ML17347B652

Forwards Licensee Response to Questions Discussed During 891017-19 Audit Re Resolution of Station Blackout Issue. Proposed Util Design Will Use Class 1E weather-protected Unit Intertie to Mitigate Effects of Station Blackout

ML17347B652
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	03/29/1990
From:	Harris K FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17347B296	List: ML17347B295 ML17347B652
References
L-90-56, NUDOCS 9004090145
Download: ML17347B652 (129)

Text

,ACCELERATED REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9004090145 DOC.DATE: 90/03/29 NOTARIZED:

NO FACIL:50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HARRIS,K.N.

Florida Power 6 Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

DOCKET 05000250 05000251

SUBJECT:

Forwards licensee response to questions discussed during 891017-19 audit re resolution of station blackout issue.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

A050D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL Q SIZE: $3 7 ~F TITLE: OR Submittal: Station Blackout (USI A-44) 10CFR50.63, MPA A-22 NOTES:$ N~ ~4'4 9 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-2 PD INTERNAL: NRR PD1-4PM TAM NRR/DST/SPLBSDl NUDOCS-ABSTRACT EXTERNAL: LPDR NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

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P.O. Box14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 MAR 2 9 1990 U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:

Document Control Desk Washingtonr D

C 20555 L-90-56 Gentlemen:

Re:

Turkey Point Units 3 and 4

Docket Nos.

50-250 and 50-251 Information to Resolve Station Blackout On July 21, 1988 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) amended its regulation to 10 CFR Part 50 by adding a new section, 10 CFR 50.63.

This new regulation requires the Turkey Point nuclear site to withstand a total loss of all AC power on one unit (unit blackout), following loss of offsite power to the site.

On April 17, 1989 Florida Power

& Light Company (FPL) submitted information in letter L-89-144 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.63.

FPL proposed to mitigate the effects of a unit blackout by implementing criteria provided in attachment C.l, Licensing Basis

Criteria, to the letter.

During October 17-19,

1989, the NRC conducted an audit of FPL's response to resolve this issue.

Nine (9)

NRC questions were addressed by FPL at the audit, one of which was determined to be an industry generic unresolved issue regarding unit electrical interties.

FPL's response to nine NRC specific

>questions discussed during the audit is attached to this letter.

In response to the unresolved

issue, NUMARC representatives met with the NRC staff on November 8,

1989.

During this meeting the NRC staff provided guidance that if followed would resolve the intertie issue.

The proposed FPL design will use a class 1E, safety related, seismically and weather protected unit intertie to mitigate the effects of a unit blackout.

The intertie is capable of supplying emergency power to any safety related bus on the affected unit from any emergency diesel generator bus from the non-affected unit.

This proposed intertie, as described in L-89-144, complies with the NRC guidance and resolves this issue for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.

9004090i45 900329 PDR ADOCK 05000250 p

PDC an FPL Group company

I 1

~ ~

~ 0 L-90-56 Page 2 of 2 FPL requests that the NRC pre-approve the proposed safety grade design changes at the Turkey Point facility pursuant to 10 CFR 50.63.

This request is based on criteria provided in attachment C.l to FPL letter L-89-144.

As demonstrated during the audit, this document meets 10 CFR 50.63 criteria and encompasses guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.155 and NUMARC 87-00.

If there are any questions please contact us.

Very truly yours, K. N. Harris Site ice President Turkey Point Plant Nuclear KNH/RWG/rh Enclosures cc:

Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC (2 copies)

Senior Resident Inspectors USNRCg Turkey Point Plant

Discuss why the plants should not be classified as P3 sites in accordance with NUMARC 87-00 Section 3.2.1 Part 1.A.

FPL Res onse:

FPL's bases for determining the offsite power design characteristic group was analyzed using guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.155.

During the October 17-19 station blackout audit FPL presented, in detail, the results of FPL's analysis to confirm a

P2 characterization from the results obtained using Table 2

through 8 in Regulatory Guide 1.155.

The results of that presentation are provided below:

A)

Table 8 of R.

G.

1.155 "DEFINITION OF EXTREMELY SEVERE WEATHER ESW GROUPS":

In FPL's submittal for Turkey Point (L-89-144),

dated April 17, 1989, the site was characterized as ESW Group 4 (i.e. 3.3 x 10

<e<

1 x 10

).

Hurricane frequency for the Turkey Point nuclear site was studied for the NRC by Sandia National Laboratory (i.e.

NUREG GR-4762/SAND 86-2377) and for FPL by Dames and Moore (Draft 8 4598-144-09).

The mean value of wind speed frequencies for 125 mph as reported by Sandia and Dames and Moore is 6.25xl0 '/yr. and 4.9x10 '/yr. respectively.

Both studies have used data from the U. S. Weather Bureau.

The results define the extremely severe weather proups for the Turkey Point site as ESW Group 4 (i.e.,

3.3x10

<e<1x10 ').

These numbers were determined by linear extrapolation of the data provided to the NRC auditors.

The data is provided in enclosure (1) to this response.

B)

Table 7 of R.

G. 1.155 "DEFINITION OF SEVERE WEATHER RECOVERY SWR GROUP"'ursuant to FPL submittal of April 17, 1989 the Turkey Point site was characterized as SWR Group 1.

FPL reviewed a number of system restoration procedures with NRC auditors during the Oct 17-19 review.

These procedures encompassed the following:

System Restoration Restoration of off-site power to nuclear plants-Turkey Point Restoration of off-site power to nuclear plants-St. Lucie Black start-general FPL's real time analysis for single contingency loss of a transmission line or generator.

In addition, FPL demonstrated the effectiveness of these procedures by review of real system disturbances which occurred on the FPL grid in May 17, 1985 (recovery made in 44 minutes) and August 20, 1989 (recovery made in 20 seconds)

Excerpts from these reports have been provided to the NRC auditors and are provided in Enclosure (1) to this response.

C)

TABLE 6

OF R.G.

1.155 "DEFINITION OF SEVERE WEATHER SW GROUP":

Regulatory Guide 1.155, Revision 1,

changed the frequency numbers for determining Severe Weather (SW) group.

This change necessitated a re-characterization of the SW group for both sites to SW group 1.

This change did not effect the results of FPL's analysis.

Using the R.

G.

1.155 table 6 formula and NUMARC 87-00 data (table 3-3),

Severe Weather (SW) group frequencies, as reported in FPL's April 17, 1989 submittal, have been recalculated to be approximately 2.3x10 'as amended during the audit) for Turkey Point site.

The SW group determination does not impact the classification of the Turkey Point site.

Thus, the validity of the NUMARC 87-00 data was not challenged.

D)

TABLE 5 R.G.

1.155 "DEFINITION OF INDEPENDENCE OF OFFSITE POWER I GROUP" Turkey Point was evaluated as an Il or I2 site.

(see response to NRC question 2).

E)

TABLE 4 R. G. 1. 155 "OFFSITE POWER DESIGN CHARACTERISTIC P

~

~

~

~

GROUP 's Pursuant to FPL's submittal of April 17, 1989 and discussed during the October 17 audit FPL characterized the Turkey Point site as P2.

The basis for the "Offsite Power Design Characteristic Group" for Turkey Point is summarized by depicting the results of FPL's analysis of Regulatory Guide 1.155 tables 8 through 4:

Extremely Severe Weather (ESW)

Group Severe Weather Recovery (SWR)'Group Severe Weather (SW)

Group Independence of Offsite Power Group 4

1 1I 1 or 2

Beginning from Table 4,

P3 Group, the site has experienced a

total loss of offsite power caused by grid failures at a

frequency equal to or greater than once in 20 site years.

However, FPL has demonstrated, by procedures, that the site can recover AC power from reliable alternate (non emergency)

AC power sources within approximately one-half hour following a grid failure.

Thus, a

P3 characterization is possible only with "any combination of" the factors provided in table 4.

Regulatory Guide 1.155, Table 4,

depicts six'6) different site combinations to qualify as P3.

Power Group (I

1 or 2) eliminates the sixth combination for the Turkey Point site.

Power Group (I

1 or 2) and Severe Weather (SW) group (1) eliminates all, but, the second combination for the Turkey Point site.

Power Group (I 1 or 2), Severe Weather (SW) group (1), Severe Weather Recovery (SWR) group (1) and Extremely Severe Weather (ESW) group (4) eliminates all combinations for the Turkey Point nuclear site

~

Turkey Point site does not meet the combinations of P1 in accordance with the procedure in Regulatory Guide 1.155, therefore P2 was selected.

Discuss how the plants meet (will meet) the offsite power system Group II criteria by referring to NUMARC 87-00 page 3

11 or Regulatory Guide 1.155 Table 5, p.12.

FPL RESPONSE:

FPL has concluded that the existing configuration of the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 offsite power sources places Turkey Point into an I1 or I2 category of Regulatory Guide 1.155, Table 5.

An I1 or I2 category does not affect the final categorization of Turkey Point Units 3

and 4.

This determination is based on the following Regulatory Guide criteria:

CRITERIA UNDER I 1

"Alloffsite power sources are connected to the plant through two or more switchyards OR separate incoming transmission

lines, but at least one of the AC sources is electrically independent of the others."

The following design consideration was used to evaluate Turkey Point to the above Regulatory Guidance:

o Turkey Point has eight separate 240KV incoming transmission lines on two different right of ways.

These lines come from five different substations.

o The Turkey Point switchyards have four independent buses; southwest, northwest, southeast and northeast.

Existing breakers provide the required isolation and independence between these buses to electrically separate the incoming lines.

The northwest bus contains the following circuits which are electrically independent from the circuits on the southwest bus:

1-Line t 1 to Davis substation 2-Line I 1 to Flagami substation 3-Line g

2 to Davis substation

The southwest bus contains the following circuits which are electrically'ndependent from the circuits on the northwest bus:

1-2-

3-4 5-Line g

3 to Davis substation Line N

2 to Doral substation Line g

1 to Levee substation Line g

2 to Flagami substation Line to Florida city substation In addition to the Turkey Point switchyard being electrically separated, the design satisfies Regulatory Guide 1.155 table 5

criteria for I (1) by providing separate incoming transmission AC sources which are electrically independent of each other.

