ML17333A543

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 211 & 196 to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74
ML17333A543
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 08/15/1996
From: John Hickman
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML17333A542 List:
References
NUDOCS 9608210197
Download: ML17333A543 (6)


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2055&4001 SA TY LUATION BY THE 0 F

C OF NUC EAR EAC OR R

GU A ION 0

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211 0

F CIL T OPE A ING IC NSE NO.

PR-58 N

AME DM T NO.

196 0

FAC LITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.

DPR-74 DIANA C

GAN POWER CO P

NY DONALD C.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NOS.

1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-315 AND 50-316

1. 0 INTRODUCTION By letter dated January 12, 1996, the Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) requested amendments to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended to Facility Operating License Nos.

DPR-58 and DPR-74 for the Donald C.

Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos.

1 and 2.

The proposed amendments would delete surveillance requirement 4.4. 11.3, which requires demonstrating the operability of the emergency power supply for the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) and block valves.

2. 0 EVALUATION The Cook Nuclear Plant pressurizer has three PORVs which limit reactor coolant system pressure.

The PORVs, which are spring closed and air-to-open upon actuation of their associated solenoid valve, operate automatically or by remote manual control.

Remotely operated stop valves are provided to isolate the PORVs.

The solenoid and block valves are electrically operated and powered from emergency buses.

The PORV solenoids are powered by the 250V DC power supply and the block valves are powered by the 600V AC power supply.

TS 4.4.11:3 currently states:

"The emergency power supply for the PORVs and block valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating the valves through a complete cycle of full travel while the emergency buses are energized by the onsite diesel generators and the onsite plant batteries.

This testing can be performed in conjunction with the requirements of Specification 4.8.1. 1.2.e and 4.8.2.3.2.d."

The licensee states that TS 4.4. 11.3 was added in response to.a NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations,"

post-TMI requirement.

The requirement was based on the majority plant design which powered the PORVs and block, valves from non-emergency power supplies.

Although the Cook PORVs and block valves are permanently powered from Class 1E emergency

buses, the licensee still implemented TS based on the NUREG requirement.

96082i0197 960815 PDR ADQCK 05000315 P

PDR

il 1i The current TS allows testing of the PORVs and block valves in conjunction with TS 4.8.1. 1.2.e and 4.8.2.3.2.d.

TS 4.8.1. 1.2.e requires verifying the operability of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) iricluding its ability to start on the appropriate signals and to energize the emergency busses.

During this test, the EDG powers the 600V AC power buses directly.and powers the 250V DC power buses by means of battery chargers.

TS 4.8.2.3.2.d requires performing a plant battery service test during shutdown to verify that the battery capacity is adequate to supply the actual or simulated emergency loads with the battery charger disconnected.

The licensee states that the coincident testing was implemented to. allow testing of the PORVs and block valves during testing that was already required to be performed on the EDGs and the plant" batteries.

These two surveillances, which demonstrate operability of the Class 1E emergency power supplies are not proposed to be changed by this amendment.

In addition, TS 4.4. 11.1 and 4.4. 11.2 are not proposed to be changed by this amendment.

TS 4.4. 11.1 requires demonstration of PORV'operability by operating the PORV and solenoid air control and check valves through one complete cycle of full travel at least once per 18 months.

During this surveillance the PORV's associated solenoid valves are powered by the 250V DC bus.

TS 4.4. 11.2 requires demonstration of block valve operability by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel at least once per 92 days.

During this surveillance the block valve is powered by the 600V AC bus.

Since these surveillances are conducted with the valves, connected to their normal (emergency)

buses, the surveillance demonstrated both the operability of the valves and the continuity of the valve's connection to the bus.

Section 50.36 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Re ulations established the regulatory requirements related to the content of TS.

The rule requires that TS include items in specific categories,"'including safety limits, limiting conditions for operation, and surveillance requirements.

The rule specifies that limiting conditions for'peration (and associated surveillances) are to be included in a plant's TS if the item meets one or more of the following criteria: (1) an installed instrumentation that is u'sed to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure

boundary, (2) a process
variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure 'of or presents a

challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier, (3) a structure,

system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier, or (4) a structure,
system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

The staff's review of the proposed change determined that the functionality of the emergency

buses, the PORV solenoid valves, the block valves',

and the conn'ections between the valves and buses are all verified by other surveillances.

Therefore, the performance of TS 4.4. 11.3 constitutes an integrated test that is redundant to th'e other testing and unnecessary.

Since 1

4 4

A A the operability of the PORV and block valves is fully demonstrated by other surveillances, TS 4.4.11.3 would not be specifically required by 10 CFR 50.36.

Additionally, the staff has previously stated in NUREG 1431, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants," dated April 1995, that the surveillance which requires demonstrating emergency power operation of the PORV and block valve is not required for plants with permanent 1E power supplies to the valve.

Based on the surveillance being unnecessary for the Cook plant design, that inclusion of the specific surveillance in TS is not required by 10 CFR 50.36 or other regulations, and the previously stated staff position, the proposed deletion of TS 4.4.11.3 is acceptable.

3.0 C

0 In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Michigan State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments.

The State official had no comments.

4.0 'VIRONME AL CONSIDERAT ON The amendments change surveilance requirements.

The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released

offsite, and that there is no significant'ncrease in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The Commission has previously issued a

proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 7554).

Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR. 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),

no environmental impact statenent or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5. 0 CONCLUSION The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the heal-th and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the. proposed

manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and:, safety of the public.

Principal Contributor:

John

Hickman, HRR August 15, 1996

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