ML18004A279
| ML18004A279 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1986 |
| From: | Zimmerman S CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 3979AWS, NLS-86-227, NUDOCS 8607070387 | |
| Download: ML18004A279 (17) | |
Text
RF".ATDRY INFOR) lATION DISTRI i ~ION 'BYSTEl'l (R IDB>
ACCESSION NBR: 8607070387 DOC. DATE: 86/06/30 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCVET I F+C IL: 50-400 Shearon Harri s Nuclear Power Plant>
Unit 1 f Car ol ina 05000400 AUTH. NAl'lE AUTHOR AFFD IATION ZIi~lYiERNANfS. R.
Carolina Power 8c Light Co.
RECIP. NAIlE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTONf H. R.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Director (post 85il25 Q,-<<7Po/
SUBJECT:
Formards Reu 2 to CRDR final summarg re(t, in response to discussion w/SN Saba during wk of 860609. Further enhanc ement/demarcati on of pres suri z er 8c reaction h ead vent valve controls will be completed prior to Fuel load.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
A003D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 5 ENCL +
SIZE:
TITLE: OR/Licensing Submittal:
Suppl 1 to NUREQ-0737(Qeneric Ltr 82-33)
NOTES: Application For permit, renewal Filed.
05000400 RECIPIENT ID CODE/Nhl'fE PWR-A ADTB PWR-A EICBB PWR-A PD2 LA BUCl(LEY, B PWR-A RSB INTERNAL: ADN/LFNB NRR BWR ADTB NRR PWR-B ADTS 0/EIB REQ FILE EXTERNAL: LPDR NSIC COPIEB LTTR ENCL 1
2 2
1 1
1 1
0 1
1 1
1 1
1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/MANE PWR-A EB PWR-A FOB PWR-A PD2 PD PWR-A PBB IE/DEPER/EPB NRR PAULBONf W NRR/DBRO ESPRIT NRR/DBRO/RBIB RQNZ NRC PDR COP IES LTTR ENCL f
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1 TOTAL NUi'lBER OF COPIEB REQUIRED:
LTTR 31 ENCL 30
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0 CMH Carolina Power 8 Light Company JUN g 0 1986 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO.
1 - DOCKET NO.50-000 CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW FINAL
SUMMARY
REPORT SERIAL: NLS-86-227
Dear Mr. Denton:
Carolina Power ttt. Light Company (CPdcL) hereby submits Revision 2 to the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP) Control Room Design Review (CRDR) Final Summary Report.
This revision is in response to discussion with Dr. Saba N. Saba of your staff during the week of 3une 9, 1986.
Enclosure 1 provides the revised sections of the SHNPP CRDR Final Summary Report, which includes the relevant information required to complete the staff's review of the SHNPP CRDR Program.
Each revised section is paginated such that it directly replaces the corresponding sections contained in the SHNPP CRDR Final Summary Report submitted to you on September 13, 1985 and Revision 1 submitted April28, 1986.
Revisions are indicated by the vertical line in the right margin next to changed areas. provides the two HEDs revised to include specific information detailing the actions taken to resolve the discrepancy.
Please note that Enclosure 2 is not a revision to the SHNPP CRDR Final Summary Report, Appendix A, but provides clarification only.
Further enhancement/demarcation of the Pressurizer and Reactor Head Vent Valve Controls on AEP-1 willbe completed prior to fuel load.
These changes willbe consistent with the MCB design and applicable Human Factors criteria.
With this submittal, CPRL considers all outstanding NRC concerns regarding the SHNPP CRDR Program to be closed.
Should you have any question concerning this submittal, please contact Mr. Arnold W. Schmich at (919) 836-8759.
Yours very truly, 8607070387 860+~0+
PDR ADOCK 05000400 A
PDRQ AWS/pgp (3979AWS)
Enclosures S.. Zi merman ager Nuclear Licensing Section cc:
Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC) W/E Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)
W/E Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII) W/E Wake County Public Library W/E Dr. Saba N. Saba (NRC) W/2E 411 Fayettevilte Street o P. O. Box 1551 o Raleigh. N. C. 27602
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Pa q(p APPENDIX A-3 AUXILIARYEQUIPMENT PANEL HEDs t
A3-6 ~
HED NO:
HED TITLE:
31D9-13.12 LEGEND LIGHT ENG VING DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA; STROKE WID H IS TOO WIDE AND SPACE BETWEEN CHARACTERS S
TOO NARROW.
CATEGORY:
DISPOSITION: III EACH LEGEND W
ASSESSED BY THE HEDAT TO DETERMINE IF E
NUMBER OF CHARACTERS COULD BE REDUCED WH CH WOULD IMPROVE READABILITY OF THE LEGENDS LEGENDS WITH MORE THAN THREE LINES OF T XT HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO THREE LINES OF T XT.
