ML17346A872
| ML17346A872 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/24/1984 |
| From: | Brewer D, Elrod S, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17346A866 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-84-35, 50-251-84-36, NUDOCS 8503040138 | |
| Download: ML17346A872 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000250/1984035
Text
Date Signed
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8'5QIy
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ee
ATLANTA.GEORGIA 30323
O~v
0
E
Report Nos.:
50-250/84-35
and 50-251/84-36
Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company
~
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami, Fl
33102
Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251,
License Nos.:
e
Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and 4
'nspection
Conducted:
October 21 - November 24, 1984
. Inspectors:
I
cH
. T
A. Peebles,
Sen or Resident
nspector
Division of Project and Resident
Programs
,
I
~
~
I
I'/
R. Brewer,
Resi ent Insp'ector
,
-
.
"
,',
-.
Date Signed
'..-..;."""'-'. -'.'ivision of P oje t and
esident
Programs
.
'8
Approved by:':--'::": '-' -::".'rk P(
St
en A. Elro,
hsef, Project Section
2C
.
Date Signed
'ivision of Project and Resident
Programs
":", 'UHMARY
,-Scope:
This routine,
unannounced
inspection entailed
276 direct inspector-hours
on site,
including 49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> of back'shift, in the areas
of licensee
action
on
previous
inspection
findings,
LER. followup,'nnual
and monthly surveillance,
annual
and monthly maintenance,
operational
safety,
Engineered
Safety
Features
walkdown, plant events,
spent fuel storage rerack,
and independent
inspection.
Results:
Of the. nine
areas
.inspected,
no violations or deviations
were
identified in .seven areas;
three violations were identified in two areas (failure
. to document
and evaluate test data,
and failure to prooerly test the auxiliary
system .Par'agrapb-'4, 'and 3 failbr'wtometa¹i;record>."pa'ragraphr12)'::."
~
I
8503040i38
850218
ADOCK 05000250
9
.
REPORT DETAILS
tenance
tenance
"Attended exit interview
Licensee
Employees
Contacted
"K. N. Harris, Vice President-Turkey
Point
"C. J.
Baker, Plant Manager-Nuclear
- "D.
W. Haase,
Chairman Safety Engineer
Group
"J.
P.. Mendietta, Service
Manager Nuclear
D.
D. Grandage,
Operations
Superintendent
Nuclear
T. Young, Project Site Manager
"J.
W. Kappes,
Maintenance
Superintendent-Nuclear
T. A. Finn, Operations
Supervisor
"J; A. Labarraque,
Technical
Department Superintendent
P.
W. Hughes,
Health Physics Supervisor,
W. C. Miller, TraiQng Supervisor
M. J. Crisler, guality Control Supervisor
."K. N. Jones,
Site guality'ssurance
Sup'erintendent
"L; C. Huenniger, Start-up Superintendent
. "E.'. Suarez,
Technical
Department Supervisor
W.
R. Williams, Assistant Superintendent
Electrician Main
R. A. Longtemps, Assistant Superintendent
Mechanical
Main
J. Arias, Jr.,'egulation
and Compliance Engineer
"E. Hayes,
IBC Supervisor
, "
F. A. Houtz, Site guality
Co'ntrol'.
M. Donis, Site Engineer Supervisor
"R.
D. Hart, Regulatory
and Compliance
"R. L. Teuteberg,
Regulatory
and Compliance
"V. A. Kaminskas,
Reactor Engineer Supervisor
.'R.
G. Mende,'eactor
Engineer
,"R.
M. Brown, Health Physics Supervisor
.
D.. Tomaszewski,
Plant Engineer Supervisor"
R.
E. Garrett,
Pl'ant Security Supervisor
.J.
E.
Moaba, Corporate
Licensing
.
G. J. Boissy,
PEP Program Manager
"B. N. Gorodetzer, guality Control Staff
2.
