ML17333A017
| ML17333A017 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia, Washington Public Power Supply System, Satsop  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1978 |
| From: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Strand N WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7811150013 | |
| Download: ML17333A017 (81) | |
Text
6P.II II500 c,"
'Ip0 o'.-%".
ill Vg
-'>>*++
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V SUITE 202
~ WALNUTCREEK PLAZA 1990 N. CALIFORNIABOULEVARD WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596 November 6, 1978 NOTE TO:
ALL THOSE ON IE CIRCULAR DISTRIBUTION LIST FROM:
IE, REGION V
SUBJECT:
IE CIRCULAR NO. 78 UL FIRE TEST The attached IE Circular 78-18 was issued this date to the following licensees:
I.
Arizona Public Service Company (Palo Verde 1, 2
8 3, Docket Nos.
50-528, 50-529, 50-530) 2.
Pacific Gas
& Electric Company (Humboldt Bay Unit 3, Diablo Canyon Units 1'& 2, Docket Nos.
50-133, 50-275, 50-323) 3.
Portland General Electric Company (Trojan, Docket No. 50-344) 4..
Sacramento" Municipal UtilityDistrict (Rancho
- Seco, Docket No. 50-312) 5.
Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Units 1, 2, 3, Docket Nos.
50-206, 50-361, 50-362) 6.
Washington Public Power Supply (llNP-l, WNP-2, WNP-3, WNP-4, and WNP.-5, Docket Nos. 50-4lj, 50-39 50-505, 50-513 and 50-509)
Region V has made distribution to the Accessions Unit for the
- PDR, Local
Enclosures:
1.
Transmittal Ltr.
2.
IE Circular No. 78-18 v 81 z 30 03]i
l
~PS R9GG
\\'G Wp.
+
0 Cy p 0>>
++*<<~
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V SUITE 202, WALNUTCREEK PLAZA I950 N. CALIFORNIA BOULEVARO WALNUT CRFEK, CALIFORNIA 94599 ttOV Docket Nos.
50-397 50-460 50-513 50-508 50-509 Washington Public Power Supply. System P. 0.
Box 968 3000 George Washington Way
- Richland, Washington 99352 Attention:
Hr. N. 0. Strand Managing Director Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Circular No. 78-18, is forwarded to you for information.
No specific action is requested and no written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, R. H. Enge'!ken Director
Enclosures:
l.
IE Circular No. 78-18 2.
List of IE Circulars Issued in 1978 cc w/encl:
M. E. Witherspoon, WPPSS A. D. Kohler, WNP-2, WPPSS J.
P.
IE Circular No. 78-18 November 6, 1978 Page 1 of 3 UL FIRE TEST
Background
On September 15,
- 1978, a fire test of' full-scale vertical cable tray array was conducted at the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) near Chicago, Illinois. It was part of the fire protection research program managed by Sandia Laboratories under NRC contract.
The purpose of the test was to demonstrate the effectiveness of area sprinklers and cable tray fire
'arriers constructed of ceramic fiber blankets in preventing damage to cables as a result of an exposure.to a flammable liquid fire.
The test resulted in damage to some electrical cables.
Discussion The configuration of the fire test was selected to simulate a section of a plant area with vertical cable trays containing redundant safety divisions arranged such that the redundant divisions could be simul-taneously exposed to a potential fire resulting from an inadvertent spill of flammable liquid in the area.
The arrangement of the cable trays and the designation of the redundant tray divisions is shown in Figure l.
Figure 2 shows the location of the fire detectors and the three groups of sprinklers.
Each of the five cable trays contained cable insulated with polyvinyl chloride and was enclosed in a separated ceramic fiber blanket fire barrier from floor to ceiling in accordance with the manu-facturer's recommendations. 'he sprinkler and detector arrangement was as permitted by NFPA Code.
- However, no water was actually used at any time during this test due to the failure of some sprinkler heads to
- actuate, as explained below.
Each sprinkler location in the test arrangement contained three nominally identical temperature sensing sprinkler heads with fusible links adjacent to an open sprinkler head which was connected to a manual water supply valve.
The temperature sensing heads were wired to signal when their links fused.
After all three temperature sensing heads at a given loca-tion activated, then the water supply for the open head was to be manually admitted.
The sprinklers were of a type which actuate at the slow end of acceptance for reaction time.
The test procedure required that all three temperature sensing heads had to activate before water would be turned on.
In this way, it was expected to get some data on variability in the response time of identical sprinklers.
IE Circular No. 78-18 November 6, 1978 Page 2 of 3 Test Details The test was started by igniting the two gallons of heptane that was poured into the floor pan.
A fully developed fire occurred almost immediately.
The ceiling smoke detector alarmed in about 15 seconds.
In about 50-60 seconds, two of the three temperature sensing sprinklers located between the wall and cable trays 1
and 2 activated.
The fire between cable trays 1, 2, 3, and 4 appear ed most intense, apparently because of a chimney effect between the four trays.
The flames between cable trays 3 and 5 did not appear to be so intense.
The ceramic fiber blanket absorbed some of the heptane so that after the heptane iri the pan burned, most of the flame seemed to come from the bottom outside surface of the ceramic fiber blanket.
No additional temperature sensing sprinkler heads at any location activated; thus, the sprinkler water supply was not turned on for any of the three sprinkler locations.
The apparent slow response of the third temperature sensing sprinkler is being investigated, since this was not intended to be a slow response sprinkler.
At about 3 minutes into the test there was an indication of a short circuit in cable tray 3, which was probably caused by the fire.
After 5-7 minutes the height of the flames appeared to subside;
- however, residual flames continued for about 40 minutes.
Preliminary Results and Analyses Preliminary information indicates that the fIammable liquid or flames penetrated the protective barriers at the bottom of'he vertical trays and caused fire damage to the polyvinyl chloride insulation on cables in four of the five trays.
On subsequent 500-volt megger tests, it was found that another cable in tray 2 had also experienced some damage, as evidenced by a conductor to ground short.
The most probable cause of the fire damage in certain cable trays appears to be related to the absorption or seepage of heptane under the ceramic fiber blanket at the juncture with the floor.
Once the heptane entered the interior regions of the cable tray, then ignition apparently occurred via the small opening at the floor or through a vapor/air path within the joints.
There is some indication that some cable damage was caused by absorption of heptane on the inside of the barrier (wicking effect) and its ignition which heated a cable tray ladder rung, causing damage to a cable in contact with the rung.
The ingress of the heptane into the ceramic fiber needs to be further evaluated since this appears to be the most significant failure mode.
IE Circular No. 78-18 November 6, 1978 Page 3 of 3 Tentative Conclusions The test results are still being analyzed, and it would be premature to establish firm conclusions at this time; however, the results now available indicate that the following areas of the fire protection program need close consideration:
1.
To protectagainst spills of flammable liquids, barriers or curbs may be needed to prevent entry of the flammable liquid behind fire barriers.
A wick effect may also need to be considered in the design of fire barriers.-
2.
Some small fires may not actuate sprinkler heads.
To reduce this possibility in sprinkler systems to be installed, fast response sprinkler heads should be considered (less than approximately 3 minutes in the UL Standard 199 "Automatic Sprinklers for Fire Protection Service" ).
3.
The location of the fire detection devices and the sprinkler heads relative to the fire, and components being protected is of great importance.
The path of the air movement in the area influences the actuation of such devices and should be considered in the system layout.
The final results of this test will be issued when the analysis of the test is complete.
This circular is being issued for information only.
No specific action is requested and no written response is required.
If you desire addi--
=
tional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Attachments:
1.
Figure 1
2.