OTHER LEGENDS CANNOT FEASIBLY BE REDUCED FURTHER USING STANDARD ABBREVIA ONS.
OPERATIONS'UMAN FACTORS AND ENGINEE NG FOUND NO PROBLEMS IN READING THE LEGENDS A3-18.
HED NO:
HED TITLE:
CATEGORY:
DISPOSITION:
31D9-017 ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT BOX LOCATED ABOVE HEIGHT CRIT RIA II OP RATIONS FINDS THE READABILITY OF THE ALB T'E ACCEPTABLE AND FEELS THAT READING CCURACY IS NOT IMPAIRED.
HUMAN FACTORS ONCURS.
THESE ANNUNCIATORS ARE READ FROM DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF THE PANEL.
A3 1
APPENDIX A-16 AUXILIARYCONTROL PANEL BEDs A16-lo HED NO:
HED TITLE:
CATEGORY:
DISPOSITION:
31AC-0101 DISTANCE FROM WALL TO BENCHBOARD OF PANEL IS 36 '
INCHES'HICH IS LESS THAN THE CRITERION OF 50 INCHES.
III THE HEDAT VERIFIED THAT CLEARANCE IS ACCEPTABLE FOR THE REQUIRED OPERATOR TRAFFIC AT THIS TIME. ENGINEERING WILL ENSURE THAT NO PROTRUDING EQUIPMENT IS ADDED TO THE FACING WALL THAT WILL INTERFERE WITH REQUIRED OPERATOR ACTIONS.
EQUIPMENT THAT I S CURRENTLY MOUNTED ON THE FACING WALL WILL BE REMOVED BY THE FIRST REFUELING OUTAGE.
A16-2 HED NO:
HED TITLE:
CATEGORY:
DISPOSITION:
31AC-1101 LABELS FOR SWITCH POSITION(S)
MISSING III SWITCHES ARE SPRING-RETURN-TO-CENTER SWITCHES WHICH ARE USED FOR
'NORMAL'ENTER POSITION.
IT IS A SHNPP-1 CONVENTION NOT TO LABEL THESE CENTER POSI TIONSONTHE SPRING-RETURN-TO-CENTER SWITCHES ~
THIS CONVENTION IS CONSISTENTLY CARRIED OUT ON THE MCBg AEP 1 AND THE ACP A16-14'ED NO:
HED TITLE:
CATEGORY:
DISPOSITION:
31AC-1113 UNLABELED SWITCH POSITIONS ON ROTARY CONTROLS III SWITCHES ARE SPRING-RETURN-TO-CENTER SWITCHES WHICH ARE USED FOR
'NORMAL'ENTER POSITION.
IT IS A SHNPP-1 CONVENTION NOT TO LABEL THESE CENTER POSI TI ONSON THE SPRING-RETURN-TO-CENTER SWITCHES.
THIS CONVENTION IS CONSISTENTLY CARRIED OUT ON THE MCB, AEP-1 AND THE ACP.
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INTEGRATION OF CRDR WITH OTHER ACTIVITIES ho gh the CRDR was specifically directed toward evaluating the ontro Room (CR)
(including the auxiliary shutdown panel),
CPaL recogni s the interface between the CRDR and other related activitie such as the design of a Safety Parameter Display System (SP
), implementation of REG.
GUIDE 1.97 requirements, development of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs),
operator
- training, and he implementation of Emergency Response Facilities (ERF).
The org ization of the CRDR considers the coordination of the CRDR with hese related efforts. This report reflects the balanced and orde y approach CP&L followed to implement the NUREG-0737 requiremen s.
It is not the intent of this report to describe all the detai ed information related to SPDS, REG.
GUIDE 1.97, and EOPs developm nt and implementation.
This report is limited to the man/ma hine interface requirements and the integration of these requir ments as they affect plant operation.
The integration of REG.
GUIDE 1.97, SPDS and the ERF took place in conjunction with the human actors review of the MCB and the subsequent redesign.
1 These items are discussed below:
a.
Safety Parameter Display System SPDS has been and continues to be revi wed with its companion items (EOPs and Control Board modifica ions) for continuity.
(See Section 6.3.3.10 for discussions o
the human factors review of the SPDS.)
The SPDS 'consists of the six critical safe y functions as defined by Westinghouse.
Each of these cr tical safety functions is associated with a fault tree, which as developed J
and coordinated with the EOPs.
1 13
The SPDS was developed as a set with the EOPs. It functions as a companion to the EOPs and as an aid to the operator.
The revised MCB layout includes six colorgraphic CRTs.
