ML17328A675
| ML17328A675 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1990 |
| From: | Dan Barss, Foster J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17328A676 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-90-03, 50-315-90-3, 50-316-90-04, 50-316-90-4, NUDOCS 9004300114 | |
| Download: ML17328A675 (37) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1990003
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION 'III
Reports
No. 50-315/90003(DRSS);
50-316/90004(DRSS)
Docket Nos.
50-315;
50-316
Licensee:
Company
1 Riverside Plaza
Columbus,
OH
43216
Licenses
No.
Facility Name:
D.C.
Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and
2
Inspection At:
D.C.
Cook Site,
Bridgman, Michigan
Inspection
Conducted:
April 2-6,
1990
Inspectors:
J.
os
e
Team Leader
Date
4/~l/a
Date
Approved By:
W. Snell, Chief
Radiological Controls
and
Emergency
Preparedness
Section
Date
Ins ection
Summar
Ins ection
on
A ril 2-6
1990
(Re orts
No. 50-315/90003(DRSS).
50-316/90004(DRSS
)
11
annual
emergency
preparedness
exercise involving observations
by four
NRC
representatives
of key functions
and locations during the exercise
(IP 82301),
and followup on previous
Open Items (IP 92701).
Selected
portions of the
Operational
Status of the
Emergency
Preparedness
Program module (IP 82701)
were also completed.
Results:
No violations, deficiencies
or deviations
were identified.
This was
an unannounced,
after-hours, offsite partial participation exercise
involving
a considerable
challenge to the licensee's
program.
The licensee
demonstrated
good response
to a challenging hypothetical
scenario
involving multiple
equipment fai lures
and
a large radiological release.
Some areas,
including
timeliness of facility activation,
could still be improved.
90043001i4
50C>42.
Poli
ADOCK 0.00031
9
DETAILS
NRC Observers
and Areas
Observed
J.
Foster,
Control
Room, Technical
Support Center
(TSC), Operations
Support Area (OSA), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
D. Barss,,EOF
D. Passhel,
Control
Room,
G. Stoetzel,
OSA, In-plant Teams
iT
Persons
Contacted
American Electric Power
Indiana Michi an Power
Com an
~A. Blind, Plant Manager
"J. Rutkowski, Assistant Plant Manager,
Production
- B. Svensson,
Licensing Activity Coordinator
K. Baker, Operations
Superintendent
"J.
Sampson,
Operations
Superintendent
D.
Loope, Radiation Protection Supervisor
"M. Barfelz, Safety
and Assessment
Department
- L. Bounds,
AEPSC,
Emergency
Planning
"B. Burgess,
Simulator Coordinator
"M. Jury, Security
"R. Krieger,
Cook Plant Emergency
Planning Coordinator
- R. Heydenburg,
Site equality Assurance
"T. Stephans,
Production Supervisor
Engineer,
Operations
~I. Fleetwood,
ACC -
~G. McCullough, Training, Simulator
~C.
Ross,
Managerial
"D. -Londut, Managerial
"G. Griffin, Stores
E. Gerschoffer,
Security
~Denotes
those attending the
NRC exit interview held on April 6, 1990.
The inspectors
also contacted
other licensee
personnel
during the course
of the inspection.
Licensee Action on Previousl
Identified Item (IP 92701
Closed)
0 en Item No. 315/89027-01:
During the 1989 annual
Exercise,
Protective
Act>on Recommendat>on
PAR) information did not receive
adequate
review,
and there were errors in
PAR information transm'ission
to State of Michigan personnel.
During the present exercise,
PARs were
discussed
with State officials and background information provided to
insure State officials were aware of the reasons
for recommended
PARs.
PARs were clearly communicated
to appropriate
State officials.
Initial
and periodic update
messages
to State officials included
PAR information.
These
messages
were reviewed
and approved
by appropriate
senior utility
management
in the
EOF.
This item is closed.
,
General
An exercise of the D.C.
Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and
2 Emergency
Plan was conducted at the D.C.
Cook Nuclear Plant site
on April 3, 1990.
The exercise
tested
the licensee's
and offsite organization's
capabilities to respond to a simulated accident scenario resulting in a
major release
of radioactive effluent.
The licensee
conducted
an
off-hours,
unannounced
exercise.
This was
a "partial participation"
exercise
including partial participation by the State of Michigan and full
participation
by Berrien County.
Attachment
1 describes
the Scope
and
Objectives of the exercise
and Attachment
2 describes
the exercise
scenario.
I
5.
General
Observations
a.
Procedures
This exercise
was conducted
in accordance
with 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix
E requirements
using the D.C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Emergency
Plan
and
Emergency
Plan Implementing Procedures.
b.
Coordination
The licensee's
response
was coordinated,
orderly and timely. If
the scenario
events
had been real, the actions
taken by,the licensee
would have
been sufficient to permit State
and local authorities to
take appropriate
actions to protect the publ.ic's health
and safety.
c.
Observers
The licensee's
observers
monitored
and critiqued this exercise
along with four NRC observers.
d.
Exercise Criti ues
6.
A critique was held with the licensee
and
NRC representatives
on
April 5, 1990,
two days after the exercise.
The
NRC discussed
the observed
strengths
and weaknesses
during the exit interview.
On April 6, 1990,
a public critique was held where
NRC and Federal
Emergency
Management
Agency (FEHA) representatives
discussed'the
tentative findings from the exercise
evaluation
teams.
S ecific Observations
(IP 82301)
a.
Control
Room (CR)
This is the second year that the licensee
has utilized the Control
Room simulator to drive annual
Exercise actions.
Simulator use
greatly enhances
the degree of realism involved in an exercise
scenario.
A simulated Technical
Support Center
(TSC) was also
utilized.
In general,
Control
Room personnel
responded
well to the simulated
conditions presented
to them via the simulator.
They promptly
recognized
the system
alarms displayed, classified events
and
made proceduralized notifications properly.
Also, in general,
they displayed
an excellent
knowledge of applicable
procedures,
and procedure
usage
was evident.
The public address
announcements
to plant personnel
were
considerably
improved relative to last year's
exercise.
