ML17348A778
| ML17348A778 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/1990 |
| From: | FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17348A777 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9012260120 | |
| Download: ML17348A778 (55) | |
Text
ATTACHMENT 1 PROPOSED TECHNZCAL SPECZFZCATZON Marked-up Technical Specification Pages
..9012260 l 20-. 901219 i; PDR',
. ADOCK,05000250
~P.-
'DR
SAFETY LIMIT: AND LIM'TING <AFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS
- 2. 2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS pmmt sSl~+
c 4'/jg~Qpu p~/j,~BwcEi 2.2. 1 The Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and Interlock Setpoints shall be set consistent with the Trip Setpoint values shown in Table 2.2-1.
APPLICABILITY:
As shown for each channel in Table 3.3-1.
ACTION:
With a Reactor Trip System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column but moie conservative than the value 'shown in the Allowabl'e Value column of Table 2.2-1, ad'u e set oint consistent with the Trip setpoint value gg
~ew.'ith the Reactor Tr System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint less conservative th v
ue shown in the Al1owable Values column of Tabl 2.2-1 declare the c anne
>nopera e and apply the ap e ACTION statement requirement of Specification 3.3.1 until the channel is restored to OPERAHLE status with its Setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
2I TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8( 4 2-3 AMENDMENT NOS.
Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value of Table 2.2-1 and determine within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> that Equation 2.2-1 was satisfied for the affected channel or where:
Z R
EQUATION 2.2-I Z+R+S<TA The value for column Z of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel S
The "as measured" value (in percent span) of rack error for the affected channel, Either the "as measured" value (in percent span) of the sensor error, or the value of Column S (Sensor Error) of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel, and TA The value for Column TA (Total Allowance in percent of span) of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel.
TABLE 2.2-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEH INSTRUHENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT 1.
Hanual Reactor Trip'
. 2 ~
Power Range, Neutron Flux a.
High Setpoint b.
Low Setpoint 3.
Intermediate
- Range, Neutron Flux 4.
Source
- Range, Neutron Flux 5.
Overtemperature 4T 6.
Overpower bT 7.
Pressurizer Pressure-Low 8.
Pressurizer Pressure-High 9.
Pressurizer Water Level-High 10.
Reactor Coolant Flow-Low ll. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low TRIP SETPOINT
'109X of RTP""
<25X of RTP*"
<25X of RTP**
<10'ps See Not'e 1
See Note 3
>1835 psig
<2385 psig
<92X of instrument span
>90X of loop 8esign flow"
>15X of narrow range instrument span
/c 121 5~+oi
$//gg/~~
pP IfJ lz) gs) pfp-hrft 0k ALLOWABLF. VALUE II NgAg
>la~
<~]X of RTP""
zg.o
<~X of RTP""
3/
<~X of RTP*"
(&
<~ x 10" cps 5'ee 4o~C. 2 gag, A/a7S 5 lfl7
>~ ysig psig 3 g q;SL g.Wl JS.
(y.al d.d p.z q,rz z 54-g.Df
( (g
('5 J /g
)>+
+0
+pa L
<~X gg,0
>~X design ig.z span Il,g of instrument span of loop flow" 5.D
<.53 lo of narrow range instrumen Loop design flow = 89,500 gpm Cj
""RTP = RATED THERHAL POWER
+ g,yp y>a> f>> pzftz -7 Cl7Cb') zuj
+~p-Pnz$5ssn/ pcs PI'~ssa>>
~
~
FUNCTIONAL UNIT 12.
Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch Coincident With Steam Generator Water Leve I-Low TRIP SElPOIN1 F'eed Flow below steam flow
>15K of narrow range instrument span ALLOWABLE VALUE ff feed Flow ~ 2~.VPo below steam flow l3+2
>~X of narrow range instrument span TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)
REACfOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SEfPOINTS 5cdSof PrsFJ
(~)
7 3~t A9 13.
Undervoltage - 4.16 kV Busses A and B
>45 psig 14.
Underfrequency - Trip of Reactor
~
- 56. 1 tlz Coolant Pump Breaker(s)
Open 15.
Turbine Trip a.
Auto Stop Oil Pressure 47go ha>
K>~~>ge.
Hz
+3
>~ psig (2
dd 8,5b (a
do b.
Turbine Stop Valve Closure 16.
Safety Injection Input from ESF D.
Reactor Trip System Interlocks a.
Intermediate Range Neut> on Flux, P-6 Fully Closed "*"
~( (I x 10-'a amp Ful ly Closed *"*
-i/
.i OwlO ggpS L>m>t sw>tch )s set when Turbine Stop Valves are fully closed
~+ I > ra
~paw pn>>M~ Xi'az. pipw g,yp Sp~~4~ F~4w~~+~ w ~w~ "'~~~ ~/~+
For XM~ C.jwa A'P.B<<R R
L'
I-UNCTIONAL UNIT
~g, V~j 5~/Ap.
g>+~~g g~~f f'.~)
(5)
ALLOWABLE VALUE N f7 lRIP SETPOINT TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEH INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SllPOINTS b.
Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 1)
P-10 input gpaa~
glOX 2)
Turbine First. Stage Afiasfaag ging Pressure c.
Power Range Neutron ilPaasfujj /SAN F lux, P-8 of RIP**
Turbine Power of RfP*"
d.
Power Range Neutron g+~>/
Pig% of RTP**
Flux, P-10 18.
Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position Trip 19.
Reactor Trip Breakers 20.
Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic
!94
~X of RIP""
l~.o
<~X Turbine Powe
/gal
~~ of RIP""
t.n N~P. of RTP""
m CD m
CD C/I
""RTP = RATED THERMAL POWER
TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATIONS NOTE 1:
OYE TEMPERATURE dT dT (
)
< dT 1+xS
- ...,o (K
K ~
[T (
) - T')
+
K (P - P')
f (a)})
(1 gS) 1 gS Where:
dT
~1+t 5
+
l~) lg dT, Kg K2 1+x
+ rg ryp rS' 1
~+rg Measure(l dT by RTO Instrumentation ag compensator on measured dT; Time constants utilized in the lag compensator
- 4, = 3'slap.~
Indicated dT at RATED lllERHAL POWER for dl, Q gidp CS ~ J
- 1. 095; 0.0107/ F;
'Ze
+'sarm amer o(meara} m.Ad
~~gp, l/gl
+>w ~N~p 4pww~ J 4 ~A)~$4'Pi4",
The function generated by the lead-lag compensator for 7 dynamic compensation; avg Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for T, ~= 25sd,spy g=3sg~'vg'~
Average temperature,
~F; Lag compensator on measured T
avg'ime constant utilized in the measured T
lap compensatorfpz avg 574.2 F (Nominal I at RATED THERMAL POWER);
~avg 0.000453/psig; P ressurizer
- pressure, psig:
Gree coustau7 ss~J IT>+ ~dp
~
P gg Q ggc+r
I pc CD I
Qo I
CXt NOTE 1:
(Continued) pl TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued) 2235 psig (Nominal RCS operating pressure);
-I Laplace transform operator, ~ 5'EC, and f> (41) is a function of the indicated difference between Lop and bottom detectors of the power-range neutron inn chambers; with gains to be select.ed based on measured instrument response during plant ~tests such that:
(1)
For q
- qb between - 14X and
+ 10K, f (hl) = 0, where qt and qb are percent, RATED TlIERHAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and qt
+ qb is total TNERHAL POWER in percent of RATED THERHAL POWER; p
-7 (25 For each percent that the magnitude of qt - qb exceeds 14'X, theM Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by~ of its value at RATED TIIERHAL POWER; and l.y~
(3)
For each percent that the magnitude of qt - qb exceeds i lOX, e
rip Setpoint-shall be automatically reduced by ~of its value at RATED IIILRHAL POWER.
/.Sg~
m C7 m
NOTE 2:
~> ~A<~>~i~ ~>pi~>>4 7>>'ez~rid I s4<~I d '~J
~
Ap PJ t'jo p,~P9p pg e>Aa~<~
CD CIs
m ID Cl)
NOTE 3:
OVERPOMER 4T Mhere:
1
~+tg Ks 1
~+tg TABLE 2. 2-1 (Continued) tABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)
(K
- KQ~
77-K
[7
-7"] - ((S())
(7
+ yS)
=. As defined in Note 1, As defined in Note 1, l ~V~5 ckFIA/$1 /N +8~ lp As defined in Note 1, As defined in Note 1, As defined in Note 1, 1.09, 0.02/'F for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average temperature, The function generated by the rate-lag compensator for T
dynamic compensation, avg Time constants utilized in the rate-lag compensator for T
, t> ~ 1O ~cS'.~
avg's defined in Note 1,
TABLE 2.2-l. (Continued)
TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)
NOTE 3:
(Continued) f<(WI)
- 0. 0006A/ f for T > T" and K; = 0 for I ~"'
As defined in Note I, Indicated T
at RATED THERHAL POWER (Calibratio>> temperature for dT i>>stromentatio>>,
< 574.2'f),
As defined in Note I, and 0 Ea all w2'OTE 4:
ID l sA P ~>+~~
7gg
~e/'5'twgcw~ I+'p 5 g 7 5/BsS/ss cu~p~64 7~p p'~> >p'
~
ff If no allowable value is specified as indicated by [ ], the trip set point shall also be the allowable value.
- 2. 2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS ys'ey>>>> ep>>e'~x$ iuiwg z// >>< 4>> ~c>>p jzz~p.<
>> ~45'~ cQ~>>/~,
BASES 2.2.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS p g gc7aP drift that may occur between, operational setpoints can be measured and calibrated, Trip Setpoints have been specific less conservative than Trip To accommodate the instru tests and the accuracy to which Allowable Values for the Reacto Table
- 2. 2-1.
Operation with Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable The Reactor Trip Setpoint Limits specified i able 2.2-1 are the nominal values at which the Reactor trips are set for ea functional unit.
