ML17320A226

Forwards Phase Ii.B Response to Encl 3,Section 2.4 of DG Eisenhut Re Overhead Handling Sys Operation for Control of Heavy Loads,Per NUREG-0612.Two Aperture Cards Available in PDR

ML17320A226
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	12/03/1982
From:	Hunter R INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR AEP:NRC:0514F, AEP:NRC:514F, NUDOCS 8212090296
Download: ML17320A226 (25)

Text

~p

/

~

REGULAT~ INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION @BR;8212090296 DOC ~ DATE: 82/12/03 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET FACIL:50<<315 Donald C ~

Cook Nuclear, Power Plarlt~ Unit 1~ Indiana L

05000315 50 316 Donald C,

Cook Nuclear Power Plant~

Unit 2i Indiana 8

05000316 AUTH,NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HUNTER<R,S.

Indiana 8 Michigan Electric Co, RECIPeNAMh RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTONiH,Ri 'ffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulationi Director

SUBJECT:

Forwards Phase Il.b response to Encl 3<Section 2 '

'of DG Eisenhut 801?22 ltr re overhead handling sys operation for controls of heavy loads~per NUREG-0612 'wo aperture cards available in PDR>

l

,DISTRIBUTION CODE:

A033S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR i

ENCL 1 SIZE:

t TITLE; OR Submi t tal:

USI A"36 Control of Heavy Load Near Spent Fuel" NOTES:

REC IP IENT ID CODE/NAME NRR ORB1 BC

, INTERNALS NRR REQUAzG 09 NRR/DSI/AEB RGN3 COPIES.

LTTR ENCL

/

7 1

1 1

1 1

1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME NRR CLEMENSON01 L/ORAB 12 R

ILE 04 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 1

1 EXTERNAL: ACRS NRC PDR NTIS 13 02 6

1 1

1 1

LPDR NSIC 03'6 2

2 1

1 i)TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED ~

LTTR 27 ENCL 27

lh IIMW W f hlfW fM l IWIIFi rue

~

W WSX hkl,i, W 'W,LJ q'tM j f Ahr 1

MMh II

'll a he,~

'1 1

r

'IP, kf 414 rk'1 f Ik 1

hi V<<1 f kf i 4 l r <<I <<ell

'l ~

I.~ M,,

r-,

irk tr j

ll W

Wr

'h

~ 4<<

~ y<<h kl'

'kk ieei

,M hh lf!'I I fi I

e ptk $ I<<

the

'J<<

rl II

'1rf> 7 fWA f f l I "i

<<)

'11fk f W' W ff t,) <<W <<, 1 W'

1 1 l I!

<1 I 4,

>r ll ihf, <<<<) "i

'1 p "f 'l" W

4 rrh

'1

i

<<1 g CMI I f "II 4

kk f hr'hl'

~<<~<<m~

~

~a= I I

JWII I l

i hrkMMM I M<<htfM W

Ilw i

kh,> ri,h,li h.

g

~

.I Illkr rk I r, Ii)

I 1'"

1 )if 1 Wh 1

I 4

P,ii W

,il1 kk,i M

Ih

'4 kk I

n II 4

I If ie k,'

INDIANA II MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY P. O. BOX 18 BOWLING GREEN STATION NEW YORK, N. Y. 10004 December 3, 1982 AEP:NRC:0514F Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit Nos.

1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316 License Nos.

DPR-58 and DPR-74 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS - PHASE II.b Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Mr. Denton:

This letter and its Attachments are Phase II.b of our response to Enclosure No.

3 to Mr. D.

G. Eisenhut's letter of December 22, 1980.

Phase II.b responds to Section 2.4 of Enclosure No.

3 and is being submitted on the schedule stated in our letter No.

AEP:NRC:0514D dated July 12, 1982.

This document has been prepared follow1ng Corporate procedures which incorporate a reasonable set of controls to ensure its accuracy and completeness prior to signature by the undersigned.

Very truly yours, R, S.

unter Vice President RSH/sag Attachment cc.'ohn E. Dolan - Columbus M. P. Alexich R.

W. Jurgensen

-W. G. Smith, Jr.

Bridgman R. C. Callen G. Charnoff Joe Williams, Jr.

Resident Inspector at Cook Plant 82>aoe02ee sala0S PDR ADOCK 05000315 P

PDR

gZ'QZOl q p'Gllt:OU DTZGCgoZ COMXHOI OL HEVhl. 10VD2 BHV2E II'P I TCGIIGG MoG'M'-28 GUq DLK-3'4 DocII'6< MoG'0-3Id G"q 20-3TQ DOIIayq C

COOING MIICTGffz I'QIJg VEI>:MISCIOQTVI; DGCGIIIPGZ 3 I(j8

ATTACHMENT TO AEP:NRC:0514E DONALD C. 'COOK'NUCLEAR PLANT CONTROL OF 'HEAVY 'LOADS NUREG-0612 2.4 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATION IN PLANT AREAS CONTAINING EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR REACTOR

SHUTDOWN, CORE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, OR SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING "NUREG

0612, Section 5.1.5, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of equipment or components required for safe reactor shutdown and decay heat removal.