Figure 2
0 Figure 1
0 approxvmate boundary Of pBA"fed liqUld Sp'all f'lr5f'
~ 3"+
10~je Di~
> ~ts"~
'ertical 7roy Corner Test
pgggg>~qATIC pkWlf pEfCCl'd' fg~my J py)s[j ICY H~az d g~ gpss spy; hC<h eor<~i~c+~h ~o gp f~y 4'tAffEjR l
pea' gg ls~ ~
)OP
~v.
g~5.
lt E~
FIOURK 2 ggp ylaK 6Kf4ERAt.
I
IE Circular No. 78-18 November 6, 1978 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1978 Circular No.
78-01 78-02 78-03 78-04 Subject Loss of Mell Logging Source Proper Lubricating Oil for Terry Turbines Packaging Greater Than Type A guantities of Low Specific Activity Radioactive r1aterial for Transport Installation Error That Could Prevent Closing of Fire Doors Date of Issue 4/5/78 4/20/78 5/12/78 5/15/78 Issued To All Holders of Mell Logging Source Licenses All Holders of
, Reactor OLs or CPs All Holders of Reactor OLs', CPs, Fuel Cycle, Priority I rlaterial and Maste Disposal Licenses All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs 78-05 Inadvertent Safety Injection 5/23/78 During Cooldown All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs 78-06 78-07 78-08 78-09 Potential Common Node Flooding of ECCS Equipment Rooms at BMR Facilities Damaged Components of a Bergen-Paterson Series 25000 Hydraul ic Test Stand Environmental qual ification of Safety Related Equipment at Nuclear Power Plants Arcing of General Electric Company Size 2 Contactors 5/23/78 5/31/78 5/31/78 6/5/78 All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs All Holders of CPs Enclosure 2
Page 1 of 2
IE Circu'lar No. 78-18 November 6, 1978 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1978 Circular Subject Date of No.
Issue Issued to 78-10 78-11 78-12 78-13 78-14 78-15 78-16 78-17 Control of Sealed Sources Used in Radiation Therapy Recirculation M-G Set Overspeed Stops HPCI Turbine Control Valve Lift Rod Bending Inoperability of Multiple
= Service Hater Pumps HPCI Turbine Reversing Chamber Hold Down Bolting Checkvalves Fail to Close In Vertical Position Limitorque Valve Actuators Inadequate Guard Training/
gualification and Falsified Training Records 6/14/78 6/15/78 6/30/78
~ 7/10/78 7/12/78 7/20/78 7/26/78 10/13/78 All Medical Licensees in Categories G-and Gl All Holders of BHR OLs or CPs All Holders of BHR OLs or CPs for plants with
'PCI Terry Turbine All Holders of Reactor OLs and CPs except for plants located in: AL, AK, CA>>
FL>>
GA>> LA>> MS>>
SC All Holders of BHR OLs or CPs for plants with a HPCI Terry Turbine
, excepting Duane Arnold and MonticelTo All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs All Holders of and applicants for Reactor OLs.
Enclosure 2
Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V 5UITE 202, WALNUTCREEK PLAZA 199D N. CALIFORNIABOULEVARD WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596 SEP 2 9 I978 Docket Nos.
50-460 50-509 50-513 Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 3000 George Washington Way
- Richland, Washington 99352 Attention:
Mr. N. 0. Strand Managing Director Gentlemen:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 78-12 which requires act'ion by you with regard to your power reactor facility(ies) with an operating license or a construction permit.
Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.
Sincer ely,
Enclosures:
List of IE Bulletins Issued in 1978 Enge ken Director cc w/enclosures:
M. E. Witherspoon, WPPSS A. D. Kohler, WNP-2, WPPSS J.
P.
- Thomas, WPPSS G.
K. Dyekman, WPPSS N. Lewis, WA Energy Facility
0 Q
UNITED SlATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 September 26, 1978 IE Bulletin No. 78-12 ATYPICAL HELD MATERIAL IN REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL HELDS Description of Circumstances On August 4, 1978, the NRC was informed by the Duke Power Company and the Babcock and Hilcox Company (BRH) that the weld wire used in some of the reactor vessel welds in Oconee Unit No.
3 may have differed from that specified.
A chemical analysis of one sample of archive material by BQ!
disclosed that the nickel content was measured to be O.l percent (versus 0.45 to 0.8 percent nominal specified) and the silicon content was measured to be 1.0 percent (versus 0.3 to 0.6 percent nominal specified)..
, The heat of weld metal in question was supplied by the Page
- Company, a
Division of the American Chain 8 Cable Co., Bowling Green, Kentucky to BSW, the manufacturer of the Oconee, Unit 3 vessel.
Further checks by BQl of its records have. identified eleven additional vessels in which the incorrect weld material may have been used.
Owners of these vessels have been notified.
The NRC staff has made a determination of the possible effects on reactor vessel integrity of the use, or possible use, of the improper weld material.
Weldments containing the atypical material are likely to have higher than normal nil-ductility transition temperature characteristics.
Therefore to maintain reactor vessel safety margins, implementation of new conservative pressure/temperature operating limits may be required.
Hhile the specific problem has been identified as possibly affecting twelve vessels manufactured by B&W, it is not possible to conclude in the absence of specific information that similar atypical weld material was not also supplied to other vessel manufacturers and used in reactor pressure vessel fabrication.
Action To Be Taken By Licensees and Permit Holders:
For all power reactor facilities with an operating license or a construction permit, except those already identified as possibly having atypical weld material Tl i
1 ih id eifi d h
i g
p fbi ypi pressure vessel weldments are:
Three Mile Island Unit Nos.
1 and 2, Crystal River Unit No. 3, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit No. 1, Oconee Unit No. 3, Rancho Seco Unit No. 1, Midland Unit No. I, Quad Cities Unit No. 2, Browns Ferry Unit No. 1, Turkey Point Unit No.
4 and Zion Unit Nos.
1 and 2.
1of 3
IE Bulletin No. 78-12 September 26, 1978 1.
Conduct a record search of all primary reactor pressure vessel 2
weldments (excluding ~artial penetration welds) and submit the following information a.
The principal vessel manufacturer.
If other manufacturers were utilized, identify those companies and the weldments completed by those firms.
b.
The type and form of weld materials and the identifying heat and lot numbers used in each weldment.
c..
The weld material manufacturer(s) and the types and form of materials supplied.
d.
The specified properties of the weld materials and the, completed weldments (Chemistry,. tensile and impact properties, as appropriate).
2.
Describe the procedures utilized during fabrication to verify conformance to the specifications.
Specifically provide the following:
a
~
Describe the type, number and dates of tests performed on welding materials to satisfy the material conformance testing requirements for each heat, lot or combination of heat and batch, etc., of welding materials used in the construction or repair of the reactor pressure vessel in your facility.
Ihdicate whether each heat, lot or batch subdivision (coil or spool) was tested and the extent of such testing, i.e., were both ends of a coil or spool of wire tested for each sub-arc flux-wire combination or heat-flux batch combination7 The record search may be performed by the vessel manufacturer and the requested information reviewed as appropriate by each licensee prior to forwarding to the NRC
. It is not the intent of this Bulletin to require each licensee to individually examine manufacturing records of a generic
~ nature.
Records of nonconforming conditions that may be identified by the manufacturer and are uniquely applicable to a specific vessel should however be carefully examined by the owner.
Some of the information requested by this Bulletin may have been previously supplied to the NRC under the Surveillance Program.
Information previously submitted may be referenced in lieu of resubmittal.
20f 3
IE Bulletin No. 78-12 September 26, 1978 b.
'escribe the type, number and dates of other tests such as procedure qualification, welder performance tests, in-process checks on post-weld tests which were performed.
c.
For each of the tests described in 2(a) and 2(b) above, descr ibe the parameters of each test and provide the results obtained.
Identify the applicability to specific weldments by correlation of heat, lot or batch as appropriate.
3.