Each
announcement
was clearly audible,
and contained the emergency
classification,
information regarding the reason for the
classification,
and additional essential
information as req'uired.
P
C't
0150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br />,
a rough leak rate calculation indicated
an Reactor
Coolant System
(RCS) leakrate of approximately
18 gallons per minute,
well above applicable Technical Specifications.
An Unusual
Event
was declared at 0159 hours0.00184 days <br />0.0442 hours <br />2.628968e-4 weeks <br />6.04995e-5 months <br />, utilizing ECC-14, the proper
Emergency
Action Level
(EAL) per the licensee's
EAL scheme.
At 0208 hours0.00241 days <br />0.0578 hours <br />3.439153e-4 weeks <br />7.9144e-5 months <br />,
an Alert was properly declared,
based
on the amount
of primary to secondary
leakage.
During initial notifications of the Alert declaration,
at 0218 hours0.00252 days <br />0.0606 hours <br />3.604497e-4 weeks <br />8.2949e-5 months <br />,
the communicators
were utilizing Procedure
PMP 2080
EPP. 106 "Initial
Offsite Notification."
The Controller noticed that the necessary
call to the Security organization
had not been
made,
and that the
procedure
did not include
a requirement for such
a call.
This
guidance is contained in the Alert procedure
(PMP 2080
EPP. 103)
itself.
To preserve
the scenario timeline, the Controller directed
the communicators
to call the Security organization.
This was not
a prompt, but a recognition that the procedure
in use
was either
inadequate
or inappropriate
and would invalidate the scenario
timeline.
A procedural
error was
made
by Control
Room personnel
early in the
scenario,
forcing a minor modification of the scenario timeline and
affecting
some later actions.
The operators
had properly entered
Procedure
No.
Ol-OHP 4023.002.003
Tube Leak", in
response
to the sc'enario
tube leak.
This is a relatively new
procedure, still in Revision 0, with an effective date of ..
November 20,
1989.
Step
3 of the procedure calls for the
operators to implement
a normal plant shutdown per the guidance
in Procedure
No.
01-OHP 4021.001.003
"Power Reduction."
Step 3.a
of the tube leak procedure
indicates that the Unit shutdown should
be complete,
and Step 3.b indicates that when the Unit shutdown is
complete,
then continue with Step 4, which directs the operator to
perform an emergency
boration of the Reactor Coolant System.
This
step insures
adequate
The operators
inadvertently initiated Step 4,
emergency boration,
prior to Unit shutdown.
Emergency boration of the operating reactor
caused
a rapid decrease
in reactor power,
a primary to secondary
power mismatch,
and
a rapid primary system
cooldown.
The resulting
rapid Reactor Coolant cooldown'educed
primary pressure
to the point
where the reactor trip setpoint
was reached,
and
a Safety Injection
initiated.
The reactor trip was several
minutes prior to that
anticipated in the exercise
scenario,
and the simulator operators
initiated the loss of offsite power earlier (so as to maintain the
integrity of other data built into the scenario).
Procedure
No.
01-OHP 4023.002.003
Tube Leak," should
be reviewed to determine if appropriate
warnings exist regarding
emergency
boration of the
RCS while the Unit is at power'.
This
is an
Open Item (No. 315/90003-01).
Additionally, there were few plant status briefings in the Control
Room (although the operators
appeared
to be very aware of overall
plant status),
and personnel
there
gave few "repeatbacks";in
response
to orders
from the Unit Supervisor.
"Procedures
used" plastic plates
are available in the Control
Room.
These plates
are intended to aid in organizing the process
of exiting from, and possibly later returning to,
a procedure.
"Procedure
used" plates
seemed
cumbersome
to work with, and since
there were only four of them, it would tend to make reconstitution
of events
more difficult.
There
was
a
CR log recorder;
however,
but information was not as complete
as in past exercises.
By the
end of the drill, a number of procedures
were open
on the Unit
Supervisors
desk.
Requests
for action by the
CR to the Technical
Support Center
(TSC)
need to be more accurate
and timely; there
was
much confusion
over
the CR's request to send personnel
to upper containment to check
pressurizer
Power Operated Relief Valve
(PORV) emergency air bottles
and Radiation Protection
(RP) coverage.
About an hour
elapsed
from
inception of the idea to the
TSC response
to have personnel
enter
with only a dose rate meter (There were
no more
RP Technicians
available).
The initial initiating events,
(DMIMS) system alarm (suggesting
possible
mechanical
fuel
damage
including the digital metal
impact
monitoring system,
and high Reactor
Coolant
Pump vibration, were
not communicated to the other emergency facilities.
Later in the
exercise,
participants
did not understand
the root source of the
radioactive releases,
but they accepted
the fact that a release
was taking place.
Based
upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's
program was acceptable.
Technical
Su
ort Center
(TSC)
As in last year's exercise,
the licensee utilized a simulated
Technical
Support Center
(TSC) located adjacent to the Control
Room
Simulator.
This facility has displays
and layout mimicking the real
TSC,
and the displays
are driven by the simulator.
Use of this
facility greatly enhanced
the realism of the accident scenario.
As
with the use of any simulated facility, it was recognized that this
does introduce "exercise artifacts" or differences
in performance,
due to the location of the facility differing from the actual
facility.
(This can affect staffing times
and communication flow.).
The TSC was declared
"manned" at 0315 hours0.00365 days <br />0.0875 hours <br />5.208333e-4 weeks <br />1.198575e-4 months <br />.
Facility activation
was delayed while awaiting minimum staffing to be met.
.Mhile a
statement
to the effect that "the TSC is manned"
was made,
a formal
announcement
of facility activation
was not made.
Mith the exception of the initial scenario
events,
TSC personnel
were very aware of plant status
and events,
and actively sought
methods of halting of mitigating the accident scenario
events.
Personnel
assigned
the. TSC positions displayed
good exercise
deportment
throughout the exercise.
Noise levels in the
were good,
and the
TSC manager periodically cautioned his staff
to maintain the noise level
needed for communication.
Appropriate
attention
was devoted to reviewing ongoing events to determine if
a change
in emergency classification
was warranted.
Excellent
command
and control
was demonstrated
by the
TSC manager.