The Trip Setpoints have been selected to ensure that the core andgeactorgoolant system are prevented from exceeding their safety limits during normal operation and design basis anticipated operational occurrences and to assist the Engi-neered Safety Features Actuation S
s
'tigating the consequences of accidents.
yg,lPJ/N /8 The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints 1
Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are.the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties.
Sensors and other instru-mentation utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes.
The various Reactor trip circuits -automatically open the Reactor trip breakers whenever a condition monitored by the Reactor Trip System reaches a
preset or calculated level.
In addition to redundant channels and trains, the design approach provides a Reactor Trip System which monitors numerous system variaoles, therefore providing Trip System functional diversity.
The functional capability at the specified trip setting is required for those anticipatory or diverse Reactor trips for which no di rect credit was assumed in the safety analysis to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Trip System.
The Reactor Trip System initiates a Turbine.trip signal whenever Reactor trip is initiated.
This prevents the reactivity insertion that would otherwise result from excessive Reactor Coolant System cooldown and thus avoids unnecessary actuation of-the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System.
Manual Reactor Tri The Reactor Trip System includes manual Reactor trip capability.
TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 Ec 4
.B 2"3 AMENOMENT NOS.137AND 132
. e <<r Trr p system or interlock function is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as measured" setpoint in within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.
since an allowance has been made in the safety analysis to accommodate this error.
An optional provision has been included for determining the OPERABILITY of a.channel when its trip setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable Value.
The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured"
("as found")
deviation from the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components, in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncertainties of the instrumentation to meas'ure the process variable, and the uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation.
In Equation 2.2-1, Z +
R +
S
< TA, the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the
- sensor, and the "as measured"
{"as found" - nominal) values of the errors are considered.
Z, as specified in Table 2.2-1, in percent
- span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement.
TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in percent
- span, between the trip setpoint and the value used in the analysis for reactor
, trip.
R or Rack Error. is the "as measured"
{"as found"
- nominal) deviation, in percent
- span, for the affected channel from the specified trip setpoint.
S or Sensor Drift is either the "as measured"
{"as found"
- nominal)'deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 2.2-1, in percent
- span, from the analysis assumptions.
Use of Equation 2.2-1 allows for a sensor drift factor, an increased rack drift factor, and provides a threshold value for determining reportability.
Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the avior that the rack has not met its allowance.
Being that there is a
small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive
'drift is expected.
Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should war rant further investigation.
INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3. 2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown fn Table 3.3-2 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpofnts set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpofnt column of Table 3.3-3.
APPLICABILITY:
As shown in Table 3.3-2.
ACTION:
aO b.
Nth an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpofnt trip less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-3, adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value if8iu pc~+ jyzibb ccfll'8>4>p< >o/4>+~+5' Nth an ESFAS Instrumentatfon or Interlock Trip Setpoint less co ative than the value shown fn the Allowable Value column of able 3.3-3, c.
Nth an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-2.
Cc SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS 4.3.2.1 Each ESFAS instrumentatfon channel and interlock and the automatic actuation logic and relays shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the ESFAS Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-2.
TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 3/4 3-13 AMENDMENT NOS.
AND
where:
- l. Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value of Table 3.3-3 and determine within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> that Equation 2.2-1 was satisfied for the affected channel, or
- 2. Declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement requirements of Table 3.3-2 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
E(UATION 2.2-1 Z+R+S<TA Z
The value for column Z of Table 3.3-3 for the affected channel, R
The "as measured" value (in percent span) of rack error for the affected channel, S
Either the "as measured" value (in percent span) of the sensor error, or the value of Column S (Sensor Error) of Table 3.3-3 for the affected channel, and TA The value for Column TA (Total Allowance in percent of span) of Table 3.3-3 for the affected channel.
FUNCTIONAL UNIT
~(
fr a
'>>'gP
~> ~z) (S)
TRIP SETPOINT ALLOMABLE VALU TABLE 3.3-3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM NS RUM N A ON RIP SE POINTS Safety Injectfon (Reactor Trip, Turbine Trip, Feedwater Isolation, Control Room Ventf 1 atf on Iso 1 atf on, Start Diesel Generators, Contain-ment Phase A Isolation (except Manual SI), Containment Cooling Fans, Containment Filter Fans, Start Sequencer, Component Cooling Water, Start Auxiliary Feedwater and Intake Cooling Mater) a.
Manual Inftiatfon ve
]p]y.
g,y y 2 d.>
(y,o g.f b.
Automatic Actuation Logic N~
h~ps~g S TED
>HAS psfg Jdd
<380'sf c.
Containment Pressure-High d.
Pressurizer Pressure-Low S'7
.~
g7 gled g7 e.
High Differential Pressure Between the Steam Line Header and any Steam Line.
f.
Steam Line Flow-High
]py /lb 23 Cofncfdent wfth:
Stoa ~ Gener ator Pressure-Low or T -Low 2.
