ML17328A598
| ML17328A598 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1990 |
| From: | Giitter J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Alexich M INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| References | |
| GL-88-05, GL-88-5, TAC-68912, TAC-68913, NUDOCS 9003050160 | |
| Download: ML17328A598 (19) | |
Text
February 22, 1990 Docket No. 50-315 and 50-316 Mr. Hilton P. Alexich Indiana Michigan Power Company c/o American Electric Power Service Corporation
Dear Mr. Alexich:
DISTRIBUTION iDOCKET FILE~
PD31 R/F NRC 8
LOCAL PDRs JZWOLINSKI PSHUTTLEWORTH JGIITTER EJORDAN OGC(FYI)
ACRS(10)
JTHOMA BBURGESS, RIII
SUBJECT:
PREVENTION OF BORIC ACID CORROSION AT D.
C ~
COOK UNITS 1 AND 2 (GENERIC LETTER 88-05)
(TAC NOS.
68912 AND 68913)
The purpose of this letter is to advise you that our audit of your boric acid corrosion prevention program has resulted in an acceptable finding and the staff considers this issue to be closed.
On July 24-26, 1989, the NRC staff and our consultant visited the D.
C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.
1 and 2 to audit the program to prevent boric acid-related corrosion.
The audit team include K. Parczewski (NRC) and C. Czajkowski (consultant, Brookhaven National Laboratory).
Boric acid corro-sion prevention requirements were described in Generic Letter 88-05 which was issued on March 17,
- 1988, and requested the implementation of such a program by all licensees of operating PWRs and holders of construction permits for PWRs.
In you letter dated June 7, 1988, you provided a description of, and a commit-ment to, a boric acid leakage monitoring and corrosion preventive program for D.
C.
Cook.
A copy of the trip report covering the results of the audit which was prepared by our consultant is enclosed.
The staff has reviewed this report and agrees with its findings and the conclusion.
On this basis and the observations made during the audit, we conclude that you have adequately implemented a program for monitoring small primary coolant leakage through carbon steel components caused by boric acid corrosion as described in your submittal dated June 7, 1988.
The results of the D.
C.
Cook audit will be used along with audit results from other plants in our overall determination of future action to be taken regarding NRC's final resolution of this industry-wide generic issue.
Our review of this issue of the DE C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Unit Nos.
1 and 2 is closed.
k Sincerely, Original signed by'00
<PgPi60 900222 PDR ADOCK 050003i5 P
Enclosure:
Audit Report cc w/enclosure See next page Joseph G. Giitter, Project Manager Project Directorate III-1 Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V 8 Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ni~
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Docket Nos.
50-315 and 50-316 t
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 February 22, 1990 Mr. Hilton P. Alexich Indiana Michigan Power Company c/o American Electric Power Service Corporation 1 Riverside Plaza
- Columbus, Ohio 43216
Dear Mr. Alexich:
SUBJECT PREVENTION OF BORIC ACID CORROSION AT D.
C.
COOK UNITS 1 AND 2 (GENERIC LETTER 88-05)
(TAC NOS.
68912 AND 68913)
The purpose of this letter is to advise you that our audit of your boric acid corrosion prevention program has resulted in an acceptable finding and the staff considers this issue to be closed.
On July 24-26, 1989, the NRC staff and our consultant visited the D.
C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant Unit'Nos.
1 and 2 to audit the program to prevent boric a'cid-related corrosion.
.The audit team include K. Parczewski (NRC) and C.
Czajkowski (consultant, Brookhaven National Laboratory).
Boric acid corro-sion prevention requirements were described in Generic Letter 88-05 which was issued on March 17, 1988, and requested the implementation of such a program by all licensees of operating PWRs and holders of construction permits for PWRs.
In you letter dated June 7, 1988, you provided a description of, and a commit-ment to, a boric acid leakage monitoring and corrosion preventive program for D.
C.
Cook.
A copy of the trip report covering the results of the audit which was prepared by our consultant is enclosed.
The staff has reviewed this report and agrees with its findings and the conclusion.
On this basis and the observations made during the audit, we conclude that you have adequately implemented a program for monitoring small primary coolant leakage through carbon steel components caused by boric acid corrosion as described in your submittal dated June 7, 1988.
The results of the D.
C.
Cook audit will be used along with audit results from other plants in our overall determination of future action to be taken regarding NRC's final resolution of this industry-wide generic issue.
Our review of this issue of the D.
C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Unit Nos.
1 and 2 is closed.
