ML17313A476

Final After Action Report, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML17313A476
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	10/26/2017
From:	US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	NRC/RGN-II
Shared Package
ML17313A40	List: ML17313A476
References
Download: ML17313A476 (63)

Text

1 Final After Action Report Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise I Exercise Date: February 22, 2017 I October 26, 2017 I

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1 Final After Action Report Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise I Exercise Date: February 22, 2017 I October 26, 2017 I

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I Uncla.s sified Radiological ~me,rgency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

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• unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness'Prograin After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Table of Contents Page I Table of Contents ..... ........................... ................... .. ... .................. ..... ...... .. ...................... ......... .. ... ..3 Executive Summary ................................................................................... .... ......... ...... ................... 5 I Section 1: Exercise Overview .... ........................................ .... ... ....... ...... ................ .......... ............... 7 1.1 Exercise Details ...... .... ......... .................. ... .................................. ...... ... ..... ............. ........ 7 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership ............ ............................. ..... ....... .......... ......... ...... 7 I 1.3 Participating Organizations ...................................... ........ ... ......... ... .......... ... .................. 8 Section 2: Exercise Design Summary .................. ........... .... .. ... ........ ........... .. ... ....... ...... ........... ..... 11 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design .............. ...... ......... .. ...................... .. ... ..... ..... ...... ... .... ..... . 11 I 2.2 2.3 Exercise Core Capabi lities and Objectives ....... ... .. ......... .. ............ ........................ .......11 Exercise Scenario ............... ..................................................... .. ...... ..... ........................ 13 Section 3: Analysis ofCapabilities ........................................................ .... ...... ........... .................. 17 I 3.1 3.2 Exercise Evaluation and Results .. ........................ ................... ...... .... ..... ......................17 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation .......... .. ............... ....... .. .... ........... ... .. .. ...... ... . 17 3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation ....... .......... .. ............ .. ...... ...... 19 I 3.3.1 State of Florida .................................. ... .... .... ....... .... .. ........... ...... ... .. ................. 19 3.3.1 .1 Florida State Emergency Operations Center .... ........ ... ................... 19 3.3 .1.2 Florida State Incident Management Team ..... ............. ................... 20 I 3.3.1.3 3.3. l.4 Florida Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control ......... 21 Florida Department 'o f Heai'th Bureau of Radiation Control ......... 22 3.3.1.5 Florida Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control ......... 24 I 3.3.2 Miami-Dade County .............. .................................. ...... ............ ..... ............ .....28 3.3.2.1 Miami-Dade County Emergency Operations Center .. ................... 28 3.3.2.2 Miami-Dade County Traffic Control .. ...... ... ............... ................... 30 I 3.3.2.3 3.3 .2.4 Miami-Dade County Waterway Warning ..... ....... .. ........... .............31 Miami-Dade County Public Schools ........ ..... ............ ........... ... ...... 32 3.3 .2.5 Miami-Dade County Congregate Care ... ....................................... 33 I 3.3.3 Monroe County ................... .... .......... ........... ............ .. ................ ...... ... ............. 34 3.3.3 . l Monroe County Emergency Operations Center. .. ... ..... .. ........... ..... 34 3.3.3.2 Monroe County Traffic Control. ...... ..... .. .. ........ .. .... .... .............. ..... 36 I 3.3.4 Joint Information Center ... ..... ...... .. .. ... .... .. ....... .. ....... ......... ........ ... ... ...... .......... 37 3.3 .5 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration .................... .................... 38 Section 4: Conclusion .................. .................. .... .. ........ ... ................................. .... ... .... ................. .41 I Appendix A : Exercise Timeline ........... .............. ..... .. ..... ........ .... ................. ...... ....... ......... ........... .43 Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders ........... .................... ....... ............................ .45 Appendix C: Florida Exercise Extent of Play Agreement.. .. .............................. ..................... .... .47 I

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I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

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I Unclassified I Radiological Emergency. Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Executive Summary I On February 22, 2107, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated a full participation plume exposure pathway exercise for the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant.

I These evaluations also include out-of-sequence activities conducted January l 0 - 13 and January 25 - 27, 2017.

I The Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant is operated by Florida Power and Light and is located in Miami-Dade County approximately 25 miles south of Miami on the shore of Biscayne Bay and 2 miles east of Homestead, F lorida. The Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant 10-mile emergency I planning zone is div ided into l 0 emergency response areas and encompasses parts of Miami -

Dade and Monroe Counties.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency's overall objective of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in coordinating and responding to an emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of this report is to analyze exercise results, I identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, identify potential areas for improvement, and support development of corrective actions.

I I This exercise was held in accordance with Federal Emergency Management Agency' s policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. FEMA evaluated this exercise using Homeland Security Exercise and I Evaluation Program methodology. The previous Federal evaluated exercise was conducted on February 25, 2015. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted February l 0, 11 and 12, 1982.

I Officials and representatives from the State of Florida, Miami-Dade and Monroe Counties, U.S.

Coast Guard, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and Florida Power & Light as I well as numerous volunteers and other organizations participated in this exercise. These organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them.

I Out of sequence activities included congregate care; school interviews, a relocation drill , and the local National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration interview for the emergency alert I system. All jurisdictions met their exercise objectives and demonstrated the corresponding Core Capabilities identified in Section 2.2 of this report. No Level 1 findings were identified during the exercise; however, the Federal Emergency Management Agency identified two level 2 findings. The first finding concerned the lack of contamination control by a radiological field I monitoring team member. The field team member was provided training during the demonstration and then demonstrated proper contamination control techniques, which resolved the finding. The second finding concerned the inability of the dose assessment specialist to I provide timely and accurate dose projections to the Bureau of Radiation Control operations officer. This finding was corrected during a May 24, 2017, drill at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power I 5 I

I U nc.lassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Plant where dose assessment staff succe,s~fully demons~rat~d .their: ability to perform I independent dose assessments.