CRITERIA UNDER I 2

2.A "After loss of the normal AC power

source, there is an automatic transfer of all safe-shutdown buses to one preferred alternate power source.

If this source fails, there may be one or more manual transfers of power source to the remaining preferred or alternate offsite power sources."

For the Turkey Point design, upon loss of the normal AC source (ie.

main generator and its associated circuit),

two (2) sources of a separate preferred alternate power supply are provided to all safe shutdown buses.

1.

One source is an automatic transfer of all safe shutdown busses of the affected unit to that unit's startup transformer, and 2.

The other source is a

manual transfer of one safe shutdown bus (3A or 4A) of the affected unit to the unaffected unit's startup transformer.

The remaining safe shutdown bus (3B or 4B) can be energized by additional manual breaker actions.

These separate preferred alternate power sources are redundant to each other due to the unique design of the Turkey Point site.

Further, as discussed during the audit, the addition of the safety grade 10 minute intertie will provide an additional method of supplying AC power.

Any one of eight offsite transmission circuits from the Florida Grid provides AC power source for the two separate preferred alternate power sources.

Enclosure (2) to this response provides copies of Section 8.2 of the Turkey Point FSAR and diagrams depicting the above information.

Confirm that the plants'rocedures have been

reviewed, and have been (or will be) modified to meet the station blackout response guidelines per NUMARC 87-00, Section 4.2.1, the AC power restoration guidelines per Section 4.2.2 and the severe weather guidelines of Section 4.2.3.

Identify and discuss any exceptions to the guidelines.

FPL RESPONSE:

Turkey Point currently has procedures to mitigate effects of hurricanes and tornados.

FPL procedures meet or exceed NUMARC 87-00 guidelines.

However, as committed in FPL's station blackout (SBO) submittal of April 17, 1989, site procedures will be modified and revised to:

a) electrically cross-connect units in 10 minutes from the control room to mitigate the effects of a unit blackout and b) commence unit shutdown 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> prior to the projected onset of hurricane force winds at the site.

Procedure modifications will be completed as part of implementing SBO modifications at FPL sites.

Turkey Point's Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 20106 "Natural Emergencies" (enclosure (3) to this response) is currently in use to address hurricanes and tornados.

Prov@de the number of gallons of water required for decay heat removal during the four-hour coping duration and the minimum permissible condensate storage tank level per Technical Specifications. If additional water sources are necessary for decay heat removal, identify these, list the number of gallons provided by each source and identify any plant modifications and/or procedure changes needed to utilize these water sources.

FPL RESPONSE A detailed discussion is presented on condensate storage tank capacity in FSAR section 9.11.3 for Turkey Point.

This FSAR section addresses technical specification permissible volumes and capacities (the minimum allowed volume is 185, 000 gal).

Both units have condensate volumes well in excess of twenty hours.

Turkey Point nuclear units require 52,300 gallons per unit for the first four hours.

Enclosure (4) to this response provides copies of the above FSAR sections for your information.

5)

Confirm that the alternate AC (AAC) source will meet the criteria provided in Section 2.3.1, Appendix B, of NUMARC 87-00.

Identify and discuss any exceptions to these criteria.

In particular, discuss the single failure of 4160V Bus 3D or 4D.

Also discuss single failure of 480V Load Center Bus 3H or 4H, in particular with respect to the battery chargers.

FPL RESPONSE Turkey Point nuclear site will provide a safety grade, class 1E, weather and seismically protected intertie between units.

The intertie will allow each unit to be crossed-connected in 10 minutes from the control room.

No single failure of any emergency bus or emergency diesel or battery in the non-blacked out unit will preclude mitigating the effects of loss of all AC power on the blacked out unit.

The proposed intertie (associated switchgear,

cable, breakers),

as described in FPL letter L-89-144,

dated, April 17, 1989 complies with NRC guidance and resolves this item for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.

The criteria used to address SBO modifications shall conform to safety grade criteria applicable to the unit's current licensed design bases.

As discussed during the NRC

audit, criteria applied to implement this design will meet or exceed the guidelines in Appendix B

NUMARC 87-00.

Enclosure (5) provides a line by line review of NUMARC 87-00, Appendix B criteria, with the FPL proposed modification.

6)

NRC UESTIONS:

Confirm that the QA guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 1.155, Appendix A will be implemented for the AAC facilities.

FPL RESPONSE'uality Assurance (QA) guidance for Station Blackout Modifications will be dictated by 10CFR50 Appendix B

requirements under the current QA program at Turkey Point.

10

Discuss the proposed training program associated with station blackout scenario..

FPL RESPONSE:

FPL's training program for SBO includes:

1.

providing training on current procedures that have been upgraded to reflect system modifications to recovery from a unit blackout, and 2.

implementing Turkey Point' current training program when plant changes are performed to safety systems.

Currently, procedures and training are provided at both sites for mitigating the effects of loss of all AC power on one unit.

The new 10 minute intertie will enhance and facilitate existing recovery actions.

As required by the rule, FPL has committed to demonstrate the capability to intertie the units in 10 minutes.

Enclosure (6) to this response contains Turkey Point's site procedures which are currently in use to address loss of all AC power.

Discuss the features of the proposed EDG reliability program, noting in particular the similarities and differences with respect to Appendix D of NUMARC 87-00.

FPL RESPONSE As presented during the Oct 17-19, 1989 SBO audit, the current FPL EDG reliability program is based on quality improvements achieved from statistical quality control methods.

The basic elements of FPL's program consist of the following:

a) problem identification and Pareto analysis b) root cause analysis to include cause and effect diagrams c) monitoring parameters using statistical quality control techniques, and d) initiating corrective actions and countermeasures to improve EDG performance.

11

FPL is currently following industry and NRC initiatives for resolving B-56 EDG reliability.

Based on our achievements on the Turkey Point Diesel Generator reliability program (Table 1),

we believe that our statistical systems reliability approach provides the required high reliability without the need for accelerated testing.

Following closure of the industry initiative on B-56, we will review the new guidance and, if appropriate, make enhancements to our current program.

Table 1 provides the emergency diesel generator failures for the last 20, 50, and 100 demands as requested by NRC auditors.

TABLE 1 FLORIDA POWER fc LIGHT EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURES TURKEY POINT 20 DEMANDS' 0

B 0 50 DEMANDS' 0

B 1 100 DEMANDS:

A 0 B - 2 12

Verify HVAC capability to ventilate electrical equipment at Turkey Point.

(i.e.

batteries,

chargers, inverters, switchgear and charging pump rooms)

FPL RESPONSE a)

The split a/c unit for the control building annex is included as a load in the SBO evaluation.

This unit will provide heat removal from batteries, battery chargers and inverters.

b)

The current load center and switchgear rooms (LC-SWGR) air conditioning syst: em is being enhanced as part of the Emergency Power System (EPS) upgrade.

As part of the design

process, adequate ventilation during station blackout will be verified.

The design will allow for the re-energizing of the air conditioning units upon restoration of power to the applicable busses following a station blackout event.

c)

The current plant design allows for manually re-energizing auxiliary building fans upon restoration of power.

Heat-up from the charging pump rooms or any electrical equipment in the auxiliary buildings, from a unit blackout, will be avoided by loading these fans on the EDG's after power is restored to the emergency buses.

13

ENCLOSURE 1

FOR FPL RESPONSE TO NRC QUEST1ON (1)

NUREG/CR-4762 SAND86-2377 Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Analysis of a Westin house 3-Loop Pressurized ater Reactor Case Study epared by G. A. Sanders, D. M. Ericson, Jr., W. R. Cramond Sandia National Laboratories Prepared for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Wind Hazard:

Turkey Point. is located near the south end of pyorida on the Atlantic side of the Peninsula.

The site is located in Region I of the USNRC tornado risk regionalization scheme given in WASH-1300.

This is the region which has the gighest hazard of the three USNRC regions.

The mean values of wind speed frequencies are as follows:

Tornado Strai ht Mind Mind Speed

~mich 66 93 134 165 182 239 290 349 Mean Value 1.70E-4 9.37E-5 3.31E-5 1.598-5 6.65E-6 1.24E-6 2.03E-7 2.50E-8 Mind Speed

~mich 80 90ill 120 128 138 150 160 165 174 197 207 230 240 Mean Va lue

2. 188-1

1. 01E-l 2.00E-2 1.00E-2 5.008-3 2.00E-3 1.00E-3 5.528-4 2.65E-4 2.06E-4 1.00E-4 2.008-5 1.00E-5 2.00E-6 1.00E-6

DRAFT UPDATED REPORT PROBABILISTIC HURRICANE ANALYSES METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT ST.

LUCIE AND TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS FOR FLORIDA POWER a'IGHT COMPANY JANUARY 1989 calYleS OOFB A PROFESSIONAL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Job No. 4598-144-09 Atlanta, Georgia

TABLE 1 SUHHARY OF HURRICANE WIND SPEEDS AND ASSOCIATED RETURN PERI(OS FOR TURKEY POINT AN) ST-LUCIE AS CALCULATED BY VARIOUS HETHOOS National Hurricane Center/Neuaann Tr ical C

lones )33 knots Weibull National Bureau of Stand ard s Federal Emergency University of Hansgment Agency/

Western Ontario Dmes 6 Noore Return Period

( ears)

Turkey Point St. Lucie Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Point St. Lucis Point St. Lucia Point St. Lucia Point St. Lucis 100 200 300 400 500 800 1,000 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 20,000 40,000 80,000 100,000 1,000,000 94 110 117 122 126 133 136 144 149 152 153 153 155 156 157 157 157 91 103 111 116 120 127 130 140 147 150 151 153 154 156 157 157 157 73 70 78 75 80 77 82 78 83 80 85 82 86 83 89 '6 92 89 93 90 94 91 95 92 97 95 100 97 102 99 102 99 108 105 80 103 100 119 130 157 115 129 '

156 163 87 117.

144 152 79 89 144 153 O

Wind speeds in knots representing 10-meter, 10-minute values.

All wind speeds iralude the translational wind speeds.