Sincerely,
Enclosure:
Audit Report cc w/enclosure See next page Joseph G. Giitter, Project Manager Project Directorate III-1 Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V 8 Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Jir. Milton Alexich Indiana Michigan Power Company Donald C.
Cook Nuclear P lant CC:
Regional Administrator, Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Attorney General Department of Attorney General 525 Nest Ottawa Street Lansing, Michigan 48913 Township Supervisor Lake Township Hall Post Office Box 818 Bridgman, Michigan 49106 Al Blind, Plant Manager Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 458 Bridgman, Michigan 49106 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors Office 7700 Red Arrow Highway Stevensvi lie, Michigan 49127 Gerald Charnoff, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.H.
Washington, DC 20037 Mayor, City of Bridgman Post Office Box 366 Bridgman, Michigan 49106 Special Assistant to the Governor Room 1 - State Capitol Lansing, Michigan 48909 Nuclear Facilities and Environmental Monitoring Section Office Division of Radiological Health Department of Public Health 3500 N. Logan Street Post Office Box 30035 Lansing, Michigan 48909 Mr. S.
Brewer American Electric'Power Service Corporation 1 Riverside Plaza
- Columbus, Ohio 43216
BORIC ACID PREVENTION Trip Report FIN A-3871 TASK ASSIGNMENT NO.
4 A.
Introduction On July 24-26,
- 1989, a USNRC audit team visited the D.C. Cook Nuclear Power Station Units 1, 2.
The team was comprised of Messrs.
K. Parczewski of the USNRC and Mr. C. Czajkowski of Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL).
The purpose of the plant visit was to audit the licensee implemented program for prevention of carbon steel corrosion by boric acid in the reactor pressure boundary of the plant.
This verification of program implementation took the form of an audit of the Units'ritten procedures, interviews with plant staff personnel and verifying that the techniques used by the utility were proper and performed by adequately trained/certified personnel.
The guidelines for the audit fell into four broad areas of concern which should encompass the utilities'licited responses to NRC Generic Letter 88-05.
B.
Determination of the rinci al locations where leaks oF rimar coolant below the s ecification limits could cause de radation of the reactor ressure boundar com onents.
The utility issued a memo on 5/23/88 which responded to this item of Generic Letter 88-05 (P.G.
Schoepf to P.C.
Marley).
This memo listed the pressure retaining components in the reactor coolant pressure boundary which have been identified as "susceptible to boric acid corrosion" in addition to potential leakage sources which might affect these components.
Attachment 1 is the component list generated by the licensee.
The utility response to Generic Letter 88-05 included the statement that We plan to verify this component list through field walks which will be completed prior to the end of the current Unit 2 steam generator repair outage (January 1989) and during the next Unit 1 refueling outage (presently scheduled to begin in April 1989)."
The licensee did not apparently meet this commitment.
The utility did document this fact on Problem Report 89-865, dated 7/14/89 and are currently evaluating their current status.
C.
Procedures for locatin small coolant leaks Various procedures are in use for locating small coolant leaks at the D.C.
Cook Units.
Procedure 2-OHP 4030.STP.016, Rev. 4, 12/29/88, "Reactor Coolant System Leak Test," requires in paragraph 8.9:
"If the calculated gross RCS leakrate increases by 0.2 gpm above the established (i.e., 3-5 day average leakrate) leakrate OR an ini tial unidentified leakage leakrate of z0.8 gpm is obtained, perform an inspection of accessible areas of containment IAW 2-OHP 4030.001.002, Containment Inspection Tours, Data Sheet No.
4 and Attachment No. 3."
Boric Acid corrosion of carbon steel components is also addressed in pro-cedure 2-OHP 4030.001.002,, Revision 6, 12/27/88.
This attachment provides a partial list of reactor coolant pressure boundary components known to be manufactured of carbon steel materials and requires that:
"During any RCS inspection (i.e.,
cleanliness, forced outage, full temperature and pressure, increased leakage at power or routine) any leakage of.the above components (or any other boric acid leak of another component which may spray or drip onto any above component) shall be promptly identified for evaluation and correction through the initiation of a Job Order.
The Job Order must state that the leak is or has the potential to impact a
component manufactured of carbon steel."
Additionally, leak checks are required by procedure 1-OHP 4021.001.601, Rev.
16, 5/26/89 which requires:
"6. 18 Containment Inspection and RCS leakage check have been performed per 1-OHP 4030.001.002."
and 6.67 which requires:
6.67 With the RCS at normal
- pressure, inspect the RCS for leakage.