Information provided in response to this section should be sufficient to demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in these

areas, either the likelihood of a load drop which might prevent safe reactor shutdown or prohibit continued decay heat removal is extremely small, or that damage to such equipment from load drops will be limited in order not to result in the loss of these safety-related functions.

Cranes which must be evaluated in this section have been previously identified in your response to 2.1-1, and their loads in your response to 2.1-3-c.",

2.4-1.

"Identify. any cranes listed in 2.1-1, above,. which you have evaluated as having sufficient design, features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1,6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additionally design features).

For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load<<combination) information specified in Attachment 1."

~Res ense:

NONE 2.4-2.

"For any cranes identified in 2.1-1 not designated as single-failure-proof in 2.4-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes the following information:"

2.4-2.a "The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment.

Heavy loads identification should include designation and weight or cross-reference to information provided in 2.1-3-c.

Impact areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or by some. other method such that the impact area can be located on the plant general

~

~

arrangement

drawings, Figure 1 provides a

typical matrix."

2.4-2,b "For each intexaction identified, indicate which of the load and impact area combinations can be eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, mechanical stops and/or electrical interlocks, or other site-specific considerations.

Elimination on the basis of the aforementioned considerations should be supplemented by the following specific information:"

(1)

"For load/target combinations eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, discuss the basis for determining that load drops willnot affect continued system operation (i.e., the ability of the system to perform its safety-related function)."

~Res ense:

The results of the heavy load drop survey were presented in Table 1

of letter No. AEP:NRC:0514E dated September 29, 1982.

This survey identified 12 cranes and hoists that requix'ed further study.

The attached Table A lists these 12 cranes and hoists and the Appendices which provide the results of our evaluations of the effects of heavy loads dropped from'ny of those 12 cranes and hoists.

Me believe that use of the matrise format shown in Figure 1 of Enclosure 3 is not meaningful for the following reasons.

As explained in Appendix A to this Attachment, the Plant's design and construction is compact with the xesult that it is not possible to define load paths for the Auxiliary Building Crane.

This fact coupled with the weight and size of the, loads being transported, makes the use of an enveloping approach such as that taken in Appendices

.to this letter, a more informative and descriptive one.

'~Res ense:

(2)

"Qhere mechanical stops or electx'ical interlocks are to be provided, present details showing the areas where crane travel will be prohibited.

Additionally, provide a discussion concerning the procedures that are to be used for authorizing the bypassing of interlocks or removable stops, for verifying that interlocks are functional prior to crane

use, and for verifying that interlocks are restored to operability after operations which require bypassing have been completed."

The only crane or hoist listed in Table A that relies on interlocks is the Auxiliary Building Crane.

These interlocks were discussed in our response to Section 2.2,,

contained in letter No.

AEP:NRC:0514A, dated August 27, 1982.

(3)

"Where load/target combination are eliminated on the basis of other, site-specific considerations (e.g., maintenance sequencing),

provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss adminis-trative procedures or physical constraints invoked to ensure the continued validity of such considerations."

~Res ense:

Maintenance Procedure No.

12 MHP 5021.001.036, "Control of Heavy Loads in the Auxiliary Building",

was developed to address the concerns of NUREG-0612.

All loads of five tons or less listed in Table 2.1.3.C.1 of our letter No. AEP:NRC:0514C (hereby resubmitted as Attachment No.

1 to this letter) will be moved as close to the floor as practical, but in no case higher than 7 feet above the floor.

The exceptions to this practice are the Glycol Tank (5

Tons) and the LSA Waste Boxes (2 Tons) which must be lifted to an elevation of 14'o clear associated piping.

Special slings are designated for these loads having a min9saum safety factor of 6.

The loads greater than five Tons have either a specially designed lifting beam, designated slings* or are handled under a special procedure.

These loads will be handled as close to the floor as possible.

2,4-2. c "For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of 2.4-2-b, above, identify any handling systems for specific loads which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5,1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features).

For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load combination) information specified in Attachment 1."

~Res ense:

NONE 2.4-2.d "For interactions not eliminated in 2,4-2-b or 2.4-2-c,

above, demonstrate using appropriate analysis that damage would not preclude operation of sufficient equipment to allow the system to perform its safety function following a load drop

(NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, Criterion IV).

For each analysis so conducted, the following information should be provided:"

(1)

"An indication of whether oz not, for the specific load being investigated, the over-head crane-handling syst: em is designed and constructed such that the hoisting system will retain its load in the event of seismic accelerations equivalent to those of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE)."

(2)

"The basis for any exceptions taken to the analytical guidelines. of NUREG-0612, Appendix A."

(3)

"The information requested in Attachment 4."

~Res esse:

NONE

Ih

AEP:NRC: 0514F

'Table A

'EvlL105tidll'Rosll1ts Item.