GRID CAPABILITY RELATED TO SBO

~ DESCRIPTION OF FPL'S TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

~ FPL PROCEDURES

~ ACTIONS TO INSURE OFFSITE POWER SECURITY ANAIYSIS 5/'17/85 SOUTH FLORIDA BLACKOUT 8r'20/89 SEPERATION FROM INTERCONNECTION

~

SUMMARY

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System Opetatiaa JUL 29 ]988 System Reetaatim To provide guideHnes for system restoration from a blaelceut where a portion of the power system is stQl connected to the interconnected system.

Haekazt - A condition where a ma)or portion, perhaps all, of an electrical utQity system is d~ergized with much of the system tied together through closed breaker.

Step by step ladder ac~ence - A controlled sectionaHzing of the transmission grid and a sequential reenergization of the bulk stations starting from the energized system and moving through the blackout area.

Surge hny6dance loading - The mW loading required to eHminate the capacitance effect off the line (on a Hne with no t~M load the mW loading where VARS in = VARS Out).

QeneralInstraetiam 1.

Inform the Division Load Dispatchers of blackout and instruct them not to ches any Hnes until the boundaries of the blackout area have been determined.

2.

Decide on a plan of restoration bearing in mind the foQowing ma r

~o b.

fgfP

~f~

e.

(0 pIP d.

Maintain offWte power to the nuclear plants if at all possible. If the nuclear plants have lost off-site power, restore it as quickly as possible.

A restoration of 10 minutes or less is considered a prompt recovery.

~~

Restore start~ power to all available generating units.

Units stQ1 running, but carrying only their own auxQiary load, can be tesynchronized as soon as the plant has stabQized and is ready.

In restoring start~

power to a unit in a black out condition (unit did not stay on it's own auxiHary trans-former), the restoration must be done in such a way that the plant auxiHary buses are not energized without plant operating personnel assuring that no equipment is unduly connected to the auxiliary bus.

PaQure to do this may result in equipment damage.

OQ fQled transmission pipe cables can be re-energized at once if they have not gone over 30 minutes without the pumps running or'without being energized.

Page 1 of 5

e 5USJKCT atua OpetatioM Restoratioa ot Off-Qte Power to Nuclear Plants aava 4 8 81 System Restoration 1M01 To provide instructions for restoring otf site power to Nuclear Plants when all off site power has been interrupted.

The highest priority is assigned to minimize the time that any Nuclear Plant is without adequate off site power.

A prompt recovery (10 minutes or less) is a desirable goal.

Restoration of Off-Site Power 1.

Prepare the Nuclear Plant for restoration of.off site power without back feeding out of the plant.

2.

Determine the most available energized bus.

3.

Clear the necessary circuits between the energized bus and the Nuclear Plant.

4.

As mach as passible the switching for ale~inK is to be carried on concurrently.

5.

Once there is an energized bus at the Nuclear Plant verify that the voltage is witMn emergency Hmits before energizing the start up transformer.

B.

As soon as possible provide at least two feeds to the start up transformer.

Page 1 of 1

'""MN 31 t989 18801 2 Rastoratioa of OffSite Palm to Nmher Plants - Turkey~t Plant Systea Retocathn To provide guidelines for restoring off site power to Turkey Point Plant.

p~ED

~GSO~

Pour general plans are developed using each of the three 240kV Uncs and the 500kV line feeding into Dade County from the North, plus three of the 240kV lines feeding into Turkey Point Plant, with back feed of the Turkey Point-Flagami ¹1 240kV circuit.

Restock Power to Turkey Point-Gaural 20 3.

pO P

peal 4f )0 which gg~l~off site power to Turkey Po t

t. The most e y are:

- Levee 500kV

- Port. Everglades 230k V

- Lauderdale 230kV If these beses are de-energized, determine the available ener-gized busses that are further north and determine the plan to follow to en one of the above busses from the intercon-nected system Promote 01880D) and notify the appropriate Division Dispatcher.

As soon as the minimum necessary clearing switching has been complet~ give instructions to the Division Dispatcher to energize circuits to restore off site power.

If energized busses are not readily available, order Black Start-Laxhae',iale Gas TLrhfnes QO W~hre 016810.1) and Black Start - Pact Eeecgiahs Oes Ttabine (80 Paaedure 016610.2).

Shen using Black Start to provide off site power it is desirable to have m

es on Hne before starting to energize 2 OkV circuits into Dade County.

I off er to Point Plant eference is to the te onnec s

otherw the busses are to be consider the o ow ng order:

- Port Everglades North 230kV

- Lauderdale East 230kV, '

Andytown South 500kV

's soon as the minimum necessary clearing switching has been complet~ give instructions to energize circuits to restore off site power to Turkey Point Plant.

Page 1 of 11

5UOJCCT Syatesn OpaatiaMs Restoratioa ot OffSite Power-

'St Lucio Plant oara ~ 3 $ t989 SCCTION Syetesn Restoration 1B801.1 To provide guidelines to restore off site power to St. Lucie Plant.

Restoring Off-8Ite Power to St Lucie-General System Operator 1.

Determine the available energized busses which could supply off site power. The most likelyare:

- Midway 230kV

- Poinsett 230kV

- Corbett 230kV 2.

Determine the appropriate plan to follow and notify the Eastern Division DIspatcher and if appropriate the Northern Division Dispatcher.

If necessary more than one plan can be in operation at the same time.

3.

As soon as the minimum necessary switching for clearing has been completed give the instructions to energize circuits to restore off site power to St. Lucie Plant.

Eastern Division Dispatcher 4.

Upon receipt of Instructions from the System Operator or without Instructions if it Is known that all off site power has been lost at St. Lucie Plant and Midway, prepare St. Lucie Plant for restoring off site power without back feeding out of the plant.

ht St. Lucie Plant (Station 403) open all 230kV breakers.

Oyea cr cheek to be oyea the followingbreakers:

SW28 Unit No. 1 SW30 SW33 LIne No. 1 SW23 Start up lh 4 2h SW40 SW43 Line No. 2 SW49 Unit No.

2'W52 SWSS Line No. 3 SW51 tart up 1B Bc 2B SWB4 SWBV Hutchinson island Mid Breaker Ds~<<1 <<t 0

+4

SLJ SJECT SysteIN Operatioca oATK J UL 3 0 l982 SANCTION Syatem Reatoratha 16610 e.

To provide guidelines for re-energizing portions of the area of blackout from plants which have "Black Start" capability.

General Considerations Energize transmission circuits with few substations to minimize load pick up, Pick up radial load areas while maintaining the ability to synchro-nize the "generator area" to energized high voltage transmission system across a breaker at the generation plant.

Do not try to maintain a close tolerance on 60 Hz operation.

Operation between 59.0 and 61.0 Hz should be satisfactory.

In reenergizing portions of the blacked out system from isolated generation try to limit the frequency dip to a maximum of 0.2Hz on each step of load pick up (a step load pick up of approximately 6.5% of generation capacity of units on line in the isolated area).

When possible, tie generation areas together to increase the amount of generation available to pick up load and thus minimize frequency variations.

Procedures

~0 Lauderdale Gas Turbines Procedure ¹16610.1 Port Everglades Gas Turbines Procedure ¹16610.2.

Page 1 of 1

SECURITY ANALYSIS PURPOSE:

TO EVALUATE FPL'S TRANSMISSION SYSTEM FOR THE SINGLE CONTINGENCY LOSS OF A TRANSMISSION LINE OR GENERATOR IDENTIFIES OVERLOAD CONDITIONS

~

GUIDES THE OPERATOR IN RELIEVING OVERLOAD CONDITIONS 0

USED TO SIMULATE HYPOTHETICAL CONDITIONS TO EVALUATE FUTURE GRANTING OF CLEARANCES TIME FRAME: RUNS EVERY 15 MINUTES

ON SYSTEM DISTURBANCE MAY1l, 198f POSER SUPPLY TECHNICALSERVICES FLORIDAPO%ER dc LIGHTCOMPANY 3UNQ 198f p p c

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On Friday, May 17, 1985, at approximately IIA7AMan area extending from South of West Palm Beach to Florida City along the east coast experienced a power outage.

A fire raging out of control in the transmission corridor North of Andytown substation took out of service the three 500kV transmission lines feeding power into the South Florida area.

The remaining transmission into the area was disconnected South of Ranch substation by protective relays. Available generation, unable to supply the load in the are@ was removed from service by its protective equipment.

The Northern and Western areas of the FPL system were not affected.

With the realization that a blackout condition existed, the Sys'em Operators began preparing for restoration.

A connection between the energized system to the North and the affected area was established through the Lauderdale switchyar*

Off-site wer was then made available to the Turke Point sit a

r in to desi nated restoration uidelines.

This rocess took a

roximatei for -four minutes.

uring this same time, a systematic process of restoring power to other plants in the affected are@

Port Everglades and Lauderdale, was undertaken.

Customer restoration proceeded as rapidly as possible.

With the 500kV lines still out of service, due to the fire, load pickup was limited by the thermal capability of the underlying transmission system and available gas turbine generation in the affected area.

The two Andytown-Martin 500kV lines were reenergized at 2:56PM after the fire had died out and customer restoration proceeded rapidly from that point. By 3!20PM the system load had reached its pre-disturbance value of approximately 8000MW with only isolated customers still to be restored.

There was no identified equipment damage resulting from this incident.

RESTORATION OF SERVICE With the realization that a blackout condition existed, the System Operators began preparing for service restoration.

Thc process, as detailed in Appendix F, can be divided into three parts: A - Restoration of start-up power to thc power plants in the affected area; B - Restoration of the bulk transmission system; C - Restoration of the load-serving lines.

A.- Restoration of Start-u Power to the Plants Priori was laced on rcstorin thc off-site wer to Turkc Point Plant.

To accomplish this, a connmtion between the energized system to thc North was established through thc Lauderdale switchyard.

Next, thc Port Everglades bus was energized, followed by the Flagami bus.

The Turkc Point bus was ener ized at

~:

Fla ami-T P i o th start-u transformer was dela ed for, 75 minutes b

an ino rable mid-breaker.

At a

roximatcl 12:31:27 off-site wer was restored to Turke Point Unit No. 0 rt-u transformer about for -four minutes after initiation of the blackout condition.

Simultaneously, start-up power was being restored to Port Everglades and Lauderdale plants.

Thc Lauderdale Gas Turbine Site No. 2 was energized at 12>01~50.