Highlights of the exercise included effective communication and coordination between all I involved organizations resulting in a cohesive response and recovery team. I,>articipants in each organ.ization defi"!onstr~ted their i'1dividu~~re~ponsibilitie~ ,enabling successful demonstration of Core Capabilities. The demonstrated commitment of leadership in these organizations was I reflected through their staffs.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in the exercise and made it a success. The pro~t'(SS~onal .ism. and I .

I teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exeryise . .

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I lJ nclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Section 1: Exercise Overview ..

I 1.1 Exercise Details

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Exercise Name-I 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedne~s Exerc'ise

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Type of Exercise I Full Participation Exercise

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I February 22, 2017 Exercise Off-Scenario/Out-of-Sequence Dates I January 10-14 and January 23 -26, 2017 Program I U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I Mission

Response

I Scenario Type Plume-Phase Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise I 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership Walt Cushman Emergency Management Specialist I Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 I Roger Rankin Lead REP Facility Planner I Florida Division of Emergency Management 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 I

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I U nclas~ified; Radiological Emergen.c y Prep~r~dness J:'rogram I

Aft~r Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Niel Batista I Planner, Office of Emergency Management 9300 NW 41 st Street Miami , Florida 3317~ . . i ~'

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Vince Kalson Radiological Emergency Preparedne~s Administr~t~r 490 63rd Street . ' * ~ .* * . . .

I Marathon, Florida 33050 Tim Dunn

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Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control 2044 All Children ' s Way Orlando, Florida 32818

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'I Kevin O' Hare ,* 4 . : .*. r\1 . d .* '* ....

FPL Performance Improvement Manager * ,', ** ** * . , ( ,

9760 SW 344th Street Florida City, Florida 33035 I

1.3 Participating Organizations , .

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Agencies and organizations of the followingjurisdi".tions partic,ipated in the Turkey Point I

Nuclear Power Plant exercise.

State of Florida:

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• Florida Departfl},ent of Emergency M.anageruent

• Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control I

• Florida Department of Transportation

• Florida Department of Law I;:,nforceme,nt ,

• Florida Highway Patrol , I

• Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission

• Florida National Guard

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I U nciassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program*

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Risk Jurisdictions:

I Miami-Dade County Miami-Dade Office of Emergency Management

• Miami-Dade Fire Rescue I

• Miami-Dade Police Department .

Miami-Dade CorrectiOns and Rehab'ilitation **

• Miami-Dade County Public Schools Po.lice I

• Miami-Dade Health Department Miami-Dade Emergency Medical Services .. '

• Miami-Dade Public S~ ~ools .

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• Miami-Dade Parks Service Miami-Dade Public Works J l l'

• Miami-Dade Transit I

• Miami-Dade Water and Sewer

• Homestead Divisional Liaison " . '*

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• Monroe County Florida City Divisional Liaison 'f' I

• Monroe County Emergency Managem1mt

• Monroe County Sheriffs Office

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• Monroe*County"Fire Rescue*

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• Monroe County Department of Health

• Monroe County School Board

• Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority I

• Ocea~ R~ef Public s *afety 'Depart'rnent Private Organizations:

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• Florida Power and Light

• American Red Cross

• Salvation Army I

• Mariners Hospital, Key Largo

• Greater Miami Convention and Visitors Bureau I Federal Agencies:

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration I

• US Coast Guard

• US National Park Service

• Homestead Air Reserve Base I

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I tJ nclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

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I Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Prograi;n After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Section 2: Exercise Design Summary I 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design The Federal Emergency Management Agency administers the Radiological Emergency I Preparedness Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations parts 350, 351, 352, 353 and 354. Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations part 350 codifies sixteen planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency I response planning for state, tribal, and local governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations also codify the sixteen planning standards I for the licensee. Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations part 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, tribal, and local government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by the Federal Emergency Management I Agency. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities.

During these exercises, affected state, tribal, and local governments demonstrate their I abil ities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.

I The results of this exercise, together with review of the radio logical emergency response plans, and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l , along with supplements, through the annual letter of certification and staff

'I assistance visits, enabled the Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after action report to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that the affected state, tribal, and local plans and I preparedness are : (l) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.

I The State of Florida formally subm itted the Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, I Region IV on August 26, 1983. The Federal Emergency Management Agency approved the plans pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations 350 on February 15, 1984. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on February 10, I I and 12, I 1982.

2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives I Core Capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items.

I Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology, the exercise objectives meet the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I *11 I

I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant requirements and encompass the emergency preparedness.evaluation areas. , I The critical tasks to be demonstrated were negotiated with the State of Florida and the Counties of Miami-Dad~ and Monroe .. The Cor~ Capabilities demonstrated during this

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I exercise were:

Operational Coordination: !Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated I operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of Core Capabilities.

Situation~I* Assessm~nt: Pro~ide 'all decis io~ , maker; wi.th decision-relevant information I

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Public Information and Warning: Deliver coordinated, prompt; ret'iable, and I

actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to *effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken I

and the assistance being made avaifable.  :* ' '

Environmental Response/Health and Safety: Ensure the availability of guidance and I

resources to address all hazards including hazardous* materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of'the responder operation.s' and 'the affected communities. I On Scene Security, Protection a nd Law Enforcement: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security' and protection operations for people and communities located within the affected areas and also for response personnel I

performing lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Critical Transportati0n: Provide transportation (i'ncluding* infrastructure access and I

accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel , .

equipment, and services into the affected areas.

I Mass Care: Provide life-sustaining services to the affected population with a focus on hydration, feeding, and sheltering to those who have the most need, as* well as support for I

reunifying families.

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These Core Capabilities, when successfully demonstrated meet the exercise objectives.