" No.'rane or Hoist Ca acit Location and Drawi Appendix Auxiliary Building Crane 150T/20T Containment Polar Crane 250T/35T Circulating Water Pump and Screen House Crane - 30T Auxiliary Building.

12-"5170 Containment Building 12 5170 Circulating Water Pump and Screen House 12-516 and 12-5168 Diesel Generator Crane 2T Reciprocating Charging Pump Hoist - 2T Auxiliary Building 12-5167 Auxiliary Building 12-5167 Centrifugal, Charging Pump Hoist - 2T Auxiliary Building 12-5167 10 12 Safety Infection Pump Hoist 1/2T Contaizunent Spray Pump Hoist 4T Residual Heat, Removal Pump Hoist 3T Main Steam Valve Hoist 5T Recirculation Valve Hoist - 3T Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Hoist - 2T Auxiliary Building 12-5167 Auxiliary Building

'2-5166 Auxiliary Building 12-'5166 Containment Buildings 12-5169 Auxiliary Building 12<<5167 Turbine Building 12-5167 C,D NOTE:

• The referenced drawings were attached to our letter No.

AEP:NRC:0514E, dated, September 29, 1982.

AEP:NRC: 0514F APPENDIX A AUXILIARYBUILDING CRANE Instead of looking at individual loads and load paths, the load with the worst. combination of weight or size was allowed to drop anywhere within the crane travel (with one exception, noted below),

and in any orientation.

It was also assumed that the load is stopped by the lowest level.

The load considered is a radiation shield (32 ft. long x 6 ft. wide x 3 ft. deep, weight of 55 Tons).

No mitigating measures have been considered in the load drop

analysis, such as the particular details of the building structure (i.e.

columns, cross

beams, components'tiffness, etc.)

or the characteristics of the load itself.

Based on the guidelines provided in NUREG-0612 Section 2.1-1, we have made the assumption that the load would penetrate to the lowest level, not taking into

account, the stopping power of the concrete structures, because we have not performed detailed structural analyses of the load drop.

The discussion presented below is the result of this conservative assumption.

The only area excluded from the drop analysis was the spent fuel pit area which was discussed in our response to Section 2.2 contained in our letter No. AEP:NRC:0514A, dated August 27, 1982.

Due to the compactness of the plant and the size of the load, the following systems that are needed for normal plant shutdown or decay heat removal. could be affected:

High Head Safety Injection System (HHSIS)

Essential Service Water System (ESWS)

Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Letdown System (LS)

Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

Spent Fuel Pit Cooling System (SFPCS)

Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS)

The load drop considered would damage several other safety-related systems which are not necessary for normal plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

The drawings attached to our letter No, AEP:NRC:0514C dated June 18, 1982 (response to Section 2.1.3.a) show on a component basis the equipment that could be damaged.

For the

HHSIS, ESWS,

RHRS, LS,

CCWS, and SFPCS

~ both redundant trains can be impaired by a load drop in the "Unsafe Drop Zone" noted in Drawing No.

12-5170 (attached).

For the ESWS the load

'drop would damage

valves, piping and cabling.

For the

HHSIS, RHRS, LS, CCWS and SFPCS the drop could also damage pumps and heat exchangers.

For the CRACS only one train could be impaired due to damage to cables.

No valves, piping or components of this system are in the drop area.,

Unique to Unit 1's design is a cable routing that brings power and control cables for the B motor-driven AFS pump through the drop area (extreme west

edge, Item A,

Drawing 12>>5170 attached).

However, even if this cable were destroyed, there would still be available,. not only the A motor driven-pump and the turbine driven pump in Unit 1, but also the cross ties that allow the Unit. 2 motor driven pumps to be used on Unit l.

,With respect to the'FPCS, if cooling is lost it would take the Spent Fuel Pit at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to reach 180 F.

Alternate cooling can be provided by this time (see FSAR Section 9.4).

Drawing 12-5170 shows both Safe and Unsafe Drop Zones (the Spent Fuel Pit is excluded via interlocks, see AEP:NRC:0514A, response to

'ection 2.2).

These Drop Zones were developed by assuming that radiation shield mentioned above was the dropped load.

As can be seen on the Drawing, it is not feasible to develop safe load paths, nor is it feasible to limit the crane movement only over the safe Drop Zone.

However, we believe. that the effects of the worst possible load drop which could prevent under very conservative assumptions the availability of normal cooldown and residual heat removal

systems, are bounded for a certain period of time by the total loss of,AC power event.

Our mitigating actions for this event make use essentially of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump and have been described in detail in our letter No.

AEP:NRC:0537, dated July 7, 1981.

As a matter of fact, several components not available during the station blackout event would be available in the case of the worst load drop such as the motor driven 'pumps and the ventilation system for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

Procedures and training for the station blackout event are in place as described in our letter No.

AEP:NRC:0537B dated October 9, 1981.

In conclusion, although no safe load path exists for the Auxiliary Building Crane, we feel that it still would be possible to safely shut down both units in case of a load drop.