Port Everglades Gas Turbine Site was energized at 12!00:58.

Port Everglades Start-up transformer was energized at 12:06:36.

Lauderdale Gas Turbine Site No.

1 was energized at 12<17>07 and thc Start-up transformer was energized at 12>20!35.

Start-up power to Units %o.

1 and No. 2 at Turkey Point was restored at 1202AO.

Start-up power to Unit No. 3, down for refueling, was restored at 1303i28.

Page 5

F QRIOA POWER L I.IGHTCOMPANY INTEROFFICE CORRESPONOENCE To:

Division Transmission Supervisors FRQM:

We He Cole OPERhTIONS MEMORhNDVMS TRhNSMISSION OPERhTING P ROC EDVRES 2.1.3h FLORIOA PQV(ER 8 LIGHT CQ.

STATISTiCAL SERVICE TDO - General Officy OATE:

July 18, 198B sU~<cT: PIRES NKOLTRANSMISSION RIGHTMP-MAYS coPI$5To. J. W. Hart A J. Olivera T. Urspruch~

Division TED Managers As we discussed at our recent Transmission Supervisors

Meeting, the recording of information relative to fires near our Transmission Rfghtmf-Ways is quite important and especially so for our 500 kV Cfrcufts.

The following eonsideratins are offered for a Guideline should the occassion arise of a fire near our Transmission Rtghtmf-Ways:

L Foremost in our planning should be a proper response when notified of a fire on or near our Transmission Right-of-Nays.

IL The first employee on the scene should make a rapfd assessment of the possible degree of jeapordy to the Transmission Ciruft(s).

a)

The Division Dispatcher needs to know immediately ifthe circuit is fn danger and ffnot in immediate danger, an estimation of future concern.

How long?

Be sure to report Line Name, Structure 0 and Location of fire with respect to circuits f.e. E, W, N, g etc.

b) To determine how long, several important facts are required:

1) is fire moving toward Right-of-Way or along Rfght~f-Way?

2)

What is between Ffre and Right-of-Way?

What type vegetation?

Willit burn fast or slow?

3)

Are there any canals, roads or other obstructions between Fire and Rfghtwf-Way?

4)

Make an estimate of time fire might reach Right-of-Way, c) Is there a possfbflfty of the Right-of-Way itself burning?

d)

SHould additional help be required? If so, request that appropriate crews be sent to scene.

e)

Stay near vehicle or at least kee in communication with the Division Dispatcher.

IIL Remain on the scene until released b

the Division Dis atcher

,PEOPLE

~.. SERVING PEOPLE Sorrn 1000 IStocxeaI Rev.

~ DlS'

SYSTEM OPERATIONS XEXORANDU~

TRANSMIBSIOW OPELhTING PROCEDURES 2.1.4C INTERFFICE CORQESPONOENCK To:

FROM:

Memo Book Holders C. M. Mennes sualscT:

ST. LUCIB/MIDDY TRhNSWISSION ChPhCITY LocATloN:

PSO/LFO oATa July 5, 1988 COFISS To:

I Vtth t~o St. Lucie Units on line and total plant output in excess of 1000M V.

A.

Two St. Lucia/Midway circuits in tervice Notify the plant personnel that the transmission ts in a state of alert.

The plant ts to be advised of the requirements of havtng only one line.

B.

One St. Lucia/Midway circuit in service I. Vest Palm Beach temperature ts 804F or higher.

Reduce plant output below 1000MV within 4 minutes.

(Thts

~ma require tripping one unit off line) 2.

Vest Palm Beach temperature is below 804F.

Reduce plant output below 1100MV within 8 minutes.

(This

~ma require tripptng one untc off line)

II Vith one St. Lucte Unit on line:

h.

Two St. Lucte/Midway circuits in service Nottfy plant personnel that there is one line out of service.

B.

One St. Lucio/Midway circuit in service Notify plant personnel that the transmtssion ts in a state of alert.

There ts sufftctent transmission capacity co get the power out of the plant.

The plant personnel willhave to decide tf chis line provides adequate off stte power to keep the one unit on line.

cL C. M. Mennes CMM:be an FPL Grouo comoanv

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I

Disturbance Report Separation and Electrical Islanding of Peninsular Florida August 20, 1989 Prepared by Power Supply Technical Services

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Florida separated from Georgi'h. Following the separation, underfrequency load shedding took place.

Approximately 970 MW wore she within the isolated area, including 1,576 MW in FPL's service territory. At the time of the disturbance, FPL load and generation were 10,421 and 7,243 MN respectively.

Net interchange was

-3,725 MW including Seminole load replacement schedule.

Southern Co. imports were 3,136 MW into the state.

The sequence of events leading to the separation started with the failure of Georgia Power (GAP) switch No. 766, utilized to connect shunt reactors to the Duval-Hatch 500 kV line, at Hatch Plant (GAP), Figure 1.

A phase to phase (A-B) fault occurred after the switch was opened.

As a result of the

fault, the Duval-Hatch 500kV line

tripped, followed by an incorrect trip of the Duval-Thalman 500kV terminal at

Duval, which reclosed 27 cycles later.

By then the Kingsland end of the Duval-Kingsland 230kV line had sensed an out-of-step condition and tripped at Kingsland.

Approximately 62 cycles after the Duval-Thalman 500kV line tripped-reclosed at Duval, the line tripped at Thalman on zone 2 of the backup distance relay.

Subsequent to this action protective relay action at Columbia and Ft. White isolated peninsular Florida.

The cause of the relay misoperation on the Duval-Thalman 500kV line at Duval. is under investigation.

Following the separation, the frequency dropped to 59.37 Hz, initiating underfrequency load shedding throughout the islanded area.

The following load shedding was reported by FPL and other utilities.

FPL FMP FPC GVL HST JEA KXS LAK LWV OUC SEB SEC STC STK TEC VER oss 1576 MR 119 MW 500 MR 28 MW 7

MW 275 MW 7

MW 30 MW 7

MW 60 MW 5

MW 79 MW 9

MW 2

MW 260 MW 2970 MW

ro PPL did experience soIIe high voltages, on the order of 10 but automatic controllers switched reactive devices to maintain the voltage.

Approximately 746 HVAR of reactive compensation was obtained from static var sources, both transaission and distribution and 1330 from synchronous sources (generators),

a total of 2076 MVAR.

Approximately twenty (20) seconds after the fault, Ft.

ophite reclosed, re-connecting peninsular Florida.

At around 4:14 p.m.,

Georgia Power closed the Duval 500kV line at Thalman.

FPL then instructed other utilities to proceed with the restoration of customer load.

Combustion turbines were dispatched and FPL proceeded with load restoration (4:21 p.m.). All load was restored by 5:17 p.m.

At 7:51 p.m., the Duval-Hatch

'500kV line was returned to service.

ENCLOSURE 2

FOR FPL RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTION (2)

8.2 ELECTRIChL SYSTEM DESIGN The cain generators are rated a

894 anra at 0.85 pover factor, 3

I

phase, 60 Hs, and generate pover at 22 kV.

Each ie connected to ite step up transforier through an isolated phase bus rated at 24,000 aape.

The asia geaerator step up transformer ie rated at 258/850 Iva, 50/65C POh. It transforms the voltage to 240 kV and is connected to the 240 kV svitchyard. through a

590 foot long transmission line on steel tovere vith 2 z 1691 MCM hhhC cables per phase.

The existing east aad vest 240 kV svitchyard buses are eztended through four aev bays to accommodate the additional circuit breakers and isolating svitchee arranged in a breaker aad a half configuratioa.

Even vhea both nuclear Unite 3

aad 4

are inoperative, pover vill be available at the 240 kV svitchyard froe Turkey Point Uaits 1

and 2 oi from one of the 240 kV circuits.

The svitchyard vill be conected to Plorida Pover and Light Company's traasaiesion netvork through eight 240 kV circuits vith a capacity of 540 Iva each, as ehova in Pig. 8.2-1.

Seven of the eight 240 kV circuits out of Turkey Point are on a

coemon right of vay that follove a route roughly northwest in direction froe the site.

These 240 kV circuits are carried on four traneaieeion liae structuree each consisting of tvo concrete poles with steel cross arms.

Three of the etructuree carry tvo outgoing 240 kV circuits each, and the fourth carries a single 240 kV circuit.

The structures are designed to carry tvo 240 kV circuits aad to vithstand hurricane vinds.up to 182 MPH.

They

~ have successfully vithstood vithout aay daaage the severe hurricane Betsy in 1965.

8.2-1 Rev 5 7/87

117 138 32 PORT EVERGLADES 8 1.

KENO:

82.

PERR 83.

PRIN'84.

HOME'5.SUNk' 86.

CORAV 87.

ROHAN LY C ARTr'R AVIE 91.

PERRY 92.

COUNTRY CLUB 93.

ULETA 94.

DOUGLAS 95.

ROSELAWN 96.

IVES 97.

RED ROAD 98.

GOULDS 99.

RAVENSWOOD 100.

MERCHANDISE 101.

NORTON 102.

HILLSBORO 103.

PALMAIRE 104.

WOODI ANDS 105.

CRYSTAL 106.

LEMON CITY 107.

OAOELANO i08.

KILLIAN 109.

VILLAGE GREEN 110.

RESERVATION MIAMI LAKES 112.

WESTON VILLAGE 113.

MALLARD 114.

MOTOROLA 115.

MOFFETT 116.

OUMFOUNDLING 117.

IMAGINATION 118.

HIGHLANDS 119.

WHISPERING PINES 120.

BOULEVARD AVENTURA ILAM

. INDGREN 12+.

BRANDON 125.

SEMINOLA 126.

OLYMPIA HE IGHTS 127.

GERMANTOWN 128.

SNAKE CREEK 129 'NAPPER CREEK 130.

TAMIAMI

? 31.

MAULE 132.

SANDALFOOT 133.

F ASHION 134.

MITCHELL 135.

BIRD 136.

ACME, 137.

VA. KEY 138.

STONEBR IDGE 139.

COURT 140.

SWEETWATER 141.

JACARANDA 142.

LAKEVIEW 143.

FOUNTAIN t44.

RESOURCE

RECOVERY, DADE COUNTY 145.