I The objectives for this exercise *were as follows: *

Objective l: 'Demonstrate the abilitito provide direction and control through the I

counties' and state erriergency operations centers providing protective action decision-making for state and county emergency workers and the public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.

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I Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decisions affecting state and county emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans I and procedures.

Objective 3: Dem~*nstrate the ability to imple~ent p~otective actions for state and county emergency workers and public through exercise demonstration. ' * '

I Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt alert and notificahon system utilizing the primary notification system and the emergency alert system through*exercise play.

I ,I I Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies, and procedures in,t,hejoint information center for public and private sector emergency.. in~orf1:1atio~ 'commu.nications.

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Objective 6: Demonstrate the ability to provide dose projection and protective action decision maki_ng for. .the plume phase. , ""

I 2.3 Exercise Scenario

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The following is a brief summary of the sc~natio qyveloped by Florida Pow\:!r and Light I to drive exercise play.

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, I The exercise began at 0800. It is a normal \l\f,e,ekday, ,morning, schools wer_e in session.

I ,Meteorologi9al conditions were wind speed lO .miles per hour, wind blowing fron;i 150 degrees, temperature was 78 degrees and atmospheric stability class of F.

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• I Unit 3 vyas operating at I 00%* power. Beginning ~ife spent fuel pool temperature is 94°F. It had been30 days since the last refueling outage.

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Unit 4 was operating at 100% power. Middle of life spent fuel pool temperature was 93 °F. It hi;ts been 245 days sjnce the last refueling outage . .

I Unit 3 radi9ch~mical analysis indicated elevated RCS activity <300 uCi /gm, but within technical specification limits.

I 0805: The control room noted elevated tailpipe t,e mperature readings t:h::tindicate a leaking U,nit 3 pressurizer safety valve.

I 0810: The Control Room crew will be alerted to increasing main turbine vibrations.

I Alarming was quickly followed by a loss of main _condenser vacuum and I subsequent turbine and reactor trip. The control room received reports from the field indicating that a turbine .failure (blades having penetrated the casing) had occurred on Unit 3 resulting in v_isible damage to the 3A and 3C moi~ture ,separator I re-heaters, main transformer, condens~te storage tank,_.a nd the turbine building.

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I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant The operating crew entered reactor trip or safety injection, then transition to reactor I trip response and stabilize the unit.

0820: Alert was declared, the emergency response organization will be activated and proceed to their respective emergency response facilities I

0910: Reactor coolant system activity began to increase following the reactor trip due to thermal shock to the leaking fuel assemblies such that it climbs above 300 I

uCi/gm as indicated by 2.5 RJhr on R-3-20. The operating crew entered excessive reactor coolant system activity. I 0915: A loss ofreactor coolant greater than maxim4m charging with letdown isolated occurs due to the pressurizer safety valve opening as a result of the pressure transient caused by the reactor trip, and not re-seating.

I 0923: Site Area Emergency Declared: Loss or potential loss of any two b(';lrriers.* *., -i r ' *

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.. . '. :t' 1000: The utility initiated owner controlled a{'.e,a,evacuation.

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I The control room received information from the field that oil leaking from the Unit 3 main transformer .has caught fire . . The transfor-mer deluge system does not actuate. The operating crew alerted the fire brigade to respond to the scene of the I

fire . The fire brigade was successful in extinguishing the fire within 20 minutes of arrival on scene. I l OJ 0: Unit 3 containment wide range pressure decreases rapidly. Shortly thereafter area radiation monitors in the vicinity of the Unit 3 pipe & valve room as well as the plant vent radiation monitors readings indicate increasing activity.

I 1023: General Emergency Declared: Loss of any two barriers and loss or potential loss of the third barrier.

I l 040: Due to the General Emergency, protective action recommendations based on plant conditions and/or offsite dose projections, was recommended to the risk-I counties and state. Sectors affected are Q, R, and A.

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I Unclassified I Radio logical Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I The plant condition based protective action recommendations should be:

I Miles 0 -2 Evacuation Sectors All Shelter Sectors None .,

Monitor & Prepare

~ectors None I 2-5 5 ~ 10 QRA None Non e None

• A ll Remaining A ll

I I 1'he Dose Based PA Rs should be:

Miles Evacuation Shelter Mon itor & Prepare

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Sectors. Sectoi;s Sector s 0-2 ' All

• None ' None , .*

2-5 QR A . None ., ' All Remaining * . .,

I 5- 10 No ne None A ll 1140: Dose rates at the door of the Unit 3 pipe and valve room are lR/hr. ' Dose

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I rates allowed entry into the room using emergency dose extension guidance however, due to the nature of the

• penetration fai-lure; it was not"be possible to terminate the release prior to the end of the drill.

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The exercise was be terminated once the object ives in each organization were met.

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I P nclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report , 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

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I lJ nclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities I 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and I functional entities that participated in the February 22, 2017 plume-exposure-pathway exercise and out-of-sequence activities of January 10 - 13 and January 23 - 26, 2017.

I Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on the demonstration of Core Capabilities, capability targets and critical tasks and the underlying radiological emergency preparedness criteria as delineated in the Federal Emergency Management I Agency Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual dated January 2016.

Exercise criteria are listed by number, and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:

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• M: Met (no unresolved level I or level 2 findings assessed and no unresolved findings from prior exercises)

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• 1: Level I finding assessed 2: Level 2 finding assessed or an unresolved level 2 finding(s) from a prior exercise

• P: Plan issue I

• N: Not demonstrated 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation I The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program evaluation methodology is an analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an I exercise. A capability provides a means to perform one or more critical tasks under specified conditions and to specific performance standards. Core Capabilities form the foundation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV Radiological I Emergency Preparedness Program evaluations. The Core Capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific Core Capability. Each I jurisdiction's standalone capability summaries are listed in Section 3.3 of this report.