Furthermore, with the improved crane operator training, crane maintenance and procedures now in place or coming into effect (see AEP:NRC:0514A, dated August 27, 1982; AEP:NRC:0514C, dated June 18, 1982; and -AEP:NRC:0514E, dated September 29, 1982) the probability that a

crane load drop would happen has been made very small.

AEP:NRC: 0514P APPENDIX B CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANE Instead of looking at individual loads and load path's, the worst load combination in terms of weight or size was aU.owed to drop anywhere within the crane travel (with one exception, noted below),

in any orientation, and assumed that the load is stopped by the lowest level.

The load used is a missile shield (29 ft. long x 10 ft. wide x 4 ft. deep, weight of 87 Tone).

Based on the guidelines provided in NUREG-0612 Section 2.1-1, we have made the assumption that the load would penetrate to the lowest level, not.taking into account the stopping power of the massive concrete structures, because we have not performed detailed structural analyses of the load drop.

The discussion presented below is the result of this conservative assumption.

The only area excluded from the drop analysis was the reactor

vessel, already discussed in Section 2.3 of AEP:NRC:0514A, dated August 27, 1982.

The criteria applicable to this analysis are to maintain cooling to the irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and to assure that containment isolation capability is unimpaired.

No other considerations are pertinent since the crane is only in use with the reactor shut down.

With respect to the first criterion it should always be possible to maintain cooling to the fuel, since a

load drop would eever a

maximum of two loops, under the conservative assumption stated

below, In severing any loop(s) the following sequence of events would happen:

1)

Reactor coolant lines(s) is (are) severed.

2)

Water starts draining from the refueling canal (if the canal had been filled) or the primary system through the broken legs.

3)

Suction is lost from the RHR return line (if not severed in the load drop).

4)

The containment recirculation sump starts to fill(load handling procedures plus the physical design of the steam generators enclosures make damage to the sump an incredible event).

5)

RHR suction'is taken from the containment sump+

6)

RHR discharge to the intact loops is initiated.

Therefore, we feel that under any realistic set of assumptions, cooling to the irradiated fuel can be maintained even after a load drop takes place.,

A load drop will not prevent'he containment isolation system from operating on a high radiation signal, since the initiating signals and the sampling ports are outside the crane wall area.

Due to the compactness'f the containment it. is not possible to devise a load path that would prevent heavy loads from traveling over safety-related equipment.

However, even with a load drop it is possible to maintain cooling to the irradiated fuel and maintain the capability of isolating the 'containment.

Furthermore,, with the crane operator

training, crane maintenance and procedures now in place or coming into effect (See letters Nos.

AEP:NRC:0514A, dated August 27, 1982; AEP:NRC:051'4C, dated June 18, 1982; and AEP:NRC:0514E, dated September 29, 1982) the probability that a

crane load drop would happen has been made very small.

10 A'EP:NRC:0514F

'APPENDIX C

" 'ESSENTIAL'SERVICE 'WATER 'SYSTEM In evaluating load drops on the Essential Service Water System it is only necessary to consider the area between the Circulating Water Pump and Screen House and the Essential Service Water Piping Tunnel.

It is not necessary to go beyond the tunnel, since from this point on, piping goes to individual systems and any load drop that would damage the ESW piping would probably also damage the system the piping is supplying water to.

Drawing 12-5166,

attached, shows the routing of the ESW piping and cabling.

For the most part, this piping and cabling is embedded in the foundation mat.

However, in some places, while still embedded, there are open spaces (rooms and/or channels) below the embedment.

Because of it, Drawing,12-5166 also shows those cranes and hoists whose operating area is above these open areas.

The numbering of these areas correspond to the numbering given in Table A of this submittal and in Tables 1 and 2 of AEP:NRC:0514E, dated September 29, 1982.

Number 3 is the Circulating Water Pump and Screen House Crane.

The supply piping and pumps are located inside the ESW pump zoom.

This room is designed to take the impact of the crane with a 30T load, thus no damage is expected to this equipment:

(see AEP:NRC:0514E).

However, cabling used for the operation of the pumps extends outside the ESW pump room on, the north, south and west sides.

Since all cabling necessary for the emergency operation of the Unit 1 pumps is on the north side of the ESW pump room and all cabling necessary for emergency operation of the Unit 2

pumps is on the south side, no single load drop can disable all four pumps.

Since there is a cross-tie header in the ESW piping tunnel, two operating ESW pumps are sufficient to supply the shutdown needs of both

units, No cabling on the west side of the ESW pump room is needed for emergency operation.

The cables routed to the north and south ends of the Screen House (the routing goes into the hoisting area of the 1T and 5T.Trash Basket Hoists Numbers 28 and 39) provide'ower to the sluice gate motors.

These sluice gates are opened in case the intake piping becomes blocked.

One sluice gate is more then sufficient to supply water for the ESW pumps.

Therefore, a load drop could not disable water supply to the ESW pump.

Number 12 corresponds to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Hoists.

A load drop analysis was-performed for the heaviest loads at the maximum possible height.