Contaf nment Spray q,D
$ 00 N~
ps<
r t
j p g~ctl>k
<A function defined Qf f~l/$~5 p,~ ~P as follows:
A 4p
~~~p~klwP ] >
corresponding to
~ ~ ~j.
gyes~ at Qg load 1ncraas>>g" ssga loud I>>+~~(
fng lfnearly Ee-a gWa~~p fpeer Z&
~>a>> AS'lag corrasponoing to ga>> par/ag
, >gg6'psfg
>~psig gl gzf f03 9H~~
>SkPF
>~'F h/'+
a.
Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays AO y.D b.
Contafneent Pressure-Hfgh-Hfgh Coincident with:
Containment Pressure-High TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 3/4 Ng
<QR4 psfg psfg 3-23 2I 6 psfg
~
~
psfg AMENDMENT NO 3
D
C
TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAfETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM 5'~vs~
(Ibw~l
)
~ ~ ( ~FUNCTIONAL UNIT 3.
Containment Isolation NSRUMN ION RIPS ONS TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALU a.
Phase "A" Isolation 1)
Manua1 Inftf ation 2)
Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 3)
Safety Injection b.
Phase "B" Isolation
, 1)
Manual Initiation See Item 1 above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.
y,d b.P 2)
Automatfc Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays 3)
Contafnment Pressure-Hfgh-High Coincident with:
Containment Pressure-High CO
~
<QfHt psfg Q,o psfg
<~ psfg
<~ psfg c.
Containment Ventflatfon Isolation pfJf k'k
)Ilk I)
Contafnment Isolation Manual Phase A or Manual Phase B
2)
Automatfc Actuation Logic and Actuatfon Relays 3)
Safety Injection pfP gent
/if+
4)
Contaf neent Radfo-actfvfty-High (1)
See Item 1.
above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpofnts and Allowable Values.
Partlcalata (R-ll) lg>~lc.]LA~4~p
<6.1 X 10s CPM g 3P~ ]Ppg)OQ
. hseous (R-12)
Saa (2) jF.gg~& ~+ J~)
.52.8 L<)
TURKEY POINT" UNITS 3 4 4 3/4 24
TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) g>>1 1
yw) Q) >)
INS RU A
ON RIP S
OIN TRIP SETPOINT FUNCTIONAL UNIT 4.
Steam Line Isolation ALLOMABLE VALU ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM g,q z,fl 9'7
(,IL ZS
+y gyp
(>dP 5.
a.
Manual Inftf ation NgQ
- Neat, b.
Automatic Actuatfon Logic Nag and Actuation Relays XldW c.
Containment Pressure-High-
<QfH psfg
<~psig High Coincident with:
0.0 x,S Containment Pressure-High
<H psfg psig T
Stean Line Flow-Hl
<A Function detlned 5 ~}l} gF~+>>A + ~
>/o11:~g>>.'>>ww
~a>>
>FJ.
d i w-I 1.CQ, Se lng lkneanIy co-~ loni >A>cedar>
a> ~P
'Bio>a APFP A+~ 0 ntp corresponding to dc>>~ pop~/~ tea y~~
cop>.~pe>>d>e> +o lake cp ~~no Flya> at fu11 load. Cof ncfdent wiih: psfg >~ psfg Steam Line Clg SSV Pressure-Low or SR'py.S T'Low )5&OF >~F Feedwater Isolatf on g Jf gP gP a. Automatfc Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays b. Safety In)ectfon 6. Auxflfaiy Feedwater (3) NlAP} See Item 1. above for all Safety In)ectfon Trfp Setpofnts and Allowable Values. pPff a. Autoaatfc Actuatfon Logic and Actuation Relays b. Steam Generator Mater Level-Low-Low >~ of narrow range instant spane )3' X of narrow range instrument span. c. Safety In)ectfon See Item 1. above for all Safety Ingectfon Trip Setpofnts and Allowable Values. TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 3/4 3-25 AMBIENT NOS.137 ANO>>2
~]~ g,l ad&> 4alf~ r e) <<) TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM N Ut N FUNCTIONAL UNIT 6. Auxiliary Feedwater (Continued) TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALU d. Bus Stripping e. Trip of All Hain Feedwater Pump Breakers. 7. Loss of Power a.