He assigned
tasks to his staff, prioritized their actions
and the
actions
requested
from the Operations
Staging Area
(OSA) to be
performed
by in-plant teams.
Priorities were revised
as the
ongoing situations
changed.
This was excellent.
There were frequent
and detailed
event status briefings'n the
TSC.
The
TSC Manager
had
TSC personnel
thinking about contingency actions
(e. g., "what can
we do if we loose auxiliary spray").
Excellent
technical
discussion
system
(CRCS) depressurization
via auxiliary spray
and the effect this might have
on pressurizer
spray valves were noted.
Status
board maintenance
got off to a slow start,
and
some information
was initially not available.
Status
board writers coped with this
situation,
and kept the boards
adequately well maintained throughout
the exercise.
Based
upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's
program was acceptable.
0 erational
Su
ort Area
The on-shift staff assembled
in the
OSA rather than the cafeteria
just above the
OSA,
as is provided for by Procedure
(Evacuation of Plant Personnel).
General
Employee Training also
states
that personnel
should assemble
in the cafeteria.
The Public
Address
(PA) announcement
stated that personnel
should report to
the basement
of the Lakeside Office Building, for accountability.
This is correct;
however, after personnel
cavd-in at the basement
they should immediately proceed to the cafeteria
(arrows
on the
floor depict the intended path,
but one card reader
was out of service).
Had this event
been during normal work hours, on-shift personnel
assembling
in the
OSA could have slowed
OSA activation considerably.
The on-shift Radiation Protection Technician
(RPT, the first arriving
member of the
OSA staff) didn't have
a key to the box which contained
keys to the radiation protection offices.
He had to break the glass
window of the box.
Licensee
personnel
indicated that this is the
desired
sequence
of events.
'v
The
RPT properly established
contamination control points a't the
North and South entrances
to the
OSA and initiated habitability
surveys.
The
OSA was declared
operational
at 0315 hours0.00365 days <br />0.0875 hours <br />5.208333e-4 weeks <br />1.198575e-4 months <br />.
The
OSA maintained
good communications with in-plant teams during the exercise.
Teams
used radios
as the primary communication
means with telephones
used
as
a backup.
There were more than
an adequate
number of phones
available in the radiation protection area
and the staging area
of the
OSA.
Briefing, debriefing,
and tracking of in-plant teams
was good.
Response
Team Request
forms and
Team Briefing forms from
Procedure
were completed for each
team dispatched,
from the
OSA.-
The Radiation Protection Director (RPD) and the
appropriate skill supervisor
were involved in the formal team
briefings.
Debriefings were conducted
when key teams returned
from the field.
No formal briefings were provided to the
OSA staff located in the
North staging
room.
A status
board
was located in the
room for
players to obtain information on plant status,
and an individual
was assigned
to maintain the board.
However, during the briefing
of the offsite field teams,
one team
member asked what type of
accident
was occurring.
Therefore,
the status
boards
may not have
provided sufficient information or been
read
by the
OSA staff.
A
brief verbal briefing given by the
OSA Manager
or Assistant
Manager,
covering topics
such
as plant status,
emergency classification,
offsite release
potential
and high radiation levels in the plant,
would be beneficial.
The
OSA appeared
to be delayed in getting information of the
Power
Operated Relief Valve
(PORY) radiation monitor alarm, which occurred
at 0446 hours0.00516 days <br />0.124 hours <br />7.374339e-4 weeks <br />1.69703e-4 months <br />.
It wasn't until approximately
0455 hours0.00527 days <br />0.126 hours <br />7.523148e-4 weeks <br />1.731275e-4 months <br /> that the
OSA communicator received this information.
The
OSA also did not
receive
word of the General
Emergency until approximately
0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br />,
while it was declared at 0450 hours0.00521 days <br />0.125 hours <br />7.440476e-4 weeks <br />1.71225e-4 months <br />.
Considering the
PORV radiation monitor alarm at 0446 hours0.00516 days <br />0.124 hours <br />7.374339e-4 weeks <br />1.69703e-4 months <br />
(indicating elevated radiation levels), it is not clear why
Team
6 (whose mission
was to close the
PORV, Valve MRV-243)
was not issued
high range dosimetry
and was given
a turn-back
dose of only 1R.
Team
6 was delayed approximately
40 minutes
at the Auxiliary Building access
control point, awaiting dose
extensions,
administration of Potassium
Iodide,
and issuance
of
high-range Self-Reading
Dosimeters
(0-100R).
It wasn't determined
until after the. team
had been dispatched
at 0523 hours0.00605 days <br />0.145 hours <br />8.647487e-4 weeks <br />1.990015e-4 months <br /> that the
above precautions
would be necessary.
Based
upon the above findings, this portion of the
licensee,s'rogram
was acceptable;
however,
the following item should
be
considered for improvement:
~
The
OSA Manager should periodically conduct short
briefings of OSA personnel
regarding plant status
and ongoing repair efforts.
Emer enc
0 erations
Faci lit
(EOF
By 0245 hours0.00284 days <br />0.0681 hours <br />4.050926e-4 weeks <br />9.32225e-5 months <br />,
personnel
started to arrive at the
EOF.
Security
personnel
were in place
and checked arriving personnel
for proper
identification before allowing entry into the
EOF.
Personnel
began setting
up the facility in an orderly manner following
established
procedural
guidance.
Communication links were established
and meteorological
forecast information obtained.
The Environmental
Assessment
Director took charge
and briefed arriving staff on known
plant conditions.
Throughout the Exercise,
status
boards
were maintained with current
available plant information.
Information was clearly displayed for
all players to review and refer to as
needed.
Initial briefings of key personnel
upon arrival at the
EOF were
conducted
by appropriate
personnel.
Current conditions,
past
occurrences
and anticipated
actions
and projected results
were
discussed
to insure arriving personnel
were well informed of plant
status
and emergency conditions.
Public address
briefings of the
EOF staff were conducted regularly
to ensure
personnel
were aware of changes
in plant conditions
and
emergency
response
actions.
The MIDAS terminal/system failed early in the exercise,
and
personnel initially seemed
helpless
to do anything to restore
its operability.
Subsequently,
alternate
methods for obtaining
necessary
meteorological
data were used.