Operational Coordination: Key leadership personnel from the participating agencies I established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure, which provided effective and coordinated direction and control. The overall decision-making process integrated critical stakeholders, enabling protective action discussions and I subsequent decisions to be made in a reasonable and timely manner.

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I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Situational Assessment: Florida State dose assessment personnel assessed radiological I and plant conditions to prepare decision-relevant information for the decision makers.

However the Bureau of Radiation Control dose assessment specialists did not provide the operations officer with ti mel y and accurate dose projections, therefore Bureau of

• I Radiation Control personnel did not demonstrate the abili ty to independently assess the radiological emergency The emergency response coordinator (Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control) effectively discussed the rad iological release and the recommendations for protective actions with the county decision makers at the I

emergency operations faci lity. The decision makers made**appropriate decisi ons based on the information they were provided. The Bureau of Radiation Control demonstrated their ability to provide timely and accurate dose projections during a May 24, 2107 ddl'l at the I

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant.

Public Information and Warning: Alert and notification of the public was made using I

simulated siren activation, emergency alert system messag s, route alerting and reverse calling software. This was followed by supplemental media releases and formal media briefings .in the joint information 'center. Thr ugh these processes, public information I

staff prepared and deli vered coordinated, prompt, and ret;able information and instructions to the public and media. I Environmental Response/Health and Safety: Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control provided appropriate staff and resources to suppott the response. They demonstrated the positioning and management of field monitoring teams and provided I

appropriate instructions for emergency worker exposure control. The field team members demonstrated proficiency in us ing monitoring equipment and exposure control equipment.

• One team did not demonstrate proper contamination control procedures. The I

individual received training by the controller and was subsequently able to demonstrate proper contamination control techniques. Field team members also demonstrated their ability to safely exit the potentially contaminated area.

I On Scene Security, Protection *and Law Enforcement: The Miami-Dade County Public School Police Department successfully demonstrated their ability to establish I

traffic control potnts to ensure a safe and secure environment for students, parents and residents of Miami-Dade County as it relates to an incident at Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. An.incident command post was established to manage officers manning I

traffic control points located around relocating public schools inside the planning zone and their paired relocation school outside the planning zone . . The exercise also demonstrated escorting of busses to *the paired schools.

I Critical Transportation: Miami-Dade County emergency management officials successfully demonstrated the capability to safeguard students and faculty i'n the event of I

an emergency during a series of separate interviews with 22 schools in the Miami-Dade County Public Schools the week of. l 0 January 2017. *The schools' leadership was consistent in their high levels of knowledge and preparedness in implementing I

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I Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant emergency evacuation procedures as they relate to, an incident at Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. . ,, . .

J'l' Mass Care; EmergeJlCY workei:s; from Miami-Dade County, and :volunteers from the American Re.d Cross demonstrated .the ability to ptQ;Vide services and accommodations I *for evacuees during out-of~sequence activities .. :These activities included registration, feeding, housing, and '.c are ofevacuees at Tamiami Park: ' **

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I 3.3 3.3.l l*

Jurisdictional Summary.Results' of.Exercise Evaluation State of Florida I *'I

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• 3.3.1.1 Florida State Emergency Operations Center

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Operational Ceordinati,on *Capability Summa*ry:

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The capability *ofOperational Coordination was* denionstrated bY'*personneL ;with the Florida Division o£Ernergency Management.*:~T.h~ State. Watch Office received I notification of an emergency from the Turkey Point nuclear1power plant, vecified information contained in the notification messages, and alerted appropriate state, local ,

and federal agencies via a designated :computer comnrnnication*program. During the I exercise.communications .operat0rs transmitted notification and activation messages to the State Emergency Supp0rt Function (ESF~ personnel. *.

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All communications ~ystems . were operational. Communication links were promptly established and maintained with affected jurisdictions.* Florida Division of Emergency Management staff communicated internally and externally via telephone, cell phone, I etnail and EM Constellation that is utilized to communicate with each of the*ESF ' s and the counties for resource requests; I The .State Emergency Operations Center had* sufficient equipment, maps and displays to

• support.emergency operations, .t heir Geographic Information Systems personnel provided weather maps and poss.ible ph1me m(i).dels based on wind speed and .directions.

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The State Emergency.Response Team Chief on 1behalf of the State Emergency

, Management Director and the Governor provided direction and control of the State I Emergency Operations _Ceflter. Additionally, the chief provided direction and control of the Incident Management Team which was deployed to: the utility's Emergency Operations Facility.

I The chief provided operational objectives for .the emergency, with the Operation Chief ensuring that the emergency support functions provided the necessary coordination and I support between the state, local and federal response agencies.

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I U ncJassifi~d Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Multiple operational and situation briefings were condtJ~teq at the State Emergency I Operations Center, as well as conference calls,with the Incident Management Team Incident Commal)der during the exercise. Tb.~. In<;ident Comm~Qder kept the Statt~

Emergency Response Team .Chief,inforJlled at all times.of the. Protective Action I Recommendations from the utility and Protective Ac~ion Deci~ ions from the Risk Counties. The Chief also discussed all resource, reqµ es.ts. fro.!TI Sta,te agencies and local Emergency Operations Centers with the Operation C,hi ~f m'l!<ing sure a,11 the requ.~sts were coordinated, supported and met.

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For !his capagil ity, the followj.n g Radiological. ~mergency Preparedness criteri ~ w.ere MET: J.a. l , 1'.c.1 ~ . l.d.l , . 1. e.1, 2.b.2.