Identify those cases of weld filler material which did not meet procurement specifications based on verification tests, i.e.
mechanical or chemical properties.
Describe the disposition action taken or the acceptance basis for utilization in vessel fabrication.
In such cases, discuss the effect that the atypical weld composition.has on the fracture toughness of the weld metal.
4.
Provide information on the availability of archive weld materials which might be used for verification purposes.
5.
Please provide your response in writing within 60 days.
Reports should be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy should be forwarded to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Construction Inspection, l<ashington, D.C.
20555.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7/31/80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
30f 3
r
IE Bulletin No. 78-12 September 26, 1978 LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN 1978 Bulletin No.
78-01 78-02 78-03 78-04'8-05 78-06 78-07 Subject Flammable Contact-Arm Retainers in G.E.
CR120A Relays Terminal Block gualification Potential Explosive Gas Mixture Accumula-tions Associated with BMR Offgas System Operations Environmental guali-fication of Cer tain Stem Mounted Limit Switches Inside Reactor Containment Malfunctioning of Circuit Breaker Auxiliary Contact Mechanism-General Model CR105X Defective Cutler-
- Hammer, Type M Relays With DC Coils Protection afforded by Air-Line Respirators and Supplied-Air Hoods Date Issued 1/16/78 1/30/78 2/8/78 2/21/78 4/14/78 5/31/78 6/12/78 Issued To All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facil ities with an OL or CP All BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities wi,th an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL, all class E and F
Research Reactors with an OL, all Fuel Cycle Facilities with an OL,
'nd all Priority 1 Material Licensees t
Enclosure 2
Page 1 of 2
LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN 1978 IE Bulletin No. 78-12 September 26, 1978,,
Bulletin No.
78-08 78-09 78-10 78-11 Subject Radiation Levels from Fuel Element Transfer Tubes BMR Drywell Leakage Paths Associated with Inadequate Drywell Closures Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Accumulator Spring Coils Examination of Hark I Containment Torus Melds Date Issued 6/12/78 6/14/78 6/27/78 7/21/78 Issued To All Power and Research Reactor Facilities with a Fuel Element transfe~ tube and an OL.
All BMR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All BMR Power
'eactor Facilities with an OL or CP BMR Power Reactor Facilities for action:
Peach Bottom 2 and 3, goad Cities 1 and 2, Hatch 1, Monti-cello and Vermont Yankee Enclosure 2
Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V SUITE 202, WALNUTCREEK PLAZA 1990 N. CALIFORNIABOULEVARD WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596 SEPSIS Wa NOTE TO:
ALL THOSE ON IE BULLETIN DISTRIBUTION LIST
, FROM:
IE, REGION V
SUBJECT:
IE BULLETIN NO. 78-12, ATYPICAL WELD MATERIAL IN PRESSURE VESSEL WELDS The attached IE Bulletin No. 78-12 was issued this date to the following licensees:
1.
Arizona Public Service Company (Palo Verde 1, 2,
& 3, Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529, 50-530)
.2.
Pacific Gas
& Electric Company (Humboldt ', Diablo Canyon Units 1
& 2, Docket Nos.
50-133, 50-275 50-3 3
3.
Portland General Electric Company (Trojan, Docket No. 50-344) 4, 5.
Sacramento Municipal UtilityDistrict (Rancho
- Seco, Docket No.
50-312)
Southern'alifornia Edison Company (San Onofre Units'1, 2,
& 3, Docket Nos. 50-206, 50-361, 50-362) 6.'ashington Public Power Supply QWNP-l, WNP-2, WNP-3, WNP-4, and WNP-5, Docket Nos. 50-4
, 50-397 0-508, 50-513, 50-509)
Region V has made distribution to the accessions Unit for the PDR, Local
Enclosures:
1.
Transmittal Letter 2.
~~
t
'I
8S Washington Public Power Supply System A JOINT OPERATING AGENCY P. O. BOX 988 3000 GXO, WASHtNOTON WAY TttcHt.ANO. WASHINOTON 99352 PHONE (509) 375.5000 August 2, 1978 G02-78-196 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V
Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza 1990 N. California Boulevard Walnut Creek, California 94596 Attention:
Mr. R.
H. Engelken, Director
Subject:
WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.
2 IE BULLETIN NO. 78-06 DOCKET NUMBER 50-397
Reference:
Letter,,
R.H. Engelken to N.O. Strand, same subject, dated May 31, 1978.
Dear Mr. Engelken:
The referenced letter transmitted the subject IE Bulletin.
The Supply System has requested our Architect Engineer to determine if our facility utilizes or plans to utilize any Cutler-Hammer Type M Relays with a
DC Coil.
Our Architect Engineer reports that Cutler-Hammer Type M Relays are not used in any safety related systems and are not planned for use in any safety re-'ated systems.
The above information completes our response to IE Bulletin 78-06.
Very truly yours, 5{,P.E.
D. L.
RENBERGER Assistant Director Generation 5 Technology DLR:GLC:seb cc:
Mr. D.
Roe Bonneville Power Administration NRC - Office of'nspection 8 Enforcement (Washington, D.C.)
~PA RE'0Ij
- .'~, JlllL~g
+a*++
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V SUITE 202, WALNUTCREEK PLAZA 1990 N. CALIFORNIA BOULEVARD WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596 JUL 8 6 @78 Docket Nos.
50-397 50-460 50-513 50-508 50-509 Hashington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 3000 George Hashington Hay Richland, Hashington 99352 Attention:
Mr. N. 0. Strand Managing Director Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Circular No. 78-16, is forwarded to you for information.
No written response is required.
Should you have any questions related to your understanding of this matter, please contact thi.s office.
Sincerely, gv.~
R.
H. Engelken Director
Enclosures:
l.
IE Circular No. 78-16 2.
List of IE Circulars Issued in 1978 cc w/encl:
L. L. Grumme, HPPSS A. D. Kohler, HNP-Z, HPPSS J.
P. Thomas, HPPSS G.
K. Dyekman, HPPSS N. Lewis, HA Energy Facility 2
IE Circular Ho. 78-16 July 26, 1978 Page 1 of 2 LIMITORQUE VALVE ACTUATORS Description of Circumstances:
At Rancho
- Seco, a Limitorque Type SMB-2 motor-driven valve actuator in a safety feature system failed to function.
The failure resulted from clutch wear which was due to manual operation of the valve and improper heat treatment of the clutch parts.
Other SMB valve actua-tors at Rancho Seco had been subjected to undue clutch wear but were still operable.
Based on information obtained from the licensee and from Limitorque Corporation, undue wear appears to be limited to Type SMB-O, 1, 2, and 3 valve actuators equipped with 3600 rpm motors.
The type SMB valve actuator is provided with a handwheel so that the valve can be actuated manually in the event that power is unavailable.
To shift from motor drive to handwheel drive, the operator must manually position a clutch so that the motor is disengaged from the drive train and the handwheel is engaged.
The clutch latches into this position and cannot be manually repositioned.
The next time that the motor is energized, the latch releases automatically and a spring repositions the clutch so that the motor engages the drive train.
1 When the clutch is repositioned, a pair of lugs on the motor-side of the clutch engages a pair of lugs on the valve-side.
At the instant the lugs engage, the lugs on the motor-side are being accelerated to full speed and the lugs on the valve-side are stationary.
Before the motor is energized, the relative position of the lugs is random.
This initial position determines the depth of engagement or bite at the instant the lugs make contact.
i<hen a full bite occur s, no damage is caused to the lugs.
When a grazing bite occurs, the edges of the lugs are chipped or upset.
After the edges are sufficiently rounded, the clutch will not engage and hold for motor actuation.
The licensee estimated that the failure of the Type SMB-2 valve actuator occurred after it had been clutched 25 to 100 times.
