ML17334A672
| ML17334A672 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1998 |
| From: | Shear G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17334A670 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-98-06, 50-315-98-6, 50-316-98-06, 50-316-98-6, NUDOCS 9803100103 | |
| Download: ML17334A672 (31) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1998006
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION III
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
50-315; 50-316
Report Nos:
50-315/98006(DRS); 50-316/98006(DRS)
Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Facility:
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Generating Plant
Location:
1 Cook Place
Bridgman, Ml 49106
Dates:
February 9-13, 1998
Inspectors:
R. Paul, Senior Radiation Specialist
D. Nissen, Radiation Specialist
Approved by:
Gary Shear, Chief, Plant Support Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
9803100103
980305
ADOCK 05000315
G
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
D. C. Cook, Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Reports 50-315/98006; 50-316/98006
This inspection included a review of the radiation protection program, including the personnel
monitoring and portable instrumentation programs.
Also reviewed was a January 26, 1998
transportation event where radioactive material was shipped without shipping papers and
emergency response information. The following specific observations were made:
Pin Su
The licensee failed to maintain positive control over a radioactive material shipment,
resulting in its leaving the site without the driver having the required shipping paperwork
or emergency response instructions.
Two apparent violations of regulatory
requirements were identified. (Section R1.1)
Rugs with low levels of contamination build-up on them were being cleaned outside of
the protected area.
The contamination to the soil was identiTied and remediated, and
corrective actions were appropriate.
(Section R1.2)
The overall calibration and maintenance system for the portable instrument program
was effectively implemented with the exception of the inspector identified RM-14/RM-20
response check weakness.
(Section R2.1)
Material condition of the Aptec PMW-3, PCM-1B whole body friskers and portal monitors
was good, and workers used this equipment appropriately.
Calibrations and tests were
performed at the required frequencies and response test results were good.
Independent reviews indicated that the monitoring instrumentation was capable of
detecting the established external and internal personal radioactive contamination limits.
(Section R2.2)
A procedural violation was identified for workers who did not check their electronic
dosimetry prior to entering the radiologically controlled area to ensure that they were
turned on. The licensee's review of this matter had not sufficiently considered the
procedural requirement that workers check their electronic dosimetry.
(Section R4.1)
A worker's failure to contact radiation protection after alarming the security gate house
portal monitors was a procedural violation. Additionally, of concern, was the licensee's
conclusion regarding where the hot particle had come from. The condition report
concluded that it had come from outside the radiologically controlled area and even
possibly outside the buildings but did not address other more likely scenarios.
Further,
the inspectors were concerned
that the condition report addressing the procedural
violation had not been responded to at the time of the inspection.
(Section R4.2)
tl "
Ck
A procedural violation was identified when workers in the lower ice condenser were
found not wearing two pairs of gloves as required by the radiation work permit. This
violation, as well as the violations cited in sections R4.1 and R4.2, in the aggregate,
indicate a decline in radiation worker performance.
Of further concern was the fact that
workers had been disregarding the RWP dress requirements for two to three weeks and
RP had failed to identify this practice.
(Section R4.3)
The licensee was effective at identifying problems, but was not as effective in resolving
and/or documenting them.
(Section R7.1)
C5
D
IV. Plant Support
R1
Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls
inS
IP
70
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances
surrounding and the licensee's investigation
regarding a January 26, 1998, occurrence of a shipment leaving the licensee's facility
without the proper shipping paperwork and without the truck having the proper placards
displayed.
b.
b ervati n
I
I
s
On January 26, 1998, the licensee prepared for transport, a shipment consisting of two
reactor coolant pump motor air coolers (one package), one reactor coolant pump motor
oil cooler, and one drum of oil. The reactor coolant pump coolers were classified as
radioactive material, surface contaminated objects, 7, UN2913, SCO-II; the oil was not
radioactive.
The truck was properly loaded and the required surveys were performed by
radiation protection (RP) personnel.
The truck was placarded and the driver was
instructed by the radiation materials specialist to wait for him to return and give the
driver the completed package of shipping paperwork.
Shortly thereafter, a licensee individual gave the driver a copy of a shipping
memorandum which briefly described the shipment contents, but did not discuss the
radioactive contamination or contain emergency response instructions.
The driver
assumed that this memorandum was the required paperwork and contacted his
dispatch.
Based on the information contained in the memorandum, the driver was
instructed to remove the placards and proceed.
