ML18005A541
| ML18005A541 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1988 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Maxwell G, Shannon M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18005A539 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-88-20, NUDOCS 8808180268 | |
| Download: ML18005A541 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1988020
Text
gP,S <tQI)~
0
C)
~
) 1~
Lj
p
)+
'~
o
+w*w+
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/88-20
Licensee:
Carolina
Power and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC
27602
Docket No.:
50-400
License No.:
Facility Name:
Harris
1
Inspection
Conducted:
June
27 - July 20,
1988
Inspector:
G.
F.
axwe
te Signed
<<
M.C
S
n
Approved by:
P.
E.
Fred ickson, Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
D te
signed
Da
e Signed
Scope:
SUMMARY
I
This routine,
unannounced
inspection
involved inspection in the areas
of Follow-up on Items of Noncompliance,
Operational
Safety Verifica-
tion, Monthly Surveillance
Observation,
Engineered
Safety
Features
Walkdown,
and Follow-up of Onsite Events.
I
Results:
In the
areas
inspected,
one violation was identified; failure to
verify correct valve positions - (paragraph
5).
0
8808k
p5ppp40
8 880804
ADOCK
0
REPORT
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
J.
M. Collings, Manager,
Operations
G. L. Forehand,
Director,
QA/QC
C.
S. Hinnant, Plant General
Manager
J.
R. Sipp, Manager,
Environmental
and Radiological
Control
D. L. Tibbitts, Director, Regulatory
Compliance
R.
B.
Van Metre, Manager,
Harris Plant Technical
Support
R. A. Watson,
Vice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
Other
l,icensee
employees
contacted
included
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
security
force
members,
engineering
personnel
and office
personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Follow-up on Items of Noncompliance
(92702)
a ~
(Closed)
Violation 50-400/87-26-01,
Low Pressure
Safety Injection
During Plant
Cooldown.
The
inspectors
evaluated
the corrective
action
which the
licensee
described
in
a letter
from
CP&L to
Region II dated
September
3,
1987.
The controlling procedure
for
normal
plant cooldown,
General
Operating
Procedure
GP-007,
has
been
revised.
The latest
revision of this procedure,
GP-007,
Rev. 3,
Section 5,
Step
15,
now contains
a cautionary
note which warns the
control
room operator that the safety injection accumulator
discharge
valves
must
be shut before allowing reactor coolant
system
pressure
to drop below 900 psig.
The inspector interviewed several
operators
and
determined
that operations
personnel
have received training
on
anticipating
plant operations
and
use of pre-evolution briefings
prior to starting plant
mode
changes.
Also, the
need
for shift
briefings for off-normal evolutions
has
been
emphasized
by the plant
operations
manager
to the operations
supervisor.
Based
on the above
evaluation
and review, this item is closed.
b.
(Closed)
Violation 50-400/87-26-02,
Improper
Electrical
Clearance.
The inspectors
interviewed operations
personnel
assigned
to implement
the Clearance
Procedure,
AP-020.
As
a result,
the inspector deter-
mined that additional training
has
been
provided to make sure that
operations
personnel
can
properly locate
the fuses for electrical
equipment
which may require
deenergizing.
The
new training program
associated
with power supplies
and
fuses for plant equipment
is
an
ongoing
program
which is helping operations
personnel
understand
electrical
control
wiring drawings
and
the
labeling
system
for
electrical
control circuit fuses.
Based
on the inspectors'valua-
tion of the licensee's
response
and the current site practices,
this
item is closed.
No violations or deviations
were identified in this area.
3.
Operational
Safety Verification (71707,
71710,
93702)
a
~
Plant Tours
The inspectors
conducted
routine plant tours during this inspection
period to verify that the licensee's
requirements
and
commitments
were
being
implemented.