The valve which failed to function at Rancho Seco (SFY-25003) is operated by the actuator and is a safety features valve in a line connecting the borated water storage tank to a high pressure safety injection pump and a decay heat removal (low head safety injection) pump.
The valve actuator is wired so that the valve which it controls will drive to the fully open or fully closed position once the motor is energized.
IE Circular 78-16 July 26, 1978 Page 2 of 2 r
SFY-25003 is used for various routine operations during refueling, e.g.
adding borated water to the primary cooling system.
In these instances, the operator uses SFY-25003 as a throttle valve.
To do this, the valve must be actuated manually, giving rise to the potential damage to the lugs as described above.
This would not occur with the type of valve actuator that is clutched with the motor at rest.
- Likewise, a separate throttle valve for supplying borated water during routine operation would preclude the need for manual oper ation of the subject valve actuator.
Limitorque Corporation has a test program in progress for determining the clutch life of Type SMB 0, 1, 2, and 3 valve actuators.
Results to date are inconclusive.
Pending other resolution of the problem, the licensee has stated that the valve will be stroked with the motor drive to ensure that the clutch has engaged the motor following manual actuation of the valve.
All licensee and construction permit holders should consider:
For Limitorque Type SMB-O, 1, 2, and 3 valve actuators with 3600 rpm motors which are used or will be used in engineered safety systems; 1)
The potential for failure of the actuators resulting from manual operation, 2)
Means for minimizing manual operation
- and, 3)
Procedures for verifying that the actuator is operable with the motor after manual operation.
No written response to this Circular is required.
If you require additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
IE Circular No. 78-16 July 26, 1978 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1978
\\
Circular Subject No.
Date of Issue Issued To 78-01 78-02 78-03 78-04 Loss of Well Logging Source Proper Lubricating Oil for Terry Turbines Packaging Greater Than Type A guantities of Low Specific Activity Radioactive Material for Transport Installation Error That Could Prevent Closing of Fire Doors 4/5/78 4/20/78 5/12/78 5/15/78 All Holders of Well Logging Source Licenses All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs All Holders of Reactor
- OLs, CPs, Fuel Cycle, Priority I Material and Waste Disposal Licenses All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs 78-05 Inadvertent Safety Injection 5/23/78 During Cooldown All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs 78-06 78-07 78-08 78-09 Potential Common Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment Rooms at BWR Facilities Damaged Components of a Bergen-Paterson Series 25000 Hydraulic Test Stand Environmental qualification of Safety Related Equipment at Nuclear Power Plants 1
Arcing of General Electric Company Size 2 Contactors 5/23/78 5/31/78 5/31/78 6/5/78 All Holders of Reactor.OLs or CPs All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs All Holders of CPs Enclosure Page 1 of 2
IE Circular No. 78-16 July 26, 1978 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1978 78-10 Control of Sealed Sources Used in Radiation Therapy Circular Subject No.
Date of Issue 6/14/78 Issued to All Medical Licensees in Categories G
and Gl 78-11 78-12 78-13 78-14 78-15 Recirculation M-G Set Overspeed Stops HPCI Turbine Control Valve Lift Rod Bending Inoperability of Multiple Service Water Pumps HPCI Turbine Reversing Chamber Hold Down Bolting Tilting Disk Check Valves Fail to Close With Gravity in Vertical Position 6/15/78 6/30/78 7/10/78 7/12/78 7/20/78 All Holders of BWR OLs or CPs All Holders of BWR OLs or CPs for plants with HPCI Terry Turbine All Holders of Reactor OLs and CPs except for plants located in: AL, AK, CA, FL, GA, LA, MS, SC All Holders of BWR OLs or CPs for plants with a HPCI Terry Turbine excepting Duane Arnold and Monticello All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs Enclosure Page 2 of 2
'1
~P,A II600 I
oO
<r+
/p +a*++
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V SUITE 202 ~ WALNUTCRELK RLAZA 1990 N. CALIFORNIABOULEVARD WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596 July 21.
1978 Docket Nos.
50-397 50-460 50-513 50-508 50-509 Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 3000 George Hashington Way Richland, Washington 99352 Attention:
Mr. N. 0. Strand Managing Director Gentlemen:
The enclosed Circular 78-15, is forwarded to you for information. If there are any questions related to your understanding of the suggested
- actions, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
~ /f0~
R.
H Ehgelke irector
Enclosures:
l.
IE Circular No. 78-15 2.
List of IE Cir culars Issued in 1978 cc w/enclosures:
L. L. Grumme, WPPSS A.
D. Kohler, HPPSS J.
P.
- Thomas, WPPSS G.
K. Dyekman, WPPSS N. Lewis, HA Energy Facility
IE Circular No. 78-15 July 20, 1978 Page 1 of 1
TILTING DISK CHECK VALVES FAIL TO CLOSE WITH GRAVITY IN VERTICAL POSITION The Anchor/Darling Valve Company reported to the NRC on May 23,
- 1978, a
condition at the San Onofre Nuclear Plant where an 8" - 15008 tilting disk check valve failed to close with gravity because it was installed in a vertical rather than a horizontal pipeline.
The valve disc was counter weighted to close with the force of gravity when installed in a horizontal pipe.
The manufacturer did not determine the reverse flow necessary to close the improperly installed valve.
The check valve is located in the Low Pressure Safety Injection System as the first valve inside the containment, and may not have closed as required to maintain the containment integrity.
Anchor/Darling has notified all purchasers of such valves and indicated to them possible implications of vertical installations.
It should be noted that similar problems may arise with tilting disk check valves from other manufacturers.
Tilting disk check valves can be designed for either horizontal or vertical piping but not for both.
Improperly installed tilting disk check valves will not function properly.
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits should be aware of the potential for malfunction of safety-related systems caused by improperly positioned tilting disk check valves.
Consideration should be given to the importance of verifying that all such valves in critical systems are installed only in the orientation specified by the manufacturer.
No written response to this circular is required.
If you require additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the Regional office.
IE Circular No. 78-15 July 20, 1978 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1978
'ircular Subject No.
Date of Issue Issued To 78-01 78-02 78-03 78-04 78-05 78-06 78-07 78-08 78-09 Loss of Well Logging Source Proper Lubricating Oil for Terry Turbines Packaging Greater Than Type A guantities of Low Specific Activity Radioactive Material for Transport Installation Error That Could Prevent Closing of Fire Doors Inadvertent Safety Injection During Cooldown Potential Common Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment Rooms at BWR Facilities Damaged Components of a Bergen-Paterson Series 25000 Hydraulic Test Stand Environmental gualification of Safety Related Equipment at Nuclear Power Plants Arcing of General Electric Company Size 2 Contactors 4/5/78 4/20/78, 5/12/78 5/15/78 5/23/78 5/23/78 5/31/78 5/31/78 6/5/78 All Holders of Well Logging Source Licenses All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs All Holders of Reactor
- OLs, CPs, Fuel Cycle, Priority I Material and Waste Disposal Licenses All Holders of Reactor OLs or~
CPs All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs All Holders of Reactor OLs or CPs All Holders of CPs Enclosure Page 1 of 2
C
/
Vg
~ ~ ~
IE Circular No. 78-15 July 20, 1978 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IH 1978 Circular Subject Date of Ho.