I I

I \

a. Lev.~11 Fin~ing: None

. * ** i .

b. . Level 2 Fin.ding: None

c. Not :PeDJonstrated: N,ol)e I '

) I \ * ,

I, I

j *'¥

d. Prior Level 2 Findings '""" Resolved: None

\

. t;

, I

e. Prior LevE:l 2 Findings-:- Unresolved: None 3.3.1.2 Florida State Incident Management Team

I Operational Coordination Capability Summary: I The Florida State Emergency Response Team , Incident Management Team staff successfully demonstrated operational coordination. The team relocated* to the area of operations and established a coordination structure to provide support to the responding I

communities' unmet needs. Oversite protoc9ls.were established to ensure a coordinated response between local communities to meet changing public safety requirements.

Timely updates provided situational aware11ess to the State of Florida Emergency .

I Response Team. The staff demonstrated exceptional emergency management knowledge throughout the exercise. . ., .. ,. I Upon arrival of the Incident Management Team at the,Turkey Point N clear -eower Plant Emergency Operations Facility they immediately began setting up operations. The facility provided ~deqµate. s.p~ce. and util,itie~., ,.The)JJ Sj dent Management Te~m came as a I

fully functioning unit with individual specialist in planning, operations, logistics, geographic inf<;>.rmation,

. . public informa,tion, .in(o;rinat}qµ. technQlogy, supervisory

.ma~agement apd all equ,ipment.an,d expendables ,needed .. They were fully operational I

within 35.minutes.

I 20 I

I

I U ndassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report

• 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I The primary method of communication between Turkey Point Nuclear Power Pfant and the State of Florida Warning Point is the Hot Ring-Down Line. Secondary methods of I communication in case of failure are commercial landline o'r the EMnet system.

Management of information b'etween the *Incident Management Team and the County Emergency Management Representatives was accomplished using a teleconferencing I bridge in the Emergency Operation Facility.

• All communications systems operated normally without fail ure duri'ng the exercise. ' '

• I The Incident Management Team deployed under the leadership of a senior State Emergency Response Team--'l'nanager. When the teain was onsite and'deCJared they were fully operational the State of Florida conducted a trahsfer of power from the State I Emergency Response Chief to the lncident Management Team Leader who was then designated as the Incident Commander. The Incident Coinmand er~ was also the Governor' s Authorized Representative. The Incident Commander maintained excellent I direction, control and coordination of the incident response. Corfrmurticationi between the Incident Commander and the local community officials was continuous. Regular briefings were provided to the State Emergency Response Team in' orde;r to keep them I situationally aware. The Incident Commander attended all protective action decision meetings and concurred on all protective *adi6 rt 'deCi'sions  : ,.

I I

1 For this capability, the following Rad161oglc~J *Emergency Preparedness crite'ria were MET: I.a.I , l.c.1, l.d .l , l.e.1 , 2.a.l , 2.b.2.

i. f '* .

I a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None'

I; I 3.3.1.3 Florida Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control Incident Management-bf Field Teams ' ,

I ,* ' '

~

• I Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:

I Florida Department of Health, Bi:lreau of Radiation Control personnel located at the Emergency Operations Facility successfully dernonstrated the ability to m'a nage field teams to locate and characterize the radiological plume. The field team directors I communicated with the teams using 800-megahertz radios. Monitoring data was relayed from the teams by radio and also by using a radiological data tracking application. The I 21 I

I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant directors providecl clear instructions to the field teams, deploying them to appropriate I locations downwind from the plant. They also kept the teams informed of changes in emergency classification levels and plant conditions. The field team directors and operations officer noted early in the event that the Mobile Emergency Radio logical I Laboratory was' staged directly downwind from the plant and instructed the supervisor to move the laboratory to an alternate location.

• , .. I For this *capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a.l , 1.d.1, 2.a.1 , 4.a.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None i. * .

r.

I b; Leve1*2 Finding:. None

./'. ' >I I .

I

c. Not.Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings -Resolved: None r

. ' I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I  !

I 3.3.1.4 Florida Department of Health Bureau of Radiation Control Field Teams I

Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summar.y: I Florida Department of Health personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to obtain field data and samples to support*dose assessment and protective action recommendations

• in support of the responder operations and the affected communities. Three field teams I

were deployed with one for trainfng onlY: The teams were successfully deployed to predetermined sampling locatfons; *,At these locations; the teams defnonstfated how to:

take field radiation measurements, air samples, survey for contamination, log sample I

identifications, and track personal *exposure.  :

The teams were prepositioned at the Princeton substation, this included; .two Fiel<;i I

Operations Specialists pe*r team, th{ Mobile Emergency Radiologi.2al 'Laboratory'and support personnel, Sample Preparation Specialists, Contamination Control Specialists, a Field Team Supervisor, and MERL Supervisor. Only the two field team's and * *:

I contamination control activities were evaluated during this exercise. Although all other activities were conducted for training only, they 'setup a:11 equipment and support supplies necessary to operate a proper sample collection and analysis station.

I

'\ " . '

I 22 I

I

I Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I All survey equipment were within calibration and successfully operationally checked.

Sample kits contained necessary supplies for supporting operations. Each team had 11 I

multiple comrnunicafion methods and all were operational.

The Field Team Supervisor conducted a pre-deployment briefing and reviewed I radiological and occupational safety precautions and activities . Once the fie ld teams were instructed to deploy he insured they had all of their equipment and supplies. The field team members were knowledgeable of exposure limits, contamination limits, and I exposure reporting requirements. *

• Once deployed the teams properly demonstrated how to take radiation surveys, I contamination surveys, and how to obtain an air sample. While taking radiation readings and air samples the team members also had to demonstrate proper contamination control techniques. One team did not demonstrate proper contamination control techniques.

I Once they received on the job training they demonstrated appropriate contamination control techniques, thereby resolving the issue.

I For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a.1 , l .d.1, l.e.l , 3.a.l, 4.a.3. . ..~ \

• I a. Level 1 Finding:* None .. ' ~

b. Level 2 Finding: 66-l 7-4.a.3-L2-01.