These
tours
were performed to verify that
systems,
valves
and breakers
required for safe plant operations
were
in their correct position; fire protection equipment,
spare
equipment
and
materials
were
being
maintained
and
stored
properly;
plant
operators
were
aware of the current plant status;
plant operations
personnel
were
documenting
the status
of out-of-service
equipment;
security
and
health
physics
controls
were
being
implemented
as
required
by procedures;
there
were
no undocumented
cases
of unusual
fluid leaks,
piping vibration,
abnormal
hanger or seismic restraint
movements;
and all
reviewed
equipment
requiring calibration
was
current.
Tours of the plant included review of site documentation
and inter-
views with plant personnel.
The
inspectors
reviewed
the shift
foreman's
log, control
room operator's
log, clearance
center tag out
logs,
system
status
logs,
chemistry
and health
physics
logs,
and
control status
board.
During these
tours
the inspectors
noted that
the
operators
appeared
to
be alert
and
aware of changing
plant
conditions.
b.
The
inspectors
evaluated
operations
shift turnovers
and
attended
shift briefings.
They observed
that the briefings
and turnovers
provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew.
The inspectors
also verified that various plant spaces
were not in a
condition which would degrade
the
performance
capabilities of any
required
system or component.
Site security
was evaluated
by observing
personnel
in the protected
and,--vital
areas
to
ensure
that
these
persons
had
the
proper
authorization to be in the respective
areas.
The security personnel
appeared
to be alert and attentive to their duties
and those officers
performing
personnel
and
vehicular
searches
were
thorough
and
systematic.
Responses
to security alarm conditions
appeared
to be
prompt and adequate.
Harris Plant Organization
Changes
During this reporting
period the Harris Plant
General
Manager
was
reassigned
to another
CP8L site.
He was replaced
by the Harris Plant
Manager
of Maintenance.
In addition to being
the
Manager of
Maintenance,
the
new Plant General
Manager
has also served in several
other capacities
with the licensee.
c.
Planned
Outage
The
inspectors
reviewed
the licensee's
schedule
for the
upcoming
refueling
outage
and
interviewed responsible
management
personnel.
The following activities are
shown
as potentially having the largest
impact during the outage.
The valve packing "live loading" program will require at least
five weeks; it is scheduled
to start
when the outage begins.
The reactor
vessel
level indication
system
has
been
scheduled
for repair
wor k on its isolation valves;
the work will require
about two weeks to complete.
The
licensee
has
scheduled
a local
leak rate test for the
containment penetrations;
the test is expected
to take about
two
and
one hal-f weeks.
Current
plans
include
inspection
and possibly
replacing
the
seals
on
each of the reactor
coolant
pumps.
This work is
scheduled
to last about
two weeks.
Each of the emergency
diesel
generators
is scheduled
for modifi-
cations
and inspections
which are required
by the Owners
Group.
The inspections
and modifications are primarily associated
with
and fittings which were installed in the diesel
engine
lube oil system
and turbochargers.
These
modifications
are
listed
in the
Plant
Operating
License
Attachment
1,
Section 6, "Prior to Restart
Following the First Refueling".
No violations or deviations
were identified in the areas
inspected.
4.
Nonthly Surveillance Observation
(61726,
71709)
The inspectors
witnessed
the licensee
conducting maintenance
surveillance
test activities
on safety-related
systems
and
components
to verify that
the
licensee
performed
the activities
in
accordance
with licensee
requirements.
These observations
included witnessing selected
portions of
each
surveillance,
review of the surveillance
procedure
to ensure
that
administrative
controls
were
in force,
determining
that
approval
was
obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test,
and verifying that the
individuals conducting
the test
were qualified in accordance
with plant
approved
procedures.
Other observations
included ascertaining
that test
instrumentation
used
was
calibrated,
data
collected
was within the
specified
requirements
of Technical
Specifications,
any identified
discrepancies
were properly noted,
and the systems
were correctly returned
to service.
The following specific activities were observed:
l
Licensee
Event
Report
(LER) 88-13
documented
a loss of the
emergency
bus
on
June 3, while conducting
the monthly
bus
under-
voltage actuating
device test
(OST-1124').
One of the corrective
actions for the
LER was to prepare
and conduct
a test to determine
the root cause.
