ML17326B476
| ML17326B476 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1988 |
| From: | Alexich M INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| To: | Murley T NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| TAC-61686, TAC-61687, NUDOCS 8811100161 | |
| Download: ML17326B476 (36) | |
Text
At:CK~~'QR-VXVi'5 ~ RMRSALRP~. R~EM ACCESSION NBR:8811100161 DOC.DATE: 88/10/20 NOTARIZED:
NO.
DOCKET FACIL:50-315 Donald,C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana a
05000315
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50-316 Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana 05000316 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ALEXICH,M.P.
Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana 6 Michigan Ele RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MURLEY,T.E.
Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Submits status of internal conduit fire seal program in response to Insp Repts 50-315/85-13
& 50-316/85-13.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
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TITLE: Proprietary Review Distribution Operating Reactor NOTES:
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indiana htichigan Power Company P.O. Box 16631 Coiumbus, OH 43216 AEP:NRC:0692BB TAC Nos.
61686 and 61687 Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Unit Nos.
1 and 2
Docket Nos.
50-315 and 50-316 License'Nos.
DPR-58 and DPR-74 STATUS OF INTERNAL CONDUIT FIRE SEAL PROGRAM AND NRC INSPECTION REPORT 85013, ITEM 2.R U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Document Control Desk Washington, D. C.
20555 Attn:
T. E. Murley October 20, l988
Dear Dr. Murley:
The following information is being submitted in response to NRC Inspection Report 85013 (August 26, 1985) Item 2.r.
(Extract 2.r is enclosed in Attachment 1.)
The Cook Nuclear Plant is licensed to the requirements of Branch Technical Position (BTP)
APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, Section D.l.J, dated August 23, 1976 in accordance with our commitment in a letter dated January 31, 1977.
(Copy of January 31, 1977, letter and the NRC response, Safety Evaluation
- Report, dated July 31,
- 1979, are enclosed as Attachment 2.)
We wish to formally advise you of the current status of the Cook Nuclear Plant internal conduit seal program and seek closure of inspection Item 2.r.
tA cQHa OO
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- OR iOC I ~
lQA IILCI It has been our understanding that the licensing basis for the plant requires sealing around piping and conduits and in and around cable trays penetrating fire barriers in order to maintain the integrity of the barrier.
A review of-the applicable Standard Review Plan (SRP) and of BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A reveals that sealing is not mandated inside of conduits.
Il The NRC's fire protection Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated July 31, 1979; states, in part (page 13):
"The penetration fire stops are provided to prevent the movement of fire from one area to another along the electric'al cables which 'run through these fire areas.
Silicone foam poured in and around the cable tra s and conduits where they penetrate fire barriers make up the penetration fire stops."
[Emphasis added]
We believed the words "in and around" applied only to the cable trays and the word "around" applied only to the conduits and other penetrations such as piping.
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Dr. T.
E. Murley AEP:NRC:0692BB We now realize that this is an ambiguous statement and should have been clarified when we received the SER because we did not intend to seal inside conduit.
This understanding developed from the seal configurations installed at that time and from the SER, which states in part (page 14):
"We conclude that the enetration fire sto s which are in lace rovide sufficient rotection from the unbounded s read of fire alon electrical cables.
We base this conclusion on our knowledge of ASTM E-119 fire tests including those cited by the licensees which substantiate the fire resistive ability of penetration fire stops constructed with silicone foam."
[Emphasis added]
The NRR inspection of the in-place fire protection measures, and Region III inspections of the penetration fire stops prior to issuance of the
- SER, supported our understanding of the licensing basis for fire barrier penetrations and our position not to seal inside conduit.
Further verification that our understanding was correct was received from the NRC in a D.
G. Eisenhut letter dated November 24,
- 1980, Enclosure 2, which stated "There are no open items on this facility."
For your convenience, Attachment 3 to this letter contains extracts from the SER and supporting documentation, the Region III inspection
- reports, and a copy of the D.
G. Eisenhut letter dated November 24, 1980.
We believe that we have fulfilled our licensing obligations to seal fire barrier penetrations to preclude fire propagation.
We are fully aware that the current issue of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 has been revised to include the additional criteria of sealing inside conduits to preclude the propagation of hot gas and smoke through the conduits.
We have participated in industry studies and many discussions with your staff concerning the propagation of hot gas and smoke.
Although we are not required to seal inside conduits because we are licensed under BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A criteria, we have concluded that sealing one end of certain double open-ended conduits would enhance the safety of the Cook Nuclear Plant.
We plan to seal conduits that meet the following definitions and criteria:
1.
An open-ended conduit is one in which the contained cables exit the conduit into an open air space, rather than into an enclosure attached to the conduit.
2.
The distance specified for conduit terminations, in Items 4, 5,
and 6 below, represent the linear length of the conduit as measured from the point of exit from the penetration.
3.
When both ends of any size double open-ended conduit terminate at the wall, it will be treated as a sleeve and sealed in accordance with our fire barrier penetration seal program.
4.
Double open-ended conduits smaller than 2 inches in diameter will be sealed on at least one end when either end of the conduit terminates less than one foot from the barrier.
Dr. T. E. Murley AEP:NRC:0692BB 5.
Double open-ended conduits 2 inches in diameter will be sealed on at least one end when either end of the conduit terminates less than 3 feet from the barrier.
6.
Double open-ended conduits greater than 2 inches in diameter will be sealed on at least one end when either end of the conduit terminates less than 3 feet from the barrier or has a
cable fillof less than 40$.
7.
The seal inside of conduits will, as a minimum, be as described in Topical Report WEFP01-P (see below) or its equivalent.
We will perform the above sealing on new installations including the resealing required by installation (pulling) of new cable in existing applicable conduits.
Existing installations are already sealed as a minimum to the above criteria.
The above criteria is based on review of the final report on the Conduit Fire Protection Research Program (Topical Report WEFP01-P) completed on June 1,
1987, by Professional Loss Control, Inc.
This criteria, as demonstrated in the Topical Report, provides guidelines for the internal sealing of conduits to prevent the propagation of fire through conduits.
In addition, the above criteria also provides reasonable assurance that the propagation of hot gas and smoke through conduits will be minimized.
This report was officially transmitted to the NRC by the Wisconsin Electric Power Company via a letter of November 4, 1987, for review as a licensing topical report.
(Attachment 4)
We had participated along with other utilities in the conduit sealing study and testing program upon which Topical Report WEFP01-P was based.
We do not plan to perform regularly scheduled surveillance inspections on these internal conduit seals since the internal sealing of conduits is not a regulatory requirement for Cook Nuclear Plant.
We also believe the inherent nature of the internal conduit seals are relatively immune to normal wear and tear type deterioration.
0 In conclusion, we continue to believe that we were in compliance with Appendix A and with the Safety Evaluation Report dated July 31, 1979, at the time of the 1985 inspection.
As indicated in our letter AEP:NRC:0692AG, dated September 13,
- 1985, we believe that the 1979 Safety Evaluation was based on the 1976 Standard Review Plan (NUREG-75/087) and BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, and on-site observations and inspections conducted by the NRC from 1975 through 1978.
- Further, we believe that our conscientious effort in 1984 to update the Cook Nuclear Plant for installation of internal conduit seals in accordance with the latest information should not be construed as a requirement to retrofit the previously NRC inspected and approved (1975 through 1978) sealing methodology nor looked upon as indicating a breach in our previous sealing program.
Dr. T.
E. Murley AEP:NRC:0692BB Our past efforts have exceeded our licensing requirements for the sealing of conduits and are indicative of our dedication to safe operation.
We believe the resolution presented in this letter represents a conservative
- approach, as well as being prudent, and is in accordance with the guidance provided by your staff during our July 12, 1988 discussions.
We respectfully request that NRC Inspection Report 85013 Item 2.r dated August 26,
- 1985, be closed.
This document has been prepared following Corporate procedures which incorporate a reasonable set of controls to ensure its accuracy and completeness prior to signature by the undersigned.
Sincerely, M.
. Alexi h Vice President ldp Attachments cc:
D. H. Williams, Jr.
W.
G. Smith, Jr.
- Bridgman R.
C. Callen G. Charnoff A. B. Davis NRC Resident Inspector
- Bridgman G. Bruchmann
Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0692BB
Attachment 2 to AEP:NRC:0692BB
0
Attachment 3 to AEP:NRC:0692BB
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Attachment 3 to AEP:NRC:0692BB Page 1
1.
Safet Evaluation (SE) dated Jul 31, 1979 a.
The SE identified the following guidance documents which were used to establish the bases for licensing the D. C. Cook Plant in the area of penetration fire seals:
0 Standard Review Plan (SRP)
NUREG-75/087< Section 9.5-1 dated May, 1976, including Branch Technical Position (BTP)
APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A, dated August 23, 1976.
Our response to Appendix A to the BTP 9.5-1, dated January 31, 1977.
Additional information requested by the NRC staff.
Our response (dated October 27, 1977) to NRC questions (dated July 11, 1977).
b.
The
- SRP, page 9.5.1-26 paragraph (j) states in part: "Floors,
- walls, and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have minimum three-hour fire rating.
Penetrations in these barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to pzovide fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the barrier itself."
The
- SRP, page 9.5.1-28, paragraph 3(d) states in part:
"Cable and cable tray penetration of fire barriers (vertical and horizontal) should be sealed to give protection at 'east equivalent to the fire barrier."
C ~
Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1, page 15 for Plants Under Construction and Operating Plants, pazagraph (j) states in pazt:
"Floors, walls and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have minimum fire rating of three hours.
Penetrations in these fire barriers, including conduits and piping, should be scale(i or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the f'e barrier it,self....
The fire hazard in each should be evaluated to determine barrier requirements.
Ef barrier fire zesistance cannot be made adequate, fire detection and suppression should be provided...."
Our response to Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1, page 33, states in parts "All openings for cable, pipe, and ductwork in these walls, floors, and ceilings have been sealed with foamed in place silicone...."
d.
NRC Question 9, dated July 11, 1977 states in part: "Substantiate the fire resistance capability of the following items by verifying that their construction is in accordance with a particular design
Page 2
that has been fire tested, and identify the design and test method used and acceptance criteria....
c.
fire barrier penetration seals....
(3) Other pipe or conduit openings - )ustify the lack of seals where they are not provided in fire rated barriers. "
Our response dated October 27, 1977 to Question 9.c(3) states>
"There are no openings in what we consider fire rated barriers which have not been sealed."
e.
The SE, page 2, states in part: "All licensees were requested to:
(1) compare their fire protection programs with the new guidelines; and (2) analyze the consequences of a postulated fire in each plant area.
The results of these actions as applied to D. C. Cook, Units 1
& 2, are discussed below.
"We have, with the assistance of our fire protection consultants,*
reviewed the licensees'nalysis and visited both Units 1 and 2 to examine the relationship of safety related components,
- systems, and structures to combustible materials and associated fire detection and suppression systems....
The SE, page 13, states in part:
"The penetration fire stops are provided to prevent the movement of fire from one area to another along the electrical cables which run through these fire areas.
Silicone foam poured in and around the cable trays and conduits where they penetrate fire barriers make up the penetration fire stops.
"The licensees have cited applicable generic test data for the penetration fire stops which show that the silicone foam material in this application provides a three-hour fire resistance to an ASTM E-119 type fire exposure.
"During our site visit we saw many of the penetration fire stops which had been installed in Unit 1.
Subsequently, we learned that some penetration fire stops being installed for Unit 2 were (identical] to those designs that had been tested....
The SE, page 14, states in part:
"We conclude that the penetration fire stops which are in place provide sufficient protection from the unbounded spread of fire along electrical cables.
We base this conclusion on our knowledge of ASTM E-119 fire tests including those cited by the licensees which substantiate the fire resistive ability of penetration fire stops constructed with silicone foam."
2.
NRC Region III Ins ections of Penetration Fire Sto s
a.
Report 050-315/75-01 for inspections dated January 7-9p 1975 Section 2 states in part:
"The licensee stated that all silicone
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Page 3
seals were installed in the Donald C. Cook Plant by Brand Industrial Services, Incorporated (BISCO)....
During his tour of the plant, the (NRC) inspector did not observe any missing or damaged fire barriers...."
b.
Report 050-316/77-17 dated September 21, 1977.
Section III'aragraph 3.e. states in part:
"The Region III inspector observed BISCO personnel working on penetrations identified as trace numbers 302-003-1, -2, and -3 in the cable spreading room...."
c ~
Report No. 050-315/77-25>
050-316/77-35 for inspections dated December 6-8 and 19-22, 1977.
Pages 3 and 4 paragraph g states in part: "In the company of Operations Quality Control Coordinator, the
[NRC) inspector made a tour of the following areas examining....
penetration areas requiring special sealing materials....
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Control room (including all cabinet interiors)
Control room cable spreading room Switchgear rooms Switchgear room cable spreading areas Cable tunnels Diesel generator rooms Various areas of the Auxiliary Building and Turbine Building All penetration areas inspected were adequately sealed with approved and accepted sealant materia's...."
d.
Report, 050-315/78-08; 050-316/78-03 for inspections dated February 14-16 and March 8, 1978.
Page 4 states in part:
"(Closed)
Item D.S, Attachment to License DPR-74, Fire barriers in cable spreading area below control room... All areas requiring the installation of fire barriers appeared to be completed.
The inspector did not observe any area which required the installation of a fire barrier...."
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<se shee<fir>>llv >dent<fiea ie. >hr procedure with the>>ppfupfisie pf< c>>v:>ors>>nd mi Ihadi for ace< sr sprciheo d plant syet< ms Ih>>: should be cnunrged to reduce the d>>mige pcirl.t>><l during ~ lvcvl hre snd the luce<ion of Iccsl vnd remote can<cols for such msnsiement Ie p. vny hydfiuhc or elec<lie>>: system) iii Ihc zone coiercd by Ihe sperilic f<f>> fivhi<ng pc<<<.cdure Ihv> could increvse Ii:<..>>zulus if::he ~rri because of aver pfessur<zs><vr. or electr'crl hrzscdsl e Viisl hest sensi'.ive eye<em components Ihs< need
<o be kept cool >>hi!c I gh<:ng r, local fir<<PJ>I<cuiifiyhrzufdvvs combustible) Ihst need cooling snould be designated
- f. Orgsmzstion of fire fighting bcigsdes end the ~ s)ignment of speci ~ I duties according to job title so that ell fice fighimg functions are coveced by any complete shift personnel complement. These duties include command control of the brigade. trans paciinp file suppression snd suppor< equipmcnt tv the hre
~cenes. applying the extinguishsnt to >he fice.
communicet>an with the control coom. snd coordinot>an with ovis<d>> fice dep<>rtmen<s.
g Potential cvdivlugif~ I and toxic huzirds in fire zones
- h. Vent<let>on system opecation that ensuces desired plant ~ir d)s<f)but<an when Ihe vent<I ~ tian Aow'is madihed for fice conteincnent or smoke clearing opecetions.
- i. Operations cequinng cnnlfol roam and shih engineer coordination or su<bur<cut<on.
- j. Instruct<one for plant operators and gcnecel plant personnel during hce.
I Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capability
- 1. Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability provided for ~ specific fice area
~hall be able to achieve
><nd maints>n subcnticsl reactivity conditions in the reactor. maintain reactor coolant inventory
~chieve end mvintam hot ~tandbl
'onditions for ~ PWR (hot shutdown 'for ~
BWRI and achieve cold shutdown
'onditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> snd maint ~ in cold
~hutdown conditions Ihereaher. Dunng Ihe postfire shutduwn. Ihc ccrc<or coolant system process variables shell bc miintvined wi<hm those pcedictcd for v loss v( normal a.c.
power. end the fission product boundary Integrity shell not be sf lected i.c.. there shell be no fuel clad damage. rup>urc or any pnmary coolant boundary. or rup<ure of the containment boundary.
2 1'he pecfnfmsnce goals for the shutdown functions shill be.
~ The ce<<c>)v<>y control function shall be capable of achieving and mvintin<>>ng cold shutduwn resctiv<>y conditinns b The reactor rovlan< m.st eiip function
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< I i Blegi snd br wi>h)n Ihe Iei'el >nd<catinn in Ih< pfessufizrr lof PKV!Is Tni fv.<finl h< u< lrmnv>>l funr<ion shall be Cupubie nl >>chil i>rg vnd m>><nt ~ )n<n<<
decsi hei< icmaisl d Tt:r places) monitor>ng function shel(be cipr!<le n: pcnvid>ng n".<Cc> cesdirgs uf Ihe pf<<cei) i Sf<ible) nrce)sufy tO peffurlr. Snd control the >>bove funft<on) e The s<.poof<<ng functions shell be csp>>!<Ie n! pcvvidieg >hc p<VC< es Cooling lublic>><iar. r<c. neces) ~ ry to permit Ihc opere>icr. o! Ihc cquipmcnt used fnr life shutdoivr.!unction) 3 Tl.e sh;<dawn cspsbiiity for spec>fic file
~ cev) m>>1 be unique fnc evrh such area or it mu] h< nne umqvc c<i<r.'instmn o. eye<erne f<<f rll $ >>C" >>frs<) In e::h~cf Cu' e Ihe rltccesiii e s.,vidown rnnshil>>y sh<<ll he
>ndepender.'f lhe spec:f<C hie sresis! ind sh>>ll rcfomma'.)<e par'.!)<c conditiors whole afts>tc pviief is svvilub:e snd where o!h)te power >s no> eve<i<<hie!nf 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> I'coceauce) shall be m ef(eci to <mplement th>s cap>>bib>y s lf
~in cold shu>dawn willnat be available because of fife dsnsegc.
the equipment end systems comprising the means to achieve end mimtain tl:e hat standby or hot shutdown condition shill be cap>>h!e vf meintv)n>ng such conditions unul cold shutllown car. be achieved. I( such equipment end systems will not bc capsb! e of being poweced by both onsite and affs<te elec>cic power systems berausc of fice dumuge. en indep~ndent on)its power system ghall be provnled. The number of operating shif< personnel.
exclusive ol fire hngsde members. required to operate such equipment end systems shell be on s<<e ~I all umvs S. Equipment snd systems compri ~ing Ihe means to achieve and mein>em cold shutdown cond:t<ons sbsli not bc damaged by fire: or the fice dslnsge to such equipment
~ nd systen: ~ shall he limited so that the
~ystcms can be made operabl>> snd cold shutdown achieved wi>hm 72 houcs.
Materi ~Is for such reprirs shell be readily
~ ve<lsble on ~ ite and pcocedurcs shall be in effect to implement such reps>cs, Ifsuch equipment end systems used prior Io 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
~ ftcc Ihe fice willnot be capable of being powered by both onsite and offsite electric power sys>ems because af fire damage. en independne: onsite power system shall be provided Eqv>pmcnt and systems used after 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> msy bc powered by o(fsite power only
- 6. Shutdown systems.tnstalled to ensure postfice shu>dawn capability need not be desipncd to meet seismic Category I enter<a.
single failure cciteri~. or other design basis
~ cc<dent critene. except where required for other ressoi.s.