(OTSC computer system)
A phased activation of the
EOF was
used to assume first responsibility
for communications
and later
Dose Assessment
duties
as staffing levels
permitted.
Later, shift staffing plans were developed to insure
personnel
would be available for continued
long term facility
operation.
Protective Action Recommendations
(PARs) were initially developed
and issued
using default values
and later confirmed with available
dose projection information,
and actual 'field measurements..
Good
discussions
and evaluations
of available information, in light of .
anticipated plant conditions,
were conducted
by the Site
Emergency'oordinator
(SEC)
and Environmental
Assessment
Director..{EAD).
PARs were discussed
with State -officials and background"information
provided to insure State officials were aware of the reasons"for
recommended
PARs.
PARs were clearly communicated to appropriate
State officials.
Initial and periodic update
messages
to State
officials included
PAR information.
These
messages
were reviewed
and approved
by appropriate
senior
management
in the
EOF.
I
When plant conditions indicated that parameters
could exceed existing
limits and
go beyond available
Emergency
Guidance
documents,
personnel
were directed to contact appropriate
support contact personnel
and the
NRC to conduct necessary
evaluations;
The
EAD appropriately evaluated
dose projection information and
available Field Team measurements
and based
on actual
measured
conditions.
Field team exposures
were evaluated
and consideration
was given to rotating assignments
to limit excessive
exposure to
any one field team.
Both recommended
and State ordered Protective
Actions were clearly displayed
on a color coded status
board
to'learly
illustrate existing conditions.
Notification of State
and federal officials was timely, almost
immediate,
as plant conditions
changed
and the General
Emergency
declaration
made.
Communicators
were provided with approved accident
notification forms every 15 minutes to supply current,
accurate
and
approved information to appropriate
contacts.
Information about the lose parts monitor alarm and potential for
mechanical
damage to the core
and fuel failure were not communicated
to
EOF personnel.
Activation of the
EOF was delayed
due to inadequate
staffing levels.
It took additional
time to muster sufficient personnel
to accept
responsibility for communications
and to take charge of Dose
Assessment
duties.
Field monitoring teams
were not dispatched for their first 'assignment
until 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />
and
15 minutes after declaration of the Site Area
Emergency.
Only one monitoring team was available.
Field monitoring teams did not have potassium
iodide (KI) tablets
readily available
and
needed
to interrupt monitoring activities
to return to the site to obtain necessary
supplies.
Although plant parameter
status
boards in the
EOF contain locations
for indicating the trend of several
parameters,
no trend information
was displayed.
This information could have
been helpful in
understanding
overall plant status,
and been useful in briefing
arriving corporate
personnel.
Personnel
arriving at the
EOF were not monitored for potential
contamination after having potentially traveled through areas
downwind
of the site.
Contamination
survey equipment
was not set
up at the
EOF.
This is an
Open Item (No. 315/90003-02).
No formal logs were observed to be kept by
EOF key personnel:
Some communicators
did have scribe
pads
on which chronological
.
information was maintained,
but again
no formal log was'.observed.
The field team communicator did not use the phonetic alphabet
(Alpha,
Bravo, Charlie..) in communications
and could have caused
confusion
of team directions
and reported results.
Field team measurement
of 4 Rem/hour at the protected
area
fence
was recorded
and reported
as being at the site boundary fence.
.This
misinformation could have caused
confusion
and overly conservative
protective action recommendations.
The
EAD was
aware of the correct
information.
Nuclear Plant Accident Notification forms, Plant Messages
Nos.
5,
6, 7, 8,
and
9 issued at 15 minute intervals from 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> to
0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> contained the incorrect description of the event/initiating
condition.
"ECC-17
SGTR with loss of all AC" was stated
as the reason
for the General
Emergency
when the correct information was
"ECC-19
high dose rates at site boundary."
This is an
Open Item
(No. 315/90003-03).
Due to a lack of information regarding the initial incidents
(DNIMS
system alarm,
high reactor coolant
pump vibration), and
a minor
scenario
problem (Reactor Coolant System
sample information was
real data,
not scenario
data)
EOF personnel
did not recognize
that there
had been fuel failures
Near the conclusion of the exercise,
the licensee
performed
a
limited demonstration
of the planning
needed to recover
from .the
effects of an accident,
including long-term planning.
Mhile an
acceptable
performance
was observed,
the procedure for Recovery
or Termination from an actual
event
does not currently provide
sufficient detailed
guidance.
The procedure
(PHP 2081
EPP. 306
"De-escalation
or Termination of the
Emergency
and Recovery" ) allows
for entry into a Recovery
phase
or de-escalation
of the emergency.
classification,
but provides little or no guidance.
Current
NRC
philosophy is that events at the Site Area Emergency or General
Emergency
should
be terminated,
and
a Recovery
phase
entered.
Events at the lower classifications
(Unusual
Event, Alert) can
be
terminated.
This philosophy follows the concept that an emergency
10
classification
system is intended to activate
emergency
organizations.
It was observed that the State of Michigan expressed
a preference
for de-escalation-of
emergency classifications,
and this is acceptable
as long as all the involved parties
understand
the connotations
attached to emergency classification de-escalation,
and the, public
can also
be advised of such connotations.
tX
*
With the exception of the above
Open Item, this portion of 'the
'icensee's
program was acceptable.
However, the following items are
recommended
for improvement:
Field Monitoring Team kits should include supplies
of Potassium
Iodide.
~
Key EOF personnel
should
keep formal logs of activities
and discussions.
e.
Joint Public Information Center
(JPIC)
The JPIC was not directly observed.
A review was
made of press
releases
issued during the exercise.
News release
statement
¹1 was worded in such
a way that members
of the public would most likely have
been confused.
The statement
indicating "a tube rupture in a steam generator"
as the reason for
the Site Area Emergency 'and "a leak in the reactor coolant system"
as the reason for the Unusual
Event were technically correct,
but
would not have
been clearly understandable
to the general
public
or news media personnel.
Based
upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's
program
was acceptable.
~Secur it
Security personnel
were involved with assembly/accountability
and
completion of the emergency callout list at the
same time.
These
tasks
were well performed in a reasonable
amount of time.