Exit Interview
'he
inspectio
scope, and .findings were summarized during management inter-
lviews he14 th 6ughou)', the rzporti~ pgpij$ pith the plant ma~ager-nuclear
and
selected
members
of his staff. 'he
&<it meeting
was
held
on
November
21,
1984,
with the
persons
noted
.above.
The
areas
requiring
management
attention were reviewed.
The items identified as violations were:
failure to document
and evaluate
test
data
per the quality assurance
criteria of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B,
criterion XI (250/84-35-01
and 251/84-36-01); failure to test the auxiliary
system
in
accordance
with techni cal
speci fication
4. 10. 4'
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~
0
(250/84-35-02
and 25i/84-36-02);
and failure to retain
a quality assurance
operating
record
as
required
by
technical
specification
$.10.1.a
(251/84-36-03).
An additional
example
of violation (250/84-28-01
and
251/84-29-01)
was
identi fied; fai 1 ure
to
estab
1 ish
adequate
startup
.procedures.
f
Two unresolved
items
were identified: evaluate
the adequacy of maintenance
on the unit 3 power range instrument N-41 (URI 250/84-35-03);
evaluate the
adequacy
of
main
steam
iso'lation
valve testing
(URI 250/84-35-04
and
251/84-36-04).
Three
inspector
followup
items
(IFI)
wer'e
identified:
inadequate
surveillance
of emergency
diesel
generator
skid tank level. switches (IFI
250/84-35-07
and 251/84-36-07);
reactor trip bypass
breakers
are susceptible
to inadvertent
local operation (IFI 250/84-35-05
and 251/84-36-05)';
and
control
room
operator
inability to easily and'ccurately
fol.low .the
'erformance
of the -Reactor Protection Periodic Test,
OP 1004.2 (250/84-35-06
and 251/84-36-06).
C
The licensee
acknowledged
the findings.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
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- a.
'onthly update of Performance
Enhancement
Program
(PEP) '
~
4
The
PEP
was
reviewed to determine if commitments
were being "met.
Status
was discussed with the
PEP Manager
and with other management.
f 'I
~
f
f
The facility. upgrade project has not received the construction permits
for the administration building or for the simulator building and may
impact the
schedule.
However, 'the permit for the
Health
Physics
. "".....'".':" building has
been received
and work is scheduled to begin shortly.
~ f
~
'
f
b.
A further
example
of inadequate
surveillance
was identified by the
inspector
and will be followed as
an inspector
followup item (IFI
250/84-35-07
and 251/84-36-07).
The licensee
has'a
program to identify
these deficiencies;
however, this area
had been addressed
without the
identification of these
components.
Each of the
emergency
diesel
generator
fuel skids tanks
has
several
float level switches.
One switch causes
the tank inlet valve to open
and then gravity fills the tank from the elevated
day tank.
Another
switch
shuM
the valve
and other ywitches
have
high and
low alar'm
)', functions.
>'Thh
180 level
alarm~', if actuated,
does
not allow the,
diesel
to start.
The functioning of the switches
has
been
checked;
however,
the floats
and their settings
have
not been
checked
and the
proper settings
are not known as the settings
were last checked at the
factory prior to shipping the diesel to the site in 1970.
The licensee
agreed to correct the'discrepancy.
C.
t
L
The quarterly
progress
meeting'n
the
PEP
was held at the site
on
kovember
2,
1984.
All areas
were addressed
and
no significant devia-
tions were noted.
4.
Unresolved
Items (URI)
Unresolved
items are matters
about which more information is required to
determine
whether they are acceptable
or may involve violations or devia-
tions..
Two unresolved
items are identified in tliis report.
The adequacy of
maintenance
on
Unit 3
power
range
nuclear
instrument,
N-41
(URI
250/84-35-03)
is addressed
in paragraph
7;
and the
adequacy
of main steam
isolation valve testing
(URI 250/84-35-04
and 251/84-36-04) is discussed
in
paragraph
6.
5.