C.g.. bee~use of intecface with or impec>on existing svfrty systems, or because of rdvefse vvlvc ~>.t<nns due to f>re dimage
- 7. 1he sife shutdown equipment and sysiems foc each fire veer shill be known to br is<ili<ea ff~ sm <<rive)>><<<I nvn as<le>i c:l<,u.'i >n:. s.!.<c.)<v.< s ~ Il,s<i h.s! ih )ftr
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~eosrstion snd barf<ere he<w>>r< trave and conduit) containing reine <sled rice.uii ~ of one
~vfe shutdown diiisi<<n end Irvis end ciihil<<iti elm<i)i<if>g esca<.is<i'J Lief<~ af safe shutdown csblrs (n<m th< rrdiinJvnt divi~ion. or Ihe isnl ~lion o( these ~sis)ci ~ Ied circuits from Ihe sv(e shv<d<<wn equ<pn<ent shill bt Such IhrI e postuiv<e<l.!i<e invi><ring
~ eeoc<a>ed c<fru<t~ wi!Inot pfevrn< site
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Fife Darrfer Cable Penccfun<<n S< al Qualification pens<ration seel designs shel! utilize anlv noncombustib!e materi>>ls and shall he qualified by Iests that ~ re cnfnpirablr to tests used ta rett hce barriers The sec < ptel.re crit< f>e fac the Irst shell >nil<<or 1 The cable fae bi<circ pcr.s'.cat)on seal hss withstvnd Ihe fire en<lurvn< e Ie s> wiihou<
passage of Aamr of igniii<<n ot est>!Cs nn Ihr unexposed
~ide (nr ~ p< nnd nf t)n>e equivalent Io Ihe f>fe ces>s<>>ncr ratmg requ>ced of the herc<en The Icmpcfeture levels crcerc ed for t>>e unexposed
~ide erc analyzed snd demOnstrate Ihat Ihe maX<muln tempera>~s Is su(()c<ently below Ihe cable insula<inn ignition lempe< ~turc. snd 3 The fice becner penetration seel rema>ns intact end does not ~llnw protection of 'rater beyond lhe unexposeo surface dunng Ihe bose
~Ireem test.
N. Fife Doors F>re doacs shall be selfwlas<ng or provided with closing mechanisms cnd sh>>ll be inspected semiannually to venfy that sutomst<c hold open. release. snd closmg mechanisms and latches ere on"f>>l<lr One of the fallowing meesucrx shnll be provided to ensure Ihey w>ll pcoiect the opcmng as requited in case of hie.
- 1. Fire doors shall be kept closed and electrics!iy supecv>sed at a connnuously manned Iocst>on:
2 Fire doors shall be locked closed and inspected weekly Io venfy that the doors ece in the clnsed position:
- 3. Fire doors shell be provided with
~ utomstic hold open end release mechanisms
~nd.inspected daily Io vcnfy that doorways are free of obstcuctions: or
- 4. F>ce doors shall be kept closed and Inspected daily to verify that they arc m the closed position.
The fire brigade!seder shell hove ready access Io keys for any locked Are doors.
Areas protected by automatic tot ~ I Aaoding gas suppress>on systems eh~!i have electncally supecviscd self closing hre doors or shall satisfy option 1 ~I>>)ve.
O. OilCollcc(<an System /or Reactor Caalonc Pump The reactor coo!snt pump shell be equipped with sn oil collection system ifIhe contsmment is not inerted dunng I onnal operation. The o<l collection system shall be so designed. engineered. and mstall<<il
~ <>v'.
fa<luce w>ll not lead Io fice dvnng niicni>>< or design bes>s accident conditions aneble method o(complying with Ihi~
~ tie<he><ve wnuld be io meei R>>eut>><<s<s I'su:dr I yS en)<<'.nn e <<J!>><esi ni >>)ssss>>'. 's
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5>>t,h <<>lie <,<ion svssvnsx ah~If Iso rap.sbtv nf coll< cling luliruil I<un> at p>>ts'lit< ll pressutireil umf unlit> xx..- ts d I~.iLagr sitrs in tht reactor rnnl.snt p.-: l<<tn inl ~ tx>>i la:s<Lugv sh.ill li<
~ i>ll~
s ts ~,.>nil slt.sins >I isi,i vents J cl>sxv>I i s>nt.siis ~ s
~'
~ i i.sn hnlsl Ilv.
ent>te lwlsv u>l xvxt~'>>> s.>v ~ '
siv rnn
~rrrat> t
<~ rv<p<<t<<sl <n i< ~
~
sit ifIhv ft.~ xh P>>lnl s har>>> I<'r>wl<<'x ssl
< ~
s>>I tsts xs i>l tt
~.
h r.rl<ff>> fl. M.
$ I..L.g I
i.
I pin<i ried sh.sll iiu.linis's<'iss<if>.<I<>I till>slsg overfI<>>> Im< s. Iwin uil i >" ~
- r. oil fillans!
drain bnrs and plugs Il.sr;v>l <'iinnvctnsns un oil lines. and lube oil rese" o< ~ $ >>hriv xu
featurrs exist on Ihr rea"'r '>>nl.sni pun>nx The drain line shall hr I~.. ~
vs>>>>sgts Ii~
~ccomniu<l.<fe the Iatgs i'
~ '< nti.il u<l IvaL fSec IGIh, I'ul> b tt;t.sn. r. S<<. I, 94>t. si C.
201. Pub L 93-sit<
tt>t 5'>>'la fa II SC uOIlbf, st<4 III Dated ut LV.>sh<ngtnn. 0 C.. Ihis Iyth day of November 1980 For Ihc Nucle>sr Regular<try Commission, Satnual J. Chilk.
Secretory o/tnr Commtss>on It% D<>s Nl sa<1$ 1str4 II ta w ~ ~ $ ~ st>I o<LL>s<o cooc 1$~< ai
0 Federal Reg)s(er / Vo> IS. No. 225 / EVe()nesday.
Novefnber lq. ',980 / Rules en(l R<R<tl<(I)nns 76643 hazard to structures. systems. or compvrrni Important Io oo(rty Standpipe anJ hose
~t ~ (tons
~ nail be insid PWR contslnmcnt ~ and 0 WR con>einmr..'.o Ihst ore not Incr'ed. Standpipe end hoer
~ t~ (tons Inside cant ~ Inmi nt msy hc connected to a high qual>ty water supply ot Ou(AC(enl quanuty and pfeoouie O<hrr <han the fifa main lnop ifpl<<nt.sprr>hc Iru>urea prevent eater. ding thr fife main s<<pply in ~id cont ~ Inmen< For l(WR dfyw< II~. ~>a>>dp pr
~nd hoss
~ t ~ (iona shell be placed a>>>aid. ihc dry well wi>h sdsqaaic Ir>>r!hs o( hase In reach ony location ina>ae thc dfy well w>th
~ n effective hose
~ tfesm K IIydrasfat<c IInee Te. efs Fire hose shall be hyd<asi ~ticsllv tested
~t
~ prcssure of %0 psi or 3<> psi sbnve maximum fife m<<<n opera>in>> pf>>(sure whichever
> ~ greeter EI<>s ~ ~ !v<rd >n o>>>aide hose houses stall be irs>ra snnu<<ll). In<cfiaf
~ (ondpipe nose shell be '.cs>cd every three years F. h<>f>ymanc Fere Dc'fc et>on Automatic fife detection systems shall oe Inst ~lied In ~ II srcso of ihe pisni the( con< ~ in or present sn expc aura Are hazard tn safe
~hutdown or oa(c<y (riot<<d systems of components. These ftirdetect>un systems
~hail be capable o(operating with nr w> hout off(its power, C. Fire Pf<>(ection ofSaf c'hutdaa n Copobi If't)
- 1. Fire protection feature. shall be provided (or ~Iructurcs. syotc:no. snd compnncrts Impoftont to s ~ ie shutdown. Thrsc fcuturcs shall be capable oflimi<mg fife damage so
~
thol.'
. Onc train of systems necessary to
~chleve and moint ~ in hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control ~>stion(s) is (ree of fire damage: snd
- b. Systems necessary to achieve and malnt ~ in cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control ~tation(sj can be repaired withm 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />
- 2. Kxcept eo provided for paragraph C.3 of Ihlo section. where cables or equ>pmcnt.
Including assoasted nnn safe(y circu>ts the<
could prevent oper<<<ion or cause ma(operation due to hot shorts. open circuits.
'or short ~ to ground. or redund<<nt trains of
~ye(erne necessary to ochlevc and maintain hot shutdown cond>tiono sre located withi <
the same fire ~ reo outside of pnn:ery cont ~inment. onc of:he following mc ans o(
ensuring <hot one of thc redundant trains ts (fee of (>rc damage shall be provided:
~, Scparat>on of cables snd cquicmrnt and
~ ssocl ~ ted non safety arcuit ~ a( rcdundeni (rains by ~ fife barrier having ~ 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating.
Structural steel (afm>ng ~ part of or supporting ouch fire barr>cra shall be protected to ptovide fire rcoi ~i<<ncc cqu<valent to Ihst required of th>> barrier
- b. Scpsf<<tian of cables end equipment and
~ oooc> ~ ted nun safety are>>>ts af redundant trains by ~ h>>f>zan>sl Ji ~t<<nce uf mufr th<<n 2O feet with no lntervrning c>>mbustilibi of Afe hsx<<r J ~, ln sdd> ~>iin. Afe detectors <<nd <<I<
~u(Oma(iz (>fe S!.Op:"Si.e n SV<<>rn> Sb<<l: I>>
Insteiial >n I<I<< ill<<<<fl<<. '<f t:..'. 3 yl:.
c F;>'la'>>c '
I ',<'
Ild <<qu>pn>+ >t ~,'Iel i.'('3eoooc<stgd non agfc',y c(f(s.o(unc..
~
hour rating ln ad J>ti>>n, Afr drtrai:ro end ef:
~ u>ams>!c fif> o>>npiessivn svstem shall lic e
.!nsl ~ lied ii>>hc biC sfr<<
Inside no>>inst<ed canto>nment ~ one of the Are protection mesne aprahed shove or one of the fallow>ng fire prate<<<ion means shall bc provided d Sep<<(stion of csblro and equipment and
~ ssacia>cd n>>n sufriv ctfc>>i> ~ nf redundant
<<sins by ~ h<>(if>in><<t J>ai<<nce nf m>>rr thun ss irr> wi>i nv in>< rven>ng Co>>>bus>>hie
~ or (i!c h<<z<<fhs.
e Inst<<ll<<>(on of firr de<re<ore snd sn
~utoif otic fire supp<
"sa>nn system in Ihc Afc
~fc ~. Of f Separation of cahlrs snd equipment and assoc> ~ <cd non safety arcui<s a( rrdunJsnt
<(sins by ~ noncombustible radiant energy
~hield 3 Aiterns<tvc of drdicstcd shutdown csp<<bib<y snd >(a aoanct ~ tcJ circuits
'ndcpendrnt ol <.shlc ~. systems or component ~ >n!hc srra. fanm or xone under considcfot>on. <<hell b>> pfov>drd.
~. Where!he protection of systems whose (unction i ~ required for lint shu>down does nci satisfy the requirement of paragraph G.2
<,! thi ~ scctirn. or
- b. Where fedunJ<<nt trains of systems required fur hui shutdown located In Ihe
~smc f>fr <<fe'. ~ muy b<. s>>hire> tu dsm<<gc i<C SuPPress>an SC<ivit>rs <<r from tne rupture or insdvrf>r nt oper<<tion of Arc
~uppfcssian sya<rfns.
In addition. Afe detection end a fixrd Are
~ uppfca ~ ion system shall be Inst<<lied tn the secs. room, or zone under cons>Jere<inn.
II. Fire 8r<gade h site Arc brigade Ireined and equipped tor fire fighting shall be established to ensure
~dequate manual fire fighting capub>l>ty for
~ll <<ress o( Ihc plant <<un(sining
~ true<urea.
systems. or components Impnrtont to safety.
The fire brig<<de shall be ~ t less< Ave members on e<<ch shift,The bngodc leader
~nd st least twa brigade men.bets shell have su((icient training in or knowledge o(pion(
~s(ety rel~tcd systems to understand the effect ~ ot fire snd f>re supp(assent
~ on safe
~hutdown capability. The qu>iliCicetion of lire br>gsdc members shall include en annual physical examms >ion to dc<ermine (heir
~bib(y to perform ~ icnuouo Are fighting
~ctivi<ies. The shin supervisor shall nat be a men:hcr af the Are bf>gadc. The brigade lcsdci shall be competent (o assess Ihe patensc control toom personnel. Such comps>ence by the bngadc leader may be e>OJcnced by possess>nn of an npcratni'o berne<< or cq>>ivslcnt knew<edge of plant sa(r<y foisted systems, The minimum equipment provided for the I rigsde shsli consist of personal pfoti..tive equipment such os turnout c:nu! s. b<<<uo.
gloa vs. hard h<<<s. emergency cammumcations equ!pmrnt. pof<<<tile bah(a.'portal>le ventilat>>in >'quepm<<nt. <<nd part<<tile eating>>ishrrs S I( cvni<<ini d breath>ng oppuf<<<vs ua>ng full fui:c positive perse>>re n!<<sLa>>ppfvvc J bv NIOSI I (N<<>>un<<l
':!.II.~<<irehu!ui>w>> cap<<>>i>>>y
> ~ p<ovi<!rd <~y
~y>>i >>< or'i.'!sir<i ~!i'
~I<<wee a<<pe>>><>>y I~ I <>><>><r>>
>ir inir 'em~ ~ <
~
~
. ~.
~
~
'. e..~(
. sE institute for Ore<<pat>nn<v <<>>>fmrflyai>rn I s ihr I:8 8uresu of M>nrs) shall bc prnv>>lrd fur f>ir hng<<de. damage control. ond contrnl runm personnel, At less! IO mssLs oh<<!i Iir
~ veil<<hie fnf Are bngsde pcrsvnnc I C:antral roam pcrsnnncl msy bf lurmshr J brraihing
~ir by e mom(old system p>prd ffon: s
~ioregr rcscrv>>ir l(pfscncul Srfv>r.. >>r rs>rd opi fa<>ng I>b sli<<ll br ~ minim>>m e<f >>n<<h<<lf hour fvr thc self cunt<<>nrd>>ne> ~
At least Iwo eat(a sir ti>>>ties shall bc located an Nte for rarh orl( r>>ntuin"d bresthmg urn<. In add>tmn. en onset< Iehrur supply of reorrve ~ <r shall bc pfuvifl<d snd
~frsnerd to prem(< q>>>ck snd r<imp<< le replenishment o(cxhaus>rd supp(3 <<>r bottlro
~ s they afe rcbift>cd Ifc>>mpiras>>rs are used
~ s ~ source of breathing aif. only un>ts
~ pprnvrd fof breothing <<>r sh<<II bi'a>'d:
campressnrs shall be oprrsttlr ~ aavn>>ng a loss of of(site power. Special carr must be taLen to locate the compressor in ~ ress free ol dust and contammanto.
I. Fire Sngadc Training The fire brigade train>ng program shall ensure that the capabihty tn fight pnto nti~ I Ares ls established sml msi>I<ainr>i The program shell cons>st of sn >niti<<l cl<<ss> ~
matruction program full>>wed by penc die classroom msttuainn. Are Aghtnig pra>.tice snd fire drills:
- 1. Instn<cf>on
~. Thc initial classroom instruction shall Include:
(I] indoctrination of the plant fire fighting plan with opeciCic identificubnn uf cac.b individual' responsibib! >Co.
(") identification of Ihe type snd loa>t>an of Circ hazards end associated types of fir<!s Ihet could occur in Ihe plant.
(3)The toxic and cnrrosive cheractenotico of expected product ~ of a>mbustion.
(C) Identification of!he lacabon o( Cin lighting equipmcnt far each fire ares encl (an>>lisrization with Ihe l<<yout af the plant, mcluding access end egress routes Io each
~rce.
(5).The proper use of available C>re fighting equ>pment and the coffee( mr<bod of 1>>(ht>ng c<<ch type nf fire. The types of (>res cnvrrcd
~hould include C>fee in cncfg>zc J elertfira>l equipmrnt. firn in cal>lcs <<nfl cable tray>>,
hydrogen lires. fires involving Asmm<e end combustible liquifl~ or hsz<<rdous pfa<:cso chemical ~. Iirrs. res> Jting (>lim r>>not< act>un or modilicationo (welding). end record fil<<C>rcs.
(6) The proper use of con>munia>t><<n.
bghting. ventilation, end emergency br<<a>h>ng equipment.
p) Thc proper method for Cigh!>ng C>fcs Inside buildings end cunCineil op<<ccs.
(S) The direction and cooed>ns<>un of <<>>
C>rr Aghting activities (Cire brigade Ics Jcw only)
(g) Oet ~ iled review ot fire Cightmg s<rstrgies an J prua durco.
((O) Rc<>ew of Iha latest plant inudihcetlons s>>J corresponding chang<<a In hre fight>ng plans.
Nn< ~ Iten!a (n) and (IOI mav l. ~ deb '., ~ )
fr1<<'h<'ra<1>'lg Of ni ~ l>>>>f<<<bie>I I WI< ~
'Iee n
I
> ~ it:oi'i r I">>>> I i>l. <>>..<v
<<aa giiriltu ihr l>>r brig>>Uc.
I, 'vs<<< ~wa<e
<r
/~
FCd<'ral Rrf:IC(rf <>(
q5.
N<> '".1 /
t>Vs<In< Ctl:<S. <4<)crml>t i lf>
(<kt<l '<ti< C kntl Ri Lttl:<(Ittng P<pPC>e he e<<l,eie
~l ~ iei.ilil> <ea>hrd
>n fight>ng
ee'+
ll,~ ~
~
~ ~ee I
~1 e 4 in
t ae>e( in ee 'h ','ele'\\ teee ei
~ 41<>pe<<POI ei'i>>l(e>b(P ii> ihi'>>e le.ic re'<<pi ill ell I<<i) ice<>i>n ih,elf lee p<eei>e!e".f tei <<II (iie bfegae)
~ n e r'I>p<i and (i
>g lel,i<<1>P J n>PP<inge S!>>(t he heiJ at tract riics 3 meiothi beg all!><.g.>e(P ghpghf)PCS Ii> grV<<>> Ch.ingpi in thr hgp pewtrctinn p<nggam and u<hrg sute)PC>5 ~ls g)pep<'l efs p Ppgin J<<ge fipih re tg.eenegec cr iieeeni cb.,et( bP he ld lo crpi'.it Ihr cl >i<gee ig.. ixi<1>>g t<<en pfcg ah> (ng>>ll (igig>>elr mrint>e'i ni1 g a <WO vpag ppg><<J %he iv spiiiims grai iep cohcvornt w>lh the rrgulaf planned n>rr!engc Prce Ceg P Pfac teer crc5<i)i>s ihn(i hg h<<id fi)g p,>eh S'h.g'e<r lig<gaih e>n the pi<<tee< p>pth<<d of (ex'i<en!I Ihr 'v )fin<<i typri <<f fiers 'rat Could occur <n a nuc.lr.ii p>rc pl.eni The cP si'ssions sh>>ll pgiiiidr i>gig.idp m~n)tee gi <<ith exprgiencr in ae,t<<.il figr Pc<irg>>i" me n<.in<i Ihg usr nf emi fge n<.y l>rr.i<hing.>I;e>><>><vs .<<dec strenuous cunditiuns en ountrced in hge fighting ThesP pfactirr Srscinni sh.ill bc pro<<<dr J at (east once per year foc each (ife bogad< membef.
- 3. Drills a Fife brit(>><le dfiils shall t)p ppfformpd >n thr p(ani so that lhe hre bg)gade can pract)ce
~ 1 a ). >><n h (!CilliShall be prfform< d at rrgiil.it intervals not lo Pxcrr J 3 months for < a< h shift hfe bogadc. Fach f<fe brig>>dr memt)ef she<<id pari>cipatc m rach doll. b<<t must partirip:ilr <n al I<.acl twn Jr>lli tig 1 yi af.