Based
upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's
progr am was acceptable.
7.
Exercise Scenario
and Control
The licensee
s scenario
was quite challenging,
including:
multiple
equipment fai lures,
and assembly/ accountability.
The degree of challenge
in an exercise
scenario is considered
when assessing
observed
exercise
weaknesses.
Overall, exercise
control
was considered
adequate.
No occurrences
of
Controller prompting were observed.
11
A number of minor problems
were observed.
The tape recording simulating
the audio output of the Digital Metal Impact Monitoring System failed.
The duty staff listing, normally available in the Control
Room had
not been provided to the simulator Control
Room.
The Control
Room
crew looked for this listing following the Digital Metal Impact
~.
Monitoring System
(DMIMS) alarm.
Based
upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's
program was
acceptable.
Licensee Criti ues
The licensee
held facility exercise critiques immediately following the
Exercise,
a Controller exercise critique,
and
a critique where the the
Controller/Evaluators
presented their findings to management
personnel.
NRC personnel
attended
these critiques,
and determined that significant
NRC identified exercise deficiencies
had also
been identified by licensee
personnel.
Based
upon the
above findings, this portion of the licensee's
program was
acceptable.
Exercise
Ob ective
and Scenario
Review (IP 82302)
The licensee
submitted the draft annual
exercise
scope
and objectives
within the timeframe goals established
by
NRC Region III.
Copies of the
scenario
packages
were submitted for review.
Scenario
review did not
indicate
any significant problem areas.
The licensee's
scenario
was considered
complex and challenging,
including:
multiple equipment failures,
loss of power,
and assembly/
accountability.
To these
were
added the additional challenges
associated
with an unannounced,
after-hours
exercise.
The degree of challenge
in an
exercise is considered
when assessing
observed
exercise
weaknesses.
Simulation was reduced to the minimum possible.
Based
upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's
program
was
acceptable.
0 erational
Status of the
Emer enc
Pre aredness
Pro
ram
a ~
Emer enc
facilities
E ui ment
Instrumentation
and
Su
lies
Since exercise activities
had
been conducted utilizing the plant
simulator
and
a simulated
TSC,
an inspection
was conducted of the
actual plant Control
Rooms,
Technical
Support Center,
Operational
Support Area,
and emergency field team counting vehicle.
These facilities were all found to be maintained in an appropriate
state of operational
readiness.
Copies of the Emergency
Plan and
implementing procedures
as well as other appropriate
procedures
were
maintained
by controlled distribution and appeared
to be current.
The facilities were clean
and orderly and well stocked with necessary
office supplies.
Radiological monitoring and protective equipment
supplies
were adequately
stocked
and maintained.
Survey meters
12
were found to be calibrated
and response
checked in accordance
with established
licensee
procedures.
A review of the equipment inventory for the field team counting
vehicle
as well as discussions
with cognizant licensee
personnel
indicated that
a portable "frisker" type survey'eter
is not,
routinely considered
a part of the equipment supplied with>this
vehicle.
It is recommended that such equipment should
be made
available
as part of the regular inventory for this mobi,le counting
lab.
Additional discussion with cognizant licensee personnel'indicated
',
that the following improvements
had been
made to emergency
response
facilities since the last routine inspection,
completed in March,
1989:
~
Status
boards
have
been
added to both the
TSC and the
to indicate both utility recommended
and State
ordered
PARs.
~
An additional telephone line has
been
added to the
for use
by Security personnel.
Personal
Computers
(PCs)
have
been
added to both Control
Rooms with the
Dose Assessment
Program
(DAP) installed
on
each.
Operators
have received preliminary training on use of
this program
and appropriate
procedural
guidance is currently
in the last stages
of review prior to issuance
for incorporating
the use of DAP by the Control
Room staff.
Additionally, station
Radiological Protection personnel
are currently trained in the
use of the
DAP.
~
The
OSA has
had several
new phones installed with a cascading
feature to provide personnel
dispatched
to inplant assignments
with additional
communication capabilities
(and report back to
the
OSA as necessary).
~
An additional
room was
added to the
OSA complex to provide
a area
where
team briefings could be'conducted
away from
the general
assembly
area.
~
A new State-of-the-Art portal monitor has replaced
an older
model utilized during accountability
and assembly in the
OSA.
~
A secondary
hospital
has
been
added to provide additional
medical
support facilities.,
Based
on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's
program was acceptable.
b.
Or anization
and
Mana ement Control
A review was conducted of the licensee
Emergency
Preparedness
Administrative Tracking System
(EPATS).
This tracking system
13
is maintained in accordance
with procedural
guidance
contained in
Section
9 of the licensee's
Emergency
Preparedness
Administrative
Manual.
This system is utilized to assign
and track completion of
various
EP activities which include, but are not limited to:
routine
surveillances,
NRC Open Item and improvement items, self-identified
drill/exercise critique findings, internal audit findings, program
improvement suggestions
from site personnel
and procedure
revisions.
This tracking system
appears
to be functional
and effective'in
insuring appropriate
items are followed through to completion
as
well as insuring routine recurring activities are completed in a
timely manner.
The licensee
is currently a participating
member of the"'Michigan
Dose Assessment
Committee.
This Committee meets regularly to
bring together representatives
of state
governmental
agencies
and utilities to ensure
open dialog and coordination
of various
activities including dose
assessment
and other associated
emergency
response activities.
Based
upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's
program was acceptable.
ll.
Emer enc
Plan Activations
Since January of 1989, the licensee
has
had five actual activations
of the Emergency
Plan.
All of these
events
were classified
as
Unusual
Events.
Four of these
events
were related to Technical Specification
Plant Shutdown requirements
and one was
a bomb threat.
In each incident,
licensee
personnel
correctly classified the event
and
made appropriate
notifications in accordance
with approved procedural
guidance
and within
required time limits.
The licensee
has prepared
and maintains files for each event.
These
files contain copies of such
items
as Condition Reports,
problem reports,
Accident Information Report data sheets,
Event Notification wor ksheets,
initial off-site notification lists, control
room logs, other applicable
logs
and data sheets
as well as internal
memorandas
related to the
particular event.