Issue' Issued to 78-10 78-11 78-12 78-13 78-14 Control of Sealed Sources Used in Radiation Therapy
'ecirculation M-G Set Overspeed Stops HPCI Turbine Control Valve Lift Rod Bending Inoperability of Multiple Service l]ater Pumps HPCI Turbine Reversing Chamber Hold Down Bolting 6/14/78 6/15/78 6/30/78 7/10/78 7/12/78 All Medical Licensees in Categories G
and Gl All Holders of BNR OLs or CPs All Holders of BHR OLs or CPs for plants with HPCI Terry Turbine All Holders of Reactor OLs and CPs except for plants located in: AL, AK, CA, FL, GA, LA, MS, SC All Holders of BklR OLs or CPs for plants with a HPCI Terry Turbine excepting Duane Arnold and Monticello Enclosure Page 2 of 2
4'
)I
vive Ij'lcIshington Public Power Supply System A JOINT OPERATING AGENCY P. Q. BOX 988 3000 GEO. WAsHINl TON WAY RICHLAND, WASHINaroN 99352 PHONE (509) 3+5 500 July 18, 1978 G02-78-185 Nucl ear Regulatory Commission Region V
Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza 1990 N. California Boulevard Walnut Creek, California 94596 Attention:
Nr.
R.
H. Engelken Director 9
0 25 8
Subject:
. WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.
2 IE BULLETIN NO. 78-10 DOCKET NUMBER 50-397
Reference:
- Letter, R.
H. Engelken to N. 0. Strand, same subject, dated June 27, 1978
Dear Nr. Engelken:
The referenced letter transmitted the subject IE Bulletin.
The Supply System'has reviewed our specification and contract status and has determined, that Bergen - Paterson hydraulic shock suppressors have not been specified or approved for use on Project WNP-2 in safety related applications.
Very truly yours, DLR:GLC:seb D. L.
RENBERGER
.Assistant Director, Generation 8 Technology cc:
Mr. D.
Roe - Bonneville Power Administration NRC - Office of Inspection 8 Enforcement (Washington, D. C.)
0 p ~
~l
C600, o
II v,
+>>*++
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V SUITE 202, WALNUTCREEK PLAZA 1990 N. CALIFORNIABOULEVARD WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596 JUL 17 578 Docket No.
50-397 Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 3000 George Washington Way
- Richland, Washington 99352 Attention:
Nr. N. 0. Strand Managing Director Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Circular No. 78-14, is forwarded to you for information.
No written response is required.
Should you have any questions related to your understanding of this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, R.
H. Engelken Director
Enclosures:
l.
IE Circular No. 78-14 2.
List of IE Circulars Issued in 1978 cc w/encl:
L. L. Grumme, MPPSS A. D. Kohler, WNP-2, WPPSS N. Lewis, WA Energy Facility
'a I
IE Circular No. 78-14 July 12, 1978 Page l of 2 HPCI TURBINE REVERSING CHAMBER HOLD DOl!N BOLTING Recent inspections by the Philadelphia Electric Company of HPCI turbines at Peach Bottom 2/3 facilities disclosed broken cap screws and missing clamping plates which secure the turbine reversing chambers.
The cap screws are used to fasten clamping plates and reversing chamber rails to the support ring.
Additional detailed information is available in Section 6 of the HPCI Terry Turbine instruction manual.
Missing parts were recovered from components in the turbine steam exhaust piping and unrecovered parts are believed to be in the torus.
Subsequent examina-tion of the cap screws indicated the failures resulted from fatigue.
The design'of the cap screws includes a 1/4 inch deep concentric counter bore from the threaded end.
Failures generally occurred at the base of the counterbore with a few failures occurring at the base of the screw head.
The screw length of 1 1/4 inches allows about 5/16 inches of thread engagement in the support ring.
After review, the vendor (Terry Steam Turbine Company) recommended modification of the bolting design to prevent recurrence.
An interim solution was to replace the 3/8-16 X
1 1/4" long ASTM A574 socket head cap screws with similar 1 1/2" long cap screws.
This required deeper drilled and tapped holes in the support ring to prevent the longer screws from bottoming.
Later, the General Electric Company advised of a further modification from Terry Turbine consisting of bolting the reversing chamber directly to the support ring, lockwiring the cap screws and eliminating the clamping plate.
In addition, the replacement cap screws were changed to 3/8-16 X 1" long ASTM A193 Gr.
B6 with a Rockwell Hardness of Rc28 or less.
Information supplied by the Terry Steam Turbine Company indicates that similar turbines were supplied for HPCI systems at the following facil-ities:
Browns Ferry Unit Nos.
1, 2, and 3; Brunswick Unit Nos.
1, and 2; Cooper; Vermont Yankee; Fermi Unit No. 2; J. A. FitzPatrick; Hatch Unit Nos.
1 and 2; Hope Creek Unit Nos.
1 and 2; Limerick Unit Nos.
1 and 2; Pilgrim Unit No. 1; Shoreham; Susquehanna Unit Nos.
1 and 2.
In addition, HPCI Terry Turbines were also supplied for Monticello and Duane Arnold;
- however, these applications involved smaller machines which incorporate a single turbine wheel and reversing chambers which are supported with-out clamping plates, and therefore are not subject to similar failure of cap screws.
(
l
E Circular No. 78-14 July 1 2,
1 978 Page 2 of 2 All holders of BMR operating licenses or construction permits for facilities with a similar HPCI Terry Turbine should be aware of the potential for failure of the turbine reversing chamber hold down bolting. It is recommended that inspection of the clamping plate cap scr ews be included in the next inspection of these turbines.
If the present bolting design is inadequate, it is further recommended that the nuclear steam supplier and vendor be contacted for assistance in determining the appropriate modification.
No wr itten response to this Circular is required.
If additional information is needed regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
IE Circular No. 78-14 July 12, 1978 C
LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1978 Circular No.
'8-01 78-02 78-03 78-04 78-05 78-06 78-07 78-08 78-09 78-10 Subject Loss of Well Logging Source Proper Lubricating Oil for Terry Turbines Packaging Greater Than Type'A guantities of Few Specific Activity Radio-active Material for Transport Installation Error That Could Prevent Closing of Fire Doors Inadver tent Safety Injection During Cooldown Potential Common Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment Rooms at BWR Facilities Damaged Components of a Bergen-Paterson Series 25000 Hydraulic Test Stand Environmental equal if ication of Safety Related Equipment at Nuclear Power Plants Arcing of General Electric Company Size 2 Contactors Control of Sealed Sources Used in Radiation Therapy Date
~ of Issue 4/5/78 4/20/78 5/12/78 5/15/78 5/23/78 5/23/78 5/31/78 5/31/78 6/5/78 6/14/78 Issued To All Holders of Well Logging Source Licenses
. All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL),
Construction Permits (CP),
Fuel Cycle, Priority I Material and Waste Disposal Licenses All Holders of an NRC Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of a Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Medical Licensees in Categories G and Gl iy og I
Enclosure 2
Page 1 of 2
IE Circular No. 78-14 July 12, 1978 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1978 Circular Subject No.
Date
.of Issue Issued To 78-11 78-12 78-13 Recirculation M-G Set Overspeed Stop HPCI Turbine Contro1 Value Lift Rod Bending Inoperability of Multiple Service Mater Pumps 6/15/78 6/30/78 7/10/78 All Holders of BHR OLs or CPs All Holders of BHR OL's or CPs except as listed in Encl.
2 All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP) except for plants located in:
AL, AK, CA, FL, GA, LA, MS, SC
~p 1
Enclosure 2
Page 2 of 2
II ~
II 4
Cy
'o 0
C
}
o, I
(B o 'W~
gg
~O
+a*+~
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V SUITE 202e WALNUTCREEK PLA2A 1990 N. CALIFORNIABOULEVARD WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596 July 10, 1978 Docket Nos.
50-397 50-460 50-513 50-508 50-509 Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 3000 George Washington Way
- Richland, Washington 99352 Attention:
Mr. N. 0. Strand Managing Director Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Circular No. 78-13 is forwarded to you for information.
If there are any questions related to your understanding of the suggested
- actions, please contact this office.
Sincerely R.
H. Engelken Director
Enclosures:
l.