'(It is permissible for personnel from other departments to fulfill all or portions of inspection requirements provided a briefing is performed to inform other departmental personnel of requirements).
6.67 Any leakage must be evaluated and T.S.
3.4.6.2.
applied.
After refueling, the instrument port conoseals and the part length CROM conoseals must be checked for leakage.
~
Procedurally, the licensee meets the intent of Generic Letter 88-05.
D.
Procedures for evaluatin boric acid induced corrosion of carbon steel com onents in the reactor ressure boundar The licensee issued procedure 12 PHP 5030.001.001, Rev. 0, "Examination and Evaluation of Boric Acid Corrosion and/or Leakage," 3/27/89.
This procedure provides specific guidance for examination and evaluating of boric acid corrosion and/or leakage.
Part of this procedure encompasses the use of an Evaluation Guide (Attachment 2) which requires the determination of extent of corr'osion/wastage damage.
Coupled with the aforementioned, the utility has written procedure 12 gHP 7091 NDE.003, Rev.
0, "Visual Examination
- VTl, VT3 and VT4, 12/6/85 which provides detailed requirements for visual examinations of welds, components, fabricated parts and welds.
The procedure was written to comply with the requirements of ASME Section XI.
Section 5.0 of the procedure details some of the specifics of the inspection protocol:
N5.0 DETAILED PROCEDURE
- 5. 1 Visual Examination VT-1
- 5. 1. 1 The VT-1 visual examination shall be conducted to determine the condition of the part, component, or surface to be examined, including such conditions as cracks,
- wear, corrosion, erosion, or physical damage on the surfaces of the part or components.
- 5. 1.2 Direct VT-1 visual examination may be conducted when access is sufficient to place the eye within 24 inches of the surface to be examined and at an angle not less than 30 degrees to the surface.
Mirrors may be used to improve the angle of vision.
Aids such as magnifying lenses may be used to assist the examination.
Lighting, natural or artificial, shall be sufficient to resolve a
1/32 inch black line on an 18%
neutral gray card.
A direct examination should be performed whenever feasible.
Certain configurational or environmental conditions may preclude the u'se of a direct examination (i.e., entry port size, high radiation).
In such cases a remote exam may be substituted, provided the requirements of paragraph
- 5. 1.3 are met.
- 5. 1.3 In some
- cases, remote visual examination may have to be substituted for direct examination.
Remote visual examination may use visual aids such as
- mirrors, telescopes, borescopes,
- cameras, fiber optics or other suitable instruments.
Such systems shall have a resolu-tion capability at least equivalent to that obtainable by direct visual examination.
5.2 Visual Examination VT-3 5.2.1 The VT-3 visual examination shall be conducted to determine the general mechanical and structural conditions of compohents and their supports, such as the presence of loose parts, debris, or abnormal corrosion products,
- wear, erosion, corrosion, and the loss of integrity at bolted or welded connections.
The VT-3 visual examination may
- require, as applicable to determine structural integrity, the measurement of clearances, detection of physical displacement, structural adequacy of supporting elements, connections between load carrying structural
- members, and tightness of bolting.
For component supports and component interiors, the visual examination may be performed remotely with or without optical aids to verify the structural integrity of the component."
~
These procedures appear to satisfy the requirements of Generic Letter 88-05.
E.
Corrective actions taken b
the licensee to revent recurrence of similar t
es of corrosion.
Request for change (RFC) notice 12-2718 written by the licensee required that carbon steel body-bonnet studs and nuts be replaced with stainless steel (SA 453, Gr 660 studs and SA 194, Gr 6 nuts) on boric acid containing systems.
This would effectively eliminate the boric acid corrosion of the bolts/nuts.
A memo (4/23/85) from R.A. Kadek to distribution regarding material substi-tutions of nuts documented a change from A194-Gr.6 to A194-8F nuts due to an Anchor Darling recommendation which was implemented on site.
This demonstrated good communication between the licensee and manufacturer.
The utility has also converted a large number of valves to "Chesterton packing" in an effort to reduce stem leakage on boric acid containing valves.
The utility's evaluation on implementation of "live load" packing of valves is also a positive step towards a "leak free" plant.
Additionally, the utility had training programs for maintenance technicians which stressed the importance of boric acid corrosion prevention.
A tour of the facility was provided for the team (Unit 1) with the following valves/lines and associated job orders seen:
Com onent ID J.O.