I Criterion: 4.a.3 ,

Condition: Durir'].g the sampl,ing pr~cess the fiel~ management team member did not I .change gloves during the entire process. The member stepped into the van twice to place

, and remove the air sampler from the top of the ve.hicle wearing full personal protective equipment. The member also reached into the equipment kit to retrieve sample bags and I tape without changing gloves. At this time, the evaluator stopped the event and briefed the controller on the issues. The controller then coached and retrain~d the field management team member. The member then successfuilY. demonstrated th~ ability to I properly implement contamination control procedures.

Pos~ibie Cause:

• Not . following

. contamination controls and procedures.

I Reference.:

I 1.

2.

. I.

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REJ,>- l , C.. l ;.H. l'.?: 1.8, 9; ~.10 . a DRH SOP 8 Tra~*sfer and Prepa~ation of Sa,mples

3. DRH SOP 6 Field Operations

• I 4. FEMA Region IV REP Exercise Evaluation Guide critical Task 1.5 I 23 I

I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Effect: Due to the lack of contamination control, the equipment box and the vehicle I would have become contaminated. Sample integrity could also have been affected.

Recommendations:

';_;. ' I

l. Set up a lay down area with plastic to control the contamination area.

2. Place the air sampler on the hood of the car therefore they would not have to step up into the vehicle to place the sampler on the -roof.

I

3. Utilize your meter to control contamination by frisking items, equipment, and personnel more often.

4. Review and follow procedures prior to performing activity.*

• I Resolution: After the evaluation was paused, the controller coached and retrained the field management team member. After receiving the training, the member successfully I

demonstrated the entire process of obtaining an air sample and showed good' contamination control when handling the sample by changing gloves throughout the process. The member also utilized good~ ~ontaminat.ion control' entering and exiting the I

vehicle by removing booties and: gloyes prior to entering*the v ehide. All items and areas of the vehicle were frisked after the 'sampling process was complete ~ I

c. Not Demonstrated: Nbne

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None '

I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I 3.3.1.5 Florida Dep*;1rtment of Health Bureau of Radiation Control Dose Assessment I

Situational Assessment Capability Summary: I Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control personnel located at the Emergency Operations Facility demonstrated the ability to make appropriate protective action recommendations and participate in the decision-making process in response to a I

radiological incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. They did not successfully demonstrate their ability to independently assess radiological: and plant conditions .

I The Bureau of Radiation Control operations officer-provided overall direction for the Bureau of Radiation Control response to the emergency at the Turkey Point N uclear Power Plant. He participated in briefings led by utility personnel for state and local I

decision makers, challenging incorrect statements made by utility personnel and ensuring adequate information was provided by the utility. The operations offi cer made appropriate protective action recommendations to county decision makers and I

24 I

I

I Unclassified I After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I appropriate decisions on the administration of potassium iodide for emergency workers and the public. Bureau of Radiation Control dose assessment specialists did not provide I the operations officer with timely and accurate dose projections. Other Bureau of Radiation Control personnel ensured field teams were appropriately deployed, monitored discussion of plant conditions, and kept Bureau of Radiation Control personnel in other I locations updated on current.conditions.

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were I NOT MET: 2.b.1. .

a. Level 1 Finding: None .

I/

I ,

I b. Level 2.Finding: 66-l 7-2.b. l-L2-.02 I Criterion: 2.b.1 Condition: The Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control dose assessment specialists did not provide*their operations officer with timely and accurate I dose projections. The operations officer therefore had to rely only on utility dose projections when making protective action recommendations regarding evacuations and decisions regarding the administration of potassium iodide.

I Bureau of Radiation Control staff arrived at tl:;ie Emergency Operations Facility at 0935.

The dose assessment specialists prepared a computer to run RASCAL 4.3 and began I entering data such as meteorological conditions.

• The utility recover,y manager announced at I 026 that the plant was about to go to general emergency. The operations officer directed the dose assessment specialists to get a source term (radiological release rates)

I from the utility dose assessors. The dose assessment specialists had not yet completed a dose projection based on plant conditions at that time. They had gotten an error earlier while trying to perform a calculation and stated they were starting the RASCAL run from I scratch.

The operations officer attended a briefing at J.041 led by the utility recovery manager for I state and county decision makers. During the meeting, the utility radiation protection manager provided a :dose projection showing protective action guides for total.effective dose equivalent and committed dose equivalent to the thyroid were exceeded at two miles I from the plant. He also stated that a utility air sample two miles from the plant detected radioactive iodine concentrations that would result in four rem per hour committed dose equivalent,, The operations officer relied on the utility dose projection and air sample I analysis when concurring with the utility protective action recommendation to evacuate out to two miles in all sectors and five miles in the downwind sectors.

I I 25 I

I Unclassified After Action Repqrt Radi_ological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

Bureau of Radiation Control Standard Operating Procedure 20 states the"'use of I potassium iodide has been pre-approved by the State Surgeon General for the general pub Iic . .Based on actual releases of radioactive iodine, if the actual or projected thyroid dose from radioactive iodine is> 5 Rem the Bureau .of Radiation Control Operations Officer will authorize the distribution of potassium iodide. Counties can then implement I

their own plans for dispensing potassium iodide. " Although the utility projection (for a two-hour projected release) showed committed dose equivalent thyroid above five rem at two miles, the operations officer did not authorize potassium iodide for the public.

I According to The State of Flodda R~diological Emergency Preparedness Plan, there are no residents within two miles of the plant and six residents* in the affected downwind secto.rs withiµ .thr.ee mil~s of the plant. Those residents:wer.e ordered to evacuate.

I After the brie,ij.ng h,ad ended. One of the dose.assessment special ists presented the operations officer with a RASCAL dose projecti.on .based on cer.tain worst-case I

parameters (total containment failure and unfiltered release) . .T\le projection showed the committed dose equivalent protective action guide exceeded p(}st 15 miles and the total effective dose equivalent protective action guide exceeded past l 0 miles. They discussed I

why the~e assumptions would give* high dose proj,e~tions. Subsequent d@se projections by the utility shp\.\o'.ed decreasi,n,g dose , proj~ctions (less. than protective action* guide levels

. at 2 miles). . , . , .. .