SAGA 146.

TIMBERLAKE 147.

SOUTHSIDE 148.

REMSBURG 149.

COPANS 150.

OSBORNE 151.

S IMP SON 131 2 Circu'its 140 76 123 3 CirCuits 2 Circuits 79 Ties with HST~

KEYS ELECTRIC CO-OP 90 2 circuits LAUOANIA LAUDERDALE To Andytown 99 38 115 41 36 110 40 37 BROWARD CO.

I 128 44 47 121 116 96 118 112 45 DADE CO.

GREYNOLOS RCH CREEK 0

NORMANDY BEACH 124 93 46 51 111 97 53 GRAT IONY 120 106 OEAUVILLE INDIAN CREEK 40 TH STREET RONEY g 144 GAPE OORAL 95 125 58 57 MARKET 60 63 66 HIALEAH AIRPORT 68 F

49 65 100 LITTLE RIVER 1IAMI BEACH MIAMI 67 130 151 69 70 71 126 109 2 Circuits 94 135 COCONUT GROVE 137 75 74 108 139 78 RIVERSIDE 107 81 129 85 134 86 CUTLER 82 98 119 145 7 Circuits 84 LUCY (HST)

TURKEY POINT SUBSTATION AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM MIAMI-PALMBEACH AREA SCALE IN MILES January 1,

1989 10

TO FLORIDA CITY SOUTHWEST TO DORAL LINE g2 TO TO LEVEE DAVIS LINE $ 1 LINE g3 TO RAGAMI LINE g2 TO DAVIS LINE g2 TO FLAGAMI LINE g1 NORTHWEST TO DAVIS LINE $ 1 SOUTHEAST NORTHEAST UNIT 4 4C XFMR UNIT 4 MAIN XFMR UNIT 4 UNIT 3 STARTUP MAIN XFMR XFMR UNIT 3 UNIT 3 UNIT 2 UNITS 18c2 STARTUP 3C i

MAIN STARTUP XFMR XFMR XFMR XFMR NUCLEAR FOSSIL UNIT 1

MAIN XFMR TURKEY POINT 240KV SWITCHYARD JPNAQ 150

URK N

8c 4 SOURCES OF OFFSITE AND EMERGENCY A.C.

POWER UNIT 4 MAIN TRANSFORMER UNIT 3 MAIN TRANSFORMER UNIT 4

'4C TRANSFORMER UNIT 4 AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER UNIT 4 UNIT 4 UNIT 3 START-UP START-UP TRANSFORMER TRANSFORMER UNIT '3 UNIT 3 AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER UNIT 3 3C TRANSFORMER TO 3C 4160V BUS TO 4C 4160V BUS 4C 4160V BUS 3C 4160V BUS I

I I

14B 4160V BUS I

I I

I IL D

4B 4A 4160V BUS 4D 4160V BUS 4A D

D 3A 3A 4160V BUS 30 4160V BUS D

3B 3B 4160V BUS I

I I

I I

l(1)

I I

I I

(1)

NOT REQUIRED FOR SBO BIACKSTART CRANKING DIESEL GENERATORS (1)

JPNA9151

ENCLOSURE 3

FOR FPL RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTION (3)

1.0 Titie

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 ANO 4 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 20106 Ma 25 1989 r

NATURAL EMERGENCIES 2.0 A

royal and List of Effective Pa es:

2.1 A~revel:

Change dat Approved b

Approved b

5 25 89 Reviewed by PNSC Plant Mgr-N,

~enior Vice Pres-N 89-219 19~+

Periodic Review:

~Pa e

Date 1

05/25/89 2

03/24/89 3

10/15/88 4

05/25/89 5

10/15/88

~389

~Pa e'ate 6

10/15/88 7

05/25/89 8

12/06/88 9

12/06/88 10 10/15/88 Pacae 11 12 13 14 15 Date

~Pa e

10/15/88 16 10/15/88 17 10/15/88 18 12/06/88 10/15/88 Date 10/15/88 05/25/89 05/25/89 3.0 S~co e:

3.1

~Pur ose:

This procedure provides instructions for preparing the plant fo1 lowing activation of the Emergency Plan for a natural emergency.

3.2 Discussion

3.2. 1 The natural emergencies considered in this procedure are those associated with weather disturbances such as hurricanes or tornadoes.

The geographical location of the area is such that the occurrence of other types of natural emergencies is highly

'faprobable.

However, flooding of the low lying areas surrounding th'e plant site could occur due to the torrential rains and flood tides that accompany a hurricane.

3.2.2 Warnings of impending natural emergencies are issued by the U.

S.

Government National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

(National Weather Service) based on various weather surveillance means such as

radar, satellite photographs and meteorological reporting stations.

These warnings provide adequate information of the approach of most natural emergency conditions.

RTSs 2037, 86-488P, 88-1614, 88-2709P, 89-1028, 89-2126 PC/M 89-124 Th<s proc'edure may be a~ect by an 0 T,S.C (On The

.5pot Change) verify /r <o~dtton pnorto use 13ateueniied Initials OTSC 6497

• /em/sw/m9

EMERGEHCY PLAN IMPLEMEHTIHG PROCEDURE 20106, PAGE 2 NATURAL EMERGENCIES 3/24/PX-3.2.3 The warnings issued by NOAA (National Weather Service) are received at the FPL System Operations Power Coordinator's Office on the Weather teletype network.

J The information received at the FPL System Operations Power Coordinator 's Office is then relayed to the Turkey Point

Plant, Units 3

and 4 Control Room through one of the various normal or emergency communication channels described in EPIP-20112, c

3.3 A~uthorit:

Turkey Point Plant Emergency Plans

3.4 Definitions

The following terms, as used by NOAA, are used throughout th1s procedure:

3.4.1 TORNADO WATCH:

Meteorological condit1ons in the area described as favorable to the formation of tornadoes.

3.4.2 TORNADO WARNING:

This condition is declared once the surveillance means have shown that a tornado-has been sighted.

The area for which this warning is issued is usually smaller than that for which a watch is declared.

3.4.3 TROPICAL STORM:

A weather disturbance of large size with winds of 39 to 73 mph, rotating in a counterclockwise direction; accompanied by torrential rains and an area of low barometric pressure.

3.4.4 HURRICANE

Same as a trop1cal storm, but the winds are over 73 mph and a well defined low barometric pressure

center, called the EYE of the storm, is present.

3.4. 5 3.4. 6 3.4.7 EYE:

The center oF a hurricane where calm prevails, with winds of no more than 2Q - 30 mph and 11ttle or no rain.

\\

HURRICANE ADVISORY:

This is an informat1on release put out every six. hours, usually at 12 o'lock and 6 o'lock both day and n1ght whenever-a hurricane exists; the advisory 1s continually updated

'Sakthis informat1on 1s 1ssued in the form of HURRICANE BULLETINS wMch are issued every 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, day and n1ght.

HURRICANE WATCH:

This 1s a

cotmttunication from

NOAA, issued whenever a

hurr1cane is between 24 and 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />

from, and approaching, the U.S. coast and comprises an area approximately 100 m1les either s1de of the expected place where it could come inland.

It also gives the

size, max1mum

winds, d1rection and speed of travel.

NOTE:

Appendix B

should be consulted for instructions to be performed during a Hurricane Watch.

• /em/dtsrrr/

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 20106, PAGE 3

NATURAL EMERGENCIES 10/l5/88s-3.4.8 HURRICANE WARNING:

Thi s is a

communication from

NOAA, fssu~

w enever a

urr cane is between 12 and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

from, ar approaching, the U.

S.

coast and comprises an area approximately t

miles either side of the expected place where the hurrfcane wil strike the coastal areas.

The sfze of the area comprfsed by tt warnfng wfll be determfned by the area over whfch hurricane fort:

winds can be expected.

This warning also gfves the expected time ar location where the hurrfcane will strike the coast, as well as tt

size, maximum winds, df rectfon and speed of travels The warning ma also describe the coastal areas where hfgh water, floods or hfc waves may be expected.

3.4e9 TROPICAL STORM WARNING:

This fs a

conxnunfcatfon from NOAA fssue w enever a

rop~ca s orm is 12 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

from, and approchfng th U.S. coast.

NOTE:

Appendix C should be consulted for activities to be performs during a Tropical Storm Warning.

4.0 Precautions

4.1 All unnecessary personnel fn the Protected Area and all vfsftors fn th Owner Controlled Area shall be required to leave when a hurricane warnfng i issued for the area.

Flooding of the low-lying portfons of the area, fro heavy rains and high tides may make later evacuation impossible.

4 4.2 If a

hurricane passes directly over the plant

area, do not assume th hurrfcane has passed when the winds subside and rain stops.

This only mean.

that the EYE of the hur rfcane is over the area, and in approxfmately I hou, the wfnds will begin blowing again from the opposfte dfrection as the seconE half of the hurricane goes over the area.

4.3 When the hurricane is near the area and high winds are occurrfng, or i ther.

is sfgnfffcant likelihood that a tornado wfll strfke the fmmedfati plant site keep all activities outsfde of the plant buildfngs to a minimum.

4.4 Do not assume the emergency to be over until the recefpt of offfcfal wore from NOAA through the System Operatfons Power Coordfnator that there fs n<

longer a threat to the area.

5. ~Nffft 5.1 It. sSNH be the responsfbflfty of the, Plant Manager - Nuclear, Mafntenancs Superi ntendent

Nuclear, Operatf ons Suqerf ntendent

- Nuclear, to comply with the steps outlined in Section 8 of this procedure to protect the plant and personnel from the effects of the;emergency.

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEOURE 20106, PAGE 4

NATURAL EMERGENCIES 5/25'/8%

6.0 References Commitment Oocuments:

~

~6. 1

References:

6.1.1 Turkey Point Plant Radiological Emergency Plan 6.1.2 Turkey Po1nt Plant, Units 1 and 2 Hurricane Plans 6.1.3 National Ocean1c and Atmospheric Adm1nistration Informat1on information on area tornado and hurricane reports 6.1.4 FSAR, Section 2, and Figures 1.2-3 and 1.2-4 6.1.6 J

P1ant Procedures 1.

EPIP-20101, Outies of Emergency Coordinator 2.