Although the driver was inside the licensee's owner controlled area (but outside the
protected area), he was not required to be escorted and, therefore, there were no
licensee personnel to question the decision to remove the placards and prevent him
from leaving with the shipment.
Upon completion of the shipping paperwork, approximately two hours later, the licensee
discovered that the driver had left the site without the appropriate shipping paperwork or
emergency response information. RP personnel contacted the driver's dispatcher who
contacted the driver and instructed the driver to pull over and replace the placards.
The
proper shipping paperwork was also faxed to the driver before the shipment was allowed
to proceed.
The shipment subsequently arrived at its intended destination without
incident.
I S
49 CFR 172.200 requires, in part, that each person who offers a hazardous material for
transportation shall describe the hazardous material on the shipping paper in the
manner required by this subpart (subpart C). The failure to include shipping papers is
an apparent violation of 49 CFR 172.200 (EEI 50-315/980Q6-01 and 50-316/98006-01).
Additionally, 49 CFR 172.600 requires, with exceptions not applicable here, that no
person may offer for transportation, accept for transportation, transfer, store or
otherwise handle during transportation, a hazardous material unless emergency
response
information conforming to subpart G of 49 CFR Part 172 is immediately
available for use at all times the hazardous material is present.
Pursuant to 49 CFR
172.101, radioactive material is classified as hazardous material. The failure to include
the emergency response information with the shipment is an apparent violation of 49
CFR 172.600 (EEI 50-315/98006-02 and 50-316/98006-02).
Following this event, the licensee implemented corrective actions which included the
requirement that all drivers of radioactive shipments, prepared outside of the protected
area, be escorted until the required paperwork had been delivered and the shipment
was prepared to leave the site. The licensee indicated that this corrective action would
be evaluated to determine the need for alternate or additional actions.
ggnnl,isis>>;
The licensee failed to maintain positive control over a radioactive material shipment,
resulting in its leaving the site without the driver having the required shipping paperwork
or emergency response instructions.
Two apparent violations of regulatory
requirements were identified.
C
i
The inspectors reviewed an occurrence where the licensee identified that rugs with low
levels of contamination were being cleaned outside of the protected areas.
0
ati
F'
s
On January 11, 1998, workers removing two rugs from the Radiation Protection Access
Control (RPAC), alarmed the security portal radiation monitors.
RP personnel
responding to the event, identified contamination between 50-200 corrected counts per
minute on the rugs.
Subsequent
surveys, identified similar contamination levels on
other rugs located throughout the facility. The licensee believed the contamination
resulted from long-term buildup of residual activity.
Because the rugs were routinely cleaned in a utilitygarage outside the RCA, the
licensee performed soil sampling near the cleaning area.
Two of these samples were
contaminated with 4.8E-8 and 7.4E-8 microcuries per gram (uCi/g) of cobalt-60. About
144 cubic inches of soil was removed and subsequent
sampling identified no additional
contamination.
The affected soil was later disposed of as radioactive waste.
The licensee sent the contaminated rugs to an offsite facility (NRC licensed) for
cleaning.
The licensee's corrective actions in"luded changing the cleaning procedures
to require that the rugs be cleaned in place and the water disposed of into a
decontamination area sink. Rugs from the office building will be surveyed by RP prior to
removal for cleaning.
~lid
The licensee identified that rugs with low levels of contamination build-up on them were
being cleaned outside of the protected area.
The contamination to the soil was
identified and remediated, and corrective actions were appropriate.
Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment
I
R diati
n'
'es
n etin
I
The inspectors reviewed the operation and calibration methodology for the portable
beta~amma
monitoring equipment.
The inspectors walked down some of the
calibration facilityand equipment, observed radioactive source condition, compared
results from an independent calibration of certain instruments to the licensee's results,
and reviewed detector operability history, other calibration and test results, and selected
procedures.
rva '
i din
Calibration and instrument tests were performed as required, and equipment was as
described in the Final Safety Analysis Report.
The portable monitoring/survey
equipment consisted mainly of geiger-mueller (GM) and ion chamber detectors.
In
general, calibration and test methodology was technically sound for all portable
monitoring equipment reviewed during the inspection.
Neutron monitoring instruments
were calibrated by a vendor and all other portable monitoring equipment was calibrated
and tested by the licensee.
With the exception of the RM-14 and RM-20 detectors, all
portable instruments were calibrated using radioactive sources and were tested weekly
to ensure they responded within the + 20% of the known value. An experienced and
dedicated group of calibration technicians provided ownership over the calibration
program.