One of these CRTs is designated as the primary SPDS display, and a
second CRT serves as the alternate SPDS display.
The placement of these CRTs was considered in the redesign effort to ensure maximum readability of the displays.
The EOPs and the SPDS display formats (hard copy) have been tested as a set for over 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> on several simulators as well as over 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> in table-top exercises.
The process CP&L followed in the SPDS development is outlined in Figure 1-1.
b.
REG.
GUIDE 1.97 The REG.
GUIDE l. 97, items have been discussed by CPaL and the NRC (See LAP-83-405).
The majority of the REG.
GUIDE 1.97 instrumentation was added to the MCB during the MCB rearrangement.
Additional 1.97 instrumentation was incorporated into the MCB layout using the same human factors guidelines used in the MCB redesign effort.
CPaL has ensured that no HEDs have been introduced with these modifications.
This was verified during the completion/reassessment phase within the verification and validation activities.
The Post Accident Monitoring instruments have been highlighted on the MCB with yellow bezels.
It should also be noted that the 1.97 parameters can also be displayed on the CRTs as each parameter has been incorporated into the ERFIS.
Attachment l-l contains a listing of the 1.97 parameters and their locations.
1 14
c.
Emergency Operating Procedures The EOPs were written specifically to adhere to the Westinghouse (W)
Emergency
Response
Guidelines (ERGs)
< REV.-l and have been tested on the same simulator on which the W
generic procedures were tested.
The results provided evidence that any deviation taken by CP&L in making the procedures plant-specific resulted in expected responses and ensured that safe conditions were achieved.
The ERFIS/SPDS information has also been incorporated into the EOPs (see Figure 1-2).
The Critical Safety Function Status trees contained in the SPDS are tied directly into the EOPs.
EOP revisions are made using the methodology specified in the EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE WRITER'S GUIDE (OMM-006) ~
Notifying the appropriate departments of these changes is also a re uirement of OMM-006.
q d.
Operator Train ing The training program for the operators on the EOPs was written for SHNPP-1 and was tailored to the recently completed EOPs.
The Element Tables in the task analysis (see Section 6.4 of this report) also provide a top-level indication of the area of training for each EOP step.
In addition, the Hot License training program reflects the recently updated EOPs.
As the plant continues toward completion and as background/operating information becomes available, the training material is updated.
The training department is notified of all Control Room and plant modifications through the distribution of Field Change Requests (FCRs) and Design Change Notices (DCNs).
Plant modifications and procedure changes will be reviewed by training to determine the need for either dissemination of the information or inclusion in training.
1-15
e.
Emergency Response Facilities The ERF has been coordinated with the CRDR in the areas of information and communication needs.
The same integrated plant computer system (Emergency
Response
Facilities Information System or ERFIS) that drives the MCB CRTs also drives the CRTs in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency Operating Facility (EOF).
All CRT displays available on the MCB can be called up in the TSC or EOF without affecting the MCB displays.
This information is displayed (real time) in the TSC and EOF, which ensures maximum coordination of facilities.
The communication systems between the Control Room and the ERF conform to the reguirements of
The communication devices to be provided include:
dedicated telephones (Hot Lines), dial-up telephones, the Emergency Notification System, company radios, sound-powered telephones, and the ERFIS.
A summary of CPaL design standards and criteria for the TSC (which was also used for the EOF) is contained in Attachment 1-2.
1 16
7.1.1 Method used for recordin HEDs HEDs are recorded on Human Engineering Discrepancy Report
- forms, which are included in each Task Plan as Appendix B9 (see Figure 7-2).
A discrepancy/deviation from the guidelines is recorded on the HED,form with the items/components involved.
The form also contains a place for recording the data collection method (e.g.
Observation, Operator Interview, etc.)
and a place for listing potential human errors that may exist because of the discrepancy.
The second page 'of the HED form contains a place for the suggested backfit and the disposition of the HED.
A summary sheet called the "HED Prioritization" form (see Table 7-1), is attached to each HED.
This form contains a record of the final disposition of the HED.
The Category Number, Final Corrective Action, and Implementation rating/schedule are recorded on these forms.
7.1.2 Method used for trackin HEDs
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The HED numbering scheme (described in Figure 7-3) identifies the component type within the HED number.
This allowed for easy grouping of HEDs that addressed the same components.
HEDs addressing component labels, for example, were resolved with the re-engraving of the component labels.
HEDs were also verified for consistencies across panels.'or
- example, an HED addressing a particular type of rotary control on the MCB was grouped with.any HEDs for the same type of component that was on the ACP or AEP.
These HEDs were assessed together and the same resolution was assigned to each HED.
7-2
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T