O-OSP-102.1, Flood Protection Stoplog Inspection 3.

O-OSP-104.1, Record of Meteorological Forecasts 6.1.6 JPN-PTN-SECJ-88-079, Safety Evaluation Temporary External Flood Protection Barriers a

6.1.7 PC/M 87-212, EOG Enhancement Site Preparat1on 6.1.8 PC/M 89-124, Repair /Replace Stoplogs On East Side of Auxfl 1 ary Bufldfng 6.1.9 5610-C-1695, Network of Barriers for Ma1n Plant External Flood 6.2 Commitment Oocuments:

6.2.1

. None 7.0 Records and Notfffcat1ons:

7.1 The Plant Supervisor - Nuclear shall perform notiffcat1ons per EPIP-20101.

7.2 Plant Sbyerirfsors shall notify personnel as deemed necessary in Section 8

of thfs..,procedure.

• /em/6W/ma

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 20106g PAGE 5

NATURAL EMERGENCIES 10/15/88

8.0 Instructions

NOTE:

Plant conditions that are altered in preparation for a

natural emergency may be restored to their normal confi guraton in accordance with applicable plant procedures upon dfscontfnuatfon of the emergency condition.

CAUTION:

Personnel actions should not be performed outside p'lant buildings until the tornado has left the site 8.1 When information is received that:

A tornado has been sighted inside the Owner Controlled Area:

or A tornado has strfcken any plant structures The following personnel, when contacted, shall be responsible for listed actions below:

8.1.1 The Plant Supervisor Nuclear shall consult EPIP-20101 for direction.

8.1.2 Maintenance Suprintendent - Nuclear, or designee shall:

I.

Survey plant sfte area and dfrect clean up or tfe down operations as deemed necessary.

8.1e3 Securfty Shift Supervisor shall:

1.

Notify all visitors fn the Owner Controlled Area to vacate the site boundary.

8. Ia4 Auxiliary Equipment Operator shall:

1.

Clean the intake trash barrier 2.

Start intake travelfng screens

'":. NOTE:

Appendix B shall be consulted for actfvftfes to be performed during a

Hurr fcane Watch or when'ther severe weather dl I liOTE:

Appendix C should be consulted for activities to be performed during a Tropical Storm'.Unruing.

8.2 When information fs received that a Hurricane Warnfng has been issued for the area occupied by the plant, the following personnel, when contacted, shall be responsible for listed actions below:

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 20106, PAGE 6 NATURAL EMERGENCIES 10/15/88 8.2.1.

The Plant Supervisor - Nuclear or his designee shall:

1.

Consult EPIP-20101, Duties of Emergency Coordinator, for dfrectfon.

2.

Inftfate O-OSP-102.1, Flood Protection Stoplog Inspectfon.

3.

Initfate O-OSP-104.1, Record of Meteorological Forecasts.

8.2.2 Maintenance Superintendent

- Nuclear, or designee, shall ensure that the following is performed:

I.

Contact additfonal Mafntenance Department personnel that are necessary to prepare and maintain the plant fn safe condition.

2.

Close the following outside doors and roof hatches and inflate door seals where applfcable.

(1)

Outside Doors:

Cable Spreading Room to roof (through CRDM room)

New Fuel Storage Rooms-Spent Fuel Pits Comp. Cooling Water Surge Tank Room Door from Auxiliary Building to Turbine Area 480V L.C. Rooms 4160Y Switchgear Rooms Doors to Holdup Tank enclosures Emergency Diesel Room doors Doors from Aux. Building to No. 4 Comp.

Cool Water Equfp.

Area Elevator vestfbules Containment Purge Supply Fan Room Inlet to No.

3 Charging Pump Room from Boric Acid Tank Area Intake Chlorinator Equipment House Reactor Control Rod Equfpmnt Rooms (3B and 4B MCC Rooms)

Electrfcal Penetratfon Rooms and Enclosures Generator Excfter Swftchgear Rooms Radwaste Bufldfng Doors (East, North, and Loading Ramp)

Condensate Polisher Building Doors Computer Room Doors Battery Room Doors Borfc Acfd Storage Tank Room Outside Door Safety Injection Pump Room Doors (2)

Roof hatches:

Stairwell to Aux. Building 10 Foot Elevation RHR pump removal hatches Evaporator Condensate Demfneralfzers Monitor Tanks Radwaste Bufldfng

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMEHTING PROCEDURE 20106, PAGE 7

NATURAL EMERGENCIES 5/25/8$ '

~

4.

5.

Install stoploqs on plant flood protect1on walls as follows or construct temporary Sandbaa dikes in accordance with Appendix 0

for the specific area(s) without the required stoplogs:

Around the EOG Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps (temporary sandbag dike)

J Between Unit 3

4160 Volt Switchgear Room and 600 Building (Stoplogs 14 and 15)

East of Unit 3 Main Transformer (Stoplogs 12 and 13)

Entrance to Unit 3 Condenser Pit (Stoplog 11)

South Wall of Unit 3 Condenser Pit (Stoplogs 9 and 10)

Southeast of Unit 3 Lube 011 Reservoir (Stoplog 8)

East of Unit 4 Main Transformer (Stoplogs 6 and 7)

Entrance to Unit 4 Condenser Pit (Stoplog 5)

South Wall of Unit 4 Condenser Pit (Stoplog 4)

Southeast of Unit 4 Lube Oil Reservoir (Stoplog 3)

South of Unit 4

Steam Generator Feed Pump Room (Stoplogs 1

and 2)

Entrance to Unit 4 Spent Fuel Pit Heat Exchanger Room (Stoplog 22)

Entrance to Unit 4 New Fuel Storage Area (Stoplog 21)

Entrance to Unit 4 Component Cooling Water Pump Area (Stoplog 20)

Entrance to Unit 3

Component Cooling Water Pump Area (Stoplog 19)

Entrance to Auxiliary Build1ng Chemical Storage Area (East door to HAST Room) (Stoplog 18)

Entrance to Unit 3 Hew Fuel Storage Area (Stoplog 17)

Entrance to Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pit Heat Exchanger Room (Stoplog ld d

dgg gd d <<dg Tie down, remove, or otherwise secure all loose equipment, such as ladders; fire extinguishers and hose

reels, waste conta1ners, life rings, etc.

Empty tanks may require additional preparation (installation of temporary t1e down anchors).

Power Plant Engineering will prov1de such additional criteria on a

case by case bas1s.

Manways should be left open where practicable.

Empty tanks under construct1on are the responsibility of the tank manufacturer/contractor and should be secured by same.

6 Check and clean Fuel Oil Tank roof vents to assure adequate

-.. pressure relief if necessary.

ee ~

T'.

Store all chemical drums in the chemical warehouse, and o11-

'rums in the o11 house and/or chem1cal warehouse.

8.

9.

10.

Verify that the gas cylinders in both gas cylinder storage houses are properly secured.

Remove vortex elim1nators from the intake area and clean the trash pit.

Oog the 1ntake area gantry

crane, the cask crane and the turbine deck gantry crane.

Install life lines between important operat1ng areas of the lant,in case personnel must be.sent to these areas during

'1'gh w1nds.

• )emlswlmg

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 20106, PAGE 8 NATURAL EMERGENCIES 12/06/88 12.

13.

14.

Provide tarpaulfns and ropes at varfous locations throughout tt auxiliary building; also have on hand in the control center ar cable spreading room an ample supply of plastic film (pliofilm)

Ensure that maintenance personnel will be available at the plar during the emergency.

Provi de portabl e dewatering pumps at Condensate Pump Area Units 3 and 4.

15.

16.

Close doors and vent openings on the elevator machinery room.

Wire shut all doors on outdoor MCC's with insulated wire.

17.

18.

19.

20.

Take spare sump pumps to the Auxilfary Building.

Tie down intake trash rakes and hofsts in such a

manner tha they are secure, yet readily available if needed.

Inspect outside areas for radioactive material that needs to b

stored or protected from severe weather.

When the vent fans listed fn 8.2.3.6 are stopped, the.followfn air intake,

exhaust, or vent openfngs should be closed off Verify that the dampers of those openings equipped with damper are locked in the closed position.

Install protective cover where required, as follows:

Spent Fuel Pft Inlet Air Vents New Fuel Storage Room Fan Inlet Vent Spent Fuel Pft Heat Exchanger Room Fan Inlet Vent Spent Fuel Pit Heat Exchanger Room Exhaust Vent Contafment Purge Supply Fan Air Intake Auxiliary Building Supply Fans Afr Intake Vent Control Room HVAC Outside Afr Intakes Control Room HVAC Post MHA Emergency Fan Outside Air Intake The Operations Superfntendent Nuclear shall verify that th following preparations are made:

Make arrangements for sufffcfent operating personnel to be a.

the plant during the hurricane fn order to provide the necessar.

coverage for several days durf ng whfch the pl ant may bi fnaccessible.

2 ~

Bolt or otherwise secure the hatches on the chemfcal feed tanks.

3.

Fill condensate

tanks, primary water tanks and refuelfng wate=

storage tanks.

Ensure that the minfmum level in either fuel o

water tank, is maintained at least two feet above surroundfni retention dike elevations.

4.

When hurricane fs less than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> from the plant have portable bedding equipment brought to: the control room 'nd/or cabl~

spreading room and other suitable locations.

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 20106, PAGE 9 NATURAL EMERGENCIES 12/06/8 5.

Open and tag outdoor 480V receptacle circuit breakers.

(

attached breaker list, Appendix A).

Issue clearance to Pl Superv>sor - nuclear on alt breakers

~o ened.

6.

As the hurricane approaches the site, and high winds begin, s

the vent fans listed below:

NOTE:

Fans may be operated on a selected basis as operat conditions dictate.

Spent fuel pit ventilation fan New fuel storage room vent fan Spent fuel pit heat exchanger room vent fan Containment purge supply and exhaust fans Auxiliary building supply vent fans Containment penetration cooling fans if not required Diesel generator room vent fans 7.

Shutdown Amertap

Systems, open and tag power supply breakers all pumps and

valves, clearance to the Plant Supervisor Nuclear.

8.

Inspect any outside radioactive material storage areas ensure containers are safely stored or secured.