The RM-14 and RM-20 detectors were calibrated electronically at one point on each of
four scales on a yearly frequency.'he inspectors noted that although no radioactive
source was used to verify the electronic calibration results during the actual calibration
regimen, radioactive strontium-90 (Sr-90) sources were used to verify the instrument
was responding to within the prescribed tolerance limits before issuance.
This protocol
I
j
was required by the instrument issuance procedure (12 THP 6010RPI.500) and the
results of the verification were recorded on the test result sheet as "Satisfactory" or
"Unsatisfactory".
There was no documentation which identified the actual recorded values found during
the verification test using the Sr-90 sources.
During an independent verification of four
RM-14/RM-20 detectors, the inspectors noted that all four detectors responded at the
very low end of the + 20% allowed tolerance limitwhen using the most radioactive of the
two Sr-90 sources.
This observation was discussed with the licensee who investigated
the matter and found that the source in question had not been appropriately decay
corrected.
The lack of documented actual recorded values from the response checks
may have contributed to the licensee's unawareness
of the problem.
Corrective actions
taken to ensure proper detector response of the RM-14/RM-20 instruments willbe
reviewed during a future inspection.
(Inspection Follow-up Item(IFI) 50-315/98006-03
and 50-316/98006-03)
The inspectors noted that the relevant portable instrument calibration procedures
address actions that should be taken when the "as found " results were outside of the
acceptable tolerance limits. To prevent use of portable instruments that have possible
degraded detector performance, the licensee performed a weekly test using the primary
"Shepard Calibrator" to ensure all non-RM-14/RM-20 portable instruments respond to
within + 20% of the tolerance limits.
Qgg~s~in
With the exception of the inspector identified RM-14/RM-20 response check weakness,
the overall calibration and maintenance system for the portable instrument program
was effectively implemented.
Cal'tio
e
e
ta 'i
onit r
n
orta
tio
S
e
3
The inspectors reviewed the calibrations of the Aptec PMW-3 and PCM-1B whole body
friskers and the Gamma 40 security access portal monitors. The inspection included a
walkdown of the monitors, interviews with the RP staff, a review of test and calibration
records, observation of a whole body frisker (Aptec PMW-3) calibration, a review of
alarm set point methodology, and an independent review of the passive internal
monitoring program and whole body frisker and portal monitor sensitivities.
bserv tion
nd Fin in
During the walkdowns, the inspectors observed the monitors to be in good condition and
Workers were observed to be using the monitors correctly and in accordance
with station requirements.
The technicians performing the calibrations and testing were
part of a dedicated group who provide ownership of the program.
Completed calibration
records documented that required calibrations were accomplished at the appropriate
frequency and performed in accordance with procedures.
Whole body frisker test
results indicated they alarmed with about 100 % frequency at the set point limits of 5000
disintegrations per minute for each zone.
Portal monitor test results indicated they also
alarmed at an average frequency of 85% using an approximately 125 nanocurie source;
the radioactive source used to test both types of monitors is about equivalent to the set
point value.
The Passive
Internal Monitoring Program consisted of monitoring for internal
contaminants using the whole body friskers and the walk-through portal monitors.
These monitors were capable of detecting internal radioactive contaminates that would
produce 1% of the annual limiton intake (ALI)from gamma emitting isotopes.
Because
these monitors could not detect non-gamma emitting radioisotopes,
the licensee
performed an engineering review demonstrating that by using the stations known
radioisotopic mix to calculate the ratio of beta emitters to the gamma emitters, the
internal dose for all plant radioisotopes could be calculated.
This conclusion was
considered technically sound by the inspectors.
The inspectors also reviewed the
licensee's technical study used as the basis for implementing the passive internal
monitoring program, and the test results used to ensure the system was capable of
detecting 1% of the ALI. In addition, the inspectors performed an independent technical
review considering established whole body frisker monitor efficiencies, and known plant
gamma-emitter energies and abundance to ensure that the monitors were capable of
meeting the licensee's expected monitor response.
The results of this review also
indicated that the monitoring system should be capable of detecting 1% of an ALI.
~Co clos
Material condition of the Aptec PMW-3, PCM-1 whole body friskers and portal monitors
was good, and workers used this equipment appropriately.
Calibrations and tests were
performed at the required frequencies and response test results were good.
Independent reviews indicated that the monitoring instrumentation was capable of
detecting the established external and internal personal radioactive contamination limits.