The results show that neither the piping nor the cabling would be damaged.

Numbers 13 and 14 correspond

'to the Main and Auxiliary Turbine Building Cranes respectively.

The. areas.shown are located. over the intake channel for each. Unit's condenser.

The'mbedded cabling transversing these areas carries the ESW pump motor power for the respective Unit.

Since only two of the four ESW pumps are needed, the loss of one set of power cables does not impair safe shutdown of either Unit.

The ESW discharge lines are 30 inches in diameter, and there is only one line per Unit.

These

lines, while embedded in the foundation mat, have in each unit an approximate 20 foot span over the intake channels.

Since the mid<<channel wall is under each

line, each of these spans is actually two smaller spans of approximately 10 feet each.

In order to make one of the ESW discharge lines inoperable, the line must become crimped and blocked.

If it is only cracked, sufficient water can still flow through the line, and the ESW pumps would be operable.

If-a heavy load was dropped in either of these areas it would have to break through the HP Turbine

casing, and the HP Turbine reinforced concrete pedestal.

It would then have to cause sufficient damage to the foundation mat so as to cause the line to crimp (the line is embedded beneath 3 ft of fillconcrete and at least 4 ft of reinforced concrete). It is our Judgement that most of the the, dropped load's energy would be expended breaking through the HP Turbine casing and. pedestal and that the foundation mat would at most crack.

Therefore, the maximum damage that might

happen, taking all the above into account, is the. cracking of the line.

Numbers 41 and 43 are the Moisture Separator Reheater Hoists and Number 42 is the Transformer, Battery Pack and U.P.S. Hoist.

The effects of loads dropped from these hoists are enveloped by load drop analyses done on other hoists (see Appendix D).

The result of this evaluation is that no damage is expected due to load drops from these hoists.

In conclusion, although parts of the Essential Service Water System might become damaged in a load drop, a sufficient portion of the system would remain operable to safely shutdown both units.

12

'APPENDIX D

'MAINTENANCE'CRANES 'AND 'HOISTS

'he maintenance cranes and hoists (Numbers 4 through 12 on Table A) are dedicated for maintenance work on one or two components.

Therefore, in general, a load drop from one of these cranes or hoists will only damage the piece of equipment being worked on.

Since'the damaged piece of equipment is already out of service, the status of the system remains unchanged (see our discussion in AEP:NRC:0514E, dated September 29, 1982).

Numbers 4,

8, 9,

and ll (the Diesel Generator

Crane, the Containment Spray Pump Hoist, the Residual Heat Removal Pump Hoist, and the Recirculation Valve

Hoist, xespectively) are on the respective lowest elevation of the plant.

Therefore, a load drop cannot damage any other equipment.

Numbers 5, 6, 7, and 12 (the Reciprocating Charging Pump Hoist, the Centrifugal Charging Pump Hoist, the Safety In]ection Pump Hoist, and the Auxiliary Peedwater Pump Hoist, respectively) were analyzed for load drops.

The analyses were performed for the heaviest loads at the maximum heights.

The results show that the floors would absorb the effects of the load drop.

Therefore, no other equipment wQ.1 be damaged.

Number 10 (the Main Steam Valve Hoist) is used only during reactor shutdown.

A load drop from this hoist could only damage the Main Steam and Peedwater Piping underneath it.

Since the reactor is

-already shutdown, this piping is not needed.

In conclusion, a load drop from any of the cranes and hoists listed here willnot change the safety status of the plant.

rt

s I

~s I

s's TAO'>>1>>)>>C>>1 r IR Or IIFAVY AO>>

AKPINCIII051IIC I

IACA I'.

ss A a A>>a

Oioa, Caa<<C FIIC << IIsst L Sr c<<r fvcL llassoc bassa Caa<<c Loaoe lla<<occo Orch (0) ow o<<I.T Arrnowlnavc PnoxtsslrV (P) vo

'IICI ~ ss S

$rC<<V FVCI.

fhcqvcwor IIA<<OLco Ltrtlwo Ocvtcc

.LIART

.Dtssa I

A I~

Src<<r Ives. S<<trrt<<o Case A

2 R DIA'IIDN pssatcottaw SwlcLDO A

5>>

tssssa4IArco ss'cclncss ssstrrlsl ~ cAsc A

ts PLA I Kovst tsc<<t (c 4 ~

~ vssro tsavoss ~

VAL>>CS ~

ISCAS Cac<<a<< ~ CSSO)

(P)

(P)

(P)

(P) 110 TO<>(2 tlwlvo) he nsqvlnco roh noolr ion~

Slow on IICrLACCncwr (FVVVAC)

( Is.