Adequate information was available to understand
the
event
and corrective action taken to permit exiting from the emergency
declaration.
The licensee files did not contain
any information regarding post event
~ evaluations
of emergency
preparedness
concerns
or self-critiques of the
actual
events
from an emergency
planning perspective.
It is recommended
that the licensee
implement the practice of critiquing actual
emergency
plan activations
much the
same
as they currently do drills and exercises,
in order to improve their program with any applicable
lessons
learned in
actual
events.
Based
upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's
program
was acceptable.
12 ~
~0en Items
Open items are matters
which have
been discussed
with the licensee
which
will be reviewed further by the inspector
and which involves
some actions
on the part of the
NRC or licensee
or both.
Open Items disclosed during
this inspection
are discussed
in Sections
6. a and 6. d of this report.,
13.
Exit Interview (IP 30703
The inspectors
held an exit interview two days after the exercise
on April 6, 1990, with the representatives
denoted in Section
2.
The
NRC Team
Leader
discussed
the scope
and findings of the inspection.
The Team. Leader indicated that the unannounced,
after-hours 'exercise
had presented
a considerable
challenge to the licensee's
Emergency
Preparedness
Program.
The licensee
had demonstrated
a good response
to a challenging scenario.
Some areas,
including timeliness of facility
activation,
could still be improved.
The licensee
was also asked if any of the information discussed
during
the exit interview was proprietary.
The licensee
responded that none
of the information was proprietary.
Attachments:
1.
D.C.
Cook 1990 Exerc'ise
Scope
and Objectives
2.
D.C.
Cook 1990 Exercise
Scenario Outline
15
DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR PLANT
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
EXERCISE
Attachment
1
II.
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES
0
The exercise objectives dictate
the scope of the scenario.
The objectives for this exercise
were developed
based
upon
the Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant
Emergency
Plan
Administrative Manual,
and
FEMA Guidance
Memorandum
EX-3.
Situations will be presented
in the scenario
to prompt the
desired player
response
for each objective.
Where
appropriate,
specific objectives
and criteria for adequate
demonstration
have
been
included in the exercise
messages
for Controller/Observer
use.
ERE-90
2-1
l
Attachment
1
DONALD C,
COOK NUCLEAR PLANT
1990
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES
OSJECTI~
A.
OVERhIJ. LICENSEE OBJECTIVES
V
A-1
Demonstrate
the ability of the emergency
response
organization
to implement
DCCNP Emergency
Plan Procedures,
the
IMPCo
Emergency
Response
Manual and the
AEPSC Emergency
Response
Manual.
A-2
Demonstrate
the ability to establish
emergency
management
command and control,
and maintain continuity of this function
for the duration of the postulated
event.
A-3
A-4
Demonstrate
the ability to establish
communication's
and
information flow between
DCCNP emergency
response facilities
and participating offsite agencies.
Demonstrate
the ability to designate
subsequent
shifts of the
emergency
response
organization.
A-5
Demonstrate
the ability to notify and mobilize off-duty
personnel
during non-working hours
B.
CONTROL ROOM OBJECTIVES
B-1
B-2
Demonstrate
the ability to recognize
symptoms
and parameters
indicative of degrading plant conditions
and to classify
degraded conditions
as emergencies.
Demonstrate
the ability to initiate notification of off-site
authorities
and plant personnel.
B-3
Demonstrate
communications
and information flow to and from the
B-4
Demonstrate
the ability to transfer
emergency authorities
and
responsibilities
from the on-shift emergency organization to
the
DCCNP emergency
response
organization.
B-5
Demonstrate
the ability to implement site assembly
and
accountability during off-hours'(i., ~ ., 1700-0600).
'.
TECHNICAL SUPPORT
CENTER OBJECTIVES
C-l
Demonstrate
the ability to activate
the facility within one
hour of declaration of an emergency requiring facility
activation.
ERE-90
2.2
Attachment
1
OBJ ECTIVE
C.
TECHNICAI. SUPPORT
CENTER OBJECTIVES
(cont'd. )
C-2
I
Demonstrate
the ability to provide analytical assistance
and
operational
guidance
to the Control Room.
C-3
Demonstrate
the ability to coordinate on-site activities in
response
to the emergency.
C-4
Demonstrate
the ability to establish
and maintain hard copy
communications vith the
EOF and verbal communications vith the
EOF,
OSA,
IAG,
ENC and/or JPIC.
C-5
Demonstrate
the ability to provide analytical radiological
assistance
to the
OSA and Control Room.
C-6
Demonstrate
the ability to obtain data from the
OTSC/PSSD
system.
C-7
C-8
Demonstrate
the ability to request
emergency
response
teams
from the
OSA.
Demonstrate
the ability to designate
a second shift for TSC
operation.
C-9
Demonstrate
the ability to evaluate
the results of TSC/OSA
habitability surveys
and assess
the need to evacuate
these
facilities.
5
C-10
Demonstrate
the ability to recognize
degrading plant conditions
and classify plant conditions
as
an emergency.
C-11
Demonstrate
the ability to evaluate site evacuation
routes
and
determine
an appropriate
route based
on indicated radiological
and meteorological conditions.
C-12
Demonstrate
the actions required to be taken in the
TSC if the
emergency
involves
a breach of the reactor coolant system.
C-13
Demonstrate
the ability to determine
the level of core
damage
based
on plant parameters
provided.
Demonstrate
the ability to process
personnel
dose extension
request.
C-15
Demonstrate
the ability to assess
the need for, and process
request for potassium
iodide administration.
ERE-90
2.3
Attachment
1
OSJ ECTIVE
D.
OPERATIONS
STACINC AREA OSJECTIVES
D-1
Demonstrate
the ability to activate
the facility vithin one
hour of declaration of an emergency requiring facility
activation.
D-2 ', Demonstrate
the ability to assemble,
brief and dispatch
the
folloving emergency
response
team(s):
a.
b.
C.
d.
Damage Control Team
Post Accident Sampling Team
On-site Radiation Monitoring Team
Off-site Radiation Monitoring Team
D-3
Demonstrate
the ability,to designate
a second shift for OSA
operation.
