ML18009A277
| ML18009A277 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1989 |
| From: | Dance H, Shannon M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18009A275 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-89-21, NUDOCS 8912070318 | |
| Download: ML18009A277 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1989021
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/89-21
Licensee:
Carolina
Power and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
N.
C. 27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Harris
1
Inspection
Conducted:
Irspector;
anno
i
Approved by:
/If~>v~
'nce,
ection
ief
Division of Reactor Projects
SUYMARY
License No.:
a
e
gne
ate
gne
Scope.
This routine,
safety
inspection
was
conducted
in the
areas
of operational
safety verification,
survei llance
. observations,
maintenaIice
observations,
" onsite followup of events,
and reactor operator license verification.
Results:
MiThiI'I the areas
inspected
three violations were identified,
one cited and
two
non-cited.
The cited violation involved
a failure to adequately
evaluate
the
suitability of ccmmercial
grade
items
used
in safety
grade
applications,
paragraph
7.
The
two non-cited
licensee
identified violations involved:
a
failure to install
the operatiIIg floor equipment
hatch prior to spent fuel
movement,
paragraph
P.a;
and
a failure to submit
a written report
as required
by 10 CFR 50 Appendix H, Section III.A, paragraph
5.a.
Two Inspector.
Followup Items
were identified:
emergency
service
water flow
inadequacies
versus
FSAR requirements,
paragraph
2.b;
arid contact overloading
of Potter-Brumfield relays,
paragraph
3.a.
89g2O70318
8yggO8
PLIER
ADOCK O. OOO4CIO
0
FDC
'EPORT
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
D. Braund, Supervisor,
Security
- J. Collins, Manager,
Operations
- G. Forehand,
Director,
OA/gC
- C. Gibson, Director, Programs
and Procedures
.*J.
Hammond,
Manager,
Onsite Nuclear Safety
- C. Hinnant, Plant General
Manager
- T. Yiorton, Manager,
Maintenance
C. Olexik, Supervisor, Shift Operations
- R. Richey, Manager,
Haris Nuclear Project Department
- J. Sipp, Manager,
Environmental
and Radiation Monitoring
H. Smith, Supervisor,
Radwaste
Operation
D. Tibbits, Director, Regulatory Compliance
B.
Van Metre, Manager, Technical
Support
- E. Willett, Yianager,
Outages
and Yiodifications
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
during this
inspection
included
engineers,
operators,
mechanics,
security force members,
technicians,
and
administrative personnel.
- Attended monthly exit. interview on October 12,1989.
and initialisms
used
in the report
are listed in the last
paragraph.
2.
Operational
Safety Verification (71707)
The inspector
observed
control
room operations,
reviewed applicable logs,
and
conducted
discussions
with various
licensee
personnel.
The oper-
ability of various
emergency
systems,
the
adherence
to
LCO action
statements,
the
proper
return
to service of components,
and
adequate
switching
and
tagging
records
were
observed
or reviewed during routine
plant tours.
Site security
and portions of the Radiological
Protection
Program
were also evaluated
during the plant tours.
The inspector
also
attended
various plant meetings,
such
as
Maintenance,
Technical
Support,
Outage Planning,
and Morning Management;
a.
On August
27,
1989,
plant
personnel
were transferring
spent
fuel
assemblies
from the spent fuel cask to the spent fuel storage
pool,
when the operator
noted
abnormal
noise
comino from the north end of
the
fuel
handling
building.
Upon investigating
the
noise,
he
discovered
that the operating floor equipment
hatch
had
riot been
installed.
The
Shearon
Harris Unit
1
FSAR Section 9.1.4:2.3
assumes
that
no
irradiated
fuel will
be
handled
or transported
inside
the fuel
handling building unless
the operating floor equipment
hatch to the
unloading
area
is in place.
The
removal of the hatch cover could
prevent the
FHB Emergency
Exhaust
System from performing its intended
function in the event of a postulated
fuel handling accident.
The
licensee
halted
fuel
movement
and installed
the operating floor
equipment
hatch.
The licensee
also identified this in LER-89-15,
which detailed
the procedures
that would be revised
and reviewed
by
personnel.
This licensee
identified violation (89-21-04)
is not
being cited
becuase
criteria specified
in Section
Y.G.1 of the
NRC
Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
I
Emergency
Service Mater Flow Balance Inconsistencies.
Due to ongoing service water problems identified by various industry
events
and initiatives, plant management
requested
that the Onsite
Nuclear Safety
Group perform
a Service Water System Assessment.
The
assessment
was
completed
and given to plant management
on August 21,
1989.
The
assessment
contained
18 recommendations,
two concerns
questioned
whether
the
system
could supply
the required
flow to
safety related
components
and
a. third concern questioned
the
ESW pump
performance.
Due to the
recommendations,
the Technical
Support Staff was tasked
with developing
and performing
a special test to determine
system
and
pump
performance.
The test
was- performed
on
August
31
and-
September
1,
1989,
and the test results
indicated that flow values
listed in the
FSAR could not be met. "
Review of startup test data
and further reviews of FSAR sections
were
performed.
It was also
noted that when'he
ESM pump took suction
from the
main reservoir
ESW flow to the
emergency
diesels
was
abnormally low (approximately
50% of that indicated in FSAR);
Since
this placed
the emergency diesels
in ieopardy,
the operations
manager
immediately restricted
placing the
ESW suction
on the main reservoir
until this descrepancy
could
be resolved.
The licensee
continued
to investigate
the service water issues
and
performed
a
reduced
SW Flow Test to the emergency
diesels.
It was
found that
the greatly
reduced
SM flows to the
emergency
diesels
would still provide
adequate
cooling.
Additionally, further reviews
of cooling requirements for component cooling water indicated that
as
found flows were acceptable
even
though they did not meet the
Design
Flows.
The resident
reviewed
the related test data
and noted thai TS 3.7.5,
Ultimate Heat Sink, requires
that both main and auxiliary reservoirs
must
be operable.
Therefore,
the
ESM system would have to be able to
take
a suction
from both reservoirs
and supply all safety-related
loads.
A telephone
conference
was
held
between
plant management,
'egion
II management,
and
NRR management.
Discussions
centered
on the
plants ability to adequately
supply cooling to essential
components
during
emergency situations.
By using test results
and engineering
evaluations
the licensee
could
show plant safety
was not jeopardized
and
informed
NRC
management
that
the
ESW flow issues
would
be
actively
pursued
and
resolved.
Additionally,
NRR confirmed
the
resident's
TS interpretation
concerning
ESW supply capabilities
from
both the main
and auxiliary reservoir.
The licensee
did not agree
with this interpretation
(based
on
FSAR documentation),
but indicated
that they would comply until the matter could
be formally resolved.
Subsequent
testing
was
performed
and the test results indicated that
previous test results
could
have
been in error and that flow to the
emergency
diesels
was actually greater
than previously thought.
The.
concern with the
ESW system flow balance
and the resolution of actual
system
flows versus
th~ flows detailed
in the
FSAR are identified as
an Inspector
Followup Item (89-21-02).
3.
Surveillance
Observation
(61726)
Portions of the following surveillance
inspections
and tests
required
by
the
TS were observed
or reviewed
by the inspector:
EPT-33
EPT-134T
EPT-141T
EPT-140T
OST-1044
S/G
3C Steam/feedwater
Flow Protection
Set IY
Operational
Test
Emergency
Safeguards
Sequencer
System Test
ESW Flow Balance Test
480
VAC Molded Case Circuit Breaker Test
Flow/Pressure
Test
EDG Minimum Flow S.W. Test
ESFAS Train "A" Slave
Relay Test
Refueling Water Storage
Tank Liquid Level
Channel
II (L-991) Operational
Test
OST-1215
Emergency Service Water Sys'em Operability
The inspector verified that the surveillances
were performed in accordance
with adequate
procedures;
instrumentation
was calibrated;
limiting
conditions
were
met;
test
results
mei acceptance
criteria
and
were
reviewed
by personnel
other
than
the
individual directing
the test;
deficiencies
identi ied
during
the test
were
properly
reviewed
and
resolved
by appropriate
management
personnel;
and
personnel
conducting
the test were qualified.
On
September
11,
1989,
Engineering
Periodic
Test
EPT-33,
Emergency
Sequencer
System Test,
was
be'ing performed
by 'plant personnel.
When the
"Test Stop" pushbutton
was actuated
the
ESW Sequencer
Test Relay failed to
reset
and
Pump
1B-SB started.
The test circuit relay
is
a
Potter-Brumfield
Model
PMDR137-8.
The licensee attributed the failure to
overloading of the relay contacts.
PCR 4765
was generated
to evaluate
the
overloaded
contacts
and to verify other overloadings
do not exist in the
sequencer
circuitry.
This item is also identified by the licensee
in LER
89-16.
The inspector will continue to follow the licensee's
action
on
this
matter.
This
is
identified
as
an
Inspector
Followup
Item:
(89-21-03), Contact Overloading of Potter-Brumfield Relays.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
4.
Monthly Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
The inspector
observed/reviewed
the following'aintenance activities of
safety-related
and
non safety-related
systems
and components
to ascertain
that
they
were
conducted
in
accordance
with
approved
procedures,
regulatory
guides,
industry codes
and standards,
and were in conformance
with TS:
Molded Case
ITE Circuit Breakers
(IFI 89-13-0P)
The
inspector
continued
to follow the licence's difficulties with
manufactured
by Siemens
Automated,
Inc.