Licensee
Event Report (LER) Followup (92700)
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P
The following LER's were reviewed
and closed.
The inspector verified that:
reporting requirements
had
been met; causes
had been identified; corrective
actions
appeared
appropriate;
generic applicability had been considered;
and
the
LER forms were complete.
A more detailed review was then performed to
'erify that:
the licensee
had reviewed the event; corrective action
had
been
taken;
no unreviewed safety questions
were involved; and violations of
regulations or Technical Specification conditions
had been identified.
f h ~
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(Closed)
On August 25, 1983, 'a safeguards. test
was performed
on the
4A emergency
load sequencer
and it was found to be failed due to an
open circuit coil in an agastat
relay.
The relay was
r'eplaced
and the
testing
completed satisfactorily..
Subsequent
testing
has also been satis-
factory.
- '(Open)
Masonry walls were
found not to
comply with the
original
design drawings.'he
grouting and reinforcing of the walls is
approximately 70K'omplete.
Correction of walls in the Unit 4 control
room
- is
scheduled
'and coordinated with the ongoing battery
bank replacements.
Other walls are
being coordinated with the ongoing
10 CFR 50 Appendix
R
modifications.
The scheduled
completion is August of 1985.
(Closed)
On June 14,
1983,
a conduit was drilled into during
installation of
new conduits.
The conduit contained wiring for the
3B
~ "Cyntainment Spray
pump.
The cable
was replaced
and the
pump returned to
'.<,serviCe the next day.
The drawing showing 'the locations of the
embedded
pconduj4
Has 4tncorrhct.
T%e SraPing wah'orrected
and
a procedure
was
'
'evi'sed to more closely" control drilling into concrete.
(Closed)
On June
24, 1983,
an inside containment fire detector
became
Compensatory
measures
were taken in accordance
with the
Technical Specifications
and the detector
was replaced
on October IO, 1983.
0
6.
(Closed)
On October 2, 1983, the letdown containment isolation
valve would not close.
The unit was being brought to cold shutdown for
refueling
and the air was isolated to the valve and the valve closed.
The
air solenoid to the valve was replaced
and the valve tested satisfactorily.
~
~ P
(Closed)
On
December
16,
1983,
the
B emergency
diesel
generator
failed to start.
.The
cause
was
a faulty air start pressure
regulator which was replaced
and the diesel tested satisfactorily..
Monthly and Annual Surveillance Observation
(61726/61700)
The inspectors
observed
Technical
Specification
(TS) required surveillance
testing
and verified that testing
was performed in accordance
with adequate
procedures;
that test instrumentation
was calibrated; that limiting condi-
tions for operation
were met; that test results
met acceptance
criteria
. requirements
and
were
reviewed
by personnel. other that 'the individual
directing the test; that deficiencies
were identified, as appropriate,
and
- 'that
any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed
and
resolved
by management
personnel;
and that
system
restoration
was
adequate.
For
complete
tests,
the
inspector
verified that testing
". frequencies
were met and tests
were performed by qualified 'individuals.
The Inservice
Test
(IST) program for pumps
and valves
was
reviewed for
adequacy
against
ASME Section XI and the'S...
The inspector witnessed/reviewed
portions of the following test activities:
,Reactor Coolant Flow Protection Channels-Periodic
Test
Pressure iver. Pressure
and Mater Level Protection Channels-Periodic
Test
~...,
~
',
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I'ain
Stem Isolation Valve Closure Test
Reactor Protection
System " Periodic Test
System - Periodic Test
Emergency Diesel Generator Surveillance
The reactor coolant flow protection
channel
periodic test was performed
on
Unit 3
on
November 14,
1984 in accordance
with operating
procedure
(OP)
14004.2.
The
procedure
specifies
and
approved
method of testing
the
operabi3ity
and trip
and
alarm syttings
of the reactor
coolant
flow
protection chahnels,
'jn compliance lith TS table 4.1-,1>.gteq
5.
During the performance
of
OP 14004.2
the technician visually verified but
did not actually
record
numerous
bistable trip and .reset
voltages.
The
procedure
did not require that the
observed
bistable
actuation-voltage
be
recorded.
It required
only that the technician visually observe
the appro-
priate bistable
actuate
upon receipt of a voltage input within a specified
tolerance
band.
The technician
documented
proper. bistable
performance
not
by recording the
observed
voltage but by initialling that he observed
the
1
procedural
step
executed
without discrhpancy.
On November 15, 1984, during
the
performance
of
OP 14004.4,
"Pressurizer
Pressure
and
Water
Level
Protection
Channels-Periodic
Test,"
the
actual
protection
bistable trip
voltages
were not recorded.
As with OP 14004.2,
the procedure
required only
that the technician initial that the step
was completed without discrepancy.
A review
was
made of other protection bistable periodic test
procedures
including
OP 14004.1,
Protection
Channels-Periodic
Test"
'nd
OP 14004.3,
Tave
and Delta-T Protection
Channels-Periodic
Test."
In
each
procedure
the observed
bistable actuation voltage 'was not required to
be
recorded.
As
a result
the
supervisory
evaluations
occurring after
procedure
completion
were
performed to ensure
each
procedural
step
was
.
signed off rather
than to evaluate
whether
observed
data fell within
required tolerances.
'0
CFR 50; Appendix B, criterion XI, "Test Control," requires'hat
test
results
shall
be
documented
and evaluated to assure that test requirements
have
been
satisfied.
The
licensee
guality Assurance
Topical,
section
11.2.3,
Revision 1 and guality Procedure
11.4,
Revision 4 implement these
, requirements..
rg
Contrary to these .requirements,
during the performance
of
OP 14004.2
on
,
November 14
and
on November 15,
1984,
the licensee failed to
'ocument test results
by not recording applicable test data.
Subsequent
supervisory 'evaluations
were
inadequate
because
sufficient data
upon which
to
base
the determination
was not'vailable.
Failure to implement the
quality assurance
criteria of 10 CFR 50; Appendix B, criterion XI is
a
violation (250/84-35-01
and 251/84-36-01).
During. the .performance
of Dp 14004.2 three
additiona1
discrepancies
were
cs Id ~
~
a.
The procedure
required verification of many annunciator status lights
but did not make
use of the control
room annunciator
reference position
system.
Use of the numbered matrix system would make identification of
annunciator targets
less susceptible
to error.
b..
Bistable setpoint
data is written in volts while acceptance
criteria
tolerance
values
are written in millivolts.
A common scale
would
improve the
human factors aspect of the procedure.
c.
The door
key allowing access
to the protection racks
and issued to the
I8C technician
was. not
recorded
in the
Key Charge
Qpt Log,by the
> Nuclear Math'ngineer.
The
NME was
aware
that the
key
hhd
been
issued.
On November 16,
1984,
the inspector
observed
the performance of OP 1004.2,
"Reactor
Protection
System
Periodic Test,"
on unit 4.
The
procedure
specifies
an
approved
method of testing
the
reactor
protective
system
reactor tri'p and permissive
matrices,
in compliance with TS table 4.1-1,
item 24.
C
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~
During th'e performance of the test
an operator inadvertently
and unknowingly
shut the
4B reactor trip bypass
breaker
while trying to rack out the
4A
reactor trip bypass
breaker.
Apparently the local close
push button
was
bumped.
The discrepancy
went unnoticed until the operator tried to manually
close
the already
closed
breaker.
The licensee
is evaluating the need to
place
protective
covers
over
the
push
buttons
to preclude
additional
inadvertent
local
operation.
The susceptibility of the
reactor
bypass
breakers
to inadvertent
local operation will be tracked
as
an inspector
followup item (250/84-35-05
and 251/84-36-05).
During the
performance
of OP 1004.2 the control
room operator
could not
adequately
follow the test
progression
as
controlled
by the
reactor
operators
at the relay protection racks.