8.2.4 The Plant Manager - Nuclear, or hfs designee, shall ensure that necessary personnel are available to r'eport to the 'plant, if needed 8.3 When other natural emergency situations occur:

8.3.1 The Plant Supervisor Nuclear shall consult EPIP-20101 f

direction.

8.3.2 Other plant personnel shall perform actions as directed by Emergency Coordinator, if Emergency Plan is activated.

1.

Clean sumps and sump pump suction strainers on the auxili building and electrical cable manholes.

Test run all si pumps'.

Survey the plant site, removing trash and debris and securi loose equipment.

8.3.3 The Operations Superintendent Nuclear shall verify that t

following preparations are made:

l.

Inventory supply of laboratory chemicals and reagents and obta those that are necessary.

2.

Check diesel oil storage tank and turbine lube oil stora tanks.

Diesel oil storage tank should be topped off and turbi lube ofl storage tank should be at least half full.

3.

Make arrangements with the diesel oil suppliers for possib emergency deliveries.

4.

Holt or tfe down all hatches on water plant tanks.

r

~

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PRQCEOURE 20106, PAGE 10 NATURAL EMERGENCIES Ia/ISI8a 8.3.4 The Instrument and Control Supervisor shall check al 1 instruments located outdoors to be in weather proof condition, inspect

cases, gaskets, etc.

and weatherproof those that are not with plastic film and tape.

8,3.5 The Land Management Site Manager shall make arrangements with the Air Force Sea Survival School for removal of their boats and loose gear from the area; and also with any outside contractor working within the plant property to remove, tie

down, or otherwise secure his equipment and material to keep it from blowing away.

8.3.6 The Administrative Supervisor shall have all food storage facilities inventoried, a grocery list prepared and the necessary food purchased and properly stored.

Enough food shall be purchased for all operators, maintenance and guard personnel staying on site during the storm for several days.

The Administrative Supervisor shall also make arrangements for purchases of portable bedding as required by the Maintenance Superintendent.

EHERGENCY PLAN IHPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 20106, PAGE ll NATURAL EMERGENCIES 10/15/88 APPENDIX A 480 VOLT RECEPTACLE LIST To be verified tagged and opened per step 8.2.3.5 of this procedure.

Operations Superintendent

- Nuclear has responsibiltfy to ensure this is completed.

Panel

3P14, Bkr 4 Panel

3P14, Bkr 5 Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel 3P14, Bkr 6

3P14, Bkr 7 4PI4, Bkr 1

4P14, Bkr 2

4P14, Bkr Panel

4P14, Bkr 4 Panel

4P14, Bkr 5 Panel

4P14, Bkr 6 BREAKER NO.

30513 30653 30661 30674 30736 30905 30760 34341 40653 40903 44341 0870 0871 1023 81605 B1704 82028 Panel

3P14, Bkr 1

Panel 3PI4, Bkr 2 Panel

3P14, Bkr 3 RECEPTACLE NO./LOCATION 4 and 4A, Turbine Area East 17 and 17a, Unit 3 Containment 5,

West End, Aux. Building E/M Passageway 6,

6A and 68 East End and Exterior East Mall of Aux.

Building (See Note 1) 7, North End, Aux. Building N/S Passageway 11 and 12, North End of Intake Area 8, Unit 3 Cask Mash Area (See Note 2)

U3 Condensate Polisher Area Receptacles 17 and. 17a, Unit 4 Containment 15 and 16, Intake Area (at Traveling Screens U4 Condensate Polisher AJ ea Receptacles 9, South End-of Aux. Building N/S Passageway 10, Unit 4 Cask

'Mash Area (See Note 2) 13, Water Treatment Plant Area 01 and 02 Radwaste Control Area, West Mall 03, Radwaste N/S Passageway, North End Radwaste N/S Passageway, South End and Outside Receptacles Two Receptacles outside North Mall and two outside East Wall of No.

3 4160 Switchgear Room One Receptacle at SE Corner No.

3 Aux. Trans.

One Receptacle at No.

3 Bowser Filter One Receptacle at Mest of 3A MSRH One Receptacle at SM Corner of Cond. Retubing Pit, Ground Level (See Note 3)

One Receptacle in Aux. Feedwater Pump Area One Receptacle East of 3D MSRH One Receptacle, Turbine Deck, West Side between Units 3

and 4 One Receptacle under South End of Steam Platform One Receptacle on Mezz. Level at Panel 3P14 One Receptacle at NE Corner of Turbine Deck One Receptacle at NW Corner of Turbine Deck One Receptacle at East Wall No.

4 4160 Room One Receptacle at SE Corner No. 4 Aux. Transformer 3

One Receptacle at South Side of Cond.

Retubing

Pit, Ground Level (See Note 4)

One Receptacle East of Bowser Filter One Receptacle West of 4A HSRH One Receptacle East of 4D HSRH One Receptacle East of No. 4 S/G Feedwater Pump Room One Receptacle at SM Corner of Turbine Deck One Receptacle under South edge of Steam Platform

" One Receptacle on Mezz. Level at Panel 4P14 One Receptacle on Turbine

Deck, South of Control Room Door

EHERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 20106, PAGE 12 NATURAL EHERGENCIES 10/15/M DP10-5 DP10-6 APPENDIX A (cont'd)

Fan Room Area Receptacles Fan Room Area Receptacles Apprentice Training Building - Local breakers on seven welding receptacles on exterior North wall.

NOTE 1:

Also provides power to B.A.E. temporary pumps.

NOTE 2:

Power supply to Emergency Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Mater Pumps NOTE 3:

Power supply to L.O. Reservoir Oll Renovators (Oetaval)

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 20106, PAGE 13 NATURAL EMERGENC IES 10/15/88" APPENDIX B

A Hurricane Match condition DOES NOT result fn Emergency Plan activatfon;

however, certain actions shall be performed in preparation for the lfkelihood that a Hurricane Warning may be fssued.

At the discretfon of plant management, some of these activities may be performed prfor to the issuance of a

Hurricane Watch fn order to ensure that the site fs prepared for severe weather condftfons.

The following personnel are responsible for the performance of the actions listed below:

NOTE: The fo1lowtng steps may be performed tn any dest red sequence.

The Securft Su ervisor, or his designee shall:

1.

Ensure that all visitors leave the Owner Controlled Area, and are informed of the Hurricane Match.

The Operatfons Superfntendent

- Nuclear, or hfs designee shall ensure that the following has been performed:

1.

Check operation of. the NAWAS and LGR equipment, base radio and portable radfo equipment.

2.

Test run both A and B emergency dfesel generators, top oft day and skid fuel tanks and verify that startfng afr is at 240 psi.

3.

Test run the turbine DC oil pumps.

4.

Check fire system and test run the fire pumps.

5. 'est run the intake trash rakes and traveling screens.

6.

Inventory supply of laboratory chemfcals and reagents and obtain those that are necessary.

7.

Check diesel ofl storage tank and turbine lube oil storage tanks.

Diesel ofl storage tank should be topped off and turbine lube ofl storage tank should be at least half full.

8:

Nake arrangements with the dfesel ofl suppliers for possfble emergency deliveries.

9.

Bolt or tfe down all hatches on water plant tanks.

The Maintenance Superintendent

- Nuclearor hfs designee shall ensure that the followfng has been preformed:

Check supply of emergency items and materials such as:

Mire Wooden wedges Lumber Buckets Rope Caulkfng Nails Plastic Fflm Cloth Provide a truck and driver required ftems.

Flashlights and Batteries Portable beddfng equipment Portable Fans and Air Movers (pIiofi1m) to obtain foodstuffs and other

4

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 20106, PAGE 14 NATURAL EMERGENCIES 12/06/88 APPENDIX B (Cont'd) 3.

Clean sumys and sump pump suction strainers on the auxiliary building and e&ctrical cable manholes.

Test run all sump pumps'.

Survey the plant site removing trash and debris and securing loose equipment.

5.

Check all instruments located outdoors to be in weather proof condition, inspect

cases, gaskets, etc.

and weatherproof those that are not with plastic film and tape.

6.

Check O-SMM-102.1, Flood Protection Stoplog Inspection, to etermine temporary flood protection requirements (i.e.,

sandbag dikes).

7.

If temporary sandbag dike(s) are required, begin preparation to fill bags and have available at affected area for installation if/when a Hurricane Warning is issued for the plant ~s$ te.

The Land Mana ement Site Mana er, or his designee, shall ensure that the follow ng as been per orme 1.

Hake arrangements with the Afr Force Sea Survival School for removal of their boats and loose gear from 'the area; and also with any outside contractor working within the plant property to

remove, tie

down, or otherwise 'ecure his equipment and material to keep it from blowing away.

The Administrative Su ervisor or his designee shall ensure that the following as een performed:

1.

Have all food storage facilities inventoried, a grocery list prepared and the necessary food purchased and properly stored.

Enough food shall be purchased for all operators, maintenance and guard personnel staying on site during the storm for several days.

The'eaTth Ph sics Su ervisor, or hfs designee shall ensure that all ra4toac ve mater a

conta ners are properly stored and secured.

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 20106, PAGE 15 NATURAL EMERGENCIES 10/15/88 APPENDIX C A Tropical Storm Warning condition does not result fn Emergency Plan actfvatfon,

however, certain actfons should be performed in preparatfon for a Tropical Storm or more severe weather condftfon.

The followfng personnel are responsible for the actions listed below:

The Security Supervisor or hfs designee should inspect areas surroundfng plant securfty barriers for any loose objects or other condftfons that may reduce security barrfer effectfveness under severe weather conditions.

20 The Operations Superintendent or hfs designee should perform the following:

2.1 Inventory laboratory reagents and supplies and restock as necessary.

2.2 Check diesel oil storage tank and turbine lube oil storage tank levels.

Hake arrangments to ff11 tanks as necessary to ensure diesel oil storage tanks are topped off and turbine lube ofl storage tank is half fu11.

2.3 Hake arrangements with diesel ofl suppliers for emergency deliveries.

2.4 Begin ffllfng condensate, primary water, and refueling water storage tanks.

2.5 Inspect areas surroundfng operating equipment for loose objects or other conditfons that may damage operatfng equipment.