I At 1100, the operations officer directed the dose assessment specialists to,use th,e source term from the latest utility projection to perform a RASCAL projection. Due to I

unfamiliarity with the. utility dos.e projection form , the dose assessment specialists had difficulty figuring out what sourc.e.term inputs to use. Following prompting by the evaluator, the dose assessment specialists entered the.correct values for noble gas, iodine, I

and particulate release rates.listed on the utility form. However, they entered the iodine release rate as "I-131 equivalent" rather than total iodine. They comp leted their projection at 1141. While the total effective dose equivalent projections were very close I

to the utility projections, the committed dose equivalent projections were about five times the utility projections and showed t,he committed dose equivalent protective *action guide exceeded out past 7 miles. At the prompting of the operations officer, the dose I

. assessment specialists discussed various parameters with the utility dp;;e assessors. They did not determine why the projections differed.

I The dose assessment specialists calculated one more dose projection in RASCAL, shortening the release time to 10 minutes. One ofthe ,dose asse,ssment spe<;:ialists stated (incorrectly) that since the containment pressure had initially dropped quickly to normal I

atmospheric pressure, the release must have ,onl,y lasted <;i few.minutes, At no time during the exercise did the dose assessment sp.ecialists use ,data from utility I

field team measurements to calculate a dose projection.

I 26 I

I

I Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Possible Cause: The dose assessment specialists were not knowledgeable enough about potential release pathways to properly calculate a dose ;projection based on plant I * *conditions. They also did not understand some of the inputs required to calculate a dose projection based on release rates. They were unfamiliar with the way some data was presented on the utility dose assessment form .

I

Reference:

I 1. State ofFlorida, Department of Health, Bureau *of'Radiatiori Control , "SOP 1:

Operations, October 2013 '* * * '*

2. State of Florida, Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, SOP 17: Dose I Assessment, January 2012

3. State of Florida, Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control ~ SOP 20:

Potassium Iodide for the Public, October, 2013 I 4. State of Florida Radiological Emergehcy Preparedhess Plan, August 2014

5.

• NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1 ; f.'10 ... '

~ * ' *. ! * *

• Effect: Inaccurate dose projectidns could result in inappropriate protective action I decisions. The inability of the state to produce timely and accurate 'dose* projecti'ons resulted in a reliance by decision makers on dose projections provided by the utility.

I Recommendations:

. 1. Provide additional training to dose assessment specialists 6n the use of RASCAL.

I 2. Develop an ongoing program to hold joint training and drills with the BRC dose assessment staff and the utility dose assessment staff.

• 3. Conduct more frequent health physics drills with dose assessment specialists.

I 4. Have the dose assessmen*t staff attend Reactor Plant Basic Training covering release pathways.

I Resolution: Florida De'partment of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to calculate dose projections based on plant conditions.and radiological release rates during the St Lucie Nuclear Power Plant drill on I May 24, 2017. The proper calculation of dose projections resolved finding 66-l 7-2.b. l-L2-02 from the 20 l 7 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant exercise.

I c.

• Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings -Resolved : None I e. Prior Level 2 *Findings - Unresolved: None I

I 27 I

I Unclassified After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

3.3.2 Miami-Dade County I 3.3.2.1 Miami-Dade County Emergency Operations Center I

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Miami-Dade Office of Emergency Management personnel successfully demonstrated this core capability by establishing and maintaining a coordinated operational structure in I

support of a simulated emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. The director assumed the position of incident commander with support fro.m the. Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center staff. The deputy director responded to the utility' s I

Emergency Operations Facility and served as the liaison coordinating the respons~ with the State Incident Management Team and Monroe County Liaison. Miami-Dade Plans and Operations Directors pl~yed jntegral paxts in th~ inciden,t re.sponse,

• I

.The Emergency Operations Cienter is bo4sed within .the Miamj,.Oade Fire Rescue Headquarters; The site is secure w,ith multiple levels of security ~nd was well .equipped I

with redundant commtmications sy~tems. The prjJin~ry communications between the utility and responding jurisdictions was the Hot-Ring-Down Line. *All communications systems were functional at,the ~o m,mence me.nt of the exercise and there, were no I

communications .systems failures during the exercise . .

Following the declaration of an Alert, activation and staffing of the Emergency .

I Operations Cente~ was ~ccomp l ished in .accqrdance with p,ub l i~hed plans and exercise agreements. Using a modi~eq Incident Comm~nd Structure, multiple agencies supported the response .with the operations director assuming the position as the Emergency I

Operations Center Manager, At the General En:iergency declaration, the director used a predetermined decision mode l I

to modify the utility's Protective Action ReCfOITlmendatipns. Considering relevant, factors, his Protective Action Decision orcter concurre.d with tbe evacuation recommendation w ith adding the sheJte,r in place protection for all rema ining areas.

I These decisions were coordinated with the State of Florida and Monroe County personnel. Additionally, he concurred with the decision to require county emergency workers to ingest potassium iodine. The director's actions.were public centric and in I

concurrence with his senior staff. ,

Througho~t

• • • j l the exercise, the ! Em~rgency Operatiqns Centpr.staff worked as a cohesive I

unit with the sharing of information and the di ~c ussiqn of what specific agency actions were being .taken . .T)lese engagements allowed tbe staffs to stay abreast of the overall situation throughout the exercise. The director and his staff preformed all actions I

required of them and demonstrated that they were fully capable ofresponding to an emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant.