R4
Staff Knowledge and Performance in RP&C
R4.1
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~Typed Qg
EH
it
E
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Do i
t
In
ti
The inspectors reviewed a November 6, 1997, event in which two workers entered the
Unit 2 regenerative heat exchanger room, a EHRA, with their electronic dosimetry (ED)
turned off. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's investigation of the matter, including
the adequacy of the radiation protection staft's actions, and discussed
the event with
applicable members of the RP staff.
,II
8
fv
n
On November 6, 1997, two workers entered the Unit 2 regenerative heat exchanger
room, a EHRA, with their EDs in the offmode.
The workers identified that their EDs
were not on after having been in the room for about seven minutes.
Both workers
notiTied the coverage radiation protection technician (RPT) and left the radiologically
controlled area (RCA).
An investigation performed by RP personnel determined that the EDs had been turned
offwhen a contract RPT had tried to adjust the dose rate and accumulated dose
settings.
The workers were working under radiation work permit (RWP) no. 97-1138
which had several different tasks, each task required different dose rate and
accumulated dose settings.
The RPTs had the capability to change these settings as
needed, based on the radiological conditions of the work area using a dosimetry reader.
However, the contract RPT who adjusted the EDs had never been trained on the use of
the dosimetry reader.
When. the contract RPT removed the EDs from the dosimetry reader he never looked at
the display to verify that they were functioning normally. Additionally, the workers never
verified that the EDs were on prior to entering the RCA. Each worker was assigned
31
mrem based upon a calculation using stay times and area dose rates.
Technical Specification (TS) 6.11 requires that procedures for personnel radiation
protection be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be
approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation
protection.
Procedure No. 12 THP 6010 RPP.120, Revision 0, "Issue and Control of
Dosimetry", requires that the individual using an ED confirm that it is operating properly
by ensuring that it is ON prior to RCA entry. Failure to follow the procedure is a violation
of TS 6.11 (VIO 50-315/98006-04; 50-316/98006-04).
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions documented
in condition report (CR) 97-
3153. Contract RPTs will be trained on the use of the dosimetry readers and will be
required to demonstrate proficiency on them prior to use.
Additionally, an operator aid
was to be developed to provide guidance on the use of the dosimetry readers.
The
inspectors were concerned that none of the corrective actions addressed
the procedural
violation even though the CR identified that no one checked the EDs to verify that they
were on (See Section R7.1).
The inspectors concluded that workers did not check their EDs prior to entering the RCA
to ensure that they were turned on, which is a procedural violation. Acceptable
corrective actions were taken to address the lack of training for contract RPTs who used
the ADR, however, the licensee's review of this matter had not sufficiently considered
the procedural requirement that workers check their EDs.
II
Cl
W r erAIarm dP
In
ti
P
0
The inspectors reviewed the November 10, 1997, event in which a worker had a hot
particle on his forehead which caused an alarm at the security gate house portal
monitors. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's investigation of the matter, reviewed
the adequacy of the radiation protection staff's actions, and discussed the event with
applicable members of the RP staff.
0
rvai n
nd
'
On November 10, 1997, a worker exited the protected area through the security gate
house portal monitors. The worker alarmed the monitors twice then went through again
and passed the third time. The worker was not aware at that time that he was required
to notify RP ifthe monitor alarmed twice. The worker was outside the protected area for
only a few minutes before reentering and monitoring again. After again alarming the
monitors, he contacted RP who subsequently identified a hot particle on his head.
Although the RP staff counseled the individual, the licensee was developing further
corrective actions.
Two CRs were written concerning this incident. One regarding the
RP evaluation of the hot particle and the other regarding the workers failure to notify RP
after twice alarming the monitors.
RP performed a thorough investigation as to how the worker was able to exit the RCA
without alarming the personnel contamination monitors (PCM) at the entrance/exit to the
RCA. Using a phantom, the hot particle, and information from the worker, RP
personnel simulated his exit. Results of the simulation indicated that the monitors would
have alarmed 100% of the time ifthe individual was wearing his hard hat.
Based on
these results and discussions with the worker the licensee concluded that the hot
particle got onto the workers head sometime between when he exited the RCA to when
he alarmed the security monitors. The RP staff calculated the worker's shallow dose
equivalent to be about 2.9 rem, which was significantly below the NRC limitof 50 rem.
The worker went from the monitors to the change area in the RPAC, after he had
dressed
he went directly to the gate house.
The RPAC was surveyed and no hot
particles were found. The RP staff stated that they had considered the possibility that
the worker had not worn his hard hat through the monitor at the RCA entrance/exit;
however, this possibility had not been documented
in the CR. RP indicated that they
would consider adding this possibility to the CR.
