ML18009A307
| ML18009A307 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1989 |
| From: | Dance H, Shannon M, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18009A305 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-89-28, IEIN-89-051, IEIN-89-51, NUDOCS 8912190419 | |
| Download: ML18009A307 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1989028
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/89-28
Licensee:
Carolina
Power and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC
27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Harris
1
Inspection
Conducted:
October
7 - November 17,
1989
Inspectors:
J.
Tedrow, Senior
Re
en
nspector
License No.:
'ate
Signed
hannon,
ident
pec
r,
A
db:
H. Dance,
hs f
Reactor Projects
Section
lA
Reactor Projects
Branch
1
Division of Reactor Projects
Date Signed
0
e
gn
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection
was
conducted
by two resident
inspectors
in the areas
of plant
operations,
radiological
controls.
security.
fire protection,
surveillance
observation,
maintenance
observation,
licensee
event
reports.
review of information notices,
review of plant
onsite
safety
committee
activities, refueling activities,
and licensee
action
on previous inspection
items.
Numerous facility tours
were
conducted
and facility operations
observed.
Some of these
tours
and observations
were 'conducted
on backshifts.
Results:
One violation was identified:
Failure to provide
an adequate
procedure
for the
performance of local leak rate testing,
paragraph
3.a.
An unresolved
item is identified in paragraph
2.a concerning
the operability of
the residual
heat
removal
system.
An inspector followup item is discussed
in paragraph
8 regarding
the licensee's
activities to resolve
a control rod failure.
891219041%
891207
ADOCK 05000400
0
PNU
REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
D. Braund, Supervisor,
Security
J. Collins, Manager,
Operations
- G. Forehand.
Director, gA/AC
- C. Gibson, Director, Programs
and Procedures
- J. Hammond,
Manager Onsite Nuclear Safety
- C. Hinnant. Plant General
Manager
- D. McCarthy, Principle Engineer
NED
- T. Morton, Manager,
Naintenance
C. Olexik, Supervisor, Shift Operations
- R. Richey, Manager,.Harris
Nuclear Project Department
- J. Sipp. Manager,
Environmental
and Radiation Monitoring
H. Smith, Supervisor,
Radwaste
Operation
- D. Tibbits. Director, Regulatory Compliance
- B. Van Metre, Manager.
Technical
Support
E. Hillett, Mana er,
Outa
es
and Modifications
9
.
9
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
office,
operations,
engineering,
maintenance.
chemistry/radiation
and corporate
personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
and initialisms
used
through out this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
Review of Plant Operations
(71707)
The plant
began this inspection
period in power operation
(Mode 1).
On
October
9,
1989. at approximately
11:09 p.m.,
a reactor trip occurred
due
to
an electrical fault
on the
main generator
electrical distribution
system which also resulted
in a fire (see
paragraph
5 for details).
The
licensee
decided
to continue
the plant
shutdown/cooldown
and
begin
a
scheduled
refueling outage early.
Cold shutdown
(Node 5) was
reached at
approximately )0:45 a.m.,
on October
13.
Outage activities proceeded
and
the refueling condition
(Node. 6)
was entered at 3:20 a.m..
on November
1
when the reactor vessel
head bolts were detensioned.
The reactor core
was
completely defueled at 11:30 p.m.-.
on November 9.
The plant remained
in
the defueled condition for 'the remainder of this inspection period.
a.
Shift Logs
and Facility Records
The inspector
reviewed
records
and discussed
various entries
with
operations
personnel
to verify compliance
with the
Technical
Specifications
(TS) and the licensee's
administrative
procedures.
The following records
were
reviewed: Shift Foreman's
Log; Control
Operator's
Log; Shift
Outage
Manager's
Log; Night Order
Book;
Equipment
Record; Active Clearance
Log; Jumper
and Wire
Removal
Log; Shift Turnover Checklist;
and
selected
Chemistry/
Radiation Protection
and
Radwaste
logs.
In addition, the inspector
independently verified clearance
order tagouts.
During
a review of the shift foreman's
log on November 7.
1989, the
inspector
noted that the "A" Residual
Heat
Removal
(RHR) system
had
been
declared
due to the
removal of two pipe supports
(RH-H-14/21).
This system
was in operation
during this time frame
and was being utilized by the licensee to-satisfy the requirements
of
TS 3.9:8.1
and
Upon notification of the missing
pipe
supports.
the shift
foreman
conservatively
declared
the
system
pending further engineering
review and also 'complied with
the action statement
of TS 3.9.8.1.
b.
A reviev, of maintenance
records
revealed that the two pipe supports
were
removed at approximately 1:00 p.m..
on November 6.
requires that two trains of RHR be operable with one train
operating, while the plant is in Mode
6 with less
than
23 feet of
water above the reactor vessel
At approximately 8:30 p.m.,
a refueling cavity fill was
completed
which placed greater
than
23
feet of water above the reactor vessel
In this condition.
TS 3.9.8.1 requires only one
and in
operation.
On the morning of November 7. the "B" emergency
480 volt
busses
were deenergized
for maintenance.
This action disabled
the
"B" RHR train,
and in conjunction with the already inoperable
"A"
RHR train, would have rendered
both
RHR trains inoperable.
S
The licensee is presently
per'forming an engineering
evaluation of the
"A" RHR system with the two pipe supports missing to determine if the
system
could perform its intended
safety function in this condition.
Preliminary results
of this analysis
indicate that the
system
was
with the missing
su'pports.
This matter is considered
to be,
unresolved
pending
NRC
review of the
engineering
evaluation.
Unresolved
Item~
(89-28-01):
Review the
licensee's
engineering
evaluation
of
A
system
operability with two pipe
supports
missing.
Facility Tours
and Observations
Throughout
the inspection
period, facility tours
were conducted
to
observe
operations
and
maintenance
activities in progress.
Some
operations
and
maintenance
activity observations
were
conducted
during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection
period,
licensee
meetings
were
attended
by the
inspectors
to observe
planning
and
management activities.
- Unresolved .items
are matters
about
which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable
or may involve violations or deviations.
The facility tours
and observations
encompassed
the following areas:
security
perimeter
fence;
control
room;
emergency
diesel
generator
room; auxiliary building; containment
building; battery
rooms;
and
electrical
switchgear
rooms.
During these tours. the following observations
were made:
Monitoring Instrumentation
- Equipment operating
status,
area
atmospheric
and liquid radiation monitors. electrical
system
lineup,
reactor
operating
parameters.
and auxiliary equipment
operating
parameters
were
observed
to verify that indicated
parameters
were in accordance
with the
TS for the current
operational
mode.
(2)
(3)
Shift Staffing - The inspectors
verified that operating shift
staffing was in accordance
with TS requirements
and that control
room
operations
were
being
conducted
in
an
orderly
and
professional
manner.
In addition. the inspector
observed shift
turnovers
on various occasions
to verify the continuity of plant
status,
operations
problems,
and
other
pertinent
plant
information during these turnovers.
Plant
Housekeeping
Conditions
-
Storage
of material
and
components.
and
cleanliness
conditions
of various
areas
throughout
the facility were
observed
to determine
whether
safety and/or fire hazards
existed.
Radiological
Protection
Program - Radiation protection control
activities
were
observed
routinely to verify that
these
activities were in conformance
with the facility policies
and
procedures,
and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The
inspectors
also reviewed selected
RWPs to verify that the
RMP was
current -and that the controls were adequate.
Security Control - In the course of the monthly activities, the
inspector
included
a review of the licensee's
physical security
program.
The
performance
of various shifts of the security
force
was
observed
in
- the
conduct of daily activities to-
include:
protected
and vital area
access
controls; searching of
personnel.
packages.
and vehicles;
badge
issuance
and retrieval;
escorting
of visitors; patrols;
and
compensatory
posts.
In
addition,
the
inspector
observed
the
operational
status
of
Closed
Circuit Television
(CCTV)
monitors,
the
Intrusion
Detection
system
in the central
and
secondary
alarm stations,
protected
area
lighting, protected
and vital
area
barrier
integrity,
and
the
security
organization
interface
with
operations
and maintenance.
(6l
Fire
Protection
- Fire pr'otection activities. staffing
and
equipment
were observed
to verify that fire brigade, staffing was
appropriate
and
that fire alarms,
extinguishing'quipment,
actuating
controls,
fire
fighting
equipment.
emergency
equipment,
and fire barriers
were operable.
1
No violations or deviations
were identified.
3.
Surveillance
Observation
(617261
Surveillance
tests
were observed
to verify that approved
procedures
were
being
used;
qualified personnel
were
conducting
the tests;
tests
were
adequate
to verify equipment
operability;
calibrated
equipment
was
utilized; and
TS requirements'were
followed.
The following
OST-1033
OST-1813
OST-1825
EPT-143T
EST-210
EST-212
EST-215
tests
were observed
and/or
data reviewed:
Daily Surveillance
Requirements
Daily Interval
Remote
Shutdown
System Operability,
18 Nonth Interval
Safety Injection:ESF
Response
Time, Train'
18 Month
"A" ESW Flow/Pressure
Test
Periodic Containment Integrated
Leak Rate Testing
Type "C" Local
Leak Rate Testing
Snubber Surveillance
a ~
During the performance
of procedure
EST-212.
on October 30.
1989.
a
technical
support technician mistakenly cross
connected
with the
RCS letdown line vent.
The error was identified within a
few minutes.
the connection
was terminated,
and appropriate
levels of
management
were notified.
The plant
was in
Mode 5. utilizing
RHR cooling.'he
was in
mid-loop operation
and
the
licensee
was maintaining
containment
closure.
The maintaining of containment
closure
presented
special
problems
in that
the
outside
containment
vent
valve for this
could not be open with the inside containment drain valve
open simultaneously.
This problem was
overcome
by modifying the test
method
to
use
compressed
air to
blow out the water
from the
versus
the normal
vent and drain.
Upon cross
connecting
the
IA system with the
letdown line,
RHR system
pressure
injected
water into the
The
licensee
estimated
that approximately
25 gallons of borated/
contaminated
water could
have
been injected into the instrument air
system.
Approximately
13 gallons of water was subsequently
drained
from the
system
low points.
No personnel
or area
contaminations
resulted
from this event.
The use of instrument air for breathing
air
was
prohibited
and
a portable
breathing air compressor
with
temporary lines
was installed.
Attachment
2 of procedure
EST-212 clearly identified the penetration.
isolation
valves.
vent
and
drain valves.
and
provided detailed
procedural
steps for the conduct of this test.
The penetration
was
clearly marked
and valves were properly tagged.
but the procedure
did
not provide the necessary
steps
or precautions
for using instrument
air to blow out the penetration.
The failure of the licensee
to
provide
an adequate
procedure for the performance
of this test is
considered
to
be
a violation of TS 6.8. l.a.
Violation (89-28-02):
Failure to have
an
adequate
procedure for the performance
of local
leak rate testing which resulted in instrument air contamination.,
- b.
Ouring
the
performance
of test
EST-210,
the initial containment
pressurization
attempt failed
due to air
leaks
through loose valve
packing
on several
instrument root valves.
The loose
packing
was
adjusted
and/or
replaced
and
the test
was
subsequently
reperformed
successfully.
One violation was identified.
4.
Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
The inspectoi
observed/reviewed
maintenance
activities to verify that
correct
equipment
clearances
were
in effect;
work requests
and fire
prevention
work permits,
as
required.
were
issued
and
being followed;
quality control
personnel
were: available for inspection activities
as
required;
and,
TS requirements
were being followed.