Status 1-CS-440-2 1-CS-440-1 1-CS-441-1 I-QCR-301 1-ICH-111 I-IPX-129(-VI) 1-SI-1566E 1-IHO-52 1-IFI-53 1-IHO-51 1-IHO-110 1-CS-441(cap) 759447 727714 737598 736361 A12991/722625 723746 723710 761602 nothing 761601 722631 737598 closed open open closed open closed closed=-
closed closed closed open
1-SI-114 Ll L2 L4 L3 1-NFA-230(-DL)
I-0IA-31(-IV) 1-CS-440-4 1-IRV-136 1-NFP-241 419201 737263 005581 727708 nothing closed open open open The three items with no i'nformation associated with them are being evaluated by the utility [I-IFI-53, 1-SI-141(L3),
I-NFP-241].
All other items were satisfactory.
gualifications of NDE personnel involved in visual inspections were also checked:
J.F.
S.H.
J.W.
J.L.
M.R.
Steinhauser Shugarts Wodarczyk Ovellette Hill
.LII-VT1,2,3,4 LII-VT1,2,3,4 LII-VT-1,2,3,4 LII-VT-1,2,3,4 LII-VT-1,2,3,4 All were in order.
F.
Conclusions 1.
The program at D.C.
Cook meets the intent of Generic Letter 88-05.
2.
The utility has an active program of leakage prevention.
3.
One area which could be improved is the incorporation of all of the individual procedures for leak prevention at the plant into one overall controlling document.
These conclusions were discussed with utility personnel. at the Exit Critique.
G.
Documents Reviewed 1.
- Letter, 5/23/88, "Generic Letter 88-05, List of RCPB Components Susceptible to Boric Acid Corrosion."
2.
Request for Change (RFC),
DC-12-2718, package of all associated materials.
3.
D.C.
Cook (Units 1&2) response to NRC Generic Letter 88-05, 6/7/88.
4.
Operation Weekly letter, Attachment 83, Pg 1 of 6, 7/19/89, 6/21/89, 6/28/89.
5.
Procedure 02-OHP 4030.001.002, Rev. 7, "Containment Inspection Tours,"
6/5/89.
6.
Procedure 1-OHP 4021.001.001, Rev.
16, 5/26/89, "Plant Heatup from Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby."
7.
Job Orders 8 A019201,
- 723710, 722631,
- 723746, 759447.
8.
Document Routing Form for Generic Letter 88-05,88-210, 6/20/88.
9.
Memo J.H. Ersland to R.L.
Simms re:
STA Tracking, 88-05, 7/14/88.
10.
Training modules:
"Gate Valves" "Gate Valves" "Globe Valves" "Globe Valves" "Diaphram Valves" "Diaphram Valves" "Butterfly Valves" "Butterfly Valves" "Ball Valves" "Ball Valves" MH-C-F421 HH-L-3011 HH-C-F422 MM-L-3012 HH-C-F424 MM-L-3014 HH-C-F425 MH-L-3015 HH-C-F426 HH-L-3016 11.
Log books for daily containment airborne particulat'e surveys
- Units 1&2.
12.
Production Note Bulletin re: Boric'Acid Leakage, dated 7/25/89, from J.E.
Rutkowski.
13.
Procedure 2-OHP 4030.STP.016, Rev.
4, 12/29/88, "Reactor Coolant System Leak Test."
14.
Memorandum, R.A. Kadlec to P. Schoepf, dated 5/10/88, subject: Generic Letter 88-05.
15.
Procedure 12 PMP 5030.001.001, Rev.
0, 3/27/89, "Examination and Evaluation of Boric Acid Corrosion and/or Leakage."
16.
Procedure No.
12 gHP 7091.NDE.003, Rev.
0, 12/6/85, "Visual'Examina-tion - VT-1, VT-3 and VT-4."
H.
Personnel Interviewed 1.
The following personnel were contacted during the site visit:
D..Burris S.
Cherba D. Londot J. Moline P. Schoepf E. Apshagen D. Ruth J.
Schwerha Unit Supr.
- 1&2 STA Section/S&A Dept.
Maintenance Haintenance Nuclear Engr/Tech Supp.
RFC Supr Design Change Coord.
Former Ass't Shift Supr.
J. Steinhauser J. Droste S. Sinko J.
Ersland R. Crowder J. Tilly 2.
The following personnel were Carl Czajkowski Kris Parczewski A. Alan Blind B.L. Jorgensen L.S. Gibson J.R.
Sampson R.T.
Rickman S.J.
Cherba Brian Worm Paul G. Schoepf K.R. Worthington B.A. Svensson J.E.