A svff>rienl num!>rf nf lhrce >folic. bwl niil
.;.;,less Ihan nni
(<>f e ich sh>lt htc licig.ii(P prc rear chal( he unannounced lo detcfm>nc Ihe i'. 'fire fighlmg readiness of Ihe plant hre bozadr. hciga JP Iradrf. and hfe pfotrction systrhic and cquipmenl persons planning
~nd>>vthvoz<n(t an unanniivnrrd do(i Sh>>ll ensu<
~ that Ihe responding sh>ft hte bogadc tnemhrfs acc nol aware Ihal a df>il is be>ng p(ann<<d unt>i >I is begun Unannounced df>lls aha(i nol be scheduled closer than four weeks.
At (Past one drillpcr year shall be pPc(1rmad on a -back sh<fl" (of each sh>fl hre bf)gag(r c Thr dolls shall be preplanned lo estabhsh lhr tr<<in>ng oblrctiies of lhe doll
~nd shall lw rot<<cued to delrfminP hnw well Ihe tf <<ning olil<ctives ha vP hg cn mi I, Unarm<<oner J drills shall hc planni J and cohqwrd by mrmbrrc i>f thr managrnirnt staff re spuns<(>lr (uf plant safe tv and hfe pgotrcliun. i'i rf<<rmanrg Jrficirnririn( a ho bfga<le or uf indtv<<lu'il fifrling.>de <nemiw fs shall (er rrmi J<PJ Iiyschrdubnc>>JJ>t<>>nai It>>me<i<< h>f II<<' >fig.<<li'c nie min'fi
('nca<<c(.<<;teecy i(fili(>> efeicm.<f<
.J(.'>P foil<1>>i'ifiiy w fr(i<~:it <fr<I( <<<thin .tw ef.)vc. d At 3 yrar interval>>. a ran<h>ml< s<<icctcd unan<<ee inrmf dtiil shall be r t>tiqurd l>v quahh< i( <nJ<v<Jua(c <nJ pan Jrnt of thr (>rc ns<ih s staff A copy uf the written re poet (corn <<irh >nd<v>duals sh>gl( be avae(ab(P for e>>RC tpi w w, r (hi'iC Sh>>(( e<C a C.<<mmu<n in<.i<<di ehr foll<eiii< c ce i~ee>Pge< ee( fig<<,i(,ettg> 1'(fe ct>iv>1< $ $. hc;g>>efe e<nd ie Ie g <ie>n pl.e ~ Pn<<nt and eii" wt i qwiph>e 1t an<(!>1 ~ fe>ghteng cee.e>Pc>Pi I ~ Xiircchle n> nt 1.<1 ti l<<eg.i.le hi ~ mle ~ g 5 kilielil~'<Ige wf hei e<<hi'1 <e)ir iii ihe ti~ ~ lichililg 'cI< ate gs (elg <hP acr>> ae'ce>ehe ii iee <iig <>>in <hr fi<<AiirsimrntP( Il:P hie<)aetr mpml>p< i Co<<l<<<m.ini e iii<h rct.iii!iihe"i pl.in! Ii<V firht>ng piece r<iu<e 5 an<i uir ii( fi
>ng < u<<ete<eee nt >C>e iiiilingirlfc<int<<ne J Pnee'<erg>e 'v tlie'>><l.il>v eief>>.c et>i'c. eeininiiinie..i<i<<O pq>> mire)< .)net Ve ptii>><iem re)ie rhie <<< tee )tee e.iie n'. (e<,le !'>e.llele Ill I h< iimwi.e>> ei i>cp of h<r (ivhten 'qiiiph>mt <1 <I<<i<ref In seep< <<eth Ihe ~ ii<e.a<i<en and tsrp <1( (>rp irle c)e~( loe )hp <I<ill 1hp a<r.i >>n<l tvpi nl (iie ~ e hee ~ e h feii I!;e i(fili sho<<lil di. I~ < ft ~ em th>>ip iiire( in the' e.i ee>iii drill co Ih.it h<igael" mret>>>"Cc>>cr tf,>;1 ~ e! in hghiirg liie i in i.igie>>i ~ pl.ini a<<.ei 1hr i<<el cele)n 5<'ee'Pte'd i<)owl<! Semvl>><P <he')zP anil a ~i.inerc1i n', <<f a (<fr Iha< <,nwiel grace)g>>>fels <<<.cv. <O lhr a<e a cPIPctrd rdie)<<><ex he< f>c<<lpirlopmpni due'ii the'<") ~ <gite<ice J 1<i g<<ipimif t<i <>l><,iin Pqwipnehnt, and veganirr fo<<hr h>see)n<<ng loss nf ~ u>i>m.et>r, swppgrcc<<>n <.ap.il<<litv (Cf Aiirccmrnt of iigig igir Ii;iJcf'c direction of thi fi<i fighting effort ac <o thoroughnrcc. accuf acy, and effectiveness
- c. l(r g:nc<b In<()v<d<<>>l rreo< Js uf Iraining pfoviele'il Io each fi<P brig;iiirmrmbrf, including drill cfitiqiics, shall be main<a>ne J foc al IP.iii 3 vc are
<u Pnc<<o th>>< <.i<.h mrmlirfti 1 1 iiri training in all p.if<i <if Ihr tf;>ining pgi>gg.im Thr<<grrhfds of tr;<<n>ng shall he av.<<la! JP fog YRC frvipw ki t<.iini<<g iic hfi>.ide np<(
Iri<<ning fur hgv fighting>>ith>n ii<<iie(1<<vi ch.iil I>e'rhi <(wig<<l fi>t all thoci l>gic.<<ic mrmi>> cs
>> hiii<'rc(utmun4e records sho>>"
defirienci pc
( Eo)rn;mr<'gghfgne fmerc< ncv lighting umts with at Iract an )I~
houg h>>t!ecy po>>e 1 supply shall iir pfiii'idvd in <<R>>c<)as ner Jrd fnf oprralion i>f s.i(P shvtdoivn cquipmenl and >n access and eggrss foul<! Ihecrto V Agin>>ngslrafgvc Confri>ls Administrative controls sha(! br estabiished lo min<mizc hrP hazafds in ateas containmg slfiirt<<CPS cvctg ms and comlionents important tn ca(Pts. 1hrsc con<f1>lc chai( Pst>>bi<eh pfnrrJwcrc to I Govrfn the han Jl>ng.ind lin>itat<<>n of Ihe usi of i>fnafycombucti(J<
ma)Pc<)>ls rOm>> iiitil>IPand Aamm:)hlP g>>C<ei and bq<<>eli h gh <<(hrirnrs pcftii<<l,iti~ )in>>nd ch.iti,o.i( hit< fs. Jry iun ecchangi
~ ti iinc uc othrf combust>i>le supplies in safety 1< fatrd afpac
', i'giehiiiit thg et<<Cage o( c,'vml>usliblri <n s >fr<'> ~ <1'I 1<i'Q,ifP,>'c oc i'st )bi<i 1 <il 5)go JIP J c> ~ )C.>we
.>Ci )>c >v<lh appfnpf<<itp
(>f<'fiitpg,<i<in
.'I (:eei ~ cn thP h.iniiling <ef )<<w( hmi<
tt.inii< n< fitr l<iniis ciich;is <.ni<<i<<ic<>bli and fb>mm<ilile i<<i<<iJs. wouii ancl p(ait>c pfoil<<res or other romhwst<lil<~ m.itrri<<lc in b>>ibl>n) c con<a)n<<c 5>>)i ty.rel;ite el cvs:i h:5 or Pili<<pmenl during <<II ph.<5< c uf opec<et)ng, aml 1 cpi c )>>((I Juc<ng m.<<nt< o.in<:P.
miidif<<at)een iifrpfui !en>t ope f.i<wine c
!h'c>cee ite'ilt'
~'.ee!e',eff )1;e'1'e ~ e ~
1 ge c(eee!>e
~ >>i<~ fei
>hi 1-; h>n< (i.e
~
~ e ~ ! ~ ~ <e<<
fe'>
e <<ee! pgiegeeiieid <<uga
.<1'<ice<i< i tu <<)e <et<f1 ie ei>>
~".(.<<I<fe<inn.il fi<~ pgh<Pr t<<><<<<L Ihr 1\\ ~ ~ ~ L,e'e'1 1!'\\ le<el< 1'Ililf~'
t.iei i en the'ie ei( e>gne>eeeh ce<<ige
~ i I>> ucP
~ (,1 fi.e<1<<
lee <me< ivi<e'm te)
~ ieni<ii( we'Iilmg (t.emr gutting h<<. t>ng
<>1 cnh(P<>n>c opr<.et<<ini A ie pa<a)r prfmit ih.ilflir<ci<<rd feii P.i< h age a whr<g>>n<L ii 1<< i>e iliioe II li~ egk iiiniinwriwirt mwt< >hah <ini'hi(t Ihr
<<lit ch.ill i<<v.iliJ (<>c no< mw<r Ih,in C
heiwgi <<hrn thp plant ic oppcat<<>g wg fiir lhe
<lie ~ >>>>eeh eif a p;igt<<ul.if pile dug)n>C plant ill>le ~ le1<< 11 1 ~ Cei<<<<<i( Ihi femiiial heim Ihr>>gr.e of ail
<<.cite
<!e lie>i i<<..ip oi( spilli o< o<hrf 1
e nil><<i<i!i(Piie <<ilting (gum thr <<ei<k irt>v>tv immi ele.e<i Is hiliii<<ing1.<<n>leh te<<n <>f Ihi'>e iiiei( of <'eig.h w<<gk Shift.
<<>)ee h<<i ~ '1 <.elg<< ~'i (><st V..e>n<.<<n thr pe rio<li<. hiivirkraping inir>>e t<<>nc to rnsu
n<<i d g iimph<<n< i
<<1!h thrir ail<hen>it!<<tice'ont<<<(i g> Ciinigol Ihr wir nf ct>e <<fe< romlee)5> J>le!5 ir. i.i(e ti ge (.iti il
~)g<<>>c Aliiieiiiilui<1( in i.i(iti <Pi.itin(.irr.ic J<<<mg m.<<n<<nan<.P mii<fihi.iii<<n,<>1 trfuPli<<g <epi <al<eenc (surh as I.iv <inwn bh>4kc ut Sc,af(uf<f)ng( ih.ilihr tii>>ted>>ilh.> flame CP<afd int Fquipment Or cvpplie s (such ac ni w fui II shiope J in un!fr.itrJ ciimhuitii>irpa<.king containers mas'r unp,icLPd >n shh ty frintr<lareas if friluifr<l(<>g v;<lid nprrat>ng <rwii>ns I I<<iirigr, aii i<<>mlmstiblr ma>PC)alc Shall i<<'rmeiiril foim thr.ig< n immr.itriyfollnwing thr vnp.i<.i ing Su<:h trans)mt riiml>usl<ble m.<<vc<.J, un(i;cs st<if< J )n;<ppcuvr J ron<a<herc. shall nnl be fr(i unatlrn Jrd J<<<inr liiorh bfr<<LS shift rh.inc< c or nthrr cimel.ig pre>i>ilc I.ne)sr 1'iinJ>i>ce<lih p,>< L<<<g hi ete'ci II ii>1,h 1lee'f 1'cl'i'(i>>it, of piilie thyli n< sh<< '.Iw)g ch.iil lip pi<<<.i J i<<
meta( cnnta>hers with hght fill>ngself.closing mptal covers.
9 Contrnl actions to be taken by an
<nJiii<f>><rc. (ot cciimple.
n<>tili<.;itin<so( control roon>. attempt Ii>
ectengu)sh (ire. and actuation of local hre suppcc55<<<n sv'ctpfi>5.
lo Con!Col act<one lo be taken iiy th<:
control room opi futof to determine Ihr ng Prl b>f hc)ga JP assislance upon report of a hrc.or rrri<<p< of alarm on contr<it>on of ficr over I'A syslrm. Sounding (>fe alarms.
and notifying Ihe shift suprrv<sot and Ihe ftre bf>c.>Jr Iradef of the type. size. and locat>on of Ihc hfe ll C:ontroi act>ons to iw taLcn liythP (ifP iicig.idr after not>f)cwt)on by Ihe control fnnm np<<rotor of a fire. for pxample. acsemhltng in a dg Signatc'J location. rrce ivmg ilirrrt<onc from thr fire I)giga JP Ic,<<(rr. ane( ghsrh.irc>nc spi cific fire (ighting r<>>c(ee)nc)b)l) t>e c mcl<<iling i< Irrtw>n.inJ Iti>nipiirt.it<<>niifhfi'ghling 1 <(<<ipmrnt I<> fifP I<<<u<t<i)n. CP(e'Ct>e<<> iif prot< <:hii pq<n>pnt, <qipc;>ling ><<clrwi'tiiius lief >ice eif (iti'wppceax<<wi s'vcti nlc. >>nil 1>sc of pfrpl,inneJ stc>>te(pes fur fighting hrcs in sprcihr.,iri 1)i l3 Ih fine the struts girs foc f>fthtw>g hfps in all c.if< tv rrlalrd arr'ic am( areac ptesv<<ting a h;izart( tu S.>( ly ce(>>lrd equipmenl Thccr it<<<ii gipc ch.ile ih cicti.<tc:
.1 i.1 ~'!. ~I eg >le i<1 1'.>4!) eic<'e> cus vJ l>y II>I'tee'
'." (eee'feil'il.mc
( ><i\\<i)egg>is!>ants bi 5l su>IP<( le)f
s s
~
~
s h=
L I
s Feders)
Register / Vnl 45. Nn. 225 / IVcfti>est)My..'>iovembrr 19. 1qIN / Rules anil Jtcgu)dt><>ns 76F>ll the l>censi
< have bern <<ccrptr d Ii) Ihr NRC xl<<ff us a,ilihfying Ihe pr<<visinas of Apprn<J>x A to ilr.inch Tcchnical Pnsi t<un (ITI'ICSII 9 5-1'ef)re<ed if.
stuff fire prulert>on ssfnly rvaluol>oa reports issued prior lo Ihc efirrlive date of this roti!. or tn thc cxtcnt lh;i: fire pfu<rclinn fcui>>rcs werc ucrcti'cd by ihc siiiffin romt>fchens<vv fifi~
pro>< rlinn s ifi ty ev it>>ulion frports issued before App< n<lix A tn Itf,<nrh Tcchaicut tsnsi>i<<n II'II'PCSII!I5-1 was published in August 19 6
'LV<>h rrsprct to sil othrr fife prot<!ction feature>> covered by Appcnhix R. att nuctc.ir power plants li<;eased lo opera!e Pfinr lo Jun<<ory 1. 19"9 ahull sh!>sty ih<f
~ ppticablc requiremcnls of Apps:n<!ix R to Ihis part. Including spec<(<co!Iy the requifcmcnls of Sections III G. III.). and (II.O.
(c) Allfire protection modifications require to satisfy thc provisions of Apprndix R lh th>o par> or directly
~ffecled by such requirements shall be completed on th>> follow>ng schcdutc; (1) Those fire protection fcalures that involve revisions of adminislrat>ve conlruls. manspower changes. and
'raining.
shall bc implemented within 30 days after thc cf(ective date of this section end Appendix k tu lh>s p irl.
(2) Those fire prot<.ction feslures that involve installal>on of mod>ficstions that do nol require prior NRC approval or plant shutdown shall hc implemented within 9 months after lhc <if(ective dote of this section and Appendix R lo this pert.
(3) Tt>ooe fire protection features.
except for those rrquiring prior NRC
~ppraval t>y paragraph (c)(5) of this occtio>>. that i<>vntve installation of modifications Ihsl dn requ>rc plant shutdown, Ihe need for which is justified in Ihe plans and schedules required by the provisions of paragraph (c)(5) of this section. ahull be implcmcntcd before
~tartup after thc earliest of the following events commencing 180 days or more
'Clanficahnn and guidance wi<h rcspcci io pe<ms<vs>s>e
~!<emshvcs
<o rais ~!> Aprrnd<s A IO Irrfs APCSII OS-< hrs brrn prnvsdcd sn four oihrr 3
MRC dsscumcn< ~
~ "Supp!cmcniary Cusdrncc on Info<ma<son Mcedrsl Iur F<<c Pro<ac<<un I:vr<urhnn.'" 3 ~ ted (hs< 2>, IV>a
~ "Srmrlr Tcchnical speci!<ca<<un," da<cd L<r>t
>t >aft
~ 'Mvc<rst p>an< Ys<e P<o<cchon I unchonr<
Re>ron<sin><<I ~ ~. Adsnsnwituisvc Cun<<ui rnd
(}vr>sS Ipef
~
X<vnfss<>>rr hrsfus<rmrn< ~ lut Oprrr Isna gs rcl.sss du<ra x<~> ii I'v r A I ssst sss's issu.
~.sir< ~ I, ~ sssv~l. ~ '. 9 ~,svs< Iles'.
I s ~ ~
~ ~ s rsi s' ' r'
~ shrs.s s
~
sss ~ ~
ssr's hssss s
~
inrvr rss
~Iris<sos sssur u< uhs'd hs
~ u ts ias s ~ ~ Is usss!
nf<rr the effective'ale nf this sect>oa and Appendix R I<> lhis purl, (i) Ihr. f>fs> refueling au<age:
(>II another plunnrd outage Ihat lasts for at least So days: or ii<<; an unplanned gutsge that lasts for al tcs<$ <
1 "0 du<'$.
(4! Those fire protect>on features that fe<<uifc pfinr.'4RC <<ppf<ivat by pufuc.aph tet!it of this section. shalt be i<npirmi:ni< d wilh<n Ihc tolinw<ag ache>te Or<lice<cd shutdown systems 30 months aller shRC appfuvht. mod<f>cd>in'ns requir>ag plant
$ hui<thwnbefore slartup after thc earliest of the even<a given in paragraph Ic! dl commencing 1R0 dnys after NIIC sppfuval. mod>I<<.atinns nol requinng piun< shutdown 6 months after NRC ilppfoval (5) I.>censeeo shell make any modif>cut>ops necessary to comply with these requirements in accordance with the above schedule without pf>or review and approval by NRC except for mo<t>f>c'i>tons requ:red by Sect>on ill.C.3 of Appendix R to this part. L>censecs shall submit plans and schedules for meet>ng the prov>sions of paragr Iphs (c)(2). (c)(3). and (c](4) within 30 days after thc effective date of this section snd Appendix R lo this port. Licensees sh>>tl out><nit design descriptions of modifications needed to satisfy Section III,G.3 of Append:x R!o this perl within 30 days ofter the the effective date of this section and Appendix R to lhis part.
(0) In thc event that e request for exemption from a requirement to comply with one or more of thc provisions of Appendix R filed within 30 days of the effective dole of this rule is based on an assertion by the liccnscc that such required modif>ca>iona would not enhance f>rc protect>on safely in the fucilityor that ouch modifications may be detrimental to overall facility safety, the schcdulc requirements of paragraph (c) shall be tolled until f>nat Commissinn act>uii on the exemption request upon a dctcrm>nial>on hy thc Director of Nuclear Reactor Regu!stion that Ihe licensee has provided a sound lechnical basis for such assertion thol warrants further stuff rcvie:v of the request.