SCIfsti 5 I

SLINO ~

. SLI<<44 (I'vrvac)

'12 tlIP 50it 001>>0 12 t'IIP SP~

'IZ tIIp 5fclv,cot,o'8 fltC 6>>

arc<<r fucL A ~ IctsoLT A

P>>

Cnawc Loao Ocqcw A t FlIC 8>>

Nest fvcL AossnaLT A

9 Svrtnetaucrvac IICV t Src<<t fucL tlawol.l<<o Cna<<c (0) s

{p)

(r)

(P) 5, ttcv fvca. $<<lrrlwo cewtatwchs vITN heecnsLY (P) 1-1/2 Taws 18/~E/18900>>

II 25T 50/rca<<

100 150 rest IscrvcLINO lNISOIIAL ro chanc 25 Tone Arraox crew'r 18 tlDNT<<o>>

1850//1890/

100-150 rch IscrlscLINO, SLIIIOO tta<<DLI<<e TooL Csassc Rory lla<<OLIN~ T44L SLIH~ ~

VZ tlIP ICI.CI FOr.crit lZ lllP lscLIO fOF OM 12 tvI L050 for.008.

~

12 tvl le~ fOr.011 12 tlIP LO Ct FGF,KA l<<sr<<verso<<ODD<<

PI Ossle<<t I >>ate ~ t<<c ~

h 10, fqvlrnl<<t llavoss tl5 Tqwo A~ ncqvtnco ovhtwo hcrucLI<<4 SLINOO 12 t1IP pal OOI 0)2 h.

11 ~

Rcaetsh CooLA<<t Pssssr Rovatlss ~ Asst<<SLV 'P) 28 TQ NO A~ Acqvtnco ovhlwo

~IAINICHANCC SLI<<~ 4 12 tlIP 50? 'I,OOI Og A

1Z>>

Rcacton Csoca<<t Pvnr tbtoh (P) 58 TON ~

hs wcqusncb ovhiwe ts>>INISIIANCC SLI<>

LSA Itastc Ooacs (P) 2 TDH~

A 14>>

MASSC CosstalssCII tICSAL Ossl (p}

Ta<<o A

15>>

CLvoaL Taws(

(p)

TDNO

'NIT Na 1 18 Ol>> V<<lT lla>> 2 1890I A

16 RCAotoa Syvo.RAON (1) prvos/has<<)

(P)

'I-5 Tone I

IISAYT LOAD~ AAC DCrlssCO A~

ASIT Loaot

~ AASSICO ISI * ~ Irtw AACA ArtCN A rLAHT ~ CosnC ~ OrCWATIOHAL'I THAT v<<c cossol<<co vst ~Isror A ~ I<<OLc ss'c<<T rvcL A ~ actssLY AND ~ To A~ 44 ~ IAvco IIAIIDLI<<e 100'oh

'vsse

~I'telrl~

r5P/r ca<<

5P/rcah 12/vc*h L/tea<<

vclewo noae Tssaw rLAHT IN qVCOTI4N SLI<<ao SLIII~ 4

~ SLI<<4 ~

SLI<<ao 12 tlIP 5>>0ZI OOI OQ 12 tllp 5021 001 OQ 12 tlIP 5021 001,04

'lZ tllP 502'I COI OQ

>>'7

r ES N "L-C D, ', ~

R r

o

~J AE

~n.tjc' I

Ga F

SIINAI OE REKZZDR..

ONYPiJNtitENT ~

MAIN SttAIA OIM o

R W*

I 5TCAM GENERATOR

(+)

I I

I I

I IIIO I

I

~F I

PRIMA WAIT~

~Sie2 I

TANK 75ASSE I I

5 UMIT

, SSLSOI 'll

'R L

ISOTOHitZOTON S9-805 CNOIATS I I

75I3IE SCENETQR CONTAIMMENT LLNITHTF2 ST)

~evnnsot ptrneao Martlet 0'AIN STEAM ENCLOSVRC, L

ROOF KLXTLCI44'~

S'H'RIEIIART

~R SIISUGE I

ON TORA E TANK AUX.BUlLDtNG CRAPPIE LOAD cARRYING/pe r- =

SAFE DROP I>. ZONE 2

UHsA,F E DROP ZONE KEY PLAN

~

.I

.I J

Cg~TOR ON~AIMIAKNTO REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK OIIMP RKIAOVAI NATCH; (I)

SVIAI'LCR I

'ES IIATCIII I

IL j /

SCENT SUILlAX1.

SCRTIC'C SROatj FICE Crr R~EFUEllM WATE~TORAGE TANK 765 KV TAKEOFF TOWERCII3)

RCACIOIL HCAOLATOCnrn SPACE CONTROI

'IOO OFAIIFK MISSILE SHIELD MANIPULATO CRANE CCNTAIIOCENT PORC,E SUPPLY UNITS Herc>>

(Ttrl HOT HACH INC SHOP

~Or

~TOP CF EEO ROOF 'ELEGY. CC4L0'

~/-

+

PECTRICA~" P!

ROOF EEEf. 637-'6', /

//r.-

55 0 ROOF GEY aa'-if PCNEIRASESI NR RLCIIVIRS ONWFCOCNI CIXLSre HROEIANC IAIITROR SO-TON 5 EO.ION HOOTS BA st III EI'CI tilt SIS'4'tn

~tRASON COal ION)NTCOOLSIG SOCLE ANK FREIGHT ELEVATOR ROOF ELEV CESAR'ONTROL ROCAS.

JUL CQNCIROIRNFI Deist

~ROOF ELEKGSCFKP SS'IOF 5SIOO IJ ELECTRICAL SWITHGEAR ROOF EL. 6375 6 snot POTNAIOR tlat

+,

QNEOSAI@

I LAESOALO SUPPLY AIR INTAKC LOOVCR HOUSING 0

UPPER CRANE (ISORTat)

~ W

<<~OOVT lo'ren I

C -J 1-ISEATER SAT ROOF ELIY. ESSE~ TI IOOISTURC st panATPR

~ ttNTS

~

ROOF NAlCS.

~f CCCCEIITEE gin'Ton I

ROOF YENTIIA a

f liter II LIMIT FOR SO(

UNIT

, FCRIO) 4 TON

~

Nooxs

'o S4 al al l454 AHT H TIH ILERSTAG nt 0

I TV I

t I

R8INE VNI N4L MOISTURE SCPARATOII VCR TS IAOISTURC SIPARASOR VENTS RSINE VNITNOE OI I

no AI lt V

LIMIT FOIC I 4'ION h.

S GCHERAL RCYISI C

SietIALOITIS'Oet I

COOIAAL RSTTSIOH REVISIONS

'lHO oatelel eire relelnt er TIO Antanaa occtan roeca atattct coat. av 4 lorna noe clvoooe llulIt II IH To H oaooecto

~a cora n ceno aa H otal. Oa ena toa re0

~aero eeoaeoav to OOT linea elleoef let rattle coenaT ot tw AIt Itattcs coat oa nn HT tenon ocreeonn lo ona aatnta

~Inn lon Hloeno orv anntn

'lect leerl t

jNoolcs~

nicer rter~ OAaet 4

4 WIT Stet tear It cont a

I

]

~

RooF PATCRs

~

~U INOIAHA4 MICHIGANELECINIC CCA DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT SIOONAN HCNNAN PLANT ARRANGEMENT REACTOR BUILDING I9 MAIN-FLOOR ELEV 550I I

~

ISS tt Oe Ls'OIO

~LOT OOV't 4

4

~ OC4 tt' tsoca OS4' 4

~

I 4

5 S

1 G

5 4

5 2

IA tl'0 INL HSA IR-5170-3 BEEE'A+ROIEILCCS5IRUCTNNIJCCESS ATEIQCfKECITNOINRL

~OS is r

~

I r

Ier PE.

AHOOCAN CLCCTRC FORCE MESNE 5 SROAONST

~

~

V g

ClW 0

~l I,

Cr C'

'\\

~

'e a

~

a Ca S

~

~

~ 0

'rC r t

~

~

~

~ >e ll l

r

~rl

~ Q

'C C

e a

~

~

4

~ - ~

~ B CONTAINMKNT (FL'(F(O, ~

r"'UMP PIT COMP'T.

IFI51'INER I51.0 115LANT Ba EAST WEST AXIS LINER CONTAIN f I

.ay~I CONTAINMKNT SLTFG.

SUMP PIT COMP'T.

o

~

I 84 AL

)

F OC L M KEY PLAN

'4 UNITS ESIGS +@

0 DSICC JCSG

~,

I

~-I~

~"S~

I 4

R I

I 12a 43'C

+ REACTOR~~4, CONTAINME UNIT4(

PIFEICHASE 310'-O' PIPE HASE 43'C 12'CONTAINMENT~+4 REACTOR UNIT42 EO DIP'T. HATCH(ABOV f C 40"0 31"C'!

0 CIItl

'IC PLANT ES NORTH SOUTH AXIS TC I

F50 FOR CCNY.Stt PILN ON DSGIC 5IG7,CF) 3 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS RESIDUAL NEAT REMOVAL PUMPS (~P (iP ASSKHGKR KLKVATOR CONC VCL CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMPS EVAP..COIL DRAIN TANK 8a PUMPS OW I

a~tot gN Fr)f ~

SUIIO kANIC P YANK PUMPS NIGH LCVCL SUNP TANK RCADNAY PRIMARY WATER PUMPS FENC'E RfACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANKPUMPS PIPE TUNNEL AUX. BUILDING SUIAP (BELOW)

(LA.EVAP. FEED PUMPS 8 CVCS HOLD UP TK RKCIRC. PUMPS BELOW O'ICCH CURB('tYP) q d2 ESSENTIAL SERVICE.

0 57C 0 lf WTR FCPINrt TU E

FL EL57016 0

stANNCR 0IE FAI TEARY HATER NAKE UP FUNP CACIORCOOIANY CC SUMP PUMPS 5

DMINYANEC OUNIS PIPE TUNHfl.

FREIGHT ELEVATOR OVERFLOW OLD UP TANK AREA SUMP.

s DE'ICINGTUNNEL 0

PLANOF SCREEN HOUSE fORE BAVC KCSCHARCE flUNES PLATF. EL573'3 CVCS HOLD UP'K.