Rotkowski D.L. Londot NDE Supr.
Haintenance Supt.
R.P. Shift Tech.
Skills Training Supr.
Sr..Instructor Unit Supr.
(¹2) present at the entrance meeting:
~Tati Aft'ill Research Engr./BNL Sr.
Chem.
Engr./NRC Asst. Plt. Hgr./C.C.
Cook Sr. Resident Inspector Asst. Plt. Hgr./D.C.
Cook Safety
& Assessment Supt./
D.C. Cook ISI/NPRDS Supv./D.C.
Cook STA Section/S&A Dept.
OPS/ACC Nuclear Eng'g.
- Tech.
Suppt.
Sr. Auditor/ASPSC Site gA Licensing Coord./Cook-HGRL APH/Production Haint. Staff Engr./D.C.
Cook 3.
The following personnel were present at the Exit Critique:
NRC K.I. Parczewski, NRR C.J.
Czajkowski, NRC Consultant (from Brookhaven National Labs)
D.G. Passehl, NRC Resident Inspector B.L. Jorgenson, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Plant A.A. Blind J.E.
Rutkowski L.S. Gibson J.R.
Sampson
~EPSC S.J.
Brewer P.G.
Schoepf H.L. Horvath J.B. Droste S.J.
Cherba D. Londot B.
Worm D. Burris R. Rickman
V
~
ATTACHH 1
R AMKRKAN fLfCTRIC POWER Gate Hay 23, 19SS Subject COOK NUCLEAR PIANT Generic Letter 88-05, List of RCPB Components Susceptible to Boric Acid Corrosion Ftom P.
G. Schoepf P.
C. Marley - Bridgman Attached is a list of pressure retaining components in the reactor coolant pressure boundary vhich have been identified as "susceptible to boric acid corrosion" along vith potential sources of leakage vhich could impact these components.
This list has been assembled based on a review of industry and Cook Plant experience as outlined in response to Requirement 1 of the Generic Letter (see my April 25, 1988 memo vhich outlines our proposed actions).
This list should be used as a basis for the field-valks of the Unit 1 and 2
reactor coolant systems to verify susceptible areas and leakage sources and to identify other leakage paths vhich could impact the RCPB.
These field-valks are scheduled to be completed during the April, 1989 refueling outage for Unit 1 and prior to completion of the Steam Generator Repair outage for Unit 2.
Folloving these field valks, the Plant vill develop detailed inspection procedures for the RCS during outages (components not accessible during power operation) and during periods of increased RCS leakage (accessible components).
The plant should consider using this list as an interim checklist, in the event, that ve have the opportunity to inspect the RCS prior to the scheduled valk-downs (during any forced outages on Unit 1).
P.
G. Schoepf PGS:tr)
Attachment cc:
S.
H. Steinhart E. V. Gilabert T. R. Satyan-Sharma M. G. Smith, Jr.
- Bridgman
BORIC ACID CORROSION OF REACTOR COOIANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY INSPECTION PLAN FOR SUSCEPTIBLE COMPONENTS SUSCEPTIBLE COMPONENT S POTENTIAL LEAKAGE SOURCE PATH COMMENT I.
Reactor Vessel, Vessel Head and Closure Studs 1.
Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) vent plugs at the top cap of each of the 53 CRDMs.
2.
Incore thermocouple (T/C) instrument tube conoseals at each of the five instrument tube head penetrations.
3.
Incore T/C pressure tube swagelock fittings for each of the five T/C instrument tubes.
Not examinable during power operation.
Although these have not had a history of leakage, they should be considered in the ivent that boric acid is discovered in the vessel head area with no other apparent source.
Located inside the CRDM ventilation shroud.
Not examinable during power operation or with RCS at full temperature.
Same comment as No. 2.
4.
RVLIS vessel head shut-off valves RC-121,
- 137, and 138 (packing and body-to-bonnet points).
5.
RVLIS sensing line flanges above vessel head (2 sets).
Located outside the CRDM venti.lation shroud but within the vessel stud circle.
Not accessible during power operation or with RCS at full temperature.
Same comment as No. 4.
Generic Letter 88-05 May 20, 1988
SUSCEPTIBLE COMPONENT S
POTENTIAL LEAKAGE SOURCE PATH.
COMMENT I.
Reactor Vessel, Vessel Head and Closure Studs (continued) 6.
Reactor head vent piping.
Flanges above vessel head, within stud circle and head vent valves RC-134 (packing and body-to-bonnet ]oint), NS0-21, 22, 23 and 24 (solenoid housing points).