(d) F>re protection features accepled by the NRC staff in Fire Protection Safety Evol<< ition Ruisortx referred to in paragraph (tit of Ibis hect>on und supplements lo such repurts. other than features cov<.frd tiy paragraph lc). shall l>e cnraplcle<l iis sn<in as practicohlc bul n<< laic. ih'in!hc coniplt iion <tale c<<rfs nlty spi <.ifiv<! in hrenh<<c>>ndi>iona
<Sf <V< I:;>IS,sSI
.sSsls S.'
~ Shsl ~ ~ ~if.n Slf ash!I
~ us ~ ~
~
s s
L s.sss>
~.'s determ>nCO. upon.i hhn<v>ag I>> Ihe licensee. thol Ihcfc <<<t<<iid cause far extending ourh dale nnd that the public health dnd safely >s nal ddv> forty.
affected by such ex>ms>nn Extensions of such dale shall nut exceed the d,it< s detcrmincd by purugrdphs (c)(1) Ihrough (c)(4) of this ocr<ion, (1) Those fir< pi<it<'ct>un feat<<ms!hal Involve rcv>sionx of iidaiiillslriitlve controls. m<<npuwer ch<ingrs, snit lra>ning shall br <mplrmcntrd within 4 months after the dante of Ihr NRC stuff Fire Protection Fval<<<<linn Its pnrl accepting or requifins all<.h fv'i<urea, (2) Those fire pr<<tcctinn fealurrs involving Install.i:infir<<t><inx nol requ>ring pf:or approv<<t nr plant shutdown shall be imp!emcnlrd with;n
'2 months after Ihe uute of Ihe NtsC staff Fire Protection Safety Fvalu.<i<un Report accept>ng or reqi>>r>ng such features.
(3J Those fire prsteetion features.
including alternative shutdown capability. involving <nsthltation nf modifications requiring plant shutdown shall be implemented before the startup after Ihe earliest of Ihe following even's commencing 9 months or more after lhc dale of the NRC staff Fire Protect>on Safely Evaluation Rcporl accepting or requiring such features:
(i) The f>rst refueling outage:
(ii) Another planned outage that last ~
for at least 60 days: or (iii)An unplanned outage that lasts for at )esot 120 days.
(4) Those fire protection features involving dedicated shutdown capability requiring new builftings end systems shell be implemented within 30 months of NRC approval. Other modif<cotions requiring NRC approval prior to installation shall be implemented within 6 months after NRC approval.
(e) Nuclear power plants licensed lo operate after January l. 1979. shall complete all fire protection modifications needed to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part in accordance with the prov>sions of their l>censes.
- 2. A new Apnendix R is added to 10 CFR Pert 50 tn read as follows:
Appendix RFifa P<o>action Program fof Nuctnar Power Fault!tea Opefa<ing I.fiefio January 1 ~ St>79 I. Inffodvcnon ond Scope This Appendix applies lo licensed a>>etc of power elec<Me genera>sag s>a>fons <ha< werc opera>ma prior >U )unuse> l. 19.9. exes pi iu the chic<<I Set I<lflh:npufajifagh Sa a><I!>!
"'his p sfi h'Vi>h fs sp":. '.Us<<<<sr:. s ~ i. ~ '
1>suer Il>f xui ti I Irlb'.ll'1 II xs' Issf, 'sfs' sfisiiu Iii>>lh'ssi>>i ~'x frvui s'<s 'O vui, ~:
a
~
~
766l federal Register / Vnl, ) / ~%'rtjnrs<l;Iv. Nf>vnn>I>rr tq.
I<)RA / R!Iles ant( Re!(vial>on<.
Cn<arw<<i 0 of Atalw<w!>~ A Iia Ihi~ p.a<I spccihrs Ihii".iiiu<Iufrs sys<< ms eh J con>pu>>r>><s imp<if<In< Io se(II) shill tw desig>>r J v>><l I<ii.~ >Ia al In mi>>>ni>zr. i uns>slrnt witt> aa'Iaa'I
~<<<fl'I) fi'alii<<<'ma ia 1. the pivlailaihiyInil v((cC< ul Afrs en J explvsivns Wha <'aansidering Ihe elle<as of Afr those
~)'Si ~'ms cosa>a
>>a<a ~lh.aa hw'ving ea>at
<la>alla<a<ah<fag saa(a'haalalaaaa o
~ ~ aha!as eosv<nn min>> imp>a<<a<<w a io ~ a>la ls Iaa a waasa.
Join.aga
<aa iha m i;in lv>ol tv <<.aii at.io>>aga fesullal>g ffaaoa I<ass a>( f<rota>nt Ihfawagh taawlvlf The phrises
'"<n>II><<en< tv silat) '<
"Sv(eiy re(vieJ.- <vill lir usa'J Ihfvwghoui Ihis Appcndia R ia applying io illsih iy (unct>fans Thr phf ~ I~ 'ifvSlwi>>l<>wn- >>>lt be usr J Ihrooghuut Ih>s Appendix R is
~pplying Iv bo>h hot ind cold shu>dnwr.
funC<anns Becaaase fire may ~ ((oct sa(e shutdown systems ind because the lvs ~ of Iun:<ion of systems used io mat>gv<c Ihe cons< quf nara of design basis accidents unJcf postfife conditions dues nvt per sr <mpict put>he safety. Ihe need to limit fire damage Io systems required Iu ar hieve ind niiintain safe shu>down cond>t>ons is greatrr Ihin Ihe need to limit fire <liniigi to those systr>ns required tv mitigite Ihe cvnsequrnrrs uf
.design hvsis irriJrnis Three lcvrls of fire dafnage limits ire estiblishe J according to Ihe sifet) functions o( Ihr structure. system.
or compvnent foe a<vneoe Seats Oeeatn sash ACCe>en<a One Iara o< oapnamtn< nocti<an ao
<loa sea>a ooaan a>ona Ianea
~at ccvwoa aooan cv enasasency con
~0<
~ >a<a>n<st aaaaas<
oe anania,neo Iet o< 4t oahasv Of ~ orate 4t, aaacssxt an tape<art srt aoaaa tens o< aahanaan< necossvf ao
~ca>ere coos a<<Ocean ane r oe onaaoeo aaf o sana>ao
>ae vcaaasnt
~n eapoore
<se. <4< oonaaoo anaha Oe Sana<et
<O tao< el aoaa< Ons Vera Can Oe aepe ev CV aaaeee OOVOOao
~at<a< 12 <apace ahrXI cvwee capoos aota vwh ci eaohwhn<
nectssvy
<CV aaaa<aSSSOn O< Con<tear>nato
'oevas i>I<a<pa tears acca>enas aaaof ot ovneseo of ~ <ansat tappeal ~
Ite
~ fhaoovt rre an ~spare 4t h ~ wt ea ~ Irate ~ ee
~aa< eaaoaaes eaanoa ta Ca<a< or Ionaaena conaoaas>ca>os ano h
~a<VW ae any SvaaCWOS
~>a>enh Or CVnrenVeS aeaaaee
~Oaaeore SO
<noa Saane Vta fee taaoe>S aaf Iran >re Ie 4, snaoae
>acta oa aaraaa>n>
cva co<van<a tert< <noae
~e aft<ates sfsaena s,
an<
lo so<oaf tiara
~ 4t raacAAs ont Ian of stat snaaaooen oaccnrna ma) ccvas'erat an ta posar e 4t
<cv Iat aooarao an< Ivn x>ca>to ra Iar sonar Sara ano ~ 4r anaoaaraz a<mora>cars
~anea caen pare'OeaanOVa< Ion naaa Conllhit an taOOavr Sa ~
<O Ooe'ca>aanean<
Vena aoa ~ < SO ra Vat Svnt vra The most stnngcnt fire Jimage limit shall apply (vr thus< systems !hit (v(I <ntv n>vre Ihan onr cit<<gnfy, II<<dunil.int systi ms word to n'>tigi!e the cons<<qwrnf.es of other design bis<s icciden<s bwt not na <.res.<ry fiirsifi
~hutdown n>ey lae tost Ivi tingle exposure ri'ic. Ilvdasa.r. Ia<<ito<.loan oh~It lwf pruvol<<<l sa>
Ihwt i< (<fa.'altllll>willyo>>a xui h system will nvt damvgv.thi reilu>>diff< svsta m.
II Iae'<a<Irfal lla'apt>rial<a<'laf'a A h<fa.afa a'f<<rn I'faaa'fo<o A fifa'wa<! ~
~ <wall Pfaag<
al>l Slaaall Iia'ea I I ~ ~ >a.l a
~
~..i...~...,
~
pfvgivm sh atl i ot.ilihsh thr lifo pin<i a.<i<an pa>tw s (aaf <hn pfaa<r<.>>on <i( stfu< Iwfos.
s>><s ma coat
< vmponvnts wopa>fi ant tv safe!y vl
> OLh pl.a >anil <hc p<aa<,ralof< s, ritii>pfna ilt.
~ <><I pa'fs<anlaa'i fa'qa>af>'J to <hapl<'mew< th>>
pf ~igfvm ~ < ih<'leo< s<<c The fifrpf<<icr<ion p(a>gram shell be iander Ihr ilirrat<<wi aa(.in inalivialw.>l whn h.> at,a>><ha><<la f aa>>>if>i'hsaaf.i<r vai>h Iha fa'opaah
~ <aala<
~ ~ a
~ af <ha'aaasa<a
~ ao loll wlwa Iaaao nvaaat.a!a>a
~ <.atl pa <sa>>aoa I La><a>>ta ilga.i!air iii Iaaa<t> Afa pfaala r i>vlf a<nfl ni<,la'alf s.a(Sly
'I hv A>a
>><<a<a <.<iun pfaag<im shill ex<en<i Ihr ron< rf>< a>f <lrlr>>sa"in Jchih >v Af<'foiec<iaan in Arc vfa.>s lw>paar<a>>I >v si(ety.
wi<h Ihe (<allaaw ing vla>a'a.!Isa;S
~ to pfrsvn< f>fes ffaaoa s<vf<<ng.
~ lo Jr<rri ral>i<ll), ron>Col. ind ex!<ngu>sh pfomptl) <hafsn A!vs Ihit Ja> vcaun
~ tv pfvvidr pfo>nr<<aw> (or structures.
systems. ind coniponents <nipnrtint to safety, so Ih.>i a (.rc >nit is nvt prvmptl) raf>>>>fu<shed t>y Ihr Ar< suppress>on ac>>v>ties will not present Ihe si(e shutdovan of the plant.
II F>re Hozords Anoi>'sis A Are hazards analysis shall be perfotmeh by quihfied Are protectmn and reactor systems enganrrrs to II) LonsiJcr potent> ~ I in si>u and tfinaient Arr hvzvfJC. I I determine Ihe cnnsruurnces n( f<re in iny loca>>on >n the plini on <hc ahihty tv safely shut down Ihc reactor or on Ihc ibihty to minimize vnd control the rcleaoe of rod!>>activity to Ihe environment. inJ Ig) specify meisufes for fife prevent:on, fire detection. Arc suppression. inJ f<re containment and alternitive shutdown cip'il>>lityas required (nr rich fire arri con>iini>>g structures.
systems. and components impiirtant to sa(ety in secor dance with NRC guidchnes and reguli Iion s C. Ffra Prevention Foot<<res Fire pra><ICI<vn fCatureo Shall meet the foll>>aaing general requirements (or illfire arevs Ihat rvntain or present a fire hozird to struc>ores. systems. or componen!S important
'to Sa(a'I)'.
- l. In situ fire hazar Js shall be identilied and s>><table protection provided.
2 Trinsicnt fice hazards assvL<ate J with normal operi <ion. maintenanre. repair. or mudiAcition ictivities shall b>> identified and eliminate al whrre possible, Those trans>ent Afrh.<zirJs that ran not be ehminated shall be controlled and suitable protection prov>>i>>J
- 3. Fire detection systems. portable cali<>ttu<shrrs, ind stanilpipc and hose stitin>>s sh~ll Iw <nstvlie>)
a Fire barriers or au!omit>c suppression systems or both shall be instilled is ni r< saury to protect redu>>dint systems or cv>>>pv>>rnts necessary fa>r su(c shutdown, 5, A s>tr f>re brigiJC Oh~It be rstit>l>shed.
trwini d. and equipped inJ iholl be vn s>te at all ames.
h I ire detection und suppression systems
~h.ill lav J<<sigiia il. i>>st ~ ((I<i. mui<itiinrJ, aml tcstvJ by Pvrsa>>invl prupi fly<tuil>AVJ liy ex(>et<en<.C'n J It ilfllilgiii fili'n<<a'LtI<II>
eys< ~ was y
iu<va'<livia<,~
ta>aa<
~'ala>ia 1 aah ~all ai aaaa<aalailsala' I Iaa
~ >>' aia'ta. ~ I:ata: lai;ila'ls ~ fv <n a
a
~ a
. r 0 AIfrrnof<veur Dc.(a< utaaf Shvfalaaavw Coy>>h>i<f)
In ireis where Ihr Afe prv>rctiun Ir.<!a>fa s cunno<rnsufc s.ifr sh at>>>n a.ipit iliiiin Ihr a Vent O(i f>re m t!it ~fei eltrfv.a'iaa.
<>I drilici>rdsife shut down cip:it>>hi) sf<ill h<
prvaiJed III Syrc<fic Rrpufrenarnff A ISnfvr a<ryp(<<Ca I ar I<n.'awppra ss>.v Svafrms
'I wo scptrvte water supph< s shel! Iia provided Iu furnish nrcrssiry wiia f s ~ >Ia oar vnd prcssure Iu the (ire mein loup F~ch supply shill consist o( v a<orig, i.a ~ ~ L pump. p<pmg. an J a pp.op><e <soli>.aa>>.>>>.t control valvesTwo srpifita re<i natiri sue<>ons in one or mofr iniiL< stfaia ia fi s (rom ~ large body ol >>a>ef Intr<. I~Latr willsatisfy Ihr rrqwirrmrnt for Ivao sr:aif aia at Water SIOrage tanLS Theoe Supplinv Sh.il'..
sepirated so Ihat ~ fiilufeol a>>in sop<ala aa a<!
not result <n ~ (ailure c( Ihe othrr svppis Each supply ol Ihr fife water d>ter>'.aa>t<nn system shall be capibie o( providing for a penod of g hours the maximum expertf il water demands as determined b) Iiie Iwe hazards analysis lur safety relitrJ ireis nr other areas that present ~ Are exposure hazard to safety related areas When storage tanLs are use J fvr comhlna
~
service water/fire wvter uses Ihe minin>>ini volume for fire uses shall be enawfeJ vy means of dedicated tanLs or by some physical means such vs ~ vertical staniipipe for other water service hdmimstrative controls. including locLs for tanL I utlri valves. are unaccep!ab!e as Ihe only nieins to ensure mimmum water volun>e Othrr water systems used is vne of the two fire water supphes shell be perrnvncntly connected to the fire mam system and shall be capable of automatic ahgnmint to Ihe Afa
'ma>n system. Pumps. controls. Ind power supplies m Ihese systems shill satisfy the requirement ~ for Ihe mim Are pumps
".)>>>
use of other water sys>ems (or fire protection shat(not be incompst>ble with their (unctions required for safe ptant shutdown. Failbre of Ihe other system shall not degrade the fire main system.
- 8. Secnonol Isololion Valves Sectional isolation valses such as post indicator valves or lacy operated vilves shall be installed in Ihe fire fnim lupp to permit isolation of portions of the Afe main Iovp (ur maintenance or repiir>>nhvui mterruptiog thc entire water supply.
C H)'<<Iron!/solo(ion valves Valves shall be installed to pen>>it >svlitiv>>
nf outside hyflrants from tha Arr mim fvf maintenance or reps>r so<thou> mterrupt.r.
the water supply Io au!omatic or min"i!!>>c~
suppiess<on systems in in) ira ~ conte><
ia'aa or presenting a f>re hizird to sifety reliii
.'r sife shuhlown equ<pmcn>.
I). hfnnvol Fire Soppr< i.run St>>>>alp<pe and husc syat'o>s she'll b>>
<nstulled su Ihot it leis< vot i l(eLI>ae ha>ye strevm willbe whir tv rre<<h iny I>>nit>>a>> Iliit cain!a>>>s of Prrxrn>n ca<>a>sf><a f>fv he..
au sita>>.IU<L>.. I)s<a'>><s.
>a< waaalna<ac>><
~
initwirt>>>I to s<<fa ta ALLess to perl>lit I'Ifvct>sa'unct>vning ua
a, federal ReE!ister / Vol. 45. Yo. 225 / IVedncsrjsy. November 19, 19' Rules and Rettulations IOO>()9 would increase.
s< vere locahzed environments woold develop m lhe ares of the fire. and ~ large smo<<nt of smoke would be generated.
These conditions could ~ ((ect operub<l<IE of sufely related equipmcnt insi<lv conluinmcnl.
1'herc(ore. sn oil collection system Is necessary to confine any oil discharged
~
due lo leadksgu or f<<ilute of the lubrication system anil lu pr<<vent il from becoming s fir<<h izord by draining il to a se(e locution. Tliuse ucc.urrun<,cs could be random or could be sc:1micslly Induced bcr ouse the cx>u<>og lul>u oil system piping snd oil collrc<>nn sys<cms may not be designed to withstand e
design basis scim<c event.
Appendix A lo OTP APCSO 9.5-1 states Ihut for operating plunts.
"postulated fires or fire prot<<ction syslem failures need nol be considered concurrent with other plant accidents or the most severe natural phenomena.-
The basis for that ~latemcnt is two fold.
First. nuclear power plants sre massive
~
~
~
~
~
~
i structures. end essential services sre designed to wilhstand earthquakes and other natural phenomena, Second. Ihe history of many (ires ussoclaled with recent earthquakes have been evaluated. Thcsc evaluations showed that such fires usually are due lo failure of piping or tanks of Aammsble gasse1 or liquids such as municipal natural gas distribution systems or gasoline storage
'". '>: and/or dispensing stalions. Where such potential fire hazards exist in nuclear power plants (e.g.. hydrogen for generator cooling. or oil fuel for Ihe emergency diesel generator or station specs heating boilers) they ere designed and installed to wilhsland lhe damaging effects of various natural phcno<ncna.
snd other special fire protection features are provided as necessary.
E(owcver.
General Design Criterion 2 Design Boses for Protection Agoinst Noturol Phenomeno requires that structures,
~ystems, and components important to safety be dcsigncd to withstund thc effects of esrlhquukcs without loss of capability to pcr(orm their safety function. Regulatory Guide 1.29.
"Seis<nic Design Classification."
describes an acceptable method for
'dentifying end classifying lhose aturea of light water cooled nuc'.ear wer plants Ihst should hc d> signed to withstand lhe c((cele of th<<Safe Shutdown Earthquake. In this guide.
paragraph C.l spplirs lu systems that
~ re required Io remain functional to ensure heat removal cap>>bility:
perag>eph C.2 applies to systims that rlo nul hov<< lo roi>><<<i< froiu.l<<iiiulIor I<iol urpa>su.
la>it wl>osa (i>>ll>ii'.o>>>at ra >lui.<
4 tonr<lnn>n>> ot <ho>>r Ivu<>~>ns rnvrraa>I pump oil coll<<el<on syslein is covered bk purugruph C brcausc its (unction is required to pro<re< sa(cty r>:lut<<d systems rather:h><n lo pcrfor<n s safely function. Orcuus<: the failure of the oil collect>on system (or s A<l<so><rully
<nduccd oil fire should not prevent s s>i(<<ty related sysli m (<ou> per(orm>rg Its safety function (l<<iaululory Gu>dn 1.29. -Seisnic 0> s>gra CI'<<ss<ficu<<ur.."
purugruph C 2). Ih> oil collection system sh<>oi>l I>> d<><n>:d. engineered. and instullud so lhn< ils (u<lurc willrol lead lo o fire <<f!uc<>ns suf> iy rcluted equipnicnl ss u ri:soll o( un eurlhqueke.
The proposed ruli> permitted lwo el<cine<ives nn oil collection system or en automatic fire soppri >sion systrn:.
Wc huve d<<lclrd lhi;ill<<rnutiveof the suppression sysl<<m because unacc<<ptuble damager. may result lo Ihe safety related systems from Ihe burning of oil before the suppression system is
~ctusted and because the fire water supply system is not designed to withstand seis<nic events. ln addition.
these pumps are locuted wilhin Ihe biolo<<<csl shield inside containment.
ther<<fore. timely fire brigade aclion would be di(ficullif Ihe suppression system malfunctions. Furthrr. ifthe suppression system becomes inoperable during operation.
a fire watch or patrol cannot enter the arcs during operation.
Comment Resolution A number of commenters suggested
!hat Ihis section is loo detailed snd should be substantially modified. This requirement wus changed to delete the option of protecting the reactor coolant pump lubrication sys!em with an automatic fire s<<ppression system. We have modified the rule to indicate that the requirement that the oil collection system be designed to provide reasonable assur<<nce that it will withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake csn be mel by satisfying paragraph C.2. of Regulatory Guide 1.29.
-Seismic Design Clussif<calion.- as described ubove.
Q. Associotcd Circuits.
Technicol Bosis. When considering the consequences o( s fire in s given fire area during lhc evaluation of safe shutdown capabilities of a plant. the stuff must be uble to conclude that one train of equipment Ihal oun he used immediately to l>ring the re'uctor Io e hot shutdown rondition remains unaffected by th>>t fire. The stuff must also be able to conclude that damag<< to one train of equipmenl usewn wi>l l>i~ limil> rl so that thr I' <>i>t>II>l.'na I,'a<'l'la>fI><'ll I'> a><1 I ~ a>a'I ~>> Iu a,oi ~ ~ ~ > I
> I <1 ><> ~
a 2 il>lors lbue
'I'aarho>>
>al lla>a
> ~ ta>r qa a ~ iaaan Illr'.
Capabd<ty.-) ln the fire huzards an.aiv1,1 for s plunt. Ihr equipment rclieu upor. <c perform both functions must br idrnt<ficd for each fire ares. II follows thai any associated non.sefety circuits in Ihe (<re ares that could ed vers>:ly s((ect Ihe ident<(<cd shutdown equipmcnt by frcding back potrnt<1lly d>>ubling condiliuns le,g,. hot shor'.1 or shorts lo ground J to the power suppli>.
or control circuits of that equipmrn:
must also be evaluated. Of course such disabling conditions must bc prevented to provide assurunce that the iiluntifi<<il oaf>. shutdown equipmenl willfunrlior.
as designed. These requirements have now been incorporated in Secln>n ill.L.
-Alternative and Dedicated Shutdown Capubility.-
Comment Resolution Many commenters stated that thai requirement should be deleted because many older plant designs did not consider associated circuits and this is.
therefore. a new design requirement.
The comme<itcrs felt that Ihe analysis that willbe required to satisfy this requirement willbe both long and complicated snd the requirement should therefore be deleted.
The Commission rejected these suggestions for the following reasons.
- 1. Virtuallyall of the fire protection modifications made to date have been required to correct deficiencies that resulted from lack of consideration of certain specific items during miliel design and construction.
- 2. The Orowns Ferry tire showed the necessity of divisional separation of the sssocialed circuit of the control cables lo prevent the disabling of safety systems by a single Gre. This has been discussed with licensees during evaluations of allernslive end dedicated shutdown capability and is neccssury to ensure that sa(e shutdown systems will be able to function properly in the event of fire.
- 3. The staff considers incomplete any fire hazard analysis that does not consider Ihe e(fects of lire damage to circuits Ihat are associated with safe shutdown systems.
>ircmc>>ts of Appendix R a>>J remains convinced that the regulations Ure >>of substanf>ve and ere insignificant frum the standpoint of cnvtronniu<<tal >nipact. One comme>>tvr suggested that all p)ants bc required In install il<.dire>i>d Ii shs<~>Jr>sss tu <ss ~<ss> l<sss< 1 u< < ~ Lushhrst sn hi ts>'as< I< s I I'<< <a I "<< c > us ~ ~ > s'st .sss<s<<st< Is shutdown capabilitv The Comm>ss>on dnvs not agfcr W<'<< I<vs<'h.it Ihi'omm<so<un s overall fir<< pfut< LI>>>n pfs 'r.irn involv>ng <'stens<ve pl,int sl<vcifi<, fife pm><<c>>on modifications Iha> are has< d on ggiilance srt fnrth in Ilfdnrh Te< hnirdl I'>>sit<on O'I'I'l'(:Sll !>!>-I df>>f i<s hppcn<l>x h an<I il<< of>> <:if<c frqs<<t<:mv>>>n nf Afip< n<lix R I>> fLLss<<IVL'I<sf<<II<' >s'a<<<'s p<<<vl<l<'<< l<<I<Is>i<< f<f<'f>>I<<'.I<<<ri Onc comm< n>er st;>ted Ihdl thc an:t>>guity of Ih< f><<cps>s<< I ri g>>l ~it>on with f<>>hifd tn criti<:~il i>i ms r< il>>>><'s th.ii i> b< r< not<c< d 'I'h<<curn>><<n>i r f< h rrn<.<<d three po<ii<ins ul Ih<< pfopnsv<l Apprn<!ix R as rx.impl< s of su<.li am!>>g:>>I>'. 1'hey werc S< i:I>i>>> III G. Sec>ion III t4. and Sc<:ti>>n IIIQ. LV<. have reviewed tnrsr exampl< s. In reference Io thi hrst example. Ihe commenter stated that Ihe first paragraph of Sect>o>> III.C idcntihes altrrnative shutdown capability as an optional protective f<<utuf<<anti th>>t p;irugraph ill.C.2.c Ihcri identifies altcrnut>ve shutdown capatiility as a minimum fire protection feature We do not agree with this statement Thc f>rs> paragraph of Section III.('dentifies altvrnut>v<<shutdown et>pal>ility as one, option in a coml>>nation of hrc protection featurvs fr>r a snvcific fire area. Paragraph III.G.3 >nd>c Jt<<s when Ibis option should be used. In rcf<<rcnc<< to thv svcond example. thc commenter stated that Svctinn III <4 rvquircs a prcssure <liifvri;nti:ildrfosn thc test spec>>mcn dunng thc Ice>i>>g of fire barri<<r penetration seals but f.iils Io d<<fine the pressure dtffcrcnt<al. Th>s co<nmcnt is incorrect. The prcssure differential called for by thc proposed provision was the maximum pressure differential that tbe barrier would experience in thc specific plant installation. In any ev<<nt. the requirement for pressure differential during such testing has been dele>i:ustihle mat<<r> il is now l>cing used for such seals. In reference Io Ihe Iliirdexample. the commenter stated that Sec>i>>n lll.g is totally lacking in defi>>it<<>n, IV<<<lo not agree. Footnote 6 refcrvnces R< g>>li>tory (:uidc 1.75 and IF.F.F. Std 3&4-1974. 1'he latter document is a r>>mm<>nly>>si ~<I industry stander J that d<<h>>vs associated c>rcuits arid(>r>>v>dvs guidance for ensuring that su<:h circuits do not compromise th>> indcpv>>den< c of the sh>>!down cir>:uits they dre iissncidtL'd with. II;<SL>l un the db>>vc examples an<I niir rvvii rv uf Ihs <sil>> << ', is<L i.<<<:i sif il<<. fif<>><<>!<'v<'l<> ll' I ~ "'.<'!..<< il>L'ut<; as Df<<U<<s<<<t ~ <><UU<>>ns. otht r commenters de<>>onstrated ~ thoro>>gh undvrstandmg of the proposed requirements I Ursu ant Io tbe Atomic Energy Art of !954. as amended. Ihe Energy Re>>rg in>x'i>ion Act of I!IT4. as nm< ndri). ,<<iil S<<:Ii>>nn 552 anil 55:I >>I 1'>I'v 5 <if th> I l>><t<<<l SI ~i>i s Cn<le. n>>i>cv is hi << ~ I v givi n th<<I Ihc f<illuwmgam<>>ilm< ii>n to 'I i>l<; III,Ch.ipt< f I. C<<<lv Uf Pe<fr<<, I kegulat>uns. I'art 5(). ere puhl>slivfl es a <Inr>>ment siiliiict to cndif>ratiiiii I A nL'w 'J 50 (6 is ad<IL'<I I<l fl.'sl<l >is follows. f 50.aa Ftte protect>on. (a) I:ach opcrat>ng nuclear p< wvr pl;i>>t shall have a hrc pfo>ection Pion that satisf>cs Cntcnon 3 of Apf<ei>>l>x A to >his part.,This fire protection plan shall describe thc overall f>rc1>rotvc<<on program for the facility. identify the" venous pns>tions within the hc<<>>scc's organization that are rcspunsib>lv for thc program. state the author>t>es that di. dc)ega(cd tu each of lhesc pos>t>>>ns t< implement those responsibilities. and Uutl>nc the plans for fsre protection. fire drtvction and suppress>un capel>>lity. and limital>on of tire damage. The plan-shall also describe specific features ncc<<ssary Io inqilcmcnt Ih>> prug.;im dcscnbcd above. such as adm>>>>strdtive controls and personnel requircnicnts for fire pr<<vention and manual fire suppression activiti<<s. automatic and n dn>>:illy>>peru(ed fire dr>crt>un anil >>if>f>r<<SS>nn SyStCa>S. a>>d the med>>S IO lir>>t fire damage tu structures. nystcn>s. or componLnts important to saf<<ty su that the capaliility to safely shut du'>vn Ihc plant is ensured.s (b) Appendix R Io this par! establishes fire protection features required Iu satisfy Criterion 3 of App< iiJix A to tliis purt with respect tu carta>>> gcn<<ric issurs for nuclear power Plants licensed to operate prior lo Jan>>arv 1.19;<J. Fxrcpt fur the requirem<<nts of S<<rtit!f s tll.(:. III.J. and III.O. tbc provisions c,f App<<n<lix R to Ibis part shall nut bv applical>lc to nuclear power plants lir<<nscd to operate prior to Jan>>ury 1. 19 9. Io the extent that fire prol<<ction features proposed or implemc>>tcd I ' '>rs<L f<tc ptoicci<on Su<dsncc fvtnuctr~t P.w p>~n<soined <n <wu tsit<C ducu<nrn<on<,h Tcchnscc>Pos<<ion Avs<haty Puwct Cunss is<un S>sicsn l><inch f>TP Al'<58!iS->, (h>>sls hns s fut F<<r I'<vice><on fsst sssssfr~< > s <sr< P>rn<s - fut ncw Ptsny >..Sr>. ar<rJ Mry >s>tu ~ Apurnshs A to IITP Al'%f>stS > "I:. ~ < ~LS <<< ~ udl< S us< s'<'S Sir<r' > Arse ~ ~ ~ ~ %MS .~ ~ Fe((era) Register I Vo)November )9. lq)N / Rules and Regulations yQ~Q", sti<<.:;.,<< i}(f.vvc(I unii< L<<ssacv d< i<ii. sp<<))>ng vut sp<'Litic ci qull<'i l< l>>5 (vc ciasvc>>vcn instcuct>vn fic<<(<gh!<rg pra< iii< and lite dc>)ls 5im< comm<<ntrrs (clt <)<at th< se c"qui.emcnts were mvce dc(<<ili d Ih,<n any>bing <he Cnmmisv>on l>as )>util<vh<<' w<ih ci <(,<cd tu vp< c.itiic ic.>>>><og 'I )<<'vo>o:<sv>>>>< hrcc p>><ii>s <>>ii <l<I<< i>>>>s< u. th< ~ I invi stig<<(ivns i>t the 'I Ml ac<<<!< n< iden(it>> <I inadcqii it<<tv >ra>nrd opecatvcs us <<n imp<i(( <n< (ac<>>c and (hat worL >s now being dvn( in Ibis ~ rea. Thc (act >s ovt >ha< ih< trainiog ccquir<<aieots spcttcd vut h< cc t>>r (h< t>rc brigade memt><<cs ace <<x<<::ss<vc wh<'o compared tv train>ng cequ:. rmen! s (vc reactor opera(ors. but (ha< hce t>c>>c<(!( ~ training >s (urthec along ir. dele)open< nt. and training parameters thai arr essential to a comprehensive program have been ident>f>cd
- 45. No 22S / Wed(tear)sy.
~ ~ alt nuclear pvwer plants B.<t(crL ~ powered lights with capaci!ies of 1'~ to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is usually sutbc<en: for emergency egress, }lvwevec. the postf<re emergency)ight>ng c<<qu>remen
- l. Emuc),cncy t.(ghtic><t Tech>>(cal Basis. Emecgcn<:y )ighting is c<<quired in
>t arc of a difterent kind. The need >s for lighting thai aids Ihe access Io cquipmi:ot and components that must be manua)ly operated by plant persvnncl Io et)get* safegl<<n! shutdown during plant emerg(<ncies. Because such artivities may extend over a considerat>le pec>od of time both during and after the (ire. it is prudent to prov>de 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery emergency lig)itingcapability tn <<Ilvw suff:cient time for norm<<l lighting to be restored with a margin for unanticipated events. Comment Resolution Many commenters stated that the requirement for emergency lighting is overly r<<strictivc in three specifics: first. that emergency lighting is unnecessary In many of the designated areas: second. that Ihe requirement for seuled beam or Auocescec>t units is overly restrictive: third. that Ihe requirement for individual 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery power supp!y >s excessive. Three comment<<rs recommended a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> battery power supply: five commenters rcLv<nmendcd a plant specific power supply: anu one commenter recommended (hat Ihc:c tic no permanent installation, These suggestions have been accepted in part t.igbti>ig an>ts with I> hiiuc battery supplies urr Iv b<<prov>(led in all '<c< aas <<< c(t( d f>>r vp(rat:on of saf( shut<I<i<<;>; equi ~in<>>t in<! ir. i< r< ~ ~ s and egr< ss r<>>it< s <>>< r< ~ ii< 1b< ~ cr isi<nii!g ~ l<rtl<od il<< (<.<i ~ ~<il'll>>:<Itluc aii (< I<<<~c l>c< cmi cg<>>. l ao<.'(>s <nv>><l <: io saic plan< snutd<iwr. so>><.>>.'<>i a)su have to bc cvrcccn<<d with tn><ng in (ne ac<a Thi smut) cost di(f<<centi.i) bctwe<<n 2.boiic supply and the su)<scan(<at <<d<)(t<v>>.<t llcu<<'LI<<>n <<t(>>cd<y thi I( h>>iir supply d<ies nnt w>>cr,<nt c< ()u<<n<( tliis ci ~i(>>icc<ni i>t. Thc C>>m>>iivvi>>n t<<.s ()<<.>>)<< ) ><i c< u>>icc.in tt. hour )iu>t< c} pnwi c supp)y iii ill ac< <<s nc<<di <I!(ic vp< c ~i>iiiiivt s.itc snut(town equip>>ion< a>>J in acc('ss,<nv i grcss foulcs
- h. Ada>>a(st. ac(ce Controls Tech>>ical D<cs(v 1 he tice pc>>(i'ct>>in pc<ig<.in> uses adniinistc.<!ivc L'(<ntfotv f<ir (<(i pccven>><so and pc( b:c pl,inning. Thc i<cais l
cd >o this s(<',(>>>n are gcnrcally~ale pt< il wiihin Ibe (>ce pent<<(:(ion conimun>ty as m>n>mum r<<quiccmcnts for ao ct(< <<tive adm>>>is(cation of Ihc Are pcotcc(ion program. Controls arc placed on th<<storage and usc of comliustiblc materials to reduce Ihe fire loading >n sa(cty rcl<<tcd ((rcas and on ignition sources to avo>d c<<rclcss operations. Procedures arc used to control actions to be taLcn by indivi<lu<<ls whv d>scover a fire and by the fire brigade (or Ihc developcncnt of preplanned Are bgbting strategies and acti>a) fire f>ghting techniques. Comment Resolution Many commenters s(atcd that this reqi>>rcment was much too det<<i)ed for a regulation. Some slated that Ihc requirements should apply only Io those areas having safe shutdown cquipmcnt. Oth<<r commenters stuted that a simple s(atemcnt that vdminis)(at<Le proccdurcs should be established to control (he various fire hazards throughout the plant was suff>cient. and that the details could be spe)lcd out in a regulatory guide or some other similar document. h<<nor changes have been made in Ihe wording of this rcquiremcnt for clarification. L. Alternative aad Dcdira(cd Shutdown Capab(lity. 'cchn<cal Dusi s. In some locations (surh as thc cable spreading room) within operating nuclcut pn<ver plants. it is not always possit>le or proc(<cab)e to protect redundant safe sbu(down systems against adverse cff<<cts of fire or fice suppression act>v<tics only through the usc of fire protect>or. t>:atuces bee;(use thr. r<<dundant 'safe shutdown syst<.ms in a given fir<< area are tov rlosc tv c<<ch i:thee Alternative shutdown capabitity }<as usu'<lty been req<>>red to b< ir.<!<~I>> n:!i iit <if I!:<~ c>trvl r>>u<n. <, ~It<I< so<< ~<<)> <L< rv(ili>>, <<VIII,llg< ~<f cv<>>ns a>>:: c.>>>><<. is<<. ic<<:. ~ t <:.a<,.~u (l;<)>>>>i<a<>t m<<d>>icat>nns >v peal<<:L a<<<<cn.<<<vc sllutdvwii svs>L>'iv acl ex(en'0<v<'.. a d<<die<<ted sys'.< m In ~>> s esse>>>><<l<y minimum c.ipability s<<fr shutduv<>> tr<<in and is >nd<<pen(t<<nt of (hvsr atd} exil>ing m>>L l<c pcvvidcl) This mii>imum r.,ip.iliility>s r<<itiiiceJ Iv >>>oint>>in Inc pi<>>.css v>ici i)it< s wi>hi>> Ihuse L ~i<<iLs p><<li.>i.<l l>>c < t>>s, <(iif(s>ti p <l<~ < 1'h<'<<%<< l<t t>>ss <it >>(tv<I<'<<lv<'c Is ~<ss>>u>>'<) h< ~(.ause fici s in c<<c(i>>n ciccun<st,<n'.<<s (< ((. <.I< c(c>cu) <)>>Ic>t>><(>no systim-I could cause or bc ritut<:d I>> such a I>>ss. Fire d<<m <gr Io cold shu(d>>wo L.>lity >> limit( d I>> d,image Ih,it c<<nb<< crp<<<c<<d within ~ 2 h<iucs t>lc a (oargin io ach>cl'io~ cold shubl<iwn c(>>>J<<>vns Consider itin>> is g>v< r< to assoc>ate<) circuits bee<<use.m<>>( li)ants wcc<<nvt designed witt: this cun(.