I 28 I

I

I Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I For this capabi lity, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteri*a were MET: 1.a.l, l.c.1 , 1.d.1, 1.e.l , 2.a.l , 2.b.2, 2.c.l , 3.a.l , 3.b.l,3.c.l , 3.c.2.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None I b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated ~ None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings..,.. Resolved: None

.- l *I I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolv.e~: None * * '*I * { 0 Public Information a'n d Warning Core Capability Summary:'*

I The Miami-Dade Public Information Officets *staff successfully demonstrated this core capability by demonstrating the ability" to alert and riotify the pubiic in support of a I simulated emergency*at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant

• The primary rriethod for alerting and notify ing th'e public is through a system of fixed I sirens located throughout the I 0-mile emergency planning zone fo llowed by the broadcast of Emergency Alert System messages over local radio, television and weather radios. These emergency messages were supplemented through the dissemination of formal I press re leases, social media posts and manual alerting protocols. 'The news releases

. expanded upon the emergency messages and provided specific detailed information to the public and media. Messaging was prepared in both English and 'Spanish.

I I Prior to the activation of the Joint Information Center, the news releases were distributed

, directly to the media. Once the ceriter was activated, the news releases were forwarded to county's public information liaisons at the Joint Information Center for distribution to the I media and supporting agencies. Coord ination of the messaging and news 'release was done with the State of Florida, Monroe County and the Litility during periodic conference calls. '

• I During this exercise,. the sirens were not activated, but the public information officer fully explained the activation process. The decision to activate sirens and the EAS was made I by the Emergency Management Director in coordination with State of Florida and Monroe County Emergency Management. Simulated siren fai lures were identified by inj ect through the exercise controll'ers. Miami-Dade Police Department coordinated with I the responsible police departments to provide backup route alertin:g for the* area covered by the fai led* siren.  ; *

• I I 29 I

I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant The simulated activation of the Emergency Alert System was done outside published I protocols by faxing the selected message to the National Weather Service to process on behalf of the county. This deviation could present a delay or verification of the accuracy of the message. The county has the ability to activate the system utiliz ing the EMnet I terminal within the Emergency Operations Center and should consider utilizing its approved Integrated Public Alert and Warning System license for this activaticm.

The public inquiry function was performed by the county' s 3 } Answer .Center which I

provides the public with updated emergency information. Trends and rumors identified were primarily addressed through social media messagi11g by the public ,information officers and the sharing of accurate emergency information by the 3- 1-1 Answer Center.

I For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 5.a.l , 5.a.3, 5.b.1. * ***

I

a. Level 1 Finding: Nooe . , , .. ' 1 1 I

. b. Level 2 Finding: None .

.c.

• NotDemonstrated*: None (i . ~ .

J

• I

d. Prior.Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I

e. Prior;Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: *None

• 3.3.2.2 Miami-Dade County Traffic Control I

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Core Capability Summary: I The Miami-Dade County Public School Police Department successfully demonstrated their ability to establish traffic control points to ensure a safe.and secure environment for students, parents and residents of Miami-Dade County as it re lates to an incident at I

Turkey Point Nuclear.Power Plant: The ex,ercise was conducted 23 January. 2017 out of sequence. Miami-Dade County Public School Police Department Officers. received informative safety briefings on dos imetry, potassium iodide and radiation reporting I

protocols. Appropriate dosimetry and potassium iodide were issued *tQ all .officers involved in the exercise. A command post was established and appropriate traffic control points were established around affected schools. All officers questioned were very I

knowledgeable of their traffic control mission and of the information provided at the safety briefing. Officers were aware of how to remove impediments to evacuating traffic in the field, and how to request additional resources from their command post if it I

became necessary. Communications assets:were redundant.; No communications issues were observed.

I 30 I

I

I U rrclassified I Radiological E mergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were

• MET: 1.d.1 , 1.e.1 , 3.a*.1 , 3.d.1.

I a. Level'l Finding: None I b. *Level 2 Finding: None *

c. Not Demonstrated: None I d.

• Prior Level 2 Findings *_ Resolved: None i', fr1 ** ,

• I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 3.3.2.3 Miami-Dade County Waterway Warning I Public Information and Warning Core Capability Summary:*

• I The demonstration for alert, notification and evacuation of coastal waters around *the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant was explained by interview with representatives of the United States National Park Service, the United States Coast Guard, Florida Fish and I Wildlife Commission, and the Miami-Dade Police Department Marine Section. Each of the above agencies has a portion of the coastal waters 1O~mile emergency planning zone in their jurisdictions. The largest portion, the Biscayne National Park, is under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service, which had the lead for coordinating actions at I the Miami-Dade emergency operations center. The combined agencies had a total of eight patrol boats in action, with backup patrol boats available as needed. After .

determining that the full l 0-mile emergency planning zone would be secured at l 056, I clearance operations began at 1100, and would have been completed within the 45-minute goal. All personnel were well versed on establishing incident command, emergency worker dosimetry use; and their agency mission requirements. *They *fully I demonstrated their.ability to warn the public in the coastal areas :

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness *c riteria were I MET: l.d.l , l.e.l , 3.a.l , 5.a.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

• I b. Level 2 Finding: None * ,

• I c. Not"Demonstrated: None

• . 't

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: Nolle I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I 31 I

Unclassified' After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Pr0gram I

2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant 3.3.2.4 Miami-Dade County Public Schools I Critical Transportation Core Capability Summary.:

Miami-Dade County emergency management officials successfully demonstrate.d the I

capability to safeguard students and faculty *in the event of an emergency during a series of interviews with 22 schools in the Miami-Dade County Public Schools the week of l 0 January 20t?.. The school ' s Ieadei:shi.p was consistent.in their high leve ls of knowledge I

and preparedne.ss in implementing evacuation procedures. AH referred to their plans, which stated the Miami-Dade Public Schools Superintendent would determine the need and schedule for evacuation, and would provide the bus transportation assets to I

accomplish:.it. If so,. the students; staff and faculