depth.
Specifically schedule
changes
involving
the removal of the "B" SFP normal
power supply
and the repair of the "A"
EDG during continuing maintenance
on the "B" ESCWS were reviewed to
verify appropriate
evaluations
had
been
made or
PNSC approval
obtained.
The inspector considered
the process
to be effective.
s.
Refueling Activities (60710)
ll
The inspectors
witnessed
several shifts of fuel handling operations
and
verified that the refueling was being performed in accordance
with TS
requirements
and approved
procedures.
Areas inspected
included
containment integrity, housekeeping
in the refueling area, shift
staffing during refueling, surveillance testing,
and periodic monitoring
of plant status
during refueling operations.
In addition, the following
procedures
were reviewed:
~
PLP-616
Fuel Handling Operations
~
FHP-010
Core Mapping Following Fuel
Loading
~
FHP-014
Fuel
and Insert Shuffle Sequence
~
FHP-020
Fuel Handling Operations
~
OST-1091
Containment
Closure Test Weekly Interval During Core
Alterations
and Hovement of Irradiated
Fuel Inside
Containment
~
OST-1817
Refueling Machine (Manipulator Crane) Operability
~
OST-1818
Auxiliary Hoist Operability
~
NST-10169
Nuclear Instrumentation
System
Source
Range
N31
Operational
Test
~
HST-10170
Nuclear Instrumentation
System Source
Range
N32
Operational
Test
The inspectors
found procedure
implementation to be satisfactory.
The
water clarity and lighting in the refueling cavity was excellent.
During the core offload on October 2,
1992, operators
received
several
manipulator crane
underload interlock actuations
while
moving fuel assemblies.
Although the interlock actuation
temporarily halted crane
movement,
fuel movement
was possible in-
between actuations.
During the first nine assemblies
moved,
operators
encountered
four underload interlock conditions.
The
manipulator crane
has four load switch settings for selection
depending
on the weight of the fuel assembly
and insert.
The fuel
transfer data sheets
specified which switch setting to select.
The purpose of the underload interlock is to prevent lowering an
assembly
which comes
in contact with an adjacent
assembly
and
"hangs-up".
In this case
the load settings specified in the fuel
transfer data sheets
were in error,
but conservative,
causing
premature interlock actuation.
Licensee
personnel
compared
the load settings specified
on the
fuel transfer sheets
with original calculations of assembly weight
12
b.
and found that most of the switch positions specified
were
incorrect.
Fuel
movement
was halted until the transfer sheets
could be revised with correct load settings.
The licensee's
investigation of this event revealed that the transfer sheet
data
was incorrectly transposed
from the fuel assembly weight
calculations.
Since the fuel transfer data sheets
receive several
different independent
reviews prior to implementation,
the
inspector considered this effort to be weak for not previously
identifying this error.
During fuel reload
on October 30,
1992, licensee
personnel
discovered that
a fuel assembly
had
been
moved out of sequence.
The first step of the fuel transfer data sheets
specified the
first assembly for reload to be from spent fuel rack location A-
B2C4.
The refueling operator mistakenly latched
and
moved the
fuel assembly
located in the adjacent
rack location A-A2C4.
The
incorrect fuel assembly
was placed in the upender
and transferred
to the containment refueling cavity.
This error was noticed
by
licensee
personnel
during the next step in the fuel transfer data
sheet
when the refueling operator
was noticed
by another operator
to be over the incorrect rack location.
Fuel
movement
was then
stopped
and the first fuel assembly
was transferred
back from
containment to the spent fuel rack location.
Refueling operations
were suspended
until shift briefings were conducted
which
reinforced attention to detail principles.
Future fuel movement
proceeded
without incident indicating that the licensee's
corrective action
was appropriate.
This violation will not be
subject to enforcement
action because
the licensee's
efforts in
identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria
specified in Section VII.B of the Enforcement Policy.
NCV (400/92-27-03):
Failure to properly move fuel in accordance
with fuel transfer data sheets.
Review of Licensee
Event Reports
(92700)
The following LERs were reviewed for potential generic
impact, to detect
trends,
and to determine
whether corrective actions
appeared
appropriate.
Events that were reported
immediately were reviewed
as
they occurred
to determine if the
TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed
in accordance
with the current
a 0
b.
(Closed)
LER 90-03:
This
LER reported that
a train of essential
services chilled water was inoperable
due to air intrusion into
the system.
This item was previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/92-02.
During this outage the licensee
has
completed modifications to improve system cleanliness
and provided
new regulators for expansion
tank pressure
control.
(Closed)
LER 91-08:
This
LER reported that the high head safety
injection system
was inoperable
due to
a failure of the system's
alternate miniflow lines.
This event
was previously discussed
in
13
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/92-17.
The licensee
issued
a
supplement
to the
LER dated October
13,
1992,
which documented
additional testing performed
on the system
and system
modifications to prevent recurrence of the event.
During this
outage
the licensee
implemented modification PCR-6547 to remove
the relief valves
and install flow orifices to regulate
recirculation flow.
(Closed)
LER 91-16:
This
LER reported the lifting of several
component cooling water relief valves during
a pump start.
This
event
was previously discussed
in NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/92-
07.