IE Circular No. 78-13
- 2. 'ist of IE Circular s Issued in 1978 cc w/enclosures:
L. L. Grumme, WPPSS A. D. Kohler, WPPSS J.
P.
- Thomas, WPPSS G.
K. Dyekman, WPPSS N. Lewis, WA Energy Facility
k t
T
IE Circular No. 78-13 July 10, 1978 Page 1 of 2 INOPERABILITY OF SERVICE WATER PUMPS Description of Circumstances:
On January ll, 1978, Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, a 4-loop Westinghouse PWR with once-through cooling located on the Delaware River, experienced high strainer differential pressures and the loss of four of six installed service water pumps within a period of approximately thirty minutes.
At the time of this occurrence, the river surface was covered'ith a layer of frazil (slush) ice to an unknown depth.
Each service water pump discharge is equipped with an R.
P.
Adams VDWS-68 automatic self-cleaning strainer.
The indication of failure was high strainer differential pressure.
Subsequent investigation showed that each of the four strainers had broken shear pins in the backwash shaft which caused the self-cleaning feature to become inoperable.
The internals of the strainers revealed no unusual debr is which could have 'caused differential pressures high enough to shear the pins.
Each service water pump takes suction near the bottom of individual bays in the intake structure.
Examination of the bays revealed that silt had accumulated to significant heights between the traveling screen and pump suction in each of the bays associated with failed strainers.
The combined effects of high silt "walls," low river water level, and the surface ice, probably caused the pump suction to receive only ice-entrained water.
This mixture then caused the strainers to clog and shear the backwash shear pins due to the high differential pressures.
By the time the strainers were opened for inspection, the ice had melted.
The safety significance of this event stems from the potential, under a unique set of environmental circumstances, for a complete loss of service water.
Corrective actions included the establishment of a periodic surveillance program to ensure that silt levels in the service water bays do not reach a level sufficiently high to cause recurrence of this event.
J
IE Circular No. 78-13 July 10, 1978 Page 2 of 2 Holders of operating licenses or construction permits for power reactors who receive this Circular should review the service water design and postulated conditions. in the ultimate heat sink 'to ensure that a similar combination of surface ice, water level, and forebay silting could not pr ecipitate inoperability of the service water system.
If such condi-tions are credible, a program to monitor the conditions at the service water intake structure should be implemented and procedures established for corrective action to be taken under normal and emergency conditions.
No written response to this Circular is required.
If you require additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
IE Circular No. 78-13 July 10, 1978 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1978 Circular No.
78-01 78-02 78-03 78-04 78-05 78-06 78-07 7,8-08 78-09 78-10 Subject Loss of Well Logging Source Proper Lubricating Oil for Terry Turbines Packaging Greater Than Type A guantities of Few Specific Activity Radio-active Material for Transport Installation Err or That Could Prevent Closing of Fire Doors Inadvertent Safety Injection Dur ing Cooldown Potential Common Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment Rooms at BWR Facilities Damaged Components of a Bergen-Paterson Series 25000 Hydraulic Test Stand Environmental (}ualification of Safety Related Equipment at Nuclear Power Plants Arcing of General Electric Company Size 2 Contactors Control of Sealed Sources Used in Radiation Therapy
, Date of Issue 4/5/78 4/20/78 5/12/78 5/15/78 5/23/78-5/23/78 5/31/78 5/31/78 6/5/78 6/14/78 Issued To All Holders of Well Logging Source Licenses All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL),
Construction Permits (CP),
Fuel Cycle, Priority I Material and Waste Disposal Licenses All Holders of an NRC Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of a Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Medical Licensees in Categories G and Gl Enclosure 2
Page 1 of 2
l' I
IE Circular No. 78-13 July 10, 1978 Circular Subject No.
LISTING OF,IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1978 Date Issued To of Issue 78-11 78-12 Recirculation M-G Set Over speed Stop HPCI Turbine Control Value Lift Rod Bending 6/15/78 6/30/78 All Holders of BLAIR OLs or CPs All Holders of BMR OL's or CPs except as listed in Encl.
2 Enclosure 2
Page 2 of 2
Ilk t
6P,R BECB (4
~4 0
cy Q
~O Wp*yW 0
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V SUITE 202'ALNUT CREEK PLAZA I990 N. CALIFORNIA BOULEVARD WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596 JUN 30 1978 Docket No.
50-397 Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 Attention:
Nr.
N. 0. Strand Nanaging Director Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Circular No. 78-12, is forwarded to you for information.
No written response is requir ed.
Should you have any questions related to your understanding of this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, Mug@
Enclosures:
1.
IE Circular No. 78-12 2.
List of IE Circulars Issued in 1978 6/O P cc w/encl:
L. L. Grumme, WPPSS A. D. Kohler, WNP-2, WPPSS N. Lewis, WA Energy Facility
IE Circular No. 78-12 June.30, 1978 Page 1 of 2 HPCI TURBINE CONTROL VALVE LIFT ROD BENDING In March 1977, during routine surveillance testing of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system at Cooper Nuclear Station, it was found that the minimum turbine speed attainable via control valve regulation by the speed governor was 4000 rpm.
This indicated that the control valves were remaining partially open even though the control system was sending a shut signal.
The HPCI turbine is manufactured by the Terry
'team Turbine Company.
Investigation revealed that the control valve liftrods were bent.
The initial cause was thought to be improper linkage length adjustments causing positive overtravel in the closed position.
Subsequent
- review, while not discounting the previous conclusions, determined that the bending may have resulted from binding due to scale or rust buildup on the rods.
The control valve liftrods have a series of circumferential reliefs for steam leakage control.
Material wedging between the rod relief area and the rod bushing in the steam chest could cause momentary seizure and bending of the liftrods during the rapid closure action associated with a quick start.
Subsequent to this event a review was made to determine the extent of a possible generic problem in the area.
It was determined that the problem affects only the HPCI turbine with its multiple control valves; other applications using Terry Turbines, as in the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) in BWRs and the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump in PWRs, are not affected since they incorporate a different control system.
During the review, GE representatives were consulted and it was learned that bent lift rods had been reported at four operating BWRs.
In response, GE issued Service Information Letter (SIL) No. 223, dated July 8, 1977'--
and associated instruction/drawing sheets to GE nuclear power facilities having HPCI turbines.
That SIL together with the instruction/drawing sheets identified'he control valve lift rod problem and the recommended cor rec-tive action.
The recommended action by GE for BWR facilities with a HPCI turbine as set forth in the SIL is quoted as follows:
"l.
Examine the control valve linkage assembly for any evidence of binding, rust or scale accumulation.
Examine the lift rod for evidence of bending.
Damaged liftrods should be replaced.
Do not attempt to rework or straighten.
IE Circular No. 78-12 June 30, 1978 Page 2 of 2 "2.
Verify proper control valve linkage lengths as defined on the lever diagram contained in Section 9 of your HPCI Terry turbine instruction manual.
These measurements should be taken with the turbine in the cold condition.
"3.
Exercise the control valve linkage on a weekly basis, either manually or by starting the auxiliary oil pump, and verify total valve travel and freedom of movement.
"Iomediately report any abnormal conditions noted in the above checks to your local General Electric service representative.
"In. addition, General Electric recommends that BWR operators install a linkage modification which will reduce the bending moment on the lift rods during opening and closing cycles.
The hardware and an FDI detailing installation instructions will be made available at no charge in approximately 3 months.
Following installation and check out of this modification, the weekly check (item 3 above) may be discontinued."
ALL HOLDERS OF BOILING WATER REACTOR OPERATING LICENSES OR CONSTRUCTION PERMITS FOR FACILITIES WITH A HPCI Terry Turbine should be aware of the possibility of a scale or corrosion product buildup in the steam chest bushing area and possible liftrod seizure.
The information and recom-mendation provided by General Electric should be referred to for appropriate corrective action.