7.
Reactor vessel flange.
Same comment as No. 4.
Seal leak-off is monitored per Tech.
Spec.
requirements at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
II. Reactor Coolant Pump Main Flange Bolts (Note:
Pump casing is stainless steel and therefore is not considered susceptible to boric acid corrosion) 1.
Main flange leaks.
Not examinable during power operation.
2.
Seal housing leaks.
Not examinable during power operation.
III.Pressurizer Vessel and Manway Closure Bolts i.
Manway )oint.
Not examinable during power operation.
2.
Pressurizer heater penetrations.
Not examinable during power operation.
IV. Steam Generator Shell and Manway Closure Bolts 1.
Primary side manway points at channel head.
Not examinable during power operation.
V.
Valve Packing Follow Studs 1.
Valve packing leakage.
See attached list of valves in or near the RCPB which have carbon steel packing follow studs.
Generic Letter 88-05 May 20, 1988
SUSCEPTIBLE COMPONENT S
VI. To Be Determined POTENTIAL LEAKAGE SOURCE PATH 1.
Mi.scellaneous components vhich have had a history of leakage at Cook Plant.
COMMENT See attached list of components that have experienced leakage or exhibited corrosion damage in the past at Cook Plant.
Generic Letter 88-05 May 20, 1988
BORIC ACID CORROSION OF REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY VALVES WITHIN OR NEAR THE RCPB WITH CARBON STEEL PACKING FOLLOW STUDS RC-106L1 RC-106L2 RC-106L3 RC-106L4 RC-107L1 RC-107L2 RC-107L3 RC-107L4 NMO-151 NMO-152 NMO-153 IMO-128 ICM-129 NRV-151 NRV-152 NRV-153 NRV-163 NRV-164 QRV-111 QRV-112
~
~
Generic Letter 88-05 May 20, 1988
~
~
1 4
BORIC ACID CORROSION OF REACTOR COOIJAI'RESSURE BOUNDARY (RCPB)
MISCELIANEOUS COMPONENTS THAT HAVE EXHIBITED A HISTORY OF LINAGE AND/OR CORROSION COMPONENT COMMENT 1.
RCS Flux Mapping Seal Table Fittings Fittings should be inspected upon system pressurization.
Seal Table is examinable at po~er and should be inspected whenever RCS leakage exceeds admin-istrative limits.
2.
RCS RTD Bypass Manifold to RTD Fittings 3.
RCS Bypass Manifold Flov Alarm Svitches (NFA-210,
- 220, 230 and 240)
Fi.ttings should be inspected upon system pressurization.
Impact of leakage ~ould be on RCS supports and not the RCPB.
Fittings and svitches should be inspected upon system pressurization.
4.
SI-168 (four per unit)
Accumulator Tank Outlet Test Line Drain Inspect body-to-bonnet joint and packing for leakage whenever RCS leakage exceeds administrative limits.
5.
QRV-51 CVCS Charging to Auxiliary Spray Shutoff Valve Inspect body-to-bonnet joint and packing for leakage vhenever RCS leakage exceeds administrative limits.
6.
QRV-61 CVCS Alternate Charging to RCS Loop 1 Cold Leg Shutoff Valve Inspect body-to-bonnet joint and packing for leakage vhenever RCS leakage exceeds administrative limits.
7.
QRV-160, 161 and 162 Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet Flov Orifice Shutoff Valves Inspect body-to-bonnet joint and packing for leakage vhenever RCS leakage exceeds administrative limits.
Generic Letter 88-05 May 20, 1988
ATTACHMENT 2
BORIC ACID CORROSIOY/EROSION EVALUATION G'JIDE Component:
2.
Job Order No.:
3.
Location:
4 ~
Review SRA/QC NDE examination report,.
Determine degree of corrosion/wastage of material and indica-e affected part.
6.
For component studs (if af ected):
a ~
b.
c ~
Total number of studs:
Number o
studs a fected:
ocation of affected studs in component (attach drawing i
necessary):
7.
Is long term corrective action required'?
(i.e., Design Change)
Yes ho If yes, indicate required action:
8.
Determ ne if repair is required.
Yes No If no, attach justification for not completing repa'rs.
9.
Dete=.ine i;ustification for continued operation is re~'ec.
Yes No
- yes, attach justification and 50.59 review.
10.
Deten;ine if operation can continue with an inspection prog am.
Yes No If yes, specify inspection program on Job Order.