Maintenance
was observed
and work packages
were reviewed for the following
maintenance
(WR/JO) activities:
89-AUDR1
89-AJTI 1, AJMA1,
AJLT1.ATLF1,
ATSgl,ATWI1
PM-E0003
PM-E0012
Repairs
to
the
Charging
Pump
"C" Mini-Flow
Reci rc Valve (CS-V759SB)
Failed Snubber
Repairs
and Replacements
Clean
and Inspect the 6.9
KV Bus and Cubicles
'lean
and
Inspect
the
480
Vac
Load
Center
Breakers'and
Cubicles
No violations or deviations
were identified.
5.
Review of Licensee
Event Reports
(92700)
The following LERs were reviewed for potential
generic
impact, to detect
trends,
and to determine
whether corrective actions
appeared
appropriate.
Events that
were reported
immediately were reviewed
as they occurred
to
determine if the
TS were satisfied.
LERs, were reviewed in accordance
with
.-the current
YRC Enforcement Policy..
(Open)
LER 89-17:
This
LER reported
an anticipatory reactor trip from
approximately
100 percent
power
due to an electrical fault on the main
generator electrical distribution system,
which also resulted in a fire in
the turbine building.
This event
was also discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report
50-400/89-27,
which
was
based
on the preliminary data
from the
licensee's
initial investigation.
The
LER
contains
more
recent
information obtained
from the licensee's
detailed accident investigation
and root cause analysis.
The inspector arrived onsite. shortly after the event occurred
and observed
coordinating activities in the technical
support center.
plant status
in
the control
room,
and the licensee's fire brigade
response
to the fire.
Due to the abnormal
nature of the fire. which encompassed
three separate
plant areas.
the inspector
considers
the response
of the fire brigade to
contain the fire was excellent.
During this event,
the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
pump tripped
shortly after automatically starting.
The licensee
believes
that this
trip was
due
to
a
spurious
signal
from the
pump's
tachometer
which
actuated
an electrical. trip of the throttle valve to the
pump turbine.
Although this trip would not prevent the subsequent
automatic restart of
the
pump
on
a valid signal,
the licensee is considering elimination of the
electrical trip signal to prevent
subsequent
'spurious
pump trips.
The licensee
is continuing the corrective actions
stated
in this
LER and
plans to submit
a supplemental
report
on December 8. 1989.
This
LER will
remain
open
pending
issuance
of the supplemental
report and completion of
the corrective actions.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Review of IE Information Notices
(927011
In
response
to
a resident
action
item received
on
November
8.
the
inspectors
reviewed
the licensee's
action
associated
with
IEN 89-51,
'otential
Loss of Required
Shutdown
Margin During Refueling Operations.
The licensee
prevents
loss of shutdown margin during refueling by adhering
to refueling guidelines
published
by the
NSSS vendor.
The licensee's
refueling procedure
FHP-014,
Fuel
and Insert Shuffle Sequence.
allows for
placing of fuel assemblies
in temporary locations for certain situations
such
as
"boxing in" difficult assemblies.
The
NSSS vendor
has
performed
an analysis
on the
above action
and instituted guidelines
to prevent the
possibility of achieving
a core loading configuration which would reduce
the
refueling
shutdown
margin
below limits.
The licensee
normally
completely unloads all fuel assembli'es
and places
fuel assemblies
in the
final fuel loading configuration which is analyzed for the current fuel
cycle.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Review of Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Activities (40500)
The
inspectors
attended
selected
PNSC
meetings
to
observe
committee
activities
and, verify adherence
to
TS
requirements
with respect
to
committee
composition,
duties,
meeting
frequency,
and responsibilities.
During these meetings,
the inspectors
noticed
good participation from PNSC
members
and
good
advance
preparation
by committee
members for those
items
discussed.
Hinutes
from the
attended
meetings
were also
reviewed to
verify accurate
documentation.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Refueling Activities (60710)
The inspectors
witnessed
several
shifts of fuel handlino operations
and
verified that the refueling
was
beino
performed in accordance
with TS
requirements
and
approved
procedures.
Areas
inspected
included
containment integrity, housekeepinq
in the refueling area, shift staffing
during refueling,
and periodic monitoring of plant status
during refueling
operations.
In addition. the following procedures
were reviewed:
PLP-616
GP-009
FHP-020
FHP-014.
Fuel Handling Operations
Refueling Cavity Fill, Refueling.
and Draindown of the
Refueling Cavity
Fuel
Handling Operations
Fuel
and Insert Shuffle Sequence
The
Licensee
has
implemented
controls for the
conduct
of refueling
operations
and for maintaining
control
of plant conditions.
The
engineering
evaluation for core reload is performed
by Westinghouse
and
reviewed
by the licensee's
engineering staff.
The inspectors
noted that the licensee
has
roped off the area
around the
fuel transfer
channel
as
This area
was posted.
because
during the time spent fuel is transferred
through the containment
wall. the radiation
dose
rate in this area
increases
to approximately
2 REM/HR due to the loss of water shielding.
During
RCCA testing.
which was being conducted
in response
to
IEN 89-31.
Swelling and Cracking of Hafnium Control
Rods, the licensee
noted that two
RCCAs exhibited increased
withdrawal tension'in
excess
of 200 pounds
above
normal
(normal is approximately
470 pounds).
An additional
rod exhibited
approximately
550 pounds withdrawal tension,
and
upon visual inspection it
was
noted that
one of the
rod tips for this
RCCA was missing.
This
generic
issue
was
also previously discussed
in
NRC Inspection
Report
50-400/89-18.
The licensee
is continuing to inspect the hafnium rods in
accordance
with the information notice
and is determining
an appropriate
course
of action.
Inspector
Followup
Item (89-28-03):
Follow the
licensee's
activities to resolve
hafnium control
rod failure.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
9.
Action on Previously Identified Inspection
Findings
(92702.
92701)
(Open)
IFI
= 400/89-21-02,
Emergency
Service
Water
Flow
Balance
Inconsistencies.
The
licensee
completed
flow balance/pressure
testing
of the
emergency
service
water system.
Results
of the tests
and preliminary engineering
calculations
show that the plant can safely operate at less
than the
required
flows.
Final
review
by the
licensee's
Nuclear
Engineering
Department
is in progress
and the results
of this review will be
made
available for NRC review prior to plant startup.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted
in paragraph
1l
at the conclusion of the inspection
on
November. 16.
1989.
During this
meeting,
the
inspectors
summarized
the
scope
and
findings of the
inspection
as they are detailed
in this report, with particular
emphasis
on the Violation, Unresolved
Item,
and Inspector
Follow-up item addressed
below.
The licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the inspector's
comments
and did not identify as proprietary:- any of the materials
provided to or
reviewed
by the inspectors
during this inspection.
Item Number
Descri tion and Reference
50-400/89-28-01
50-,400/89-28-02
50-400/89-28-03
11.
Acronyms and Initialisms
Unresolved
Item
-
Review
the
licensee's
engineering
evaluation
of
"A"
system
operability
with
two
pipe
supports
missing.
(paragraph
2.a).
Violation - Failure to have
an adequate
procedure
for the performance
of local
leak rate testing
which resulted
in instrument air contamination,
(paragraph 3.a).
IFI - Follow the licensee's
activities to resolve
hafnium control rod failure. (paragraph 8).
EPT
EST
Closed Circuit Television
Engineering
Performance
Test
Engineered
Safety Feature
Engineering Surveillance Test
Emergency Service Mater
Fuel Handling Procedure
Final Safety Analysis Report
General
Procedure
IEN
IFI
KV
LER
NED
NRC
OST
PLP
PNSC
RCCA
TS
Vac
WR/JO
Instrument Air
~ Informatior, Notice
Inspector
Followup Item
Kilovolt
Licensee
Event Report
Nuclear Engineering
Department
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Nuclear
Steam
Supply System
'perations
Surveillance Test
Plant Program
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
Radiation Control Area
Rod Cluster Control Assembly
.Residual
Heat
Removal
Radiation
Work Permit
Technical Specification
Volt A.C.
Work Request/Job
Order