No written r esponse to this Circular is required.
If you require additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
~'
IE Circular No. 78-12 June 30, 1978 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1978 Circular No.
78-01 78-02 78-03 78-04 78-05 78-06 78-07 78-08 78-09 78-10 Subject Loss of Well Logging Source Proper Lubricating Oil for Terry Turbines Packaging Greater Than Type A guantities of Few Specific Activity Radio-active Material for
,Transport Installation Error That Could Prevent Closing of Fire Doors Inadvertent Safety Injection During Cooldown Potential Common Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment Rooms at BWR Facilities Damaged Components of a Bergen-Paterson Series 25000 Hydraulic Test Stand Environmental equal if ication of Safety Related Equipment at Nuclear Power Plants Arcing of General Electric Company Size 2 Contactors Control of Sealed Sources Used in Radiation Therapy Date of Issue 4/5/78 4/20/78 5/12/78 5/15/78 5/23/78 5/23/78 5/31/78 5/31/78 6/5/78.
6/14/78 Issued To All Holders of Well Logging Source Licenses All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL),
Construction Permits (CP),
Fuel Cycle, Priority I Material and Waste Disposal Licenses All Holders of an NRC Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of a Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
'All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Medical Licensees in Categories G and Gl Enclosure 2
Page 1 of 2
IE Circular No. 78-12 June 30, 1978 Circular Subject No.
L'ISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1978 Date Issued To of Issue 78-11 Recirculation M-G Set Overspeed Stop 6/15/78 All Holders of BWR OLs or CPs Enclosure 2
Page 2 of 2
~
~
~
Esf" p
tIINashington Public Power Supply System JOINT OPERATING AGENCY Is. O. BOX 908 3000 GCD, WASHINCTCN WAY RICHLAND, WASHINCTON 99352 PHONE (509)) 375.5000 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V
Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza 1900 N. California Boulevard Walnut Creek, California 94596 June 29, 1978 602-78-167 9
PKr-I'IEO Y JIJL Q
19 I8 L
IIEC!GIIV
~
RIOPECTIoiI b EIIFGlICcitEKT Attention:
Mr. R.
H. Engelken Director
Subject:
WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.
2 IE BULLETIN NO. 77-07 CONTAINMENT ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES DOCKET NUMBER 50-397
Reference:
602-78-20, letter, D.L. Renberger to R.H. Engelken, same subject, dated January 18, 1978
Dear Mr. Engelken:
The reference letter responded to the NRC that the Supply System would check insulation resistance at time of instal-
-lation and thereafter maintain a positive internal pressure.
The subject penetrations are now being installed and we wish to clarify the intent of the referenced response.
The Supply System will check insulation resistance before plant start up and thereafter maintain a positive internal pressure.
t Please advise if you have any questions regarding the above.
Very truly yours, DLR:GLC:seb D. L.
RENBERGER Assistant Director Generation 8 Technology cc:
Mr. D.
Roe - Bonneville Power Administration
'IIRC - Office of Inspection S Enforcement (ltashtngton, O.C.)
6P,It 8600 'Ip O~
ie cso sI ~*y+
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V SUITE 202'ALNUT CREEK PLAZA 1990 N. CALIFORNIABOULEVARD WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596 June 27, 1978 Docket Nos~0 50-397 50-50 50-509 50-513 Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 3000 George Washington Way
- Richland, Washington 99352 Attention:
Mr. N. 0. Strand Managing Director Gentlemen:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 78-10 which requires action by you with regard to your power reactor facility(ies) with an operating license or a construction permit.
Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, Engelken Director"
Enclosures:
l.
List of IE Bulletins Issued in 1978 cc w/enclosures:
L. L. Grumme, WPPSS J.
P.
K. Dyekman, HPPSS N.
D. Lewis, HA Energy Facility
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.
20555 June 27, 1978 IE Bulletin No. 78-10 BERGEN-PATERSON HYDRAULIC SHOCK SUPPRESSOR ACCUMULATOR SPRING COILS Description of Circumstances:
During the conduct of hydraulic shock suppressor (snubber) functional testing and seal replacement programs at several licensed facilities, a
number of broken accumulator spring coils have been found in early model Bergen-Paterson hydraulic snubbers.
The attached extract from a Bergen-Paterson advisory letter, dated April 6, 1978, states that a broken accumulator spring alone would not render the snubber incapable of performing its design function; however, the broken spring could cause internal damage to the accumulator which could result in unit inoper-abi1 ity.
The subject snubbers are of the external pipe design with serial numbers 487,000 to 515,000 and F60,635 through F75,000.
The accumulator springs in these snubbers are basically carbon steel and were coated with a petro-chemical rust preventative by the vendor.
Despite this initial protective coating, those springs found broken exhibited advanced stages of corrosion.
The factors which caused the spring corrosion are un-determined.
Bergen-Paterson has recommended that corrosion susceptible accumulator spring coils be replaced with teflon coated or stainless steel coils during the next refueling shutdown.
Action to be Taken by Licehsees:
FOR ALL PO'HER REACTOR FACILITIES WITH AN OPERATING LICENSE OR A CONSTRUCTION PERMIT:
l.
If you have received the enclosed Bergen-Paterson letter addressing the accumulator spring problem, and if you have these units installed or in ready spares at your facility, it is requested that you describe what corrective action you have taken or plan to take to assure that the operability of snubbers in safety related systems is not impaired.
It is also requested that you describe the condition of any springs that were observed during the performance of the corrective action.
1 of 2
IE Bulletin No. 78-10 June 27, 1978 2.
If you have not received the enclosed Bergen-Paterson letter, it is requested that you describe what action you plan to take if the subject snubbers are installed or in ready spares at your facility to assure that the'operability of snubbers in safety related systems is not impaired.
3.
If the snubbers are currently installed in safety related
- systems, it is requested that you identify their location in your response to this bulletin.
4.
Report in writing within 45 days for facilities with an operating license and within 60 days for facilities with a construction permit, your plan of action and,schedule with regard to Items 1
and 2.
Reports should be submitted to the Director of the appro-priate NRC Regional Office and a copy should be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington D.
C.
20555.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
Attachment:
Extract from Bergen-Paterson letter dated April 6, 1978 2of 2
- Attachment Extract from Bergen-Paterson Advisory Letter Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
B/P Hydraulic Snubbers HSSA Accumulator Spring Advisory Letter Bergen-Paterson advises that broken accumulator spring coils have been found in a number of early model hydraulic snubbers at the time when units were being dissembled for seal replacement purposes.
The early models noted are identified as being the external pipe design having serial numbers between 487,000 and 515,000 and F60,635 through F75,000.
These units were initially furnished wi th music wire or chrome silicone spring material both coated with a rust preventative.
All later external pipe design units were initially furnished wi th springs having the same material as noted above; however, all coils were teflon coated.
Our current model units are furnished with stainless steel coils.
Both the teflon coated and stainless coils have been found to give satisfactory service.
It is specifically pointed out that a unit remains functional even with a broken spring;
- however, the possibility does exist that the debris from a"broken spring coil could in fact cause damage to the Accumulator Piston U-Cup Seal resulting in possible leakage of fluid.
The remote possibility for the Accumulator Piston to become jammed in the tube also exists although, however, this has not been.experienced.
Bergen-Paterson has issued this advisement to make users aware of the possibility of broken accumulator springs and recommends that units having uncoated coils be refitted with either teflon coated or stainless steel coils at the next refueling shutdown.
Very truly yours, BERGEN-PATERSON PIPESUPPORT CORP.
Attachment 1
Page 1 of 1
~ IE Bulletin No. 78-10 June 27, 1978 LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN 1978 Bulletin No.
78-01 78-02 78-03 78-04 78-05 78-06 Subject Flammable Contact-Arm Retainers in G.E.