The pace of the test was too fast
for the control
room operator to confidently identify the proper actuation
~ of the numerous
annunciators for which he was responsible.
The control
room
-operator
requested
several
times that the operators
at the racks slow down.
It is difficult for the control
room operator to follow the procedure
'ecause
the
alarms that will be received
can not be .readily
cross
referenced
to the applicable procedural
step.
This is- particularly a
problem
because
the control'room operator
has difficulty determining
when
the
operators
at the protection
racks
have
moved to the next step.
The
inability of the control
room operator to easily and accurately follow the
performance
of
OP '1004.2 is
an inspector followup item (250/84-35-06
and
.251/84-36",06): '.'-
On November 6,
1984,
OP 7304.1, "Auxiliary Feedwater
System Periodic Test"
was performed.
This procedure
provides iestructions for verifying proper
operation of the
AFM system
in accordance
with TS 4.10..
The test
was
conducted
concurrently with
OP
0209.3,
"Inservice
Pump Testing
Program
Implementation
Procedure.
Pumps."
During the test
'the
"B"-'AFM pump
was
supplying the "B" AFM train to the unit 3 steam
generators.
The
pump
was subsequently
secured
and lined
up to supply the
"B" AFM train to the unit 4 steam
generators.
Mhen the "B" AFM pump was
started flow was observed to all three unit 4 steam generators
as expected.
However, flow was also unexpectedly
supplied to the unit 3B steam generator.
The control
room operator quickly secured
the "B" AFW pump.
An investiga-
tion revealed that flow control valve CV"4-2832 was stuck open.
Apparently
the valve had not automatically shut when the "B" AFM pump was secured after
being operated to supply the unit 3 steam generators.
Subsequent
investigation
revealed that the I/P'positioner for flow control
valve CV-4-2832
was stuck in the full open
demand position.
Debris inside
the positioner resulted
in binding which prevented
the closure signal
from
functioning.,
Debris, such
as
sand,
dirt'.and dust
has,
an occasion,
caused
similar problems with other
AFW flow control valves.
A review of
OP 7304.1 revealed
that the position of the
12 flow control
valves associated
with the unit 3 and 4 common
AFW system are never visually
inspected
to ensure
the valves
automatically
open
and shut in response
to
the position of each
steam supply valve.
S'.nce the flow control valves
have
no
remote
position indication,
a failed open flow control valve
remains
7
C
undetected
and
can result in supplying
AFW to the wrong unit when
a pump in
next started.
-Visual observation
of correct valve position following pump
operation,
followed 'by independent verification of that valve position would
preclude recurrence of this problem.
Technical Specification 4.10 requires periodic testing of the
AFW system to-
verify the ability of the system to respond properly when needed.
requires the testing of AFW discharge
valves.
Technical Specification 4.10.4 states
that
AFW tests
shall
be considered
satisfactory if control
panel
indication
and visual observation
of the
equipment
demonstrate
that all components
have operated properly.
Contrary
'o the requirement
of TS 4.10.4 the licensee
did not perform the required
visual observations
necessary
to verify that the
AFW flow control discharge
valves
would operate
as
designed.
These valves should open and shut auto-
matical]y in response
to the positioning of each
steam
supply 'valve.
Additionally the licensee failed to require
a post test lineup on the
flow control valves following the completion of
OP 7304.1
and
OP 0209.3.
These
valves
were not included
on the list of valves re'quiring position
verification upon test completion.
Similarly these
valves were not included
on the list of valves requiring independent verification as
a second
check
of .valve position.
Failure to comply with TS'.10.4
is
a violation
(250/84-35-02
and 251/84-36-02).-
'I
. The inspector witnessed testing of the Hain Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV).