The inspectors interviewed the worker concerning his not informing RP of the alarms he
had received and he stated that he was not aware of this requirement at the time.
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that procedures
be established,
implemented and
maintained covering activities referenced
in the applicable procedures recommended
in
Appendix "A"of Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2, February 1978. Appendix "A"of
Regulatory Guide 1.33, recommends that procedures
be established governing
contamination control activities. Procedure No. 12 PMP 6010 RPP.300, revision 8,
"Contamination Control Program," requires, in part, that ifa contamination alarm is
10
I
8
'J
received a second (validation) count can be performed; and ifa second (VALID)
contamination alarm is received then notify RP (radiation protection) and wait in the
immediate area until RP arrives.
The failure to followthe procedure is a violation of TS 6.8.1. (VIO 50-315/98006-05 and 50-316/98006-05).
Additionally, the inspectors were also concerned that the CR had not been addressed
at
the time of the inspection, although the due date assigned was December 25, 1997.
The work group assigned to complete the investigation were unable to show the
inspectors that any work had been completed towards addressing the CR or to explain
how this had been overlooked.
During the exit meeting, plant management
requested
that RP accept responsibility for completion of this CR.
~Cnclu~si
The workers failure to contact RP after alarming the security gate house portal monitors
is a procedural violation. Additionally, the inspectors were concerned with the
conclusion regarding where the hot particle had come from. The CR concluded that it
had come from o'utside the RCA and even possibly outside the buildings, but did not
address other more likely scenarios.
Further, the inspectors were concerned
that the
CR addressing
the procedural violation had not been responded to at the time of the
inspection.
Ic
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've
Ins ecti n S
e
83750
The inspectors observed work occurring in the upper and lower ice condenser inside
containment.
0
'o
On February 12, 1998, while observing work being performed in the lower ice condenser
the inspectors identified several workers who were not wearing two sets of gloves as
required by RWP No. 981040.
Additionally, the ice crew workers stated to the
inspectors that this practice had been occurring for two to three weeks.
The inspectors
were concerned that RP had failed to identify this during their walkdowns of the area.
The workers were removing staples from a netting material and indicated that the nature
and detail of the work made wearing two sets of gloves impractical. The inspectors
discussed this with RP management who stated that workers having problems
performing their job while following RWP dress requirements are expected to discuss
the issue with RP management so that the requirement could be re-evaluated.
The job
was stopped and the workers supervisor was counseled.
Technical Specification 6.11 requires that procedures for personnel radiation protection
be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and be approved,
maintained and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation protection.
Procedure No. PMP 6010 RPP.006, revision 7, "Radiation Work Permit Program,"
11
8
requires, in part, that all personnel are responsible for understanding and complying with
the requirements of the posted revision of the RWP. Failure to followthe procedure is a
violation of TS 6.11 (VIO 50-315/98006-06 and 50-316/98006-06).
C.
Q oilOll~l
The inspectors were concerned with the nature of the above mentioned violation as well
as the violations cited in sections R4.1 and R4.2.
In the aggregate these three
violations indicate a decline in radworker performance.
In addition, the workers had
been disregarding the RWP dress requirements for two to three weeks and RP had
failed to identify this practice.
R7
Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities
The inspectors reviewed five condition reports (CRs) related to events that were
reviewed during this inspection.
Of the five, the inspectors identified concerns with the
following CRs:
CR 97-3153, concerning the workers in the EHRA with their EDs turned
off(section R4.1); CR 97-3204, concerning the licensee's investigation of a hot particle
event (section R4.2); and CR 97-3203, concerning a worker who twice alarmed the
security radiation portal monitors without contacting RP as required (section R4.2).
The specific concerns raised by the inspectors were:
CR 97-3153 did not consider corrective actions specific to the procedural
violation (i.e., that the workers verify that the EDs were operable prior to entering
the RCA);
CR 97-3204 did not fullydocument the licensee's investigation, specifically,
regarding the likelihood of the particle originating from inside the RCA and
whether the worker appropriately monitored via the PCM; and
CR 97-3203 was still open past the assigned due date of December 25, 1997
and the licensee could not determine why it had not been appropriately closed.
Based on these concerns, the inspectors concluded that the licensee was effective at
identifying problems, but was not as effective in resolving and/or documenting them.
This was discussed with licensee management,
who planned to evaluate the issue.
This matter willbe reviewed during a future inspection (IFI 50-315/98006-07; 50-
316/98006-07).
R8
Miscellaneous RP&C Issues
R8.1
Closed
In
ecti n Fol ow U
Ite
F
os.
-
97 2 -01
nd
-31
7 20-0
On October 14, 1997, RP personnel identified that a contractor had arrived at the facility
with several hot particles located in his shoe.
The inspectors reviewed the final dose
12
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l
!,I'
calculations used to determine the workers reportable dose for this hot particle exposure
for 1997. The calculation used 7 milligrams/centimeter'mg/cm') as the density
thickness of the skin of the foot, as required by 10 CFR Part 20, a tube sock was
measured by the licensee and that was determined to have a density thickness of
36.195 mg/cm'. The hot particles were decay corrected for a more accurate
assessment
and the final number assigned to the worker was 51.1 rem. Additionally the
licensee performed the analysis using 40 mg/cm's the density thickness of the foot,
this value is suggested
by International Council on Radiation Protection Report 23
(ICRP 23). No density thickness was determined for the sock however an air gap of 1
millimeter (mm) and a sock thickness of 1mm were assumed,
the dose received using
these assumptions was 50.7 rem. The inspectors agreed with this assessment,and
this
item is closed.
R8.2
1
-
an
0-
Resolution of Unit 1 blowdown
flashtank problems which caused liquid releases from condensed
airborne releases via
the Unit 1 blowdown startup flash tank which discharged through the storm sewer
system to Lake Michigan. Modifications were made on system components associated
with the moisture separator vent tank inlet piping to correct the problem. Tests
performed after the modification indicated that flowwas equally balanced between the
north and south tanks and water carryover was minimal. This IFI is considered closed.
V Mana
e
t
eeti
s
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
On February 13, 1998, the inspectors presented the inspection results to licensee
management.
The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identified.
13
'I
1(
jl
PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
R. Fard, Health Physicist
D. Helms, Senior Health Physicist
P. Holland, General Supervisor, Radiation Support
P. Hoppe, General Supervisor Radiation Controls
D. Noble, Radiation Protection Superintendent
M. Schaeffer, Radiation Materials Specialist
M. Snyder, Health Physicist
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
Occupational Radiation Exposure
Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive
Materials
Followup-Plant Support
Qgy~n
50-315/316-98006-01
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, OR DISCUSSED
Shipment of radioactive material without shipping paper
work
50-315/316-98006-02
50-315/316-98006-03
50-315/316-98006-04
50-315/316-98006-05
50-315/316-98006-06
50-315/316-98006-07
Iosed
Shipment of radioactive material without emergency
response paper work
IFI
Response
checks of detectors low end of acceptable
'ange
Failure to ensure EDs on prior to RCA entry
Failure to notify RP after monitor alarm
Failure to follow RWP dress requirement
IFI
Resolution and documentation of condition reports
50-315/316-97020-01
50-315/316-95013-03
IFI
Worker with hot particle in boot
IFI
Modification to U-1 blowdown startup flash tank
14
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
CFR
CR
EHRA
IFI
IjCI/gm
MREM
RPAC
RP&C
TS
Annual Limiton Intake
Code of Federal Regulations
Condition Report
Electronic Dosimetry
Extreme High Radiation Area
Final Safety Analysis Report
Inspection Followup Item
Microcuries Per Gram
Millirem
Personnel Contamination Monitor
Public Document Room
Radiologically Controlled Area
Radiation Protection
Radiation Protection Access Control
. Radiation Protection Technician
Radiation Protection and Chemistry
Radiation Work Permit
Technical Specifications
Violation
15
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
12PMP 6010 RPP.006, Radiation Work Permit Program
12PMP 6010 RPP.300, Contamination Control Program
12THP 6010 RPP,120, Issue and Control Of Dosimetry
12THP 6010 RPP.500, Radiation Protection Instruments
12THP 6010 RPC.517, Calibration of Portable Doserate Instruments
12THP 6010 RPI.500, Instrument Issue and Operability Testing
12THP 6010 RPC.525, Calibration of the Eberline RM-14 and RM-20 with associated
probes
12THP 6010 RPP.900, Preparation of Radioactive Shipments
Radioactive Material Shipment Record No. RMC-98-014
CR 97-3153
CR 97-3203
CR 97-3204
CR 98-0145
CR 98-0320
RWP 981040 U1F98 & U2F98 / U-1 & U-2 Upper Containment Maintenance