The licensee
connected
recorders
to various points
in the electrical circuitry in an attempt to establish
the root cause
of the undervoltage trip.
The inspectors
witnessed
the test of the
actuating
device
and the failure could not be repeated.
It doesn't
appear that
a root cause
can
be determined.
5.
Engineered
Safety Features
Walkdown (71710)
A detailed
walkdown inspection
was
conducted
on the
emergency
service
water
(ESW)
system
and associated
operations
procedures,
surveillances,
manufacturer's
instructions,
piping diagrams
and calibration
records.
Overall, the system operational
readiness
was acceptable.
Piping
diagrams
were
used
during the
walkdown to verify configuration
control.
Hangers
appeared
to be correctly aligned,
equipment oil levels
were
adequate,
valves
did not exhibit excessive
packing
leakage,
the
majority of components
were properly labeled,
and housekeeping
ranged
from
adequate
to very good.
The
concerns
listed
below
were identified during
the
course
of the
inspection.
The
ESW motor heater
conduit
was
found disconnected
at the
motor housing,
thus
exposing
the electrical
(The licensee
made the necessary
repairs.)
An oil-filled bearing oil cup was
found sitting on the floor of the
reactor auxiliary building.
(The licensee
removed the oil cup.)
Compartment
doors
on electrical distribution panels
in the
pump
house
were
found
open.
(The
licensee
ordered
the
appropriate
fasteners.)
Data. plates,
which indicate valve position,
were missing
from the
following valves:
and
(A
work request
was written to attach
the appropriate
valve position
indicators.)
The service water Operating Procedure,
and Abnormal Operating
Procedure,
do not detail
ESW motor starting requirements
as
prescribed
on the motor data plate.
The motor data plate states
that
a third "emergency" start is permissible
after
the motor
has
been
running for thirty minutes
or at
a standstill for sixty minutes.
(The
licensee
is
reviewing
the
manufacturers
instructions
and
evaluating
the motor restart requirements.)
E
'7
The
ESW monthly surveillance test,
OST-1015,
was reviewed in detail.
It was
found that
system isolation valves that supply the charging
pump gear coolers
and lube oil coolers
(1SW-1430,
1431,
1432,
1433,
1434,
and
1435)
had not
been
included
in the monthly valve check
surveillance.
Harris
Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.4a
states
that at least
two
emergency
service water loops
be demonstrated
at least
once
per
31
days
by verifying that 'each
valve servicing safety-related
equipment
that is not locked,
sealed,
or otherwise
secured
in position is in its
correct position.
The
above
referenced
valves
which control cooling water to the charging
pumps
are not secured
in position and the correct positions
have not been
verified on
a monthly basis
in accordance
with TS 4.7.4a.
The failure of
the license to perform the
31 day valve position verification surveillance
on these
valves is identified as
a violation; Failure to Verify Correct
Valve Positions,
50-400/88-20-01.
One violation was identified in this area.
6.
8.
Follow-up of Onsite Follow-up of Events
(93702)
On July 18,
1988, water
was
found in the service air lines in the reactor
auxiliary building.
The licensee
immediately traced
the source of the
water to the service air supply for the condensate
polishing system.
The
water backflowed through valve
1SA-237, which connects
the service air to
the condensate
polishing
system.
The valve
was closed
when the problem
was identified and it was
assumed
that it had
been
open for two days since
the last resin
bed regeneration.
The inspector
reviewed the system prints
to verify that safety-related
equipment
was not affected
by the water
intrusion
and noted that the licensee's
actions
appeared
to be adequate.
The licensee
is continuing
an investigation of this item
and indicated
that
additional
procedural
precautions
and/or
operator .instruction/
training may
be necessary.
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on July 22,
1988, with
the Plant General
Manager,
Operations.
The inspectors
described
the areas
inspected
and discussed
in detail
the inspection
findings listed above.
Dissenting
comments
were
not received
from the licensee.
Proprietary
information is not contained
in this report.
The following violation was
identified:
Violation 50-400/88-20-01;
Failure to Verify Correct
Valve Positions-
(paragraph 5).
e
1
.v