D-4
Each emergency
response
team assembled
and dispatched shall
demonstrate
the folloving actions
as applicable
to the team
type and mission:
ao
b.
c
~
d.
e
~
Assembly of tools/equipment.
Preoperation
checks of equipment
and communications
devices.
"Performance of appropriate radiological precautions.
Performance
or simulation of team mission.
Post-mission debriefing and radiological controls.
D-5
Demonstrate
the ability to provide emergency radiological
support.
As a minimum the folloving activities should be
demonstrated:
a.
Establishment of emergency
dosimetry and exposure
tracking
system.
b.
c ~
Establishment of emergency control points.
Performance of habitability surveys prescribed
by
procedure.
d.
Analysis of radiological conditions to be encountered
by
emergency
response
'teams.
e.
Specification of radiological controls
and precautions
for emergency
response
teams.
D-6
Demonstrate
the ability to perform offsite radiological
monitoring.
As a minimum, two teams
should be dispatched
and
direct radiation monitoring as veil as airborne radioactivity
analysis
should be demonstrated.
ERE-90
2.4
0
Attachment
1
0$JEGTXvE
D,
OPENATIONS STAGING AREA OBJECTIVES
(cont'd. )
D-7
Demonstrate
the ability to implement
damage control activities
in accordance vith applicable
Emergency Plan Procedures.
D-8
Demonstrate
the ability to perform onsite radiological
monitoring in accordance
with applicable
Emergency
Plan
Procedures.
This monitoring should include direct radiation
surveys
end analysis of airborne radioactivity samples.
D-9
Demonstrate
the ability to obtain post accident
samples
from
the
RSC Loop end complete appropriate
chemical
and isotopic
analysis vithin three hours of the sample request.
D-10'emonstrate
the ability to obtain radiological base
data
required to evaluate
the release
level from the secondary plant
during e steam generator
tube rupture.
\\
D-11
Demonstrate
the ability to respond to a contaminated
person.
Included in this demonstration,
personnel
decontamination shall
be simulated.
D-12
Demonstrate
the actions required for an individual to exceed
the exposure limits of 10CFR20.
Included in this demonstration
should be
e discussion of post exposure
actions
and
limitations.
D-13
Demonstrate
tha ections required to administer potassium
iodide.
This demonstration
should include
e discussion of the
follov-up actions associated
with KI administration.
D-14
Demonstrate
e shift turnover.
D-15
Demonstrate
the ability to obtain environmental
samples
in
,accordance vith applicable
Emergency
Plan Procedures.
The
folloving samples
should be obtained:
e.
Vegetation
b.
Soil
E.
%REGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY OBJECTIVES
E-l
Demonstrate
the ability to activate
the facility vithin one
hour of decleretion of an emergency requiring facility
activation.
ERE-90
2.5
Attachment
1
OBJECTIVE
E.
BERGEN'PERATIONS
FACILXTY ObJECTIVES
(cont'd, )
E.2
Demonstrate
the ability to establish overall command and
control of the
DCCNP emergency
response vithin one hour of
declaration of a site area
emergency or general
emergency,
as
applicable.
E-3
Demonstrate
the ability to establish
and maintain effective
emergency
communications vith each of the folloving agencies
end facilities:
c
~
d.
a.
State of Michigan
b.
Berrien County
NRC
e.
Joint Public Information
f.
Initial Assessment
Group.
Demonstrate
the ability to establish
and maintain hard copy
data transmission
and reception'ith
each of the following
facilities:
a.
b.
Joint Public Information Center
c.
E-5
Demonstrate
the ability to direct Offsite Radiation Monitoring
Teams in order to determine
the geographical
location and
radiological magnitude of the postulated
plume.
E-6
Demonstrate
the ability to designate
a second shift for EOF
operation.
E-7
Demonstrate
the ability to develop protective action
recommendations
based
on pro]ected
dose and/or core
and
containment status,
E-8
Demonstrate
the ability to update
the State of Michigan on the
status of the emergency at
15 minute intervals.
E-9
Demonstrate
the ability to respond to inquiries from the TSC,
JPIC,
IAG and State of Michigan in a timely manner.
E-10
Demonstrate
emergency de-escalation
and termination.
E-ll
E-12
Demonstrate
the ability to pro)ect the magnitude of offsite
dose using the Dose Assessment
Program
and the
IBM Personal
Computer.
Demonstrate
corporate
augmentation of the
EOP staff.
ERE-90
2.6
Attachment
1
OBJECTIVE
E.
SSRQCICY OPXRATIOHS FACILITT OBJECTIVES
(cont'd. )
I
E-13
Demonstrate
recovery planning associated
with emergency
termination.
K-14
Demonstrate
the ability to take compensatory
action in the
event of a failure of the Meteorological Data Terminal,
F.
PUBLIC hFPhIRS
OBJECTIVES
F-1
Demonstrate activation of the Joint Public Informati.on Center.
F-2
Demonstrate
the ability to conduct media briefings.
F-3
Demonstrate
the ability to respond
to actual or simulated
inquiries from media representatives.
F-4
Demonstrate
the ability of rumor control personnel
to respond
to simulated inquires from the general public.
F-5
Demonstrate
the ability to monitor media transmissions
and
respond to inaccurate
information being transmitted by the
media.
F-6
Demonstrate
the ability to designate
subsequent
shifts for JPIC
operations.
F-7
Demonstrate
coordination of news announcement
content with
State
and County representatives.
ERE-90
2.7
Attachment
2
DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR PLANT
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
EXERCISE
EXERCISE NARRATIVE SU59fARY,
INITIALCONDITIONS:
Unit
2 at
100%
Power
= 61
ppm
EOL 17i500
MWD/MTU
Days on line
= 184
Power History
100% for 20 days
55% for
2 days
100% for 32 days
Emergency
power out of service
due to lightning strike
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> earlier
NRV-151 isolated
due to leakby
NRV-152 isolated
due to NMO-152 being stuck closed
NARRATIVE:
The simulated
events
take place at the Unit
2 end-of-cycle
(17,500
MWD/MTU) and begin to unfold in the early hours of
April 3,
1990.