PLATF. EL579'O FL.EL.5C2'0 P)

QN Sit

',M4 g

MS EssENTw SERVICE

$AfER SYsTEM Q SUPPLY IIDISCHARGE EL. 57C'-0 4

SYRAINCR AOO w

(

I~CIGCCC I '

URB lttCCAL 135+0 N(AICR PROT.

I C

+

N QAUYOIIAY (BD-SIRASItR NOP FL. EL.SCi HIGH DCMAND FIRE PROT. PUMP

"'l IN N

I CK, HIATKR DRAIN PUMPS lP ICtt 51FN'OW DEMAND FIRE tROY. IFU I

~ CN I

.8.,

COND.

C CONL

$ COND.

$ CCNDl I q'rg>>

I II I

I I.FEED Fll ra ra+

/CONDENSERl I

+CON INLO75 I

CCNCC PIT'M 4 NUO(TPS

+ TURB(NE ROOM:

MP PUMPS SI l

7-

, EI I

C. SICFOS INL'CTS F-.d i

paa 4 CCHDCNSfRSI (ABOVE)

I N r'ii I

J,I'8'IL i l.

-:; Lj(t 385C52'URBINE ROL SUMP LS Cf-5'I-.

EL50350aa Cf-IL.l~

5 DCMIN.

USTIC PUN I

I L.$

1 I.

/CONDENSER OUTLETS

-.)I I,n I

ar

<< I JV

'll TCCSN RSIAYO STRA)HERS UO5YSttll Mss IIDCCR R NUTPECCC COHDT~

Irn SVSTCM )

YK PUaTIDS OUTI.KTS TIINIIEL iICIh,SI.E Q cggESg HOIsTS 2

3 5)In Etl CONDENSER OUTUNE. (ABOVf)

EL. 5'15" 0't)

Ct DISCH. TUNNELS.

Gt~rso.scUTctcltf E)E(rlIRCTNIQlSCOCt Cttt IU OF E IGICrNEGEI RCCIICGttt CNXEIR 4'I; (L559'KF EL

.<<(c I 0

"'I) -e.')IR( l t(OR¹4.

IJ NXVTCILr FUMFS I

/

EL555'-Cr I

\\

CONOKNSCR Tilt OUTLINE (ABOVE)

EL.575' ra C ISCH. TUNNELS tt'CYIOSCICCC Ctl(

Kccr itacrIOQIslltctcist (2) 10 0 WIDENIG'Oa HIGH ROLLER GAT'E5 2857

~t DNDC OEDNION.

Ir rDOF Otaa, OCVITCOI Ctsttat NEVIOION REVISIONS Circulating Water Pump and Screen House Crane CCSCIEYTOL SCETECC.

TsetCE CCFFCNTEICCC.

Oa (WIIEN IN PLACC) 1(YFI

((TF(

FCCSCCAICD INC STOP LOGS (YIH(Ntt PCACEi I 0

IFO.OX ID)0 HIGH ROLLER ~

GATE.

gCAR CRACE (IYR)

STOP LOC15 QMIEILCIB)CO wnEYEE esocnccN

'list Naalaa % lls telstalt tt 1st ONCOKM CECCTOK TOSCO ltetxt OOOO. Das It Eaalas

~DO>> Ctesllta IlailIt N IDN 10 N IFOODDECO N INCO N assi N N tate N Nco IN tto soaae OONassoll lo aat IIDND Ntatat lls OOTNO ceeaEal 0F Ns a c 0 5ceNct cost

~Is aat NIOFNt eclvsstac 10 lass sstattc DNNN R NtsaaN OFN ONRlt 12 13

'14 28.

III 39 41

& 43 42 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Hoists Hain Turbine Building Crane Auxiliary Turbine Building Crane Trash Basket Hoists moisture Separator Reheater Hoists Transformer, Battery Pack and U.P.S Hoist

'aa CIICVCPSC UN)T NCI G.

IIISSeSN 55FIC CIST 555IOCOIVL I SCIICHDCT(SINS GC I~

UNIT NC 2 FUNP C SCR(EN HOUSE K

SHOR'E LINK INDIANA4 MICH(OAN ELECTRIC CO.

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT NUDCNAN NIOSCAN PLANT ARRANGEMENT PLAN BELOW BASEMENT D

))N(TS

( a2 DTL NO. 12-5(66-3

~rNntraC

~ s~

~

OOFS CNCEKAN CCCCYREC COTTCA SCSVKC CCNTF.

5 SNCCDSAY NCN VOCE

~ar Q

44 ~

~ 4 t'p

~ ~

I

',I 4,

1

'le i%~lg I ~ 4 4

~

~ 4 4

I

~

~

4

~

~

~

I I

II. '

'4 4

~

~

J 4

~

~

4

~

~

4

~

~"

4 4

I'

~

4 4

~

~

4

~

~

4

~

4.

4 ~ lib ~

4 0

~

~