CR120A Relays Terminal Block Qualification Potential Explosive Gas Mixture Accumula-tions Associated with Bl(R Offgas System Operations Environmental Quali-fication of Certain Stem Mounted Limit Switches Inside Reactor Containment Malfunctioning of Circuit Breaker Auxil-iary Contact, Mechanism-General Model CR105X Defecti ve Cutl er-
- Haomer, Type M Relays With DC Coils Date Issued 1/16/78 1/30/78 2/8/78 2/21/78 4/14/78 5/31/78 Issued To All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All BlJR Power Reactor Facilties with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP 78-07 78-08 Protection Afforded by 6/12/78 Air-Line Respirator s and Supplied-Air Hoods Radiation Levels from 6/12/78 Fuel Element Transfer Tube All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL, all class E and F Research Reactors with an, OL, all Fuel Cycle Facilities with an OL, and all Priority 1 Material Licensees All Power and Research Reactor Facilities with a Fuel Element Transfer Tube and an OL Enclosure 2
Page 1 of 2
1 IE Bulletin No. 78-10 June 27, 1978 LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN 1978 Bulletin No.
Subject Date Issued Issued To 78-09 BHR Dr~veil Leakage 6/27/78 Paths Associated with Inadequate Drywell Closur es All BHR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP Enclosure 2
Page 2 of 2
4 t
wO j$
9 5g Washington Public Power Supply System A JOINT OPERATING AGENCY P. O. BoX Qdd 3000 Gso. WAsHwcrov WAr Rtc~aANo. WAswNoro~ QQ352 PHOHs (50Q) 375.5000
. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V
Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza 1990 N. California Boulevard Walnut Creek, California 94596 June 15, 1978 G02-78-157
"/i
~h~ "(Qs ~
Attention:'r.
R.
H. Engelken Director
Subject:
IE BULLETIN N.'/78-0 DOCKET NUMBE 50-397 WPPSS NUCLEAR P MECH <0.
2 5
Reference:
- Letter, R.
H.
E el n to N. 0. Strand, same subject, April 14, 1978.
Dear Mr. Engelken:
The referenced letter transmitted the subject IE Bulletin.
The Supply System has requested our Architect Engineer to determine if our facility utilizes or plans to utilize any GE.Model CR105X auxiliary contact mechanisms, as listed in the subject IE Bulletin.
Our Architect Engineer reports that this type of mechanism is not utilized in any safety related application at WNP-2 ~
Very truly yours, DLR:GLC:kap D. L.
RENBERGER Assistant Director Generation and Technology cc:
Mr. D. Roe, Bonneville Power Administration NRC - Office of Inspection and Enforcement (Washington, D.C.)
([0
T
Is gAII R600C
~C Wp0
+w*w+
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V SUITE 202'ALNUT CREEK PLAZA 1990 N. CALIFORNIABOULEVARD WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596 June 15, 1978 Docket No.
50-397 Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 Attention:
Mr. N. 0. Strand
~
Managing Director Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Circular No. 78-11, is forwarded to you for information.
No written response is required.
Should you have any questions related to your understanding of this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, R. H. Engelken Director
Enclosures:
l.
IE Circular No. 78-11 2.
List of IE Circulars Issued in 1978 cc w/encl:
L. L. Grumme, WPPSS A. D.. Kohler, WNP-'2, WPPSS N. Lewis, WA Energy Facility
)
IE Circular No. 78-11 June 15, 1978 Page 1 of 2 RECIRCULATION,. M-G SET OVERSPEED STOPS A
b In August, 1977, personnel at the Cooper Nuclear Station reported finding the recirculation M-G set overspeed mechanical and electrical stops at 112 percent and 120 percent of rated core flow.
The licensee had believed the set point to be 107 percent for these
- stops, although a
search of Station preoperational and startup test records could not establish the actual initial set point.
Subsequent to this finding, the licensee set the mechanical stop at 102 percent of rated core flow.
The technical specifications require that the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) be maintained greater than 1.22 for 8 X 8 fuel.
The technical specifications further require MCPR to be above a, minimum of 1.22 times K
whenever operating at less than rated flow.
The correction fattier K
is always greater than or equal to 1.0 and thus increases the MCPR imit when at less than rated flow.
Technically, this factor increases the required RCPR thermal margin in the event a recirculation M-G set speed control failure would occur and allow the recirculation pump to overspeed.
The lower the initial core flow, the more severe is the flow transient, thus Kf increases as actual core
'low is decreased.
The Kf factor is read from a curve included in the technical specifications.
A family of K curves is given in the figur e in the technical specificationf.
The proper curve to use is the curve corresponding to the set point of the manual flow control overspeed stop (the M-G set mechanical stop).
A lower set point of the overspeed stop results in a small Kf correction factor for a given core flow, as the flow transient on an M-G set speed control failure is less severe.
Thus, it can be seen that by using a lower curve (e.g.,
107 percent curve) than that required by the actual overspeed stop set point (believed to have been set at 112 percent),
a nonconservative Kf correction factor was being used.
The M-G set overspeed stops were set during the preoperational test program by a General Electric Company startup engineer.
The stops were checked by a GE preoperational test procedure.
This procedure did not include a requirement to specifically record the stop setting.
It included only a requirement to verify that the stop setting had been made.
It appears, likely that these same procedures, and perhaps the same
- engineer, were involved in the preoperational/startup test programs at several other sites.
~E 1r I
IE Circular No. 78-11 June 15, 1978 Page 2 of 2 All holders of operating licenses for Boiling Mater Reactor plants employing recirculation M-G sets should be aware of the potential for improperly or,.undocumented settings on recirculation M-6 set speed stops.
It is:recommended that the following be considered in your review:
~ s 1.
Facility;records should be searched to determine if the actual existing set point on the recirculation M-G set overspeed mechanical stops is positively established.
2.
If the setting of the mechanical and electrical overspeed stops is in doubt, then steps should be initiated to determine the setting or additional conservatism should be included in the determination of K
3.
The actual R
being used for the process computer calculations in the deter ination of RCPR limits should be verified to be appropriate to (or more conservative than) the actual setting of the recirculation M-G set mechanical overspeed steps.
This circular is also issued to holders of BWR Construction Permits for information or use as appropriate to assure that steps are taken during the preoperational test program to confirm that the M-6 over-speed stops are set properly and that the proper Kf will be used with the process computer.
No written response to <his circular is required.
If you require additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
IE Circular No. 78-11
. June 15, 1978 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN 1978 Circular No.
78-01 78-02 78-03 78-04 Subject I
Loss of. Well Logging Source".
Proper Lubricating Oil for Terry Turbines Packaging Greater Than Type A guantities of Few Specific ActivityRadio-active Material for Transport Installation Error That Could Prevent Closing of Fire Doors Date of Issue 4/5/78 4/20/78 5/12/78 5/15/78 Issued To All Holders of Well Logging Source Licenses All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL),
Construction Permits (CP),
Fuel Cycle, Priority I Material and Waste Disposal Licenses A
All Holders of an NRC Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP) 78-05 78-06 78-07 78-08 78-09 78-10 Inadvertent Safety Injection Dur ing Cooldown Potential Conmon Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment Rooms at BWR Facilities Damaged Components of a Bergen-Paterson Series 25000 Hydraulic Test Stand Environmental gual ification of Safety Related Equipment at Nuclear Power Plants Arcing of General Electric Company Size 2 Contactors Control of Sealed Sources Used in Radiation Therapy 5/23/78 5/23/78 5/31/78 5/31/78 6/5/78 6/14/78 All Holders of a Reactor, Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Holders of Reactor Operating Licenses (OL) or Construction Permits (CP)
All Medical Licensees in
~ Categories G and Gl Enclosure 2
Page 1 of 1
I Jl p