Several
aspects
of the testing
were discussed
with engineering,
including:
The
MSIVs are constructed
such that the valve will not.close,
under
no flow
conditions,
on loss of air; the MSIVs should be considered to be "fail-safe"
'valves
and, as
such the Section'XI of the
ASME Code requires the valve to be
tested
upon loss of actuator
power;
and the as-built drawings of the HSIV
air control solenoid valves
and their many orifices do not appear to exist
and the. requirements
and specifications
of the orifices are
not
known.
Licensee
management
is pursuing
answers
to these
questions.
This is
considered
an Unresolved Item (URI 250/84-35-04
8 251/84-36-04).
~
~
Monthly and Refueling Maintenance
Observations
(62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related
systems
and components
were
observed/reviewed
to ascertain
that they were conducted in accordance
with
approved procedures,
regulatory guides,
industry codes
and standards,
and in
conformance with TS.
The following items were considered
during this review:
limiting conditions
for operation .were
met while components
or
systems
were
removed
from
service-
approvals
were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities
were
achomglished-
us'-thg
apProved
',prd'cedures
and
were
inspected
as
applicable;
functional testing and/or calibrations
were performed pri'or to
returning
components
or .systems
to service;
quality control
records
were
maintained; activities were
accomplished
by qualified personnel;
parts
and
~
~
~
~
~
material
used
were properly certified; radiological controls
were imple-
mented; fire prevention controls
were
implemented;
and housecleaning
was
actively pursued.
The following maintenance activ'itiex were observed
and/or reviewed:
Replacement of Unit 4, train A, reactor protection relay
FC 498A2X
Replacement
of Unit 4, train B, reactor protection relay
FC 498A2X
Repair of Unit 4, "C" steam generator
steam flow transmitter,
PT 495
Main Steam Isolation Valve 4B actuator repair
. Repair of Unit 3, Power
Range Nuclear Instrument N-41
Pump Seal
Replacement
'I
Unit 4 Normal Containment Cooler maintenance
'4B Main Steam Isolation Valve repacking
and repair;
4
'On October 31, 1984, the inspector observed the repair of unit 3 power range
..nuclear
instrument
(PRNI) N"41.
The instrument
was declared out of service
~
the
previous
day following the
unsuccessful
performance
of OP 12304.2,
"Power
Range
Nuclear Instrument Periodic
Channel
Functional
Test." During
the test it was
determined that the proper penalization to the over power
delta
temperature
(OPBT)
and
over temperature
delta
temperature
(OTbT)
protection "setpoints
was not occurring
on receipt of an increasing
axial
flux differential signal.
~ 8'
,
~
An investigation
revealed that the signal
from the upper ion chamber
was
connected
to the isolation amplifier for the lower detection
and vice
versa.
- The
symptoms
were originally noticed
on October 22,
1984.
The
instrument
was not removed from service at that time, however,
a plant work
'order
(PWO 6181)
was submitted requesting
a calibration of the circuit.
The licensee
is continuing to investigate the circumstances
surrounding the
reversed
detector
The length of time the
instrument
was
not
functioning correctly as well
as the safety significance of this type of
discrepancy
are
under investigation.
,The circumstances
prompting continued
used of thy ipstrpoent after identifying the*,problem
on October 22, 1984,
are under review.
Since
the
licensee's
analysis
and evaluation of this event are not yet
complete, this issue will be carried
as
an unresolved
item (250/84-35-03).
No violations or deviations
were identified.
8.
Operational
and Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors
observed
control
room operations,
reviewed applicable logs,
conducted
discussions
with control
room operators,
observed shift turnovers,
and confirmed operability of instrumentation.
The inspectors verified the
operability of selected
emergency
systems,
reviewed tagout records, verified
compliance
with
TS
LCO's'nd verified return to service
of 'affected
components.
The
inspectors
by observation
and direct interviews verified that the
physical security plan
was being implemented in accordance
with the station
security plan.
The
inspectors
observed
plant
housekeeping/cleanliness
conditions
and
verified implementation of radiation protection control.
Tours of the Unit 4 Containment,
intake water structure, auxiliary, diesel,
and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,
including potential fire hazards,
fluids leaks,
and excessive
vibrations.
