ML18009A905

Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.4.4, Relief Valves & 3/4.4.9.4, Overpressure Protection Sys, Addressing Recommendations of Generic Ltr 90-06 & Increasing Availability & Reliability of PORVs

ML18009A905
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	05/15/1991
From:	CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML18009A904	List: ML18009A903 ML18009A905
References
GL-90-06, GL-90-6, NUDOCS 9105280063
Download: ML18009A905 (21)

Text

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ENCLOSURE 4 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRC DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT PRESSURIZER PORVs AND BLOCK VALVES TECHNICALSPECIFICATION PAGES 9105280063 9105i5 PDR ADOCK 05000400 P

PDR

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

~iQ power main>airie +

e b lock Ugly(s)

With one or more PORV(s) inoperable, because o

excessive seat

leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s); otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY wi hin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HUTDOWN within the EolLowing hours.

4 a ~

3.4.4 All power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3

and 3

'CTION:

d 4

b ~

With one PORV inoperable as a result of causes other than excessive seat

leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block vaLve,and remove power from the block valve.

c ~

With two PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat

leakage, within 1, hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated bLock valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s); restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the fol-Lowing 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

d ~

With all.three PORVs inoperable balue to causes other than excessive seat

leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore the-PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close their associated block valve(s) and remove power Erom the block valve(s) and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

e.

mph nirh one or mora block valve(a) inoperable, uichin I hour.'1) restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status, or close the block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s), or close the PORV and remove power from its ssociated solenoid valve',

and (2) apply 'the ACTION b., c. or d. above, as appropriate, for the isoLated PORV(s).

E.

The provisions of Specification 3.0 4 are not applicable.

"< MODE 4 when the temperature of all RCS cold Legs is greater than 325'F.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-11 Amendment No.

INSERT (Page 3/4 4-11) b.

With one or more PORV(s) inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat.

leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s),

and 1.

With only one safety grade PORV OPERABLE, restore at least a total of two safety grade PORVs to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, or 2.

With no safety grade PORVs

OPERABLE, restore at least one safety grade PORV to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and follow ACTION b.l, above, with the time requirement of that ACTION statement based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable safety grade PORV or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 bourse'

e REACTOR COOLANT SYSTBf RELIEF VALVES SURVEILLANCE REOUIRPENTS 4.4.4.1 ln addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per LS nth b :

aP ac&ah'on inskruewhlahon a.

Perfo a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and b.

Operatic t

v 1v v b on c

1e c1e nf r 11 travel@

>n'ODESSor, priol ~ goi

~e.loLd 925'F 4.4.4.2 Each block va ve s a e

emons ra at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is clos d with power removed in order to meet the requirements of ACTION b.,

tn S e ation 3

er c ace mula&r i*

Safe<-Ret dc'.4.4.

3 The r the PO s a be demonstra ed OPERABLE at least once per i9 months by >solating the d operating the valves through a complete cycle of full travel.

nornnal ai~ and ni~n supplies

'I SHEARON HARRIS -. UNIT 1 3/4 4-?2

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.4 At least one oE che Eollowing Overpressure Protection Syscems shall be OPERABLE:

a.

The Reacror Coolanc Syscem (RCS) depressurized with an RCS vent of greacer rhan or equal to 2.9 square

inches, or b.

Two power-operaced relief valves (PORVs) wich secpoinr.s which do not exceed the limics established in Figure 3.4-4.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 4 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equaL to 325'F, MODE 5 and MODE 6 with the reactor

vessel, head on.

ACTION:

gg&ERT'see.nc~~

C a

~

n MObe 4 Wi.th one PORV inoperable, restore che inoperable PORV co OPERABLE scatus within 7 days or depressurize and vent rhe RCS chrough ar.

Lease a 2.9 square inch venc within che next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

With boch PORVs inoperable, depressurize and venc the RCS through ac Least a 2.9 square inch vent within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

In the.event either the PORVs or the RCS vent(s) are used co mitigate an RCS pressure cransient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to che Commission pursuanc to Specification 6.9.2 wirhin 30 days.

The report shall describe che circumstances iniciaring the transienc, che effecc of che PORVs or RCS vent(s) on che transient, and any corrective action necessary co prevent recurrence.

s, The provi.sions oi Specification 3.0.4 are noc applicable.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.9.4.1 Each PORV shal.l be demonstrated OPERABLE b,':

a ~

Performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST on the PORV actua-tion channel, but excluding valve operacion, wichin 31 days prior to entering a condition in which che PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days chereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE>

b ~

Performance oE a

CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV accuacion channel

.'at least once per 18 months; and C ~

Verifying che PORV isolation valve is open ar.

Lease once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> when the PORV is being used Eor overpressure procection.