Shortly after
0100 with initial plant
conditions basically unremarkable
(with the exception of
emergency
power being out of service
due to lightning) an
acoustical monitoring system
(DMIMS) alarm is received in
the Unit
2 Control Room.
The audible "clanging" sounds
picked up in three different locations in the Reactor
Coolant
System
(RCS)
reasonably
indicate the presence
of multiple,
loose, solid objects
("loose parts") in the
RCS that could,
and in fact do, prove to be damaging to the system.
Almost simultaneous
with that alarm number
pump begins to vibrate with ever increasing intensity until
an alarm is received for that condition also.
Shortly after
0130 secondary
system radiation levels increase
prompting a
decision to begin
a 10%/hr. controlled shutdown with a
subsequent
decision to declare
an
UNUSUAL EVENT at
approximately
0147.
All necessary
notifications are
made.
ERE-90
'-1
Attachment
2
DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR PLANT
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
EXERCISE
EXERCISE NARE&TIVE SUMMARY
( CONTINUED)
The primary to secondary
leakage rate'ontinues
to increase
and at approximately
0208 the operators
are
aware that it
has
become significant and trip the unit at 0210.
An ALERT
is immediately declared
followed by notification 'of
emergency
personnel.
Upon unit trip< safety injection occurs,
plus reserve
feed
trips resulting in loss of offsite power.
AB diesel
generator
indicates
an incomplete start but
CD diesel
does
start
and load.
Shortly thereaf ter
(0223) control air valve XCR-102 will not
open effectively eliminating the ability to depressurize.
When the TSC,
OSA and
EOF become operational
teams
are
dispatched
to monitor onsite
and offsite radiation levels
(none
as of yet)
and coolant
system activity; repair valve
XCR-102 and
AB diesel generator
and; investigate
reserve
feed problems
and
a leaking
stop valve.
At approximately
0445
a significant release
starts
because
the
44 Power Operated Relief Valve
(PORV) opens.
An alarm
is immediately received
from the
PORV radiation monitor.
EOF dose
assessment
projections indicate Protective Action
Recommendations
(PAR) leading to a
GENERAI
EMERGENCY
declaration.
During the next
two hours electrical
power is restored
and
XCR-102 is repaired.
The release
rate decreases
as the
stuck open f4 PORV and restored
equipment depressurizes
the
system.
This diminishing release
rate is such that
ALERT
level
PARs are
reached shortly after
0700
and recovery
planning and operations
can begin.
The exercise will terminate at approximately
0800.
ERE-90
6-2
Attachment
2
DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR PLANT
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
EXERCISE
EXERCISE HAMVLTIVE SUHKQtY (CONTINUED)
TIMELINE:
REAI
TIME
0100
0115
0117
0119
0122
0127
0133
0135
0138
0144'147
SCENARIO
TIME
00
00
00:15
00:17
00:19
00:22
00:27
00:33
00:35
00:38
00
44
00:47
EVENT CONDITION
Initial Conditions
DMIMS alarm and f24
RCP vibrations
indicating above
normal levels
(2.4
mils)
<<24 vibrations trending upwards-now
at 2.7 mils.
1
524 vibration at 3.2 mils
f24 vibrations at 5.0 mils.
Call
is placed
to J.R.
Sampson,
Superintendent
informing him of the
situation.
424 vibrations reach 7.0 mils and
alarm is received.
(SJAE), Gland
Steam Leak-off
(GSLO) and
blowdown
RMS alarms are received.
Crew
begins
checking
for
signs of leakage.
Lab sample of secondary
side is
requested.
Operations
Superintendent
is called
again and
a decision is made to
begin controlled shutdown at
10%/hr,. unless
the situation
worsens.
Increased
shutdown rate initiated
by indications of increasing
primary to secondary
leakage.
SS declares
UNUSUAL EVENT based
on
ECC-14
and 17.
ERE-90
6-3
Attachment
2
DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR PLANT
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
EXERCISE
EXERCISE NAEG&TIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)
REAL
TIME
0150
0156
0208
0210
0210
0211
0223
0217
0230
0313
0320
0330
SCENARIO
TIME,
00
50
00:56
01:08
01:10
01:10
01:11
01:23
01:17
01:30
02:13
02:20
02:30
EVENT CONDITION
SS calls Unit
1 to request initial
notifications
be
made
and to call
him back
when they are completed.
He also requests
additional
manpower
from Unit 1.
Chem Lab reports that secondary
samples
have high activity.
Leak rate
now
~ 500
gpm.
Unit manually tripped; safety
injections started
and f24 Reactor
Coolant
Pump is stopped.
SS declares
ALERT based
ECC-14 acd
ECC-17.
Blackout occurs, train
B is lost
and
AB diesel fails to start.
Control air valve XCR-102 fails to
open resulting in loss of control
air to containment.
Emergency
Response
Organization
call out begins.
Contingency for declaring
ALERT.
All Emergency
Response Facilities
activated.
On-site
and off-site radiation
monitoring teams dispatched.
team dispatched.
ERE-90
6-4
Attachment
2
DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR PLANT
EMERGENCY RESH)NSE
EXERCISE
EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY (CONTINUED)
REAL
TIME
0345
0445
0446
0455
0505
0515
0515
0532
0540
0550
0605
0642
0656
0715
0720
0800
SCENARIO
TIME
02:45
03:45
03:46
03:55
04:05
04'15
04:15
04:32
04'40
04'50
05'05
05:42
05:56
06:15
06:20
07
00
EVENT/CONDITION
Teams dispatched
from OSA to:
Repair
XCR-102
Repair
AB diesel
Find out why f4 S/G stop valve is
leaking
f4
PORV opens.
PORV radiation monitor MRA-2602
alarms.
EOF declares
GENERAL EMERGENCY
based
on site
boun ary dose
projections.
Team dispatched
to see if PORV can
be closed.
Contingency
EOF declares
GENERAL
EMERGENCY if not done at 0455.
XCR-102 is repaired.
PORV team encounters
turn-back dose.
AB Diesel is restored.
RHR is aligned.
Team returns with results.
RHR is in service.
Reserve
power is restored.
Dose projections indicate
rad
levels below alert
PARs.
De-escalate
tc ALERT.
Begin recovery operations.
TERMINATE EXERCISE.
ERE-90
6-5