The
inspectors
walked
down accessible
portions of the following safety-
reTated
systems
on Unit 3
and 4 to verify operability
and proper valve
alignment:
Emergency diesel
generators
4160 and 480 volt switchgear
High head safety injection systems
Containment spray systems
Low head safety injection system - Unit 4 inside containment
No violations or deviations
were identified.
9.
Engineered Safety Features
Malkdown (71710$
'he
inspector verified operability of the
containment
spray
systems
on
unit 3 and 4 by performing a complete walkdown of the accessible
portion of
the
system.
The following specifics
were
reviewed
and/or
observed
as
appropriate:
P
a.
that the licensee's
system lineup procedures
matched plant drawings
and
the as-built
configuration;'.
that the equipment
conditions
were satisfactory
and
items that might
'egrade
performance
were identified and evaluated
(e.g.
hangers
and
supports
were operable,
housekeeping,
etc,
was adequate;
C.
d.
e.
with assistance
from licensee
personnel
the interior of the breakers
and electrical
or instrumentation
cabinets
were inspected .for debris,
loose material,
jumpers,
evidence of rodents, etc.;
~
+
~
that instrumentation
was properly valved in and functioning and .cali-
bration dates
were appropriate;
local
and remote position indications were compared,
and remote instru-
mentation
was functional.
10
'
Several
discrepancies
were identified in the unit '3 containment
spray
pump
room.
10.
a.
Hanger,
H-2,
FSK-622a,
supporting the
component
cooling water return
flow piping from the
3A containment
spray
pump
was
not properly
assembled.
The upper hanger
clamp was disconnected
from the I-beam.
~ b.
Pressure
instrument
identification tags
did not contain
the
same
instrument
identification
number
found
on detail
one of drawing
5610-t-e-4510,
revision 35, sheet
one of two.
c.
A drain pipe support for containment
spray
pump
3A and
3B bed plate
drains
was loose.
d.
, Several
area light fixtures were not working.
Valve tags
had to be
read with a flashlight due to the reduced visibility.
e ~ . ~
~
e.
The
embossed
valve identification tags 'are difficult to
read.
- Personnel
have
compensated
by writing many valve numbers
on the valve
bodies with black markers.
f Valves
843A and
843B, boric acid injection tank outlet isolation
'. valves,
have'acking
leaks
which. have, resulted in the accumulation of
~
.
..'oric acid residue
on the valve bodies
and flanges..
~
l(
~
No violations or deviations
were
identified..'lant
Events
(93702)
An independent
review of the following event was conducted:
On November 24; .1984, Unit 4 tripped from 100 per
cent power at 8:05 AM,
-'hen the
4A 4160. volt AC bus lost its supply.
This resulted in a loss of
voltage to the
pump and subsequent
reactor trip on loss
of reactor
coolant flow.
All safety systems
responded
as required
and the
'. unit was stabilized at hot shutdown.'wo
minutes
before the reactor trip
occurred,
. operators
responded
to the
4160 volt switchgear
room to
investigate
an
alarm
on
a ground.
Upon entering the
room, -the reactor
coolant
pump breaker cubicle door. blew open
and revealed the faulted condi-
tion.
The
operator
manually tripped the breaker
which cleared the fault
and
allowed the
bus to
be
re-energized.
A decision
was
made
to not
immediately
do further troubleshooting,
but to take the unit to cold shut-
down wjth the
bus
e
rgizeg
A procedure
was .developed to take the bus out
'Pf ser$ ice an) tqdo (geest
%he investigation..
)
At the time of the reactor trip, the auxiliary transformer
was supplying the
4A bus.
The
supply breaker to the
4A bus tripped
when the overcurrent
relays
functioned.
Initial investigation
had
shown that the
4A reactor
coolant
pump breaker
developed
a phase to ground fault which caused
a minor
explosion,i.n its breaker cubicle.
The breaker is located
on the end of the