Further testing of 100 AflP ITE breakers
was conducted
using
a bneaker
testing
unit manufactured
by Multi-ANP Corporation.
The breaker
testing continued to show failures of the
100
ANP ITE breakers.
One
breaker test confirmed two poles tripping on instantaneous
current of
500
and
the third pole failing to trip at
3500
ANPs.
The
acceptance
criteria for the
100
AMP breakers
is
1200 to 2000
ANPs.
Additional testing using the Multi-AMP unit was performed
on various
40-90
AMP ITE breakers.
The test results
met the instantaneous
trip
acceptance
criteria,
which at this
time indicates
the
breaker
problems
are confined to only 100
AMP ITE-480V molded
case circuit
breakers.
This item remains
open.
b.
Brown Boveri LK16 Switchgear
(IFI 89-13-01)
The inspector
continued
to follow the licensee's
difficulties with
Brown Boveri
LK16 switchgear
breakers.
During this inspection period
three additional failures to open
on
demand
occurred.
Two breakers
were used in circuits with motor controllers
and were not expected
to
have
opening
problems.
.Slight pitting of the arcing contacts
caused
by opening
under load is the primary cause of breaker failure.
Eighteen
safety
related
LK16 breakers
are installed at the Harris
Plant.
Eight are cycled quarterly to verify operation.
Ten are
supplies
for motor control
centers
and
cannot
be cycled without
affecting plant operation.
Breaker modifications are being performed
by Brown Boveri, but at
a much slower rate than originally planned.
Additional problems
have
been
noted in that the
openinq
stops
are
being
damaged
by
the
opening
force of the
breaker
contacts.
Resolution of this
problem will be closely monitored.
This item
remains
open.
c ~
Kapton Wiring Failure
The licensee
experienced
a
second failure of Kapton wiring used
on
the limit switches for the
Steam Line
The failure caused
a
ground
on the vital
DC bus.
During
PORV testing,
the ground
became
intermittent
and
I&C personnel
were
sent
to investigate.
After
opening the junction boxes the ground disappeared.
The Kapton wiring
was
subsequently
replaced. 'he
licensee
has
determined
that
mechanical
interaction
during installation or removal
of the limit
switch
assembly
can
cause
minor
damage
to the
insulation
and
subsequent
exposure
to moisture
can lead to an eventual
breakdown of
the insulation.
The licensee
is planning to inspect
various plant
installations
of
Kapton wiring to
determine
the extent of the
problem.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
~
~
~
~
5.
Onsite Followup of Events
(93702)
a 0
b.
On
September
3,
1988,
a material
specimen,
required
to monitor
change
. in fracture
toughness
properties
in the reactor
vessel
beltline region,
was
removed
from the reactor vessel.
A technical
report is required to be submitted within one year after the specimen
is withdrawn,
as specified
in
10 CFR 50 Appendix
H Section III.A.
Due to revisions
in the original test report,
the technical
report
was
not submitted to the
USNRC as required within one year
and the
licensee failed to request
an extension for reporting.
The licensee
informed the
Resident
Inspector
and
NRR on September
5,
1989, that
the report
was late.
The technical report
was submitted
on September
5,
1989.
This licensee identified violation (89-21-05) is not being
cited
because
criteria specified
in Section
Y.G.1 of the
NRC
Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
On September
21,
1989,
the plant experienced
an
EHC oil leak.
The
roving auxiliary operator
discovered
the leak during his rounds
and
isolated
the
broken instrument line to the
"A" EHC
pump discharge
filter differential pressure
instrument.
Approximately three gallons
of oil were lost
from .the
pencil
sized
leak.
The operator's
effectiveness
is considered
excellent
because
this item was found at
2: 15 a.m.
and could have resulted in a plant trip if not discovered.
.,a
6.
Reactor Operator
License Ver'ification.
I
In response
to
a
regional
concern
over non-qualifiation of licensed
operators
from
a varity of causes,
Resident
Action 89-34
was initiated.
The following are the findings at Harris.
a.
Reveiw of Administrative Procedures
(1)
The
on-duty Shift
Foreman
is
provided with current license
'tatus
for all watchstanders
by use of a software
program which
maintains current license. status..
I
(2)
The maximum time between
a disqualifying event
and notification
of. on shift operations
management
does
not appear
to
be
a
problem.
It was
observed
that
when
an individual failed
a
portion of the requalification examination,
he was
removed from
active status .inmediately
by telephone
and'memo.
(3)
Procedures
require
proper turnover
and
assumption
of license
duties.
Qi
b.
Two back shift supervisors
were able
to, show the up-to-the
minute
status of each watch person.
c.
A list of all persons disqualified since initial plant operations
was
obtained.