The Maintenance Superintendent or his desfgnee should perform the following:

3.1 3.3 3.4 Check emergency supplfes including flashlfghts, batteries,

lumber, rope,

nails, portable bedding and ventflatfon equipment.

Hake arrangements for augmenting supplies as necessary.

- Survey the plant site for loose objects and ensure all weather

barriers, such as doors and

stoplogs, are in operable cond)tion.

Inspect all trailer and portable bufldfng tfe downs and make repairs as necessary.

Provide support to other departments in making severe weather preparations.

3.5 Inspect outdoor instrumentatfon and controls for weather proof conditions.

I l

EMERGENCY PLAN lMPLEMENTlNG PROCEOURE

20106, PAGE 16 NATURAL EMERGENCIES 10/15/88 APPENDIX C (Cont'd) 4.

The Admfnfstrati ve Su pervf sor or hi s des fgnee shou1d provide support to other departments in obtafning necessary supplfes and equipment.

5.

The Health Physics Supervisor or hfs designee shall ensure that a11 radioactive material containers are properly stored and secured.

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEOURE 20106, PAGE 17 HATURAL EMERGENCIES 5/25/89 APPEHOIX 0 (Page 1 of 2)

SKETCH 1

f,NtCEHCT OINK CGOtATN 8Ã NIT ei EKRCEM OIML 096tATN Il Alt e5 Loll'4'o+

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• larnlswlms

EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 20106, PAGE 18 NATURAL EMERGENCIES 5/25'/89 APPENDIX 0 (Page 2 of 2)

Details for Flood Protection Dike Shown on Sketch 1 of

~el:fil~xi%+t 5

EAO4LMs%% 1%&AQ~)i'd%

oa wale%,

H. Ze.an/~iW this Appendix.

j~0%%4 WO v~miq +aVt~aog M&f L.oaO y crt to.oo

~, l5,0O

. e~aes 4-o

~ia Wi01N TYPICAL SECTION THROUGH SANDBAG DIKE NTS NOTES:

l.

Actual length of dike by field.

Location of dike along walls shall be chosen to limit obstructions with the items mounted to walls.

Care shall be used when placing dike to insure equipment/components are not obstructed.

1 2.

Polyethylene sheet shall be Griffolyn T-25 or equal and'hall have a

minimum thickness of 4 mils.

3.

Sandbags shall be cotton cloth, size shall be determined by field based on availabilty and shall

. be placed to provide ihe dike dimensions shown.

4.

Polyethylene sheet I and S Number 008-51807-6 gL3 minimum.

Cloth Ba~- N and S Number 027-69400-3 qL3 minimum.

guantitf ell be by field.

~Wi ~

~ f't FINAL PAGE

• /em/sw/ma S.

ENCLOSURE 4

FOR FPL RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTXON (4)

9.11.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANKS Normal water supply to all the pumps is from the two 250,000 gallon condensate storage

tanks, through locked open gate valves and check valves.

Each tank has a

minimum reserved storage capacity of 185,000 ga]lons of deminera]ized water for the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

With this quantity of water the unit can be:

(1)

Kept at hot standby for 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> and then cooled to 350F at which point the Residual Heat Remova]

System will be put in service, or (2)

Kept at hot standby for about 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br />.

This is shown graphically in Figure 9.11-1.

The residua]

heat removal system capacity matches the decay heat generation in the reactor at twelve and one half'ours after reactor shutdown.

This, therefore, is the earliest time when the residual heat remova]

system can be put into service.

Under these conditions the unit will be kept at hot standby for at least eight and one half hours prior to initiating coo]down.

An additional auxiliary feedwater supply can be provided from the water treatment system.

Demineralized water at a

maximum rate of 200 gpm per unit will be available from the water treatment system.

The auxiliary feedwater requirement after ten hours is less than 125 gpm.

The condensate storage tanks are interconnected so that each of the pumps can take suction from either tank.

An alternate, non-safety source of water to either the AFW pumps'r the condensate storage tanks is the 500,000 gal.

demineralized water storage tank.

Deaerated water is avai]able from this tank at a maximum rate of 400 gpm.

9.11-3 Rev 4 7/86

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ENCLOSURE 5

FOR FPL RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTION (5)

e COMPARISON OF FPL PROPOSE DESIGN CRITERIA TO Y=Yes N=No APPENDIX B OF NUMARC 87-00 GUIDELViESAM)TECHNICAI.BASES FOR NUMARCINGIATIVES NUMARCST40 APPENDIX B. ALTERNATEAC POWER CRITERIA This appendix describes the criteria that must be met by a power supply h order to be classified as an Alternate AC power source. The criteria focus on ensuring that station blackout equipment is not unduly suscepuble to dependent failure by establishing independence of the AACsystem fern the emergency and next~ IE AC power systems.

AAC Power Sounc C&crftt

.I The AAC system and its components need not be designed totitQass IE or safety system requirements. Ifa Class IE EDG is used as an Alternate AC power source, this existing Qsss IE EDG must continue to meet a0 appUcable safety-related criteriL B.2 Unless otherwise provided in this criteria, the AACsystem need not be protected against the effects of:

(I) failure or misoperation of tmchanical equipment, including (i) fire, (ii) pipe whip, (iii)jet impingement, (iv) water spray, (v) hding from a pipe break, (vi) radiation, pressurization, elevated temperature or humidity caused by high or medium energy pipe break, and (vii)missiles resulung fern the failure ofrotating equipment or high energy systems; or (2) seismic events.

B.3 Components and subsystems shall be protected against the effects oflikelyweathermhted events that may iniuate the loss ofoff-site power event. Protection may be provided by enclosing AACcomponents within suucnues that conform with the Uniform Building Code, and burying exposed electrical cable run between buildings (i.e..

connectites between the AACpower source and the shutdown busses).

B.4 Physical separation of AAC components from safety related components or equipment shall conform with the separation criteria applicable for the unit's licensing basis.

Cottttcctttbility to AC Povtcr Systems

.5 Failure of AACcomponents shall not adversely affect Class IE AC power systems.

B.6 Electricai isolation of AACpower shall be provided though an appropriate isolation device. Ifthe AACsource is connected to Qass IE buses, isolation shall be provided by two circuit breakers in series (one Class lE breaker at the Qass IE bus and one nonWass IE breaker to protect the source).

0 COMPARISON OF FPL PROPOSE DESIGN CRITERIA TO APPENDIX B OF NUNARC 87-00 PTN B.7 The AAC powa source shall not normally be directly connected to the preferred or on-site emergency AC power em for the unit affected by the blackout. In addition, the AAC system shaU not be capable of automatic i,.ng of shutdown equipment from the blacked'nit unless Ucensod with such capabQity.

Minimal Potential for Common Cause Failure B.S There shall be minimal potendal for common cause failure of the AAC power source(s). The following system features provide assurance that the minimal potendal fcr comme cause faQure has been adequately addressetL (a)

The AAC power system shall be equipped with a DC power source that is electricaQy

'ndependent from the blackest utut's ptefened and Class 1E power system.

(b)

The AAC power system shall be equipped with an air start system, as applicable. that is independent of the preferred and the blacked'niA preferred and Ches 1E power supply.

(c)

The AACpower system shall be provided with a fuel oQ supply, as appUcable, that is separate from the fuel oil supply for the onsite emergency AC power system. A separate day tank supplied from a common storage tank is acceptable provided the fuel oil is sampled and analyzed consistent with appUcable standards prior to transfer to the day tank.

1 (d) Ifthe AAC power source is an identical machine to the emergency onsite AC power source, active failures of the emergency AC power source shall be evaluated for applicability and corrective mian taken to reduce subseqttent faQures.

(e)

No single point vuherabQity shaQ eaist whereby a likelyweather.rehted event or single active failure could disable any portion of the otsite emergency AC power sources or the preferred power sources, and simultaneously fail the AACpower source(s).

(f)

The AAC power system shall be capable of operating during and after a station blackout without any support systems powered from the preferred power supply, or the blackedwut unit's Class 1E power sources affected by the event.

(g)

The portions of the AAC power system subjected to maintenance activities shall be tested prior to'returning the AAC power system to service.

Y,

0 COMPARISON OF FPL PROPOSE DESIGN CRITERIA TO APPENDIX B OF NUMARC 87>>00 hvailabtTity Afar Onset af Statlan Blackout B,9 The MC Po~er system shall be sixed to carry the required shutdown loads for the required coping du uon deternuned in Section 32.5, and be capable of maintaining voltage and frequency within Umitx consiste t whh estxbUshod industry standards that wQl not degrade the performance of any shutdown system or component At x multi.unit site, except for I/2 Shared or 2/3 emergency AC power configurations, an +decent ~ts Class I<

power source may be used as an MC power source for the blaclted~t unit ifit is capable of>~ng d,e required loads at both units.

PTN Capacity and Reliability B.10 Unless otherwise governed by technical speciflcadons, the AAC power source shall be started and brought to operating condidons that are consistent with its function as an AAC source at htervals not longer than three mtxtths, followingmanufacturer's rocommendxdons cr in accccdance withpbnt~loped pocodures. Once every fueUng outage, a timed start (within the ume period specified under blackout conditions) and rated loaf capacity t shall be petformotL B.ll Unless otherwise governed by technical specifications. surveillance and maintenance procedures for the AAC system shaQ be implemented considering rrmufacturer's recommendations or in accordtuee with plantWveloped ixoceduies.

B. 12 Unless otherwise governed by technical specÃcarlres, the MC system shall be demonstrated by inidal test to be capable of powering required shutdown equipment whhin ate hour ofa station blackout event.

B.13 The Non-Class 1E AAC system should attempt to meet the target reliability and availabiUty goals specified below, depending on normal system state. In this context, reUabiUty and availabiUty goals apply to the overall AAC system rather than individual ma:hines, where a system may comprise more than one AACpower source.

'(a>

System reUability should be maintained at or above 0.95 per demand, as determined in accordance with NSAC-108 methodology (or equivalent).

H/A Y

(b)

Availability Reliability AAC systems normally online should attempt to be available to its associated unit at least 95% of the time the reactor is operating.

No reliability targets or standards are established for online systems.

ENCLOSURE 6

FOR FPL RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTION (7)

I T