- 4. 16 kV Busses A and B
(Loss of Voltage) b. 480V Load Centers (Instantaneous Relays) Degraded Voltage Load Center See Item 7. belo~ for all Bus Stripping Setpoints and Allowable Values. 3A 3B 3C 30 4A 4B 4C Coincident with: Safety Injection Oiese'enerator BreaKer Open 436V+5V (10 sec a 1 sec delay) 416V15V (10 sec t 1 sec delay) 417V+5V- (10 sec t 1 sec delay) 428VKSV (10 sec t 1 sec delay) 415Vt5V (10 sec i 1 sec delay) 414Vi5V (10 sec a 1 sec delay) 401Vi5V (10 sec i 1 sec delay) 403VISV (10 sec t 1 sec delay) See Item l. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values. N..A. TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8 4 3/4 3-26 AMENDMENT N05.137 ANO132
TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) FUNCTIONAL UNIT gzpso~p e g) 4>) (~) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM NS UM N N TRIP 5ETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUE ~ 7. Loss of Power (Continued) c. 480V Load Centers (Inverse Time Relays) Degraded Voltage Load Center 3A 3C 4A 4B 40 41'+SV(60. sec delay) 426visv(60 sec delay) 427Vfsv(60 sec delay) 43ev~sv(eo sec delay) 427V~SV(60 sec delay) 424y+sv(60 sec delay) 413vfsv(60 sec delay) 41zv~sv(eo sec delay) sec i30 [ sec 130 sec a30 [ sec f30 [
sec f30 [ sec i30 f sec +30 sec i3G [ 8. Coincident with: Diesel Generator Breaker Open Engineering Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks 'ggI a. ressur i,ier Pressure ffo4'" b. ]Law g gigyl Control Room Ventilation Isolation a. Automatic Actuation-Logic and Actuation Relays 000 psig nP zoj'g <~~psig b. Safety Injection See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values. TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 3/4 3-27 NENDMENT NOS.137 AND 132
TABLE 3:3-3 (Continued) ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM NS UM ON P S PO N S 5TN) FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALU 9. Control Room Isolation (Continued) c. Containment Radfoactfvity-Hfgh (1) d. Containment Isolation Manual Phase A or Manual Phase B PartIce)ate (R-11) haj7jc 4/~~+ ~jT i~g) <6.1 x 10s CPM ~ ~ g < /~5 gpPf gaseous (R-12) See (2) p<gppt45 H S'ae (<) e. Afr Intake Radiation Level < 2 mR/hr
- 2. 83 mR/hr TABLE NOTATIONS (1) Either the particulate or gaseous channel fn the OPERABLE status will satisfy this LCO.
(2) Containment Gaseous Monitor Setpofnt =
- CPM, CF)
Actual Pu e Flow Oesfgn Purge Flow (35,000 CFM) Setpofnt may vary according to current plant conditions provided that the release rate does not exceed allowable limits provided in Speci ffcation 3. 11.2.1. (3) Auxiliary feedwater manual fnftfatfon fs included fn Specfffcatfon
- 3. 7.1.2.
I If no alleAMe value js specified So fndf,eaQd byI', ~ trip set@~ ~hall also'.be the. allowable value. ~. TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 4 4 3/4 3"28 AMENOMENT NOS.137 ANO>>2
BASES 3/4. 3n 1 and 3/4. 3. 2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES S 0 The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip System and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensures that: (1) the associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, (3) sufficient redundancg is main-tained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance (due to plant specific design, pulling fuses and using jumpers may be used to place channels in trip), and (4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters. The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.. The Surveillance Requirements speci-fied for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveil-lance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. Under some-pressure and temperature conditions, certain.surveillances for Safetygngection cann~oe performed because of the system design, Allow'agee to gh5nge modes is provide der these conditions ~ong as the surveilla+ces a completed within specific 'equireme The.Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints specified in Table 3.3-3 are the nominal values at which the trips are set for each functional unit, TAd Sef//nje f /5 c&1IJ/W'el ed fence dJ ud/cJ /nun'/+7I svp( gc unnuudl udge<<c <</6u!'$e "dn n/ees<<n/J / sepnnnn fis v/s/kn'/ flic bdNJ dllnu/J jar vcr//Andean To accommodate the instrument drift that may occur between operational g <gq p.~~ tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated Allowable Values for the Setpoints have been specified in Table 3.3-3. pera-tion with Setpoints less conservative than tbe Trip Setpoint but withi Allowab]e Value-is acceptable no value ie 1TsgeiT sn the Allowagle column, ~no'~> the SetpePn% va!ua is +dms IImfttn setting. f The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints includes an allowance for instrument uncertainti es. Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties. Sensor and rack instrumenta-tion utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. 2. The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected plant parameters and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combina-tions indicative of various accidents
- events, and transients.
Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to 0 TURKEY POINT " UNITS 3 4 4 8 3/4 3"1 AMENOMENT NOS.$37 ANO)S
~ ~ ~ , since an allowance has been made in the safety analysis to accoiiiiiodite tfiis error. An optional provision has been included for determining the OPERABILITY of a channel when its trip setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable Value. The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" ("as found" deviation from the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncertainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variable and the uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation. In Equation 2.2-1, Z + R + S < TA, the interactive effects of the errors fn the rack and the sensor, and the "as measured" values of the errors are considered. Z, as specified in Table 3.3-3, in percent span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement. TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in per cent span, between the trip setpoint and the value used in the analysis for actuation. R or Rack Error is the "as measured" ("as found" - nominal) deviation, in percent span, for the affected channel from the specified trip setpoint. S or Sensor Drift is either the "as measured" ("as found". - nominal} deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 3.3-3, in percent
- span, from the analysis assumptions.
Use of Equation 2.2-1 allows for a sensor drift factor, an increased rack iii'iii., ip ii ii iid\\ i di iii l 'age 7 Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance. Being that there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected. Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be investigation. indicative of more serious problems and should warrant f th ran ur er TA, S, E and a liable values are based on plant equipment: at the time of'ubmittal. here the evaluated uncertainties of replacement instrumantat,ion W determined to contribute smaller channel errors, such equipment replacement need not require a change to the Technical Specifications,
ATTACHMENT 3 DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION
Page 1 of 4 EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SETPOINT STUDY TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 & 4 INTRODUCTION Pursuant to the requirements in 10 CFR 50.92, each application for amendment. to an operating licensee must be-reviewed to determine if 'the modification involves a significant hazard. The amendment as defined in this report has been reviewed and deemed not to involve a significant hazard based on the following evaluation. This amendment describes the folloying subjects: 1. Revision of Section 2.2, Limiting Safety System Settings for implementation of the Westinghouse setpoint five column methodology. 2. Revision of Section 3/4.3.2, Engineered Safety Features ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Actuation System Instrumentation for implementation of the Westinghouse setpoint five column methodology. BACKGROUND Originally the Limiting Safety System Settings and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation setpoints were established by WCAP-7392, "Setpoint Study for Florida Power and Light Company Turkey Point Units 3 and 4", in June of 1970. Since that time, Westinghouse has implemented a statistical methodology to calculate a'hannel statistical allowance for establishing and justifying reactor trip setpoints. This methodology was used in WCAP-12745,"Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology For Protection Systems Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Florida Power and Light Company" which is the basis for the revised setpoints.
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Page 2 of 4 EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SETPOINT STUDY TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 & 4 The methodology used is the "square root of the sum of the squares>> which has been utilized in other Westinghouse reports. This technique, or others of a similar nature, have been used in WCAP-10395, Statistical Evaluation of LOCA Heat Source Uncertainty, and WCAP-8567, Improved Thermal Design Procedure. WCAP-8567 is approved by the NRC noting acceptability of statistical techniques for the application requested.
- Also, various
- ANSI, American Nuclear Society (ANS), and Instrument Society of America standards approve the use of probabilistic and statistical techniques in determining safety-related setpoints specifically, ANSI/ANS Standard 58.4-1979, Criteria for Technical Specifications for Nuclear Power Stations, and ISA Standard S67.04,
- 1987, setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation Used in Nuclear Power Plants.
The methodology used in WCAP-12745, "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology For Protection Systems-Turkey Point Units 3 and -4, Florida Power and Light Company is essentially the same as that used for V."C. Summer in August,
- 1982, WCAP-11814, "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems";
approved in NUREG-0717, Supplement No. 4, Safety Evaluation Report related to the Operation of Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Docket No. 50-395,
- August, 1982.
In summary the Westinghouse five column methodology will be defined within the Technical Specifications and the appropriate values incorporated within the instrumentation trip setpoint tables for the Reactor Protection System and the Engineered Safety Features ~ Actuation System. Several of the trip setpoint values have been revised to take advantage of additional margin identified during the implementation of the methodology. Additional changes are ~ incorporated which are intended to improve the human interface by providing trip setpoints which are even
- values, thus easing operator memorization.
DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION The standards used to arrive at a determination that a request =for amendment involves no significant hazards consideration are included in the Commission s regulations, 10 CFR 50.92, which states that no significant hazards considerations are involved if the operations of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (l) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Each standard is discussed as follows:
Page 3 of 4 EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SETPOINT STUDY TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 & 4 Operation of the facility ln accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The changes proposed as a result of the Setpoint Methodology are consistent with the current plant safety analyses of record. The setpoints assumed in the various. safety
- analyses, the installed protection system
- hardware, and plant calibration procedures are reflected in these calculations.
As
- such, the changes to the technical specifications do not affect assumptions contained in the plant safety analyses, physical design and/or operation of the, plant.
All conclusions in the safety analysis remain valid. Therefore, the proposed changes do not increase the probability or consequences of accidents previously analyzed. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The Technical Specifications proposed as a result of the Setpoint Methodology calculations do not create any new or different failures modes, for equipment important to
- safety, than those previously evaluated in the FSAR.
Thus, the plant is still within analyzed conditions for design basis events (LOCA and Non-LOCAs), including consideration of the 'ingle failure of equipment important to safety. Therefore, the proposed technical specifications do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. Use of the modified specification would not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The change to the five column methodology proposed explicitly defines the safety margins to be maintained by the Technical Specifications. This change quantifies the setpoint margins which were previously undefined. In summary, it is demonstrated that each channel has additional margin after the channel uncertainties are accounted for which will preserve the safety analysis limits. The amount of margin for each channel is defined in Table 3-23, of WCAP-12745.
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Page 4 of 4 EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SETPOINT STUDY TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 & 4 In the Technical Specification submittal, there are two cases where the total allowance between the Safety Analysis Limit and the Nominal Trip Setpoint has been reduced from the existing Technical Specifications. These are the Steam Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch and the Steam Flow High functions. With respect to both functions the reduction in total allowance still provides more than adequate margin to preserve the Safety Analysis Limits while helping to prevent spurious actuations. Additionally, with respect to Steam Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch the Safety Analysis Limit is not specifically used in the analysis but is utilized to meet diversity requirements. With respect to Steam Flow High, it should be noted that the previous setpoint resulted in a risk of spurious actuations. The new setpoint is more in conformance with the values traditionally utilized in other Westinghouse plants while maintaining appropriate margins. The plant design bases willstill be maintained and will not reduce the ability to perform post-accident safety functions. Therefore, the margin of safety will not be reduced as described in the technical specifications
SUMMARY
In summary, it has been determined that the amendment request does not (l) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the probability of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety; and therefore does not involve a significant hazards consideration. The setpoints and associated margins are defined and contained in WCAP-12745, Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology For Protection Systems Turkey Point Units 3 4 Florida Power & Light Company (Proprietary) and WCAP-12746 (Non-proprietary). REFERENCE WCAP-12745, Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology For Protection
- Systems, Turkey Point Units 3
& 4,.Florida Power & Light Company (Proprietary).
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ATTACHMENT 2 DESCRIPTION OF ADMENDMENT REQUEST
'I S
Attachment 2 Page 1 of 5 Introduction and Back round This request revises Technical Specifications Section 2.2, Limiting Safety System Settings and Section 3/4.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation for implementation of the Westinghouse setpoint five column methodology. Originally the Limiting Safety System Settings and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation setpoints were established by WCAP-7392, >>Setpoint Study for Florida Power and Light Company Turkey Point Units 3 and 4,>> in June of 1970. Since that time, Westinghouse has implemented a statistical methodology to calculate a channel statistical allowance for establishing and justifying reactor trip setpoints. This methodology was used in WCAP-12745, "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology For Protection Systems Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Florida Power and Light Company>> which is the basis for the revised setpoints. Until approval of this request and implementation of the proposed technical specification setpoints, existing licensed setpoints shall remain binding. Existing setpoints are in compliance with the current licensing and design basis of the plants. Variations in the values obtained from the present and proposed settings are to be expected and arise out of differences in assumptions in the calculations of instrument uncertainties. The methodology used is the "square root. of the sum of the squares" which has been utilized in other Westinghouse reports. This technique, or others of a similar nature, have been used in WCAP-10395', Statistical Evaluation of LOCA Heat Source Uncertainty. and WCAP-8567,- Improved Thermal Design Procedure. WCAP-8567 is approved by the NRC noting acceptability of statistical techniques for the application requested.
- Also, various
- ANSI, American Nuclear Society (ANS), and Instrument Society of America standards approve the'-",',use of probabilistic and statistical techniques in determining'safety-related setpoints.=
Specifically, these include ANSI/ANS Standard 58.4-1979, Criteria for Technical Specifications for Nuclear Power
- Stations, and ISA Standard S67.04,
- 1987, Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation Used in Nuclear Power Plants.
The methodology used in WCAP-12745, '"Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology For Protection Systems-Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, Florida Power and Light Company is essentially the same as that used for V. C. Summer in August,
- 1982, WCAP-11814, "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems;"
approved in NUREG-0717, Supplement No. 4, Safety Evaluation Report related to the Operation of Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Docket No. 50-395,
- August, 1982.
This methodology has
Attachment 2 Page 2 of 5 subsequently been used to justify setpoints in numerous Westinghouse plants. In summary the Westinghouse five column methodology will be defined within the Technical Specifications and the appropriate values incorporated within the instrumentation trip setpoint tables for the Reactor Protection System and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System. Several of the trip setpoint values have been revised based on additional margin identified during the implementation of the methodology. Additional changes are incorporated which are intended to improve the human interface by providing trip setpoints which are easy for operators to memorize. The setpoints and associated margins are defined and contained in WCAP-12745, Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology For Protection Systems Turkey Point Units 3 6 4 Florida Power & Light Company (Proprietary) and WCAP-12746 (Non-proprietary). In the Technical Specification submittal, there are two cases where the total allowance between the Safety Analysis Limit and the Nominal Trip Setpoint has been reduced from the existing Technical Specifications. These are the Steam Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch and the Steam Flow High functions. With respect to both functions the reduction in total allowance still provides more than adequate margin to preserve the Safety Analysis Limits while helping to prevent spurious actuations. Additionally, with respect to Steam Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch the Safety Analysis Limit is not specifically used in the analysis but is utilized to meet diversity requirements. With respect to Steam Flow High, it should be noted that the previous setpoint resulted in a risk of spurious actuations. The new setpoint is more in conformance with the values traditionally utilized in other Westinghouse plants while maintaining appropriate margins. The use of the summation technique described in Section 2 of WCAP-12745 allows for a natural extension of the two column approach. This extension recognizes the calibration/verification techniques used in the., plants and allows for a more flexible approach in determining operability while maintaining acceptable margins of safety. Also of significant. benefit to the plant is the incorporation of some rack drift parameters on a quarterly basis (or more often if necessary). Recognizing that the plant experiences both rack and sensor drift, a different approach to Technical Specification setpoints may be used. This revised methodology accounts for two additional factors seen in the plant during periodic surveillance, l) interactive effects for both sensors and rack and,
- 2) sensor drift effects.