The activities of two people
on the list were reviewed
and
neither
were found to have stood
a license required watch during the
time they were not qualified.
d.
The verification of qualifications
are maintained
by the on-shift
clerk and are maintained
up to date
on
a daily basis.
e.
High failure rates
have not been
an issue at the Harris Plant
and the
shifts are adequately
staffed.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
7.
Action on Previous
Inspection
Findings
(92701)
(Closed)
URI 89-17-01, Potentially Inadequate
Commercial
to Safety
Grade
After further review, it was determined that
PCR 4007, which
reviewed
the acceptability of use of commercial
grade
ITE breakers
in
safety
grade
applications,
was
inadequate
in that it assumed
that
no
physical
changes
took place in the breaker.
The manufacturer
had modifed
the breaker in that the voltage rating was changed
from 600 Yac to 480 Vac
and
the
instantaneous
trip range
was
changed
from 600-1000
ANPS to
1200-2000
AMPS.
The Site Procurement
Group also 'noted that there
was
an
identifiable weight difference
between
the old model
and
new model
ITE
breakers.
'0
CFR Part
50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires that
measures
be established
for the selection
and review for suitability of
materials,
parts,
equipment,
and
processes
that
are essential
to the
safety-related
functions
of structures,
systems
and"
components.
Commercial
grade
ITE molded
case circuit breakers
were. installed in-
safety-related
electrical
systems
and
the
review for suitability of
equipment
by the licensee's
Engineering
Department
was
inadequate.
The
breakers
were physically
changed
by the manufacturer
and
the
seismic
qualification of the breakers
was
not verified prior to installation in
safety related
applications.
Further,
the modified breakers
were not
fully qualified
by testing
in that all of the
required critical
characteristic
tests (i.e.,
a dielectric test
between. the line and load
terminals with the breaker
open,
a full load starting current test, contact
resistance
measurement
with the
breaker
closed,
or testing
with the
breaker
properly oriented)
were not considered
or performed.
This
URI is
closed
and transferred to a,violation:
Failure to Adequately Eva'luate
the
Suitability of Commercial
Grade
Items
Used in Safety
Grade Applications
(89-21-01)
One violation and
no deviations
were identified.
8.
Exit interview
~
~
The
ins ectio
p
n
scope
and
findings
were
summarized
during
management
interviews throughout the reporting period
and
on October
12,
1989, with
those
persons
indicated in paragraph
1.
The inspection findings addressed
below and in the report
summary were discussed
in detail.
The licensee
acknowledged
the inspection findings
and did not identify as proprietary
any material
reviewed
by the inspector during the inspection.
Item Number
89-21-01'9-21-02
89-21-03
89-21-04
89-21-05
Descri tion/Reference
Paraora
h
VIOLATION -
Inadequate
Review for Suitability of
Commerical
Grade
Items in Safety
Grade Applications;
paragraph
7.
IFI
-
Emergency
Service
Water
Flow
Balance
Inconsistenicies;
paragraph
2.b.
IFI - Contact Overloading of Potter-Brumfield Relays;
paragraph
3.a.
Licensee
Identified Violation - Spent
Fuel
Movement
with
Operating
Floor
Equipment
Hatch
Removed;
paragraph
2.a.
Licensee
Identified Violation -
Failure
to
Make
Technical
Report
Within
Timeframe
of
Appendix H, III.A; paragraph
5.a.
Acronymns
and initialisms.
FHB
IFI
LCO
LER
MCB
MS
MSI V
NRC
NRR'P
OST
.
PIC.
Cab
PYiTR
RCS/RC
SF
.,SW
TFW
TS
VAC
WR/JO
As Low As Reasonably
Achievable
ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry
Anticipated Transient Without Scram
Emergency
Core .Cooling System
Em rgency Diesel
Gene'rator
Engineered
Safety Features
Actuation System
Emergency Service Water
Fuel Handling Building
Final Safety Analysis Report
Inspector
Followup Item
Limiting Condition for Operation
Licensee
Event Report
Main Control
Board
Main Feed
Pump
Maintenance
Surveillance Test
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Nuclear Reactor
Regulation
Operating
Procedure
Operations
Surveillance Test
Plant Change
Request
Primary Instrument Control Cabinet
Post Maintenance
Test Requirements
Power Operated
Relief Valve
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Reactor Auxiliary Building
Reactor
Coolant Drain Tank
Rea'ctor Coolant System
Radiation
Heat
Removal
System
Reactor Protection
System
Resistance
Temperature
Detector
Radiation
Work Permit
Spent
Fuel
System
Safety Injection Signal
Shift Technical
Advisor
Temperature - Feedwater
Technical Specification
Unresolved
Item
Volt A.C.
Work Request/Job
Order
1