The licensee
has finished modification PCR-5741,
Coolers
Low Flow Alarm, which upgraded
the design pressures
of the
excess
letdown heat
exchanger
and reactor coolant drain tank heat
exchanger,
In conjunction with increasing
the relief valve
setpoint to 190 psig, this action enabled
the restoration of the
CCW system to
a normal lineup.
(Closed)
LER 92-04:
This
LER reported that
a single failure could
render the entire radiation monitoring system inoperable.
This
matter
was previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-
400/92-08.
Operating
and test procedures
have
been revised to
reflect the
new slide switch positions.
A revision to the
has
been
made
and will be submitted in the next
FSAR update
package.
(Closed)
LER 92-09:
This
LER reported
a manual reactor trip which
was initiated following the loss of the running main feedwater
pump.
This event
was previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/92-15.
The licensee
has
completed real-time
training alerting operating
personnel
on the causes
for this
event.
(Closed)
LER 92-11:
This
LER reported that the emergency
bus
undervoltage logic circuitry was inadequately
tested.
This event
was previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/92-15.
The licensee
has revised the permanent test procedures
to correct
the deficiency.
(Closed)
LER 92-13:
This
LER reported that
a TS surveillance
requirement to sample the fuel oil day tank was not performed
following emergency
diesel
operation.
This event
was previously
discussed
in NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/92-17.
The licensee
has
completed training applicable
personnel
and has revised
administrative
procedures
to clarify procedure
step annotations.
The individuals involved in this deficiency were counseled.
(Open)
LER 92-14:
This
LER reported
pipe wall thinning in the
and main feedwater
systems
caused
by flow
erosion.
This matter was previously discussed
in NRC Inspection
Report 50-400/92-23.
The licensee
has replaced
those sections of
piping which exhibited extensive erosion.
The licensee is
14
presently evaluating the effectiveness
of the computerized
pipe
wall thinning program
and is investigating the cause for the
accelerated
rate of erosion.
10.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection
Findings
(92702
&
92701)
a.
(Closed)
IFI 400/91-26-01:
Follow the licensee's
activities to
increase
the charging
pump flow margin
and evaluation of quarterly
pump testing acceptance
criteria.
This matter
was previously discussed
in NRC Inspection
Report
50-302/91-27 during which the quarterly
pump testing
was
considered
to be satisfactory.
The licensee
has reanalyzed
the
minimum safety injection flow limit during
a loss of coolant
accident
and
has determined that only 348 gpm is necessary.
This
value constitutes
an additional
30 gpm available for design
margin.
A change to the
TS was subsequently
requested
and issued
on November
10,
1992.
b.
(Closed) Violation 400/92-13-01:
Failure to maintain
gC inspector
certification.
The inspector reviewed
and verified completion of the corrective
actions listed in the licensee's
response letter dated August 28,
1992.
The licensee
has
enhanced
the
gC inspector recertification
system to provide
a two week notification prior to expiration
dates.
c.
(Closed)
IFI 400/92-23-01:
Review the licensee's
activities to
repair preheater
bypass
and auxiliary feedwater piping due to
erosion.
The licensee
has
issued
LER 92-14 describing the corrective
actions
taken for this event.
For record purposes
the IFI will be
closed
and further action tracked
by the
LER.
ll.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted
in paragraph
1) at the conclusion of the inspection
on November 23,
1992.
During
this meeting,
the inspectors
summarized
the scope
and findings of the
inspection
as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis
on the Violation, Non-cited Violations,
and Inspector Follow-up Item
addressed
below.. The licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the
inspector's
comments
and did not identify as proprietary
any of the
materials
provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors
during this
inspection.
No dissenting
comments
from the licensee
were received.
Item Number
400/92-27-01
400/92-27-02
400/92-27-03
and Initialisms
Descri tion and Reference
NCV:
Failure to obey
a radiography
posting,
paragraph 2.c.(l).
VIO:
Failure to properly
establish/implement
plant
procedures,
paragraph 2.c.(2).
NCV:
Failure to properly move fuel
in accordance
with fuel transfer
data sheets,
paragraph
S.b.
ACR
ASHE
CFR
EPT
ESCWS-
EST
GPH
IFI
LER
HPT
HST
NRC
OST
PLP
PH
PNSC
RCS/RC-
SSPS
TS
Adverse Condition Report
American Society of Hechanical
Component Cooling Water
Code of Federal
Regulations
Containment
Spray
Chemical
Volume Control
System
Emergency Diesel
Generator
, Engineering
Performance
Test
Essential
Services Chilled Wate
Engineering Surveillance
Test
Fuel Handling Procedure
Final Safety Analysis Report
Gallons
Per Hinute
Inspector
Follow-up Item
Licensee
Event Report
Haintenance
Performance
Test
Haintenance
Surveillance Test
Non-Cited Violation
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Operations
Surveillance Test
Plant
Change
Request
Plant
Program
Procedure
Preventive
Haintenance
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
Pounds
Per Square
Inch Gage
Quality Control
Residual
Heat
Removal
Refueling Water Storage
Tank
Spent
Fuel
Pump
Solid State Protection
System
Technical Specification
Violation
Engineers
r System