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Attachment 2 Page 3 of 5 Interactive effects will be covered first. When an instrument technician looks for rack drift, more than that is seen if >>as left/as found" data is not used. This interaction has been noted several times and is treated as an arithmetic summation of the rack
- effects, RD, Rack Measurement and Test Equipment Accuracy (RMTE),
Rack Comparator Setting Accuracy (RCSA), and RCA; and the sensor
- effects, Sensor Drift (SD), Sensor Measurement and Test Equipment Accuracy (SMTE) and Sensor Calibration Accuracy (SCA).
To provide a conservative "trigger value," the difference between the STS trip setpoint and the STS allowable value is determined by two methods. The first is simply the values used in the Channel Statistical Allowance (CSA) calculation, Tl = (RCA + RMTE + RCSA + RD) where: T1 = An arithmetic summation of the rack effects The second extracts these values from the calculations and compares the remaining values against the total allowance (TA): T2 = TA ((A + S2)1/2 ~ EA) T2 = Rack trigger value A = (PMA) + (PEA)~ + (SPE)~ + (STE)2 ~ (RTE)2 S = (SCA + SMTE + SD) EA, TA and all other parameters are as defined in WCAP-12745. .The smaller of the trigger values should be used for comparison with the "as measured" (RCA + RMTE + RCSA + RD) value. As long as the "as measured" value is smaller, the channel is within the accuracy allowance. If the "as measured" value exceeds the "trigger value", the actual number should be used in the calculation -described in WCAP-12745. This means that, all the instrument technician has to do during the periodic surveillance is determine the as found value, and verify that it is less than the appropriate thresholds. The same approach is used for the sensor, i.e., the "as measured" value is used for the sensor, i.e., the "as measured" value is used when required. If the approach used was a straight arithmetic
- sum, sensor allowances for drift would also be straight forward, i.e.,
a three column setpoint methodology. However, the use of the Westinghouse methodology requires a somewhat more sophisticated approach. The methodology is based on the use of Equation 4.3 from WCAP-12745.
Attachment 2 Page 4 of 5 TA > (A) + R + S + EA (Eq. 4.3) where: R = the "as measured rack value" (RCA + RMTE + RCSA + RD) S .= the "as measured sensor value" (SCA + SMTE + SD) all other parameters are as defined in WCAP-12745. The equation can be reduced
- further, for use in the Technical Specifications (TS) to:
TA>Z+R+S where: Z = (A) 1/2.+ EA Equation 4.3 would be used in two instances, 1) when the "as measured" rack setpoint value exceeds the rack "trigger value" as defined by the STS Allowable Value,
- and, 2) when determining that the "as measured" sensor value is within acceptable values as utilized in the various Safety Analyses and verified every 18 months.
The significance of the above discussion is that it is possible for the "as found" to exceed the allowable value and still retain channel operability if equation 4.3 is satisfied. Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that, is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation. TA, S, Z, and allowable values are based on plant equipment at the time of submittal. Where the evaluated uncertainties of replacement instrumentation are determined to contribute smaller channel
- errors, such equipment replacement need not require a
change to the Technical Specifications. CONCLUSION. The Westinghouse setpoint methodology, -i.e., square root of the sum of the squares, results in a 954 probability with the confidence level defined by the appropriate combination of the various confidence levels of the input values. With the exception of the
- PMA, EA and RD terms, all uncertainties assumed are at least 2
a values. Calibration accuracies are the extremes of the ranges and are better than 2 o values. Rack drift is assumed based on a survey of reported plant Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and is NRC Generic Letter 89-14, 8/21/89, allows a surveillance interval extension of up to 25 4.
Attachment 2 Page 5 of 5 considered conservative. PMA values are determined or calculated on a conservative basis and are believed to be at least 2 o values. Transmitter
- ambient, steady state values are based on vendor specification data and are. considered 2
o values. Transmitter EA values are based on vendor specification data and are reported by the vendor with a high confidence. The values noted in this
- document, with respect to'treaming, are
- bounding, based on available
- data, and are treated in a
conservative manner. Temperature streaming in the hot and cold legs is under Westinghouse review and no further impact on the trip setpoints is anticipated. Using the above methodology, the plant gains added operational flexibilityand yet remains within the allowances accounted for in the various accident analyses. In addition, the methodology allows for sensor drift and an increased measured rack drift. These two gains should significantly reduce the problems associated with channel drift and thus, decrease the number of instances a channel is determined to be inoperable while allowing plant operation in a safe manner. REFERENCE 1.) WCAP-12745, Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology For Protection
- Systems, Turkey Point Units 3
& 4, Florida Power S Ligh't Company (Proprietary).
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ATTACHMENT 5 WCAP-12746, ~~Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology For Protection Systems Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Florida Power and Light Company~~
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