< lt'. >n mind. Shvuld e>ther thc a)tetra>>vc <<I dedicated cap<<bit>ty be required to (unct>oo because of a f>re. it must no!be disabled by f>re damage to assoc>a(cd circuits. Also. this capab<t>ty dvrs not have to meet thc single fa>luce cr<tcr>>>r. because it is only one of several levels of defense. Seismic Category I criteria is not imposed because fires that.<vovid require tbe installation o! atterna(>vc or dcdicatcd shutdown capabtlity arc nvt seismically induced. Comment Resalutiaa Many of thc commenters stated thai Ibis requirement exceeded the scope of Appendix R by de(<ping a)terna(>vc shutdown cequiremeo!s. They s(<<ted that the time requirements are excessive aod should bc dropped. Thr} also contend that Ih>s regula(ivn does not take into account Ihe many plant reviews b<<ing conducted under the Systentatic Evaluation Program (SEP). It is generally understood that col'd shutdown is the ult>mate s<(fe shutdown condition and that. for each (irc area. different means may be used and may be necessar'y to uchieve cold shutdown. Because a fire in certam areas at some plants would have the c<<pab<lity o( disabling systems required tv achieve both hot and cold shutdvw>>, it >s necessary to speci(y thc mimmum capability and time requiremcn( for each condition necessary to achieve safe shutdown. We <<grec that evaluations being made under the System<<(>c Evaluation Program (SEP) may <<lso cai'or <<)tern<<tive uc dcd:ca(cd sb it(lvwn capability for reasons nt)<<r!han t>re protection. I:or exon:pie s< >sm<< Avvding. or emerge>><:y r<ic<, ~ iii g rcqL>>cement<< c( su)I>n< triim tc:< St:<> n ay r<<qi>>ru all lit<<",.(;< nsri. <<h<)al<! ti<~.iv<<ir <.!:!.~ v'..<<'.>s uf I)l<'l ) s< ~ ~.:slt <(>>'<.(awe< ~ is ~ ~, ~ ~ L ~ ~ ~ ~ ~1608 Fct)rrol Rrgi~tvr; 4','S X<> "'S I 4V( ~(Inri<)~ <L Y>>v(~<n!w'r 19 1<(IIII / Ru)< s;ind Rrgwl.itinni pciwi i t<<w> t<i th< i iti n< I><>s<h I l()wvv< r. (hi Cvniniiiinin h is ili~<.iJcd Ih,it th<<moil>fi<.'itii>iii(< qw>c< il tii complete Ihc f>rc pc<i<i i.(i<in pr<>gram should nvt bc Jcfvrr< J until tl>c SI'.I> review is cumplvt<<J M Fir( Buff(<ri T<<Lhn(cul Dans Thr livst hre prot< c<>on h>c (<<dun<i.in< t(.>>ns vf s;>fr shu(d<iwn syc(<(<ws )s x< pnc.<t>>)n t>y unpii'c<<nl f>><: l>>.c(i< ~cs--w.<lls.<Ail c< iliwg Aiw>>>>sx<<>>I>h< s lh i..i>>i< th<isc huff>vcs Jf<.'>i<ii<v<,'c<')c>>t<<'tw><> featucvs. Ilw:).ic<>>>lief<<A(lyfi li.ililr. prov>J<<J tlicy J(L')f<)I)cfly<>>stulh cv b.icfi< cs h:iic b< vn used sucrvssfully h>c m iny yi.ics tv subdiv>dv large p<iti ~iitiil hrc Inss< s <nto smallcf. mvcv ac(:<;I>(;ilih risks Ev< n fice tiaffw'cs w<tli <iin'n>>>gi hJVL'u(<c<'wsfuily interrupted Ihi pci>gc< s prvviJ<<J Ihc vpi:ni<igi were pr<q)rely protected by f<r<< ilv<ns or other '>ccept J)>le mc.><is. Fire liarners are "rated-for fire resist'incv by being vxpvs<<il to:i -standur<l I<<st fire-: This it.ind ird test fire is J<<fiiied l>y tliv A<A<<cwi<ASncirty fvrTesting Jw J M;itvr<uls in AS'I'N I-119. "StanilurJ fvr Fici Resist;inre i>f Build>ng MJtcfials." Fire barriers arc commonly ratr<l as having a fire res>stance of frvm 1 tu 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Must "ImproveJ Risk- <ir -IliglilyI'r>)t<<ct<<d Risk" las clJssif<ed by insurJncv c><Criers) industrial pr<>per(i<<s in Ihc United Stat<<s require firv burricrs to have a resist Jnce rating of 2 tv 4 huurs. While a nuclear piiw<:r plunt has a low f<cL'v)<J. Ihe pvtL'(it<I<I consequenc<<s uf fire wr<<serious. Therefore. the Cow>mission hus selected 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> has been>>s Jn acceptable minimum fire resistance rating for fire barriers separating redundant trains for sale shutdown systems. Th>s willgive ample time for >(ulvmatic and n>(>nual fire suppression activities to rnntrvl any potential fire and fnr safe shut down activitivs to prop<<rly r>>ntrnl Ihc reactor. Many operating pl ints. or pl'>nts Ih'it i<fe i>lfc(<Jy liu<lt bi)I thJt Jfv (lot yL'I operati<>g. h >ve livth Ir;i<ns <if s;ifc shut<lawn eqwiliinvnt liir. iti.d in close proximity and u single hre coulnct<vnul capability of lint)> rcilunilant trains. If spccifii: pl<<nt <uwwlitiii(>sIiri <;lii<!wthe installutivn of a J Iwiiirfire l<arricr ti> separate Ihc re Jun J;iwt Irains. a I hour f>r<<barrii.r an J au(i>iw'itic hr<< s<>pprcssin<> iy: t<<ni for e'ich reJumlant tr~in will l>e cviisi(lvrvJ Ihc equ>valent ol 3 hvur I) <trier. llthe 1 hviir fir<!Ii.irriir infl aut(im.itir. f(C<')wlq><<'i<In><< h>> i ~ i< I<<<n>n>w>a>><t I>a>>>> <<" >>>t h<'w>>i >ah'<I ln'<. ~<ni<'ci J (<i minn i.<h ihu<<liiwn c,<p Jt)!)<l 'I hi i>><<>,'.< I.hvur b inlet in ci>ntwn<.(<vn with:i<i(i>m,iticlite suptic< cs>>>n Jnil Ji tv(.t<<A cJpub<l>ty for e'<ch (<<dun<Inn< tr.iin i>f sufe shwtd<>wn equipmrnt is h isi g cvns<der J ti<>ns Aiit>>mJ (<c swppcvss>on is crqu<c<<J I<> < nsiicr. pc<:mpt. i.lf<<ctivi z;>phr Jt<<)n <i)c<<ss.>>>t tv a hc<< th >I c<>i)hi < (><l.in<<< c s.<h'hut<h>wn L >p.<liiti<l I tir o>>.t<v <twi<i <If >>l .ii>t<iwi.<<i<;fic<<h t<<<ww<<)< iiitipcvss<vw Syi<<'m <h>ri fili(<I<<'vf <I<>(lI a<ill><'wit>( s(w>>br <)< Ii<< . t li.iiIn <;A <h'v< hili<'(Iliy (I)i hc< 'Ih< c< h>c< >hi: (:<>mniissi<>n <s (equi(in<<. J I h<)iir I).>rri<.'f tn <inane< th <t fire <h<n)ace will h< ~ limit<.J to one tr.>in un(<! thv fife is rxt>rgw>ihe(l Thea< ~ f< qiiirvmrn(s h.ivc nvw bc<<A <n(:<)(I>of(>(rJ in SLct<vn ill,(i.-Fire l)c<)t< ctian vi Suf<.ty l.wn<:t<vns. Coc>>ment Resulut>on Several comm<<nt<<rs made a number of suggest >ons of J n cJ>tori J I nJ ture. One. sugg<is<ivn was tn adJ -or unless vthrr hrc pr<>t<<cti<>n f<<utur<<s have b(:en proviJi;d I<> Lnsuf<.'eq<i<vi<lcnt protrctivii-ii> thi. first paragraph, where thrcv.hvur rut<'J fire barriers wvre stipulatv J unlrss a lower rating was justif>> r<ls analysis. Thr C<immissivn fi i.ls th.it this ad(ls nothing in thi w,iy <>I cl;irific'i(ionand thc suggcstivn w is nvt ail<>ptvJ.'I'hc second p ir.igralih requires th;it str<<ctural steel forming 'i part of or support>ng i<ny fire b irriiirhave a fire rcs<stuncr equivalent tv thut required of the barrier. An cx <mal<<was given nf mct <I lath and pl.istcr covering us being one mc <ns of providing equivalent protect>on. Several comcncntcrs stated that they Ihvught this wJs t<)v narrow and wovld be intcrpr<<ted by some people as thc only acceptable method permit(cd. Since the exaniple secmcd to be confusing. a decision has been made to el>m>nate it. Other comn>ents to the vffrrt th it thc rrquir< mvnt wus exc< ssivcly restn<:tivv with rrgard to fire b'irn< r pcnctr'itions. incliiding fire Jinirs uml Ihr<r,isiiic<,itv<lframvs 'inJ h;<r<lw >rii.:inilv<.util;<ti<>Asystems h ivc b<.cn acted i>pun by Ihv staff and Ihv requirement. as it had affected these items. w <s delete<i. N. F'(r<'lurrn r Cr(bl(. Prf>vtrf(t(on Suol Quc>l(fn ot(aa. ~ T chf>(col l]osis. UnpiLffced fire b <cf>L'rs offer th<<bi st pratcctii>n fnr siip;iruting ri.diin<l.int tr>>ns (>f i.ih ty. ri.la(i~il or s'if>> shut J<ilvn vquipmvnt. Ih>lvL'vec. Ihvsv l)arrw rs mi<st In pierced f(ic lni(h (l>><>>c<<l >>i<l Iniw~'f <' <Ish'i I tii'< !><'w<'t< ~>t>~>><i <<><)it In i~' <h'll I<i ~n hn'iv i JVL'( ~'<'ll I>><'v'.~<st >>il'.<'he AJ(<nn Jl c<>ns<<nsus it~in<I,<rJ>>Li,l f<>c trst<n>t.ind rut<ng thrs<<<.ihii. pi iivtr,itiwni<<i<is. S>ncr tlir c,<bli s cvn<lurt thr hrat through the bJ(r>vr anil sin<.<< the cabl<< insulativn >s cvmbustil>l>>. the acceptancr criteria of Ih< AS1'~I Stundafd F.-l!<J rrlutini tv (i nit>rcuturr on the unexp(isc<l s J<<mus< b< nppfupr<J(rly mudifi<<J Cuc(>cc>ent Rcsulatn>n Same cvmmrnters swgg<<st<<. I (hut th>s entice s<<rtivn Iw <lvlvt<nl ~ >>><I i< pl.i<< ~<I with thv lull<>wing tlv<ii<<'<<'<i(.i'i -I'<<A<it(Jtivi>suuls shall pri>vi<li thi equivJI<<nt protection which is r<<quirecr. Fvalvation of th<. pcnctr'i(inn seals based i>I<on a ih s.gn review and r<<l<<vunt test J.iia or quJ!ificJI)on tests m;iy l>c m.iil>>- Thv commenters feit that sufficient trst (l,<tJ are ava>iable to permit cvulua>(v(Ls)f design requirements without fu)I.scalt mockup test>ng and that many of!Iic items spelled out >n the rcgul;itinn. such as thc water hose stream test. wcr<<> det JilcJ and did nvt belong in Ih>> regulation The Commission h;is reconsidered Ihis issue and ecv>sed the rule to )a) require the vse of noncombust>l>lc materials only in the construction of fire barrier pcnetr;itinn scafs. )b) require fife barrier pvnctr.i(ion seals to bc qualif:cd by test: an J lc) require such tests tv satisfy cert Jin acceptance criteria. O. Fl'rc Doors.. Ted>nico/Basis. Door openings in fire walls constitute another breach that must bc protected. Fire doors th it tiave been tested and raicd (or certain fire exposures are. installed to protect these openings. Fire doors frequently fail to protect the openings in which they are installed because they are not fully closed. Various methoJS are uvailublc to licrnsces to ensure that fire doors are >n proper operating condition and th>it they willbe closed during a fire. These options are listed in App<<nd>x R. Comment Resolution Many commenters slated that Ihis rcquircmvnt is tov detail<<il und slivuld bc dclctec). Minor editorial changrs have heen made in order to more clearly stat thr. requirements. I). R<.uctor Coolot>t Pump Lubrication System. Techmcol Bnsis. Each reactor coolant pump motor assembly typic.;illyriint;>>ns 14(I tv 22U gallons nf luhv vil, Oil leJk>ng from some portions of tlic lubi< oil Systcf>) <iii<y cv(Ac <A conti>ct w<<h snffow'v'x tli'<> ~<+<'<it <'i>1><) ~A 4> ~ < t'i<< <>>I 'I liv ri".i>l>wiv,f>rv cin:hl!" ia <<<<%5 <v >Ill'<c<<w<i<ihlI<<~ <h'h<v<'<I Federal Register / Vol. <S. No. 225 / Wednesday. November t9. 1980 / Rules,and Regul ~ lions 76605 rel ~ ted Issues ere mvolved here Tb<< first is Ihe reqinremenf lor dedicated water storage tanks lor fire fighting purposes. The suggestion that Ihe requirement for dedicated tanks be deleted was rejected for Ibe reiisons stated in Ihe precedmg Technical Basis. The other point deais wifb ensuring minimum water a!orig<< ciperiiy fo. fire suppression activities>>ben storeve tanks are used for combined service. wafer/hre wafer uses The term "vertical standpipe for o!ner wafer ~ervice" simply means '.bat the suction for other water uses ir. common sinrngc tanks willbe located sufficiently h:gn io ensure Ihe minimum wafvr volume needs for fire supprcssior. activities If the commenters were assuming !hit "vertical ~tandpipe-referred orli to pipes inside the tank. this is not:he case. In lect a standpipe exterior to the storage tank is more desirable since any leakage would be immediate!y evident. On an internal standpipe a leuk in tbc pipe could actually iillnwdepletion of the water otherwise to be rescrv<<d for fire uses. The rule has been clarified to allow physical alternatives for water ~upply dedication but Io preclude exclusive use of administrative controls lor this purpose. Some commenters objected to the requirement that other water systems used as a backup wafer supply lor fire protection should be permanently connected to Ihe fire main system and suggested that it would be sufficien! to provide a water supply capable of being connected to the fire main system within ten minutes of the loss of normal water supply or pumps. The rule docs not address backup water supplies. The requirement means that. ifanother water system is used as one of the redundant water supplies. it must satisfy ~ll of the requircmcnts of the fire protection water supplies. Additional backup supplies need not meet these requirements. One commenter asked wby only ~ two hour water supply is required when the Browns Ferry Fire lasted well over two hours. Allof the investigations of the Browne Ferry Fire clearly show that lfwater had beenused immediately. tbe fire would have been extfnguisheu inuch earlier. Indeed once the manual fire fighting activities were started with the use of only one fire hose stream. the fire waa extinguishe J within onc half houf. The st ~ff would find unucceptibl<<any condition in which a postul it<<d fire tbiit could thre>itrn sifts<<shufili>>vn i.'ip.iinlii<< could nnt bc con!roll<id ir<<.'xffnonshi il within two hou.s wi!h in> uui>>uinitiun hour wafer supply is considered iidequvte. It should also be no!cd fhsl this minimuin ocdif,ifcd wafer volume is based on maximum flow rates. Since most fires are controlled and extinguished wifb much smaller now rates. Ibis requirement realistically reprcsin!5 ~ drdicifcd wifer voliime fer in excrss of f~o hiiurs B S<<c,nona! Isola!>iin Val<<cs. C. Ilydrant Isnlu.'win Vale<<s Tcchnical Dcsrs Tb<<sc Iwo requirements are similar end can be freifed togetb<<r Proper valuing is required to isolat<<portiuns ol the water disiribution system fnr miintcnanr<<or r<<pair without interrupting fh>> water supfi:y io munuii or automatic fire siippr<<ssion sys!<<ms inside Ibe plant. Vilvcs are sim>>arly rcquir<<d Io permit isolation of outside yard hydrants from the wiiter distribution system for maintenince or repair without inf<<erupting water supply to fire suppression systems insirle tbc plant. Visually indicatIng valves surh es post irdicainr vulv<<s ar<<preferred so Ibut the position of the valve can be readily determined. However. key operated valves (commonly known es curb valves) fire acceptable for these purposes where plant.specif'c conditions warrant their usc. B. Section Control Valves-Comment Resolution. hfany commenters stuted that the requirement lor -approved visually indicating-sectional control valves wes overly restrictive. unnecessary, and not specific with respect to who should give thc approval. Tbc Commission hes accepted this suggestion: the rulc now requires that sectioniil control valves shiill be provided to isolate portioris of the fire main for maintenance or repair without shutting off the entire system. Post indicator or key-operated valves are mentioned as two examples of acceptable valves. C. Hydrant Block Volves-Comment Resalutian. A number of commenters mude suggestions for rewording this section. This sectior. nas Iieen clarified to state Ibe requirement lor capubility to isolate hydriints from the fire main without disrupting Ihe water supply to automatic or manual fire suppression systems in eny area containing or presenting e fire hazard'to.safety.related or safe shutdown equipmcnt. On" coinmenter suggested that this requir<<ment be droppi.d in its entirety sin<<c iI -is a ncw requirement which hes noi been subjec!<<d Io Ihe peer revi<<w
~iii ~iiiilnisi~ Ib,i'tini:i~Itx A tii Itl'I'I"~!IU 9.o-l cunfu>>is tlic fulluwing by e visually indicvtfng oi key opere!ed (curb) valve." ind there wes in opportun:Iy to coinment on this document. D. Manua/ Fire Suppression Technical Basis. Considerable reliance is placed on automatic fire suppression systems throughout a nucleir power plan( Ilowever. manual'fir<< fighting irtivifiis ofti.n can contrnl and exfmguisn slo~ Iy developing fires before an iuiomi:ic fire suppression system is acluaf<<d. In addition. fires that are con!roil<<d or extinguished by automatic systems require ~ certain amount of manuiil rvsponsc. Also. some areas of the plant do not warrant the installition of automatic fire svppression systems Manual response is the only fire suppression available for Ihese areas: thus. it i~ important that manual fi.e lighting capability be present in'all-arces oi'he plant. and that standpipe ~nd hose stations be located throughout thc plant. The stanopipe end hose stations are to be located so that at least one effective hose stream cen be brought tn bear at any location in the pliint containing or presenting a hfizird to structures. systems, or components important to safety. They are to be supplied from the lire water supply system except lor those inside conteinmcnt. which miy be connected Io other reliable water supplies if a separate pcc:atra!ion into containment cannot be made for lire water service needs. Comm'ent Resolutian Several commenters suggested adding a sent<<nre reading "Standpipe and hose stations are not required ifsufficienl justification can be provided Ihiit adequate fire protection features have been provided to account for a given fire area." This suggestion was rejected. Thc ~taff has taken the position that the minimum requirements ere that at least one effective hose stream that willbe able to reach any location thai contains or could present an exposure fire hazard to the safety.related equipment. Tne Commission concluded Ihiitno anilyses ciin identify hazurds so carefully thai this minimum requirement can be further reduced. f lfydrastatic Hase Test Technical BosIs. Fire hoses should be hydrnsfi tfcaliy tested periodically to ensue<< tliet they willnot rupture during use. Tbc requirement for a minimuni icst prcssure of 300 psi comes lrom YI<<PA Yn 19!i IYufiiuiulI'irc I'rul<<i!iiin Asincfufinn St;inil,ird.'.o. I'fi' Sfun dard tor Fire Iiose). ~ natfunally >f660() f'ed<:ral Rrgiilrr Vcsl 4i co)s ""S I E'V< ~<It><'ci'sv X<ici mi>s ~ r 1f! 1<)Hit R<<ic'i ~<It<i Ri giil.il<<)ttc use i>nd c..iri~ uf fir<i his~i lb.ii ra. ~ Kt <nduitf:i c hnd <<ivlul C<<n>>>>s>>t Hrsnlutsos)i Many c<smmvntc fi po>>nts J cl, < thr Qffunei>><S Ui igs'Sf <h<'c'fiii ii. C i< v pf<<ssuf<" riilher tli.i>> -s)tos ~f st><>e preSS<<fi ~" in Ihii ri St<<ifs n>o>>< 1hr in<en di ~<I m<<.inine fsof Shii n OIS>SCS mrni ic that all hc>ivi wnui<i ts. )s i<~ il.s!.s pressure gfvater th.in thi m.iiisn>>ri pressiire h>unn ihs fifi l>risii~ s ti>>>> water diitrii>ut<<>>> svsos mi I hi rssrrrr> term>no>(cog> is -c>(>> r.otinv lifisi>>< ~ I hr rul<< h>>S I>S en SSS fli,ir<<."Cl (<i.s.>S!i<irin Ihe s<icf( a<I<I< d.i il"i:f<<minin:~im:s st pfcssiifs ~ r<<oluir<<nii c>: o! 1<)s> tois i>> ms's Ihv Nl'ph stan<laf'ni commi nti ~ < a!co ps>>nti <! oiit >h,st hosec should t>e ins; v< ti ii fsir chili!iii mt. cute. <ir olii<<r <l.sm,i ~ o Ai<hsiuvt) th>s >s a valid comment. it is not an unr<<solved issue with any l>r<>>>see so it need not be covered bi this rul<< In ad Jition. such <<>sl)<<c:<>one,<f<<J i<i,idy be>ng performed in J<:<:ofil ini:< with <hr plant's 1'echniciil Spi c.il<<.;iit<>nc l'. A<>t<<)>>nt)c F)rc /Pr Is r t>osis 'li c h<>i<<)l Bc)s(s. 1'hi requiri <<>> ii> thoit iiutis<<i.itii lire del<<clio<<systi ms lie i<<sl.illi;<Iin all areas th;il contain s.ife shuldiiwn or 5><fely related systems or comp<>ns Als fuliuws genvrally J<.cepti:d firs. protect>on practice. Inst Jib<>n of siirh fire detection cap<(ity is >n<lepi niii nt ol any requirements (or autom.iii<. or manual hre suppr<<ssiori rap it>>lilyin an ~rea. Thv purpose nf these detection systems
- rii~ i is .".is siiivi'!i~ n w.is r<<ji <<eii
vc early warning of fire conditions in an area so that thv hre brigade can initi ite pro<Apt actions to minimize fire damagi within Ihe plant. Comment Resoiut)on Many commenters suggested that the words "automalic fire di lect>>)n capability" be substituted for "automatic fire detecliun systems on the basis thai. as worded. Ihe requirements are too (imiling.They stated lhat an autumatic spnnkis r system with appr<<pr<ati ii(.irmrhi.ck valves and central.il.irm fvaturi s pfov<d<'s ~<c<iept'<blc'. sls')<i<.t>>sns al ~<fni<Ag capabihly. Sever.<l c<<ni>nenlc:. s rl.>><<ii:J that a separate dcti:ctiun systen)>> <<sit needed in areas cucerc d l>y spnnkivr systi nio i <iiiipl>><I ccith fiiiiiili:h<ik spri<<kl<<r liv.<>. A h>>i(<is bnk h.ii,> t<f>ie dl'I <y l>L(ure il isc.!<<ales. I hiwevef. more imp<irl'inliy.a smi>liliring (uca(iz<>>( f<<e Ih,it cu<<ld do d;in>>igv m;<y nol gv<<<.r<<le v<i<<ugh l<<ist lo In<>It thv (i<sil>le b>>k 'lVhi(s ws i(i> <i<<t <hi ii fc'o ~ )i>os) ti>>'<l.sf>ssi:i isis lssstss<iu!'..'o, li' ~ >os<(sts ~ s"i'loci 'oc its'>>i is's \\ s"i ~ii ~ ii<~~, ~ i ~tilt <ll I'i ls toss o'c oo.< ~ <sos svctrr. in Jl! sv<:I'..<ri.ii shi>>ilsl bv rr!J<ned Thv f><i <Lor.sfdi.in.ilys ~ <c r..iii hif ~ i cvpa<.it< ~ cs>(>pre>i<on svitens 'U! this woulil I>> in.iJilil<<in lo Ih< hfe C!o I<:C)i<in i)iti m 4 P:ssls < ffc))> si.Nots'ShutrAs>s't> C"l>c>.'))!st< 7'Lc l<<sic >l Bs)ici 1hc so'st ~'Ct<i<'>>r thv pc<its's t>>>A <i: ii<fL i) <<iisiiswn <.,ip.sl)iii!i ss tii eniufo ~ Iha>.it ~ ~ ioct sins nii ini o>(.<<hiev>ng.inil< ioii<liti<inc w.t. fs>>i.iin.iv,>>l.il>li~ <i<<)inc,in<i,i(lir .i"v pose><<l.i>s sl (i<c;n Ih< pl.int ili'<.isii<~ 'i Ass< i>ooi>>tst ~ Is> to<>'<(i<.t >hs il>i ~<< f<<: i "A<!<<ioiis si<i<<o < ivhii li hri s niay <><<. iir . ~Ai! I>siol>.ig.s)s th" iis>>vn Is>>i>i
- .<<r t.>>ning i,ifi chut<hiw>>
~ ic < I<.>) i>f< i ~irs ~ il<< i.<hs ii r;s )hi'f i'. <A I!>> i(s ~iivn ii.ic>>!ifs '(h<<<< i:.."i io Ai >ni J>>i fsor pi<its ctinv '.hs c.ifv 4;s><<0<>w<i c ~ <(>0>h>I>I<< o><ill~>>is'I c ii<itaii>A>int iiri~ li<aa iit.>tih '(h< hicl cri.inc is srp;>> ition Ul red<<Au.<nt s'if<< shiiidnwn tra<ni i>Id isc<>cia)<<J rife<<its Io; A><sans of I ho<<< hr<<rateil 1).irri<<rs. 'I tsv s<<c.On<I mi;~i<
- "o<s ~
>n.iti<<n i>f i~'!s ~sfJ tin<<<)( reil<<nil;int iisfi shutd<>wn t.iinc anil aiii>ci;itiil cir<.u<v;i I. h s<<f (if<~ > ~ <II~<I Is iriiii.inii.i<<<<oi>>.itic hrc i sts(sf<<>iiicii<I d<'ls'<it>>sn c: ~ ils ii)>i<tv fc)>'ioth redun<la>>I Ir,i<ni, 'I'hii Ihsf<l n>c:ans, which may i><<uci:d only when rs ciu<i<lanl Ir <<ni '<n<l <ss<ic'>;<tvd circuits Jrc si p.irati v "tt f<<vt or mo>fi; of clo;,ir sp.ic<, r<<q<>>ri.i a<<tom;il>c fire .cuppressi<in;ind diilection system>> in IA<<area. An allcrnal)ve or de<lirali d s Jfe sh<<t<isiwn cap ibilityir>>ii~ l>i n<ii nt of thv fire area <s rcq<<ireJ iffir<< pcotiicl<on (or safe shutdown capability c iniiot be providi d as outlined;>l>ove. ('<ir r.;i!iles and e<iuipmrnl n<<e<ieJ for safe shutdov n located ins>dc of nnninerled containmentc. a lesser degree of fire p. ~)lection is permitted heca<<se transient exposure fires arc less lik<<iy inside cont.>>nnient dunng pl.int operali<<A. S<<c:linn IllM. -Vile (jarri<.'rs.- J>sc<<ssvs Ihr le<:hnical basic for Ihv 3. hour harrier. and Svclion ((I.( 'lternative.inil Ded>Lated Shutdown C. Is.<l>d<ty.- disr<<sscs Ihv. Ir<:hni<:;ii t>.<sis for safi sh<<tdi>wn rap;it>>lity. ( cnl>ll><'I>ll(evvt<>t>c>n M'<ny cnmmvnters suggested thai the first paragr'iph iiv changed ilightly.imi ti>s ~ r<.st <)f Ih)i is <:li>>n <h'.h Ic (I 'I'Iis~ Is ~isis fi>r Ihi ii <:un)i.nli<>>>>s 'ii.it tlii~ r<ilv ih>>ul<l stiili~ s<n>(>(C'l>> ri.ii<<>)en>> nt Io pri>ti <:t col>lvs or vquiiimi.<<l of cviti~ <>is ni i i:is:irv (or i,ifiisii<<t<hiwn iil thi pl)i<<l anil li ivi spi:cihc imp(<<ment.itiii<< <ii~t.>>IS )n S>>m< ~ sill<i'f lyi)e sif dos<!<<A>>'<<II ~ ~ (>i< C < >>i<><i<los Sl li>>i is'I ti~ Sii S'l fi'i'rois>ig Ilis',"tii~'sl s ~ s<i' ills'<,~'<)i, il~ i ~ '<i'ise I,ol ~ Io' ~ soool ssI<<s'is>>el <too' ~ I l sro Br<costs'f~<>she 'f's's'hf>>s o) HS 'l Xi<So > m<iiiifn <nd<<Str< >I pl,into ivith rvpt.i< vmi~ <it <a>it valuei .in!iris>>i hinv Ihiicc ol a ms><ivrn nurlrar pili)et<<' <'Sl'r )<i< ge<i<'fi>)i<ig Sti) I<'l<i tlis C e .i tiill time (iillic it<<ippvil (ir< ds't> << )is><'clt <f><;(Oiling <iisltiirizvdfirv ~iiil)If it><i f1<'Co<Uis'f Itis'i'<lll I'sl ci is rity i>( fifvh,sza< li >n.<>><<i li.sr go ni <.<ting st,>I<<<<<.>i romp in i( tss.s ni.iii<<f.i<,t>>ri>>gisl.int. Ii<<';isn)niiic<on I<< iis ii s Ih.it >I <s n<>t ni c eii.><y ti> ni.<<>i! it<.' full) st.>ffs c( f<f<.'h'p.<ftmrnt I Isis) sI \\ <'f. Ail><>i(fifo' <<siss>>)s<'.al)al>>!<>y >s req>>>>vil.>I.s nucivar pi.snt Jii< il pt<s'ovf!c cits>>pt>vd afisl hills tf.l<i<s'sl (i<i~ i>fig.<cls )vills.lt<'ilc < os> n<'i'<i I tiv ( <<nin>>ssco)n has cl<<t > i>><<."ol >hoot J br<el> JS'>( f>CC'oof SO<<S <<.S>>i<i<is: ~'i Ilii~ <rin<muni sizi s<<(bess nt to p<<rli>fi>> Ihs Jrt>uns Ihi<l mise Is<'Lqu<f<.ll ilc !he l>fig.iileJ<<r>ng the fire a<<JTO'(ffc>c)dc si>n>> margin for unanticipali cl eii nts '<A>>(arly. the Iraining r<<q<<irvmen! i list<IJ dfL'1)As><(Lfe<j t(is'<<n<<)'><<i)) n<<e Jed tii ensure that Ih<< lirv t>r>!i. mill iie.ibh tn functiu<<effe<;tive(c c!>>ring a fife i.mergi ncy. 'I'I<< iirispos<<ii ru!e requ<fvd emery< n-y bre J thing;ippJratus with<l sp<<<.sfyinv the nun:ber of such p>ec'vs of )>pisa>">Isis Che rulv h'is been modified lo spvs ic Itic p<<rsi>nnel (or ivhom such a(>p~..) t<is is ti> be proviJed a<<il lo sperify r<<<<<rir <<<r re<tv>remenls. .( I Fire Br)L'orleComment Hrcolittiot> hkany comnicnlers suggested changing this requiri)ni<<nl to a si<<iplo ~ State,')>L'nt that a trainvJ and vq<<>pi>co. nomin;il size. sile f>re t>ng<>dc Uf fivv persons bv provided on ea<:h shill l nless a lesser number is justi(ieil. This recommended change was reject<<d by Iht'omm>ss<on for the reasors slated in the 1'crhnicai 8;>s<s. Somr corn<<>r<<ters objcctcd to thc eiclusion of Ihe shift supervisor lrom the firo iirig'i<le.1'he c<<A>n:entcirs f<<ll th il Ih>> sh:ft supervisor shiiulil c<o '.<i lhe fire and pr<<vidi Ihe i>>ini ht Ul bii rxpert<se an<i '<<ilhiir>ly.Thv rule would n>>t pfL'VLAII(i<i ( hiiiL'vL<',lhL'i>sit superc<sor m;iy have l<<go <<Iii>iihlife during the course ol a hrv th,it.sile r. i ly affvcls plant uperali<<ii. Thv f>re i,ng.ii!<. ILader must slav with Ihi'irvbng.idv .>nd be ass<a<> ~"'ir<iths r f<'ii>>>>)i<I"~ s) sr<<<<,' fire cn>>.rgcn tli<<'s'f<<<ci I<, '.l!< i<<(is ~sc <suf A)<<it 1)L'xcl<>JL'd (< ~ '>>:>is<<nil>>'> i>iip on thv f>rv biig;iJv I F>ri Dricoacic Tnt)t>)i>coC<)tnin<<:>t Hs sol>>t)on. M >ny co>nmenters (i>>vv I ill~ ~ ~ >o'll loioo' I <<< tl <<vil: <>il 'ii ~, Loss c ~ i i ~ >X>"coo ~ >io i' i ~ O ~ ~ < iiilil SS i S S ~ ~ ~ O il li lsl ~ ~ loss ~ ~ill >> ~.': <i"O.C (3 Fadaral Register I 'Vol 45. xylo. 2."5 / wednesday. november9.5 I, it <a irnpor'.<<nt tc re ognize th<<t Appendix R ad(!resses on'.! a por!ion cf th<<specific items con',<<:nrd in the more comprehensive documen: Brsnch Technical Posinon GTP APCSB 9 5-1 ~ ndsts Appendix A Appendix*(u BTP APCSB 9 5-1 has beer. tne basic f;re protection guid<<oce used by the staff in their fire pro<ac<<o<. r<<x(ews cno(Iu<.<rd for all oper<<!<og plants dur;n<< tr>> p((s( several ycsrs. I:or mun> p!<<nts. licensees proposed x>s:<<..s und!es<urcs that setisfactonly <<chic( ed the (irc protection cnt<<n(t s<<i!o". <o Append:x A to BTP APCSU 9.5-! ar" i<ca,tn <o promptly imple<..ent s c!! ea:ure5 <<nd systems. Sstisfactory fes'.urcs ~."." sys!rms arc ~ Ircsd> in pl<<ac sod in oper t<:on in many plsnts There is i r( esonsb!>> degree of uniformity arne-..<t mos< of these approved features!or sll f-c:iitics ~ince they were rev<ewrd <<gains! the ~sme criteris of Appen J~ A <o QTP APCSB 9.5-1, ln gcncro'i'.".e fr~<ores previously approved b> !he NRC staff in ite reviews of fire pro:ect.on <<sine the criteria of Appendix A!c BTP APCSD 9.5-1 provide an equi<<a!e.-..! Icvr! of!ire protection ssfc!y to th<<'. p:ovid<<d under the specific proi<s<ons o! App<<nd:x R Thus. the further benef<::n~t m<gh< bc provided by requinng the'reviousiy approved features br rotc".fi<<d to conform to the specific i~ngusg<<set forth in Appendix R is o 'weighed by the overall benefit of thc earl> implcmentstiun of sui:h previously approved features. which in many cases ~re currently being insteI!>>d. ' ~ ( t!!evertheless. as a res !'. of its continuing reviev of fire p.otaction matters. the NRC s(sf!has <ndicatcd to 'the Commission that there are. requirements in three sect:ons in which the protection afforded b> Appendix R over and above that previously ~ccepted. may be dcs<rsb:e The Commission hss decided:hst these requirements should be re!roactively ~pplied to all faalities. Th.s dec:ston is not meant to reflec adversely on previous licensee or stef! ev<<lustions: rather its purpose is to tsi(e fully into account the increased knout I<<d<te and experience developed un tre protection matters over the last sever<>nsunng that systems and assoc<<<trd ci. cuits us>>(i to ~chieve and.....in(sin ss!c shutdown are free from fire damuge. App>>nd<x A to DTP APCSB 951 permi'.s ~ comb<os'.<on of orr ret'<nI~:.t cn <<<<<vb I t ~ dct>>et<oil (I<id a<<pet'ss<on s<t'A<5 wi(ho ! <pe '.:>!nt( u p<:.; t ~>><<I<<<r<<!:on ~ s tA PIIAtlllt ~tlt! t.l i 6 NIP!l <<rrsoaemcn(s were accepted in some early fire protection reviews Aa ~ result of some separs<e effect ~ test ~. the staff cht(oged i<s position on this conf<<<urt<<<on. <<nd subsequent plans huv<<been requirerl tot<!os<de sddi!iona! pro'.ection in the form of fire bsrn<<rs o. suustantial physical s<<p If(li:on for saf<<shutdown systems. No cr>>d<!'!or such coatings ss fire bsrr<<<rs <x ttiiowcd by S<<'<<on IIIC of App>>nu!x R Appendix A <u Brsnch Trchn:cs! Position BTP APCSB 0.5.1 and thr pro!posed Append(x R recognized ths<< l)(rr wcr( plant unique conf:gur~<ion< that requi.ed fire pr(!<ection fc<t!ores (hat are not identical to <hnsr iis<<<d in Section il!.G of Anp~odix R For th<<sr csxcs, fire prot<<c!ion fes!urea were dc<<eloped by the hcrnsec an" described in a fire hazsrds analysis. Some of these srrangemcnts (vere accepted by the staff ss providing equivalent protection to the requircmen! s of Section III.C to Appendix R. Requirements that account for all of the par<<me!crs that are important to fire protection and consistent with safety requirements for all plant.unique configurstions have not been deveLoped. In ligh! of the experience gained in fire protection evaluations over the pest four years. the Commission believes that the licensees should reexamine those previous!> approved configurations of fire protection that do not meet the requiremcn(s as specified in Section III.C to Appendix R. Based on this reexamination thc licensee mus! either meet the requirements'of Section III.G of Appendix R or apply for an exemption thst justifies alternatives by a fire hazard analysis. However. based on present information. the Commission does not expec( to be able to approve exemptions for fire.retardant coatings used as fire barriers.. The second relates to emergency lighting. Section!II.J of Appendix R ca!le for 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> emergency ligh!ing. whereas in so<ne cases icss than 8.hour emergenc> lighting has been accepted aa satisfying Appendix A'to DTP APCSB 9.5-1. While an adequate level o! safety msy be provided by less than an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> supply. an S.hour system would provide added protection snd would generally invo!ve only <<sm<<ll cosr. The Commission the.efore believes that licensees should upgrade th. previously approved faali(ies to satisfy the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> lighting requirement of Appendix R. Tiir ih:ni r~'~<ri to prot>>c!<on a((<<<net fir<<s in non<nrrtt d c:intsinrncnts <nx '!virg r<<~(.n<r (.o(t snl pump 'i nt! !!< Cl m< permitted clthrr an oil collection aye!em or a f(re suppress(on system The ~toff hes ~ Iso accepted an autom<<t(c fire ~uppression system sa an acceptab;r method of fire protection for this ~pplication. The Commission hse concluded that fire suppression systems do nut give edequs!c pro(ection for fir!s thst msy be induced hy seismic ev<<nis Thc Commission ther>>fore brliev<<s the! previously spprov<<d suppression systems should be r<<pluc<<d with oil collection systems that csr withstand seismic events. The technical basi ~ on which these three sections are based sre further discussed in Section lll."Speafic Requirement ~." of tbis presmble.
- 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulatione 76M3 I
to either shutdown each operating nuclear power plant. or process exemption requests. The commenters then concluded that the implementation schedule should oe rewritten to allow an adequate time priod for compliance. The proposed rule stated that -<<II fire protec(ion and modifications identified by the staff ae necessary to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part. whether contained in Appendix R to this part or in other staff fire protection guidance (except for alternate or dedicated shutdown capability) ahsll be completed. by November 1 ~ 1980 unless. for good cause shown. the Commission approvee an extension," (proposed psragraph 50.481.(c)). The Commission went on to state its intention in the Statement of Consideration to the rule that "... no plant would be allowed to continue to operate after November l. 1980. or beyond en extended date approved by the Comission. unlesa all modifications (except for alternate or dedicated shutdown capability) have been implemented Thc Commission has reconsidered the implementation schedule and has determined that it should be modified for the followingreasons: ~ After reviewing the commenta and the information developed aa a result of completion of fire revirwa over the psst 8 months, the stuff has informed the Co<nmission that the date of November
- 3. bloat commenters e(ste(I that Ihe implementation schcdulc contained in the proposed rule ia impossible to meet for any of the operating plan(a. II'e commenters further etsied that ifthe implementation schedule in the effective rule ia the same ae that in the proposed rule, the Commission must be prepare~
~ The staff h" s mformcd the r r ~~<sat ~ ~ < <<t it a.a. <A 'rwa a ~ 4 ~ ~ r ~, ~ sa. a.~.J..v wi < ~ ~ xa'aJ~~ ~04 Federal Register / Vol
- 1. 1980, is not possible because the effective dele of the rule willbe sftrr tl'at date.
1980 / Ri>lns and Rettulations exemptions ifIhe new imptemcntatinn d><tes du nut pruvide an appfnpfiai< period of lime fvr c>>inplyinX with ihe requirements of hppcn(t<x R The time and manpower rcsvurccs needrd by the hcensees to prepare such requests and by the stnff Iv fi>rnii>lute rcc<un<n<<>><lao>>os <o< >hose rcqucsis i~ nut warrui<tcJ fr>>illII><'t<<lldp>>lni>>( timely lire yrvtci:lion i>>it>ruscoic>>>, The revi'sc(t i<>q>lc<nc><tat>un schedule prvvidcs a careful balance of these considcrativns. culling tof Ihe rcn>(>ining fife protect>oii mo<t>(>cut>ons to be implcme<itcd und >nsi ~ Il<<d on a phased schedule that >s as prompt is can be r<<asonably achieved Thc revised schedules d>st>ngu>sh between requirrn<cnts in>pvs< d fvr ihc first Iinic on the licens<<c by Append<<R ~ nd those requirements already impo:<<d in license comlitivns or Technic~I Spccifi<<utiv>>s iss>><<d prior to Ihc effective dat<<vf Ihc <ulc. Fur requirements imposed by Appendix R. including the iten>s -backfit-Io all plants. Ihe schedule provides a reasonable time after publication of the rule (or completion of required n>odilications. For requirements already Imposed by license conditions providing for implemcntion after t4ovember I. 1980. Ihe Commission has reviewed these schedules and has found that in ,'.- ':some instances Ihe allotted Iinie for <..'ompletion of Ihe required modifications may be excessive. Thus. (or fire protection features other than those covered by Appendix X. although Ihe Commission has extcndcd the compliance dales beyond Ihe Noveirber
- 45. No. 225 / We(lnesdnv. November'g.
~hould have bccn a reasonable schedule tnitially. Reticf from such limitation may be granted by the Director of Nudear Reactor Regulation upon a showing that there is good cause for extending such date and that public health and safety is not adversely affected by such extension. It should ~lso be noted that for tlcensces whose license conditions imposed ~ sch<<dulc with a cumpli.nce date of t4vvcnibcr l. 1~JII. ur other date prior to the ef(ective date of $ SOA8. the Commission has suspended surh compliance dut<
- 1. 1980, date in the proposed fute. the Commission has added a requirement that limits Ihe comptiance schedule in existing licenses ifsuch schedules extend beyond what we.now believe
y promutgating on October 29. 1980. u temporary rule f 5038 (45 Ht 7158<9t, which willbe ~upcrsc i:ilhy tl>is iule. 1'o h<<ltcr <o><t<><ii>>o>re ot Ihc ,':,v~ut<l>c L>><><<>><'<>I: I<" <.'>vcil il:l(l ll>c stat l s +u<t<< i>nn nf I>>c><u en<>>>>>ants. Ihc Section III. we provide n summary of Ihe Tcchnical Oasis f>>r <<>rh f( (tu>fc(nent, fiiltowcd by a su>><n>a<y <1( Ihe public comments uod a si iii >><ant of thc stuffs disp<isition nt th<>s<<comn><<nts. .Sect>(>n I. Infrv(lorfio>>oml Scope 1'I>is s<<;>>on l>us ln cn rcvis<<<l us a fcs<>I> U( <<,>>><(I<<'i'>>s to ii(lI<<<l<<' d<s(.<>ss><><<u( Ili<< imp(if>a<i<:i. v( safe sh<itdvwn cupal>il:Iy ai<il Itic (list<nction bclwccii fequir<<m<<nts f<<r "sa(<.ty. rela>ed-e<tuipmrnt and t.qu>pmrnt ncc J<:(I (vr -saf<<. sl>utdiiwn." Sr ro(>n II. Ceocrol Hequirements This sertion has bc<<n si>l>si;intiatly fewf>iten as a frsult <>f comm<<nts to pr>>vide a i.vncisi'. stan>n>afy uf g<<n<<rat fcqu>r<<ments. 1'hc sp<< :>fic rcquircnicnts were consul<(lated wi>h the appropriate parts of S<<ction lll. -Spec>(>c Xcquir(:ments.- cxcrpt Ihut Ihe credit giv<<n for 50 (vot s<<p.>roti<xi hus been divppcd. Secfiof> III.Syeci/<c Requirements The requiremcrts in this rule are based upon principles long accepted with>n that portion of American industry Ihat has been clussifi<<d by Iheir insurance carriers as "Improved Risk" or "IlighlyProtected Risk". In each of these cases. Ihc Commission lias decided Ihat thc ovcra II i>i>crest of public safely is best served by establishing soine conservative level of fire protection and ensuring that level of compliunce exists at all plants. The (<>Itowing is a list o('he specific technical bases and resolution of public comments for each of Ihe spccif>c requirements in Appendix R. A. Woler Svpplivs fur Fire Svpyression Sysfeff>a 7'echnicol Basis. One of thc basic fire protection r<<quirem<<nts for a mvd<<rn industrial site in thc United States is a separate waicr distribution system for (ire protection with dual water supplies. Duplicate water supplies arc required to ensure uninterrupted fire suppression capability allowing fvr single failures and p<<riodic maintenance and repair of vital portions of the systems. Duplicate water supplies may consist of separate suctiuns fur (ire puii>ps fr>>i><:h us luke. river. or pnnd or from twv water storage tanks. For nucleur power plants. the distribution syst<<m is req<iired to consist vf a loop arvu>>J th<<plant with suitable valves for isututiog pvrtiuns uf the systi.'m f(>r ni ~<ifl!<'i>ail<:uof rl.'pulr w<II<o>>I <lit<:ill>pi<it<;t><<'v<licl sllpply Iv Il>c <<nil>>:<s ill<. sr<>st<<< ""<<><<s) stc>>> ol.int. 'I'n>>s. with <liiul sunulies und a automat>c water suppression system Ihfovghout the plant. An ensured min<mum vcl<<me of water is sei aside and ded>cated tvi hfe protection uses Io be ava>let>le at all times regardless of other simultaneous water us<.s in the plin>.1his wat(r v<>lorn<< is d<<<I<rut>>it fiirfife scrvi< c oy means vf s<>rute it>>rug< tanks or s<<pnfutc pump suct<ons from a large bv<ly vf water. When common tankatte is e(nplvyed for (>re service nreds and other water sefv>ces. Ihe fife pump suctions must be a> Ihc bottom of Ihe tanL and other water supply suctivns must be located at a high<<r level Io ensure that the m>nimum dedicated water volume is set as>dc for fire pfvt<<ation needs. Admini st fat< ve con>rois by themselves. such as locked va!ves to ensure adequate water supply (or fire fighting needs. arc deemed- ~ unacceptable at nuclear power planta Comment Resolu:ion Many commenters stated that we werc bein~ too restrictive by stipulat<ng an underground yard fire main loop and fre >h wa, ~ i adopt>es. Our intent was only that a yard fire main loop be furnished. We have deleted the spccifiuation for an underground loop since special conditivns may dictate that part of the loop be above ground nr inside safety-related buildings. Such arrangements are acceptable. With regard to the speci(ication for a fresh water supply. the staf(was attempting to avoid potential plant problems'that are not associated with fire protection. From a fire protection standpoint, salt or brackish water is acceptable for fire suppression provided the fire protection system is designed and maintained for salt or brackish water. The requirement for fresh water supplies is therefore dropped. Other operational problems unrelated to fire proteciion that may result from the use of>alt or brackish water for f>re suppression activities are outside the scope of Ih>s regulation. Several commenters took issue with the requirement fo. two separate redundant auctions. stating that some plan'.s >.se a single large intake structure on a lake or a river for all water rcqutren<ents. The requircmcnt (or separate intake structures was not intended and the rule has been clar>Tied. Severat comments called for deleting the requirements for dedicated tanks or use of "ertical stondpipe for other wuter s<'rvi< rs whi n st>>ra'<< ta<>L>> <<" '. n<<l.'<r (:o<<<o<><t si rv<<:c wotcr/(irc w.<t< r <<s<-.i. (<r. II < I<<:.>s that tliia >s ov<.>;);<<:i><:<<se an(t other wavs ate avail<<his in c ns<>ra Enclosure 1 Wednesday November 19, 1980 .Part ll Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Program for Operating Nuclear Power Plants ~Z Frere)Rc<<sticter / Vnl iS, Nn ""S / Wrrlnrsr!nv. Ynv<<rnhrr 19. lqAO / R><t< s <<nd RF(tulatior.s NUCLEAR REGULATOR'OMMISSION t0 CFR Part 50 Fire Protection Progrmm for Operating Nuclear Power Planta AoeNcv: Nuclear Rr>cu"i'.ore Cum<nission. AcTloN: Final rule a(>acscART:1'he Nuclear Rc>(ulatory Corno<<ss<un is uioi <>ibm i>s <<To<I.>I>nns tu require ccrtu<n linis <<bio<<s for Iiri~ prot<<clion in o(>or~><n> (>ur ivor I>(>wc! plants. This a(:tion is lm:ng <<.4 n (o upgrade fice protection< a< nuclr.ir powrr plants licensed to oper~'r prior >o January
~ '< armcT>vK OAT@: February
- 1. 1979. by rrq<.ring res(>Iu!<on of certain contested ge~<<r<(. issui s in fire protection saf<<!y e~olua<>on reports.
(<4 I(,S.C. 3512). The date on wh<( h Ihe (eport>ng requirement of this rule: bcco<aes effective. unless advise.d to Ihe contrary. rellects inclusion of Ih<" 45 day penod that statute allows for much review [c4 U.S.C. 3512(c) )2)). FOR FURTNER >NFORQA&lON CONTACT; David P. No!Icy. Office o( Standards Development. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washingc<on. D.C 20555. phone 301-443-5921 or Robert L Ferguson. Office o(Nuc I<<or Reactor Regulation. U.S. Nucleair RcguL>tory Commission. Washingrcon. D.C KSSS. phone 301%92-1OJ6. QvPPcE>MENTARY INFORNCAT>oa On May
- 19. 1981 Note.The Nucl<<ar IRrgulatury Commission has subm(a<<<d ttus rule to the Comptroller Gener~I (or review as may be appropnate un<d<<r the Federal Reports Act. as amend<>ed
which would rcquirc c<<attain ra<a<mum prOViSianS far fire prOICrCI<un u> nuclear power plants operat>nIR pnor to January
- 29. 1980. the Nuclear Rmgu)atocy Commission published'ar. Ihe federal Register (45 FR 300>I2) ~ notice of proposed rulcmaking i<av<ting written suggestions or commen<cs on It>e proposed rule by June ~. 19I>O. The notice concerned prop(s<sed amendments to 10 CFR Part S0, "Do<<<>estic licensing of Production end Utilia~t<on Facilitics.-
~mendments. h numben uf coaunents Pert<>incd Iu spec>fic rnqu<rumcnts in Ihe proposed Appi:nd<x R. ~nd thee willb<< de<<lt witl> 4<:I<<w. I I<>w(ec(:r. there were three substantive contc<nr<ons which were raised by many oF. the cue>mcnters. These Ihree cnmmcnts wrc su<amanzcd <>s f<ill<>w><
- 1. 1979. Fifty.one comment letters were received regarding Ihe Ipro(<osc )
<net tne comment p<<riuu cnmil<l nove tirrn extend<<d Thr Commission dors nn> agree. The NRC h is li<<cn dev<<I<ip<ng fir<<priit<<r><un ri qu<ri m<<n>s snic<< tu75. I'h<<NR(: pulilishcd cumpri hrncive fire priitection guidcl<n<<s. (I<.<nch T<<<:hn>col Foci!ion (ITI'h('CS095-I and <(s App< n<l<c A in !976. Liccncri s ha vr con<po<<<I tb<.ir fire pro<ec>ion prugr,ims ag;>>nst >hi ci guid<.liars;in<I h.i v< ~ (Iiscuss<<I Ihrir devi,i<iona (rum Ihi sr gu>ili~l>n<
- 1. M<<st <:o<n<>><:<<I< rs >a<.<!<<<3o
tb Ili<~ YR(: ct.iff for Ih<->>.<s< (<iii< y<<.irs <t<<riiig >h< NR( s br<<pc<i<< ( >i<in <<<v< rii<>ng r<<d(:t(><s A S.i(i <v Fvul<<,it>un Ri ~Iuirt and. in n><>>I cases. s<>I>i>l< mcn>s >o thi~ So(<.>y Fvolu it>on R<<pnrt. have been issued for carh op<.rating reactor Thes(: reports d< scnbc f>r<<pn>tee<ion altrrnatives!hat hav<<been proposed by the licensee and (ound accept iblc by Ihc staff as well as unri.solved fire prot<<rtion issues ri.muining bc!w<<cn Ihc staff and thc'ic<<nsec. I'roposcd Appendix R provided Ihc Commiss>on's requirements for resolving those issues, Thus. it conc>rrns only a iim>tcd nu<nl>er of issues derived from Ihe usc of Ihc earlier guides. The Commission bcl<cves that a 30 day comment period was adequate under these circumstances.>n Appendix A to Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1. They also contend that these modifications provide a level of protection at least equivalent to that contained in the pcoposcd rulc, They express the concern that the proposed rulc was written >n such spec>f>c language that fire protection issues that wcr<<. Ihuught closed would b<<riropcncd and new. but not necessarily b<<(ter. modifications would be required. These modifications could be accomplished only by the expenditure ofcon.derahle engineering. d<<c<gn. and construction effort un(l ut great und<>& exp<i<<xi:. fhc commenters request Ihat Ih<< rcqu<r<<ments in Ihe prol>used r>>le he rewritten Io spec>ly unly Ih>> g<<neral requirements of what needs to hr. orrnm plish<<d I'liici c<in<<<<i!nts rutsc thr<<i. ri l.it<<d <cellos, I I><I I<Is< < ~ ~ I ~<<rc IiiIllril< rlt i<if arc aire idy se'. (ortn in C<<ni ro.'~rs<cr. Cri<cr>on 3 of App<<nd>x A <n ln CFR( Por< stt and <n mc NRC g<<<dane< ducuni<<nts I'h<<sr g<<neral prov>s>ons II.<v( risc Iu o number of d<spu<<<s uv<.r 'A,<<<II<<'r 'sl>crific m<<thods J<lcqu,<I<>ly a(:c(>mpl<sh<<d the intended g<ut. Thc pr >I<~s<<(j rul>> is mt<<nd<<J to pr>>vol<. suR<<a< nt sp<<cif>c gu>dance to cns:irr sa<<s4c!<>ry rcsulut>un of th< se issu<<s 'I'I'us. rcv<<(ting N> Itcneral<z<<<I g<<<<!,><><.e wiiuld not urconiplish the in<i n(I<<f Ihc prupnscil rulr 'I'Iu: s<<ron>cii<<<nvolv<~.inc<
- 2. Many licensees questioned Ihe need for backfitting all the requirements of Appendix R. They commenced that they had previously complied with staff fire protection recommendations in "good faith" and have committed to or complctcd certain modific'ations. They contend that the s!alf has prop<<rly determined that these modifications provide at least thc level of fire protection drscribed by the guidance contained
> spec>f<c>>urd<n>( used rcsoltc<l >n unnrcrsc,iry and unin>en<lcd rrstnrt<uns For < xamnl<<. th: proposed rule called for a "Ic<<sh w.i<cr" supply. For f>ref>gh!ing purpos<<s. brackish water is sat>s4ctory an.) a -fresh-water supply is unncci scurry Similarly. the proposed rute caII<<<t.for an "underground-yard fire minn loop.. Oltcn portions of a fire nia>n loiip run above ground in and as they enter structures. The Comm<ss>on ha J not >n>ended Io prohibit running port>ons o a lire ma>n loop above ground. Other similar changes are discussed <n Sec:>on III "Specific Requirements.- of this preamble. The third issue relates to imposition of requirements on plants with presently installed or w>th existing commitments to install fire protection fea>urcs pr<<viously dcterm>ned by the staff to satisfy the guidance of Appendix A to BTP APCSD 9.5-1. The Commission generally agrees that. except for Ihree sectiuns that willbe back fitted. Appendix R should not be retroactively, applied to features that have been previously approved by the NRC staff as sells(ying the provisions of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. The NRC staff had intended. in its original proposal for Appendix R. that the rcquircmcnts be applicable only for the rrsolution of unresolved disputed fire protection features. Thus. Ihe staff had not intended the provisions of Appendix R to require modification of pr<<viously approved (catures. This was not clearly described in the propos<<d rule as published for comment. In foct. Ihe Supplementary Information published with the proposed arule explicitly indicated that "Ja Jll lic<<nsees willbc expected to meet the rcquircm<<nts of this rule. in its effect>ve (orni. ini:luding who!ever <:hong< s ri<sult from public comments.". ln determming whether Ibe spec:fic requirements o! App<<ndix R slui<<l<l!<n imli<is<~il on Ii<:i ncr<<c with I>>..": ><<4< il i.'<I ur CX<SI><>>t C<>n>n<<<<< s.'>>x t ~ i<r I>illIiiu or<>tv< I<<<<> f<<I<In!i's <or i II~ a ~c v Enclosure 2SUMMARY
OF STAFF REQUIREMENTS TO RESOLYE OPEN ITEMS D. C.
- COOK, UNITS 1
A 2
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There are no open items for this faci1ity.
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