Credit may only be taken Eor che setpoinr.s when che RCS cold leg temperature

) 90'F.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1

3/4 4-40 Amendment No.~

INSERT (Page 3/4 4-40)

With one PORV inoperable in MODES 5 or 6, either (1) restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or (2) complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 2.9 square inch vent within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSi~N BASES'AFETY VALVES Continued Ouring operation, all pressurizer Code safety valves must be OPLRABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Lfmit of 2735 psig.

The com-bined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss-of-load assuming no reactor trip until the second Reactor Trip System trip setpoint is reached (f.e.,

no credit is taken for a direct Reactor trip on the loss-of-load) and also assuming no operation of the power cperated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Oemcnstration of the safety valves'ift settings will occur only during shut-down and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Sectian XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

3/4.4. 3 P RESSURIZER Rcpba~

~~mr (sec.ncaa

~Z~<

The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the param-eter is maintained within the narmal steady-state envelope of oceration assumed in the SAR.

The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptians.

The U-hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation.

The maxi-mum water volume alsa ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically salid system.

The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant ta control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation.

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES The power operated relief valves (PORVs) and steam bubble functian ta relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up ta and including the design step load.decrease with steam dump.

Operation a< the PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring loaded pressurizer Cade safety valves.

Each PORV has a

remotely operated block valve tc provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inaperable.

3/4.4. 5 STEAN GEHERATORS The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator tubes en-sure that the structural integrity of this portian of the RCS will be maintained.

The program for inservfce inspection of steam generator tubes is based on a modfffcation of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision L.

Inservfce inspection, of steam generator tubing fs essantfal in order to maintain surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the event that there is evidence of mechanical damage or progressive degradation due to design, manufacturing errors, or inservice conditions that lead ta carrosion.

Inservfce inspection of steam generator tubing also provides a means af characterfzfng the nature and cause of any tube degradatfon so that corrective measures can be taken.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNXT 1 8 3/4 4-2

INSERT A.(Page B 3/4 4-2)

In MODES 1, 2, and 3

the power-operated relief valves (PORVs) provide an RCS pressure

boundary, manuaL RCS pressure control for mitigation of accidents, and automatic RCS pressure relief to minimize challenges to the safety valves.

Providing an RCS pressure boundary and manual RCS pressure control for mitigation of a

steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) are the safety-related functions of the PORVs in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

The capability of the PORV to perform its function of providing an RCS pressure boundary requires that the PORV or its associated block valve is closed.

The capability of the PORVs to perform manual RCS pressure control for mitigation of a SGTR accident is based on manual actuation and does not require the automatic RCS pressure control function.

The automatic RCS pressure control function of the PORVs is not a safety-related function in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

The automatic pressure control function

= limits the number of challenges to the safety valves, but the safety valves perform the safety function of RCS overpressure protection.

Therefore, the automatic RCS pressure controL function of the PORVs does not have to be available for the PORVs to be OPERABLE.

Each PORV has a

remotely operated block valve to provide a-positive shutoff capability should a

relief valve become inoperable.

Operation with the block valves opened is preferred.

This allows the PORVs to perform automatic RCS pressure relief shouLd the RCS pressure

-actuation setpoint be reached.

However, operation with the block valve closed to isolate PORV seat leakage is permissible since automatic RCS pressure relief is not safety-related function of the PORVs.

The OPERABILITY of the PORVs and block valves in MODES 1, 2, and 3

is based on their being capable of performing the following functions.'.

Maintaining the RCS pressure

boundary, 2 ~

Manual control of PORVs to control RCS pressure as required'for SGTR mitigation, 3 ~

4 ~

Manual cLosing of a block valve to isolate a stuck open

PORV, Manual closing of a block valve to isolate a

PORV with excessive seat

leakage, and 5 ~

Manual opening of a block valve to unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used to control RCS pressure for SGTR mitigation.

INSERT A (continued)

(P<

b 3/~ 0-a <<-Z )

The non-safety PORV and block valve are used only as a backup to the two redundant safety grade PORVs and block valves to control RCS pressure for accident mitigation.

Therefore, continued operation with the non-safety PORV unavailable for RCS pressure control is allowed as long as the block valve or PORV can be closed to maintain the RCS pressure boundary.

Surveillance Requirements provide the assurance that the PORVs and block valves can perform their safety functions.

Surveillance Requirements 4.4.4.1 and 4.4.4.3 address the PORVs and Surveillance Requirement 4.4.4.2 addresses the block valves'urveillance Requirement 4.4.4.1.a.

provides assurance the actuation instrumentation for automatic PORV actuation is calibrated'uch that the automatic PORV actuation signal is within the required pressure range even though automatic actuation capability of the PORV is not necessary for the PORV to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

Surveillance Requirement 4.4.4.l.b provides assurance the. PORV is capable of opening and closing.

The associated block valve should be closed prior to stroke testing a

~

PORV ta preclude depressuriration of the RGB This test wilL be done in.

M0~ 90'F.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1

3'/4 4 "40 Amendment No.

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RE'ACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS SURVEI LLANCE RE UIREMENTS (Conti nued )

entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE; b.

Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months; and c.

Verifying the PORV isolation valve is open at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

4.4.9>4.2 The RCS vent(s) shall be verified to be open at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> when the vent(s) is being used for overpressure protection.

Except when the vent pathway is provided with a valve which is locked,

sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these valves open at least once per 31 days.

SHEARON HARRIS UNIT 1 3/4 4"42 Amendment No.

e 4

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g 41 J

a k

1 V

1 i1

-I

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

During operation, all pressurizer Code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig.

The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss-of-load assuming no reactor trip until the second Reactor Trip 'System trip setpoint is reached (i.e.,

no credit is taken for a direct Reactor trip on the loss-of-load) and also assuming no operation of the power-operated re'lief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves'ift settings will occur only during shut-down and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady-state envelope of operation assumed in the SAR.

The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions.

The 12-hour periodic surveillance. is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation.

The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system.

The requirement that a

minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation.

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES In MODES 1, 2, and 3 the power-operated relief valves (PORVs) provide an RCS pressure

boundary, manual RCS pressure control for mitigation of accidents, and automatic RCS pressure relief to minimize challenges to the safety valves.

Providing an RCS pressure boundary and manual RCS pressure control for mitigation of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) are the safety-related functions of the PORVs in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

The capability of the PORV to perform its furrction of providing an RCS pressure boundary requires that the PORV or its associated block valve is closed.

The capability of the PORVs to perform manual RCS pressure control for mitigation of a SGTR accident is based on manual actuation and does not require the automatic RCS pressure control function.

~ The automatic RCS pressure control function of the PORVs is not a

safety-related function in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

The automatic pressure control function limits the number of challenges to the safety valves, but the safety valves perform the safety function of RCS overpressure protection.

Therefore, the automatic RCS pressure control function of the PORVs does not have to be available for the PORVs to be OPERABLE.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1

B 3/4 4-2

,Amendment No.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES RELIEF VALVES (Continued)

Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

Operation with the block valves opened is preferred.

This allows the PORVs to perform automatic RCS pressure relief should the RCS pressure actuation setpoint be reached.

How'ever, operation with the block valve closed to isolate PORV seat leakage is permissible since automatic RCS pressure relief is not a safety-related function of the PORVs

~

The OPERABILITY of the PORVs and block valves in MODES 1, 2, and 3 is based on their being capable of performing the following functions:

1.

Maintaining the RCS pressure

boundary, 2.

Manual control of PORVs to control RCS pressure as required for SGTR mitigation, 3.

Manual closing of a block valve to isolate a stuck open

PORV, 4.

Manual closing of a block valve to isolate a

PORV with excessive seat

leakage, and 5.

Manual opening of a block valve to unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used to control RCS pressure for SGTR mitigation.

The non-safety PORV and block valve are used only as a backup to the two redundant safety grade PORVs and block valves to control RCS pressure for accident mitigation.

Therefore, continued operation with the non-safety PORV unavailable for RCS pressure control is allowed as iong as the block valve or PORV can be closed to maintain the RCS pressure boundary.

Surveillance Requirements provide the assurance that the PORVs and block valves can perform their safety functions.

Surveillance Requirements 4.4.4.1 and 4.4.4.3 address the PORVs and Surveillance Requirement 4.4.4.2 addresses the block valves'urveillance Requirement 4.4.4.1.a provides assurance the actuation instrumentation for automatic PORV actuation is calibrated such that the automatic PORV actuation signal is within the'required pressure range even though automatic actuation capability of the PORV is not necessary for the PORV to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

Surveillance Requirement 4.4.4.1.b provides assurance the PORV is capable of opening and closing.

The associated block valve should be closed prior to stroke testing a

PORV to preclude depressurization of the RCS.

This test will be done in MODES 3 or 4, before the PORV is required for overpressure protection in TS 3.4.9.4.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1

B 3/4 4-2a Amendment No.

t ry 8 Yg

~ 0

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES RELIEF VALVES (Continued)

Surveillance Requirement 4.4.4.3,provides assurance of operability of the accumulators and that the accumulators are capable of supplying sufficient air to operate the PORV(s) if they are needed for RCS pressure control and normal air and nitrogen systems are not available.

Surveillance Requirement 4.4.4.2 addresses the block valves.

The block valves are exempt from the surveillance requirements to cycle the valves when they have been closed to comply with ACTION statements "b" or "c".

This precludes the need to cycle the valves with a full system differential pressure or when maintenance is being performed to restore an inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status.

3/4.4o5 STEAM GENERATORS The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator tubes en" sure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS will be maintained.

The program for inservice inspection of steam generator tubes is based on a modification of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision 1 ~

Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to maintain surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the event that there is evidence of mechanical damage or progressive degradation due to design, manufacturing

errors, or inservice conditions that lead to corrosion.

Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing also provides a means of characterizing the nature and cause of any tube degradation so that corrective measures can be taken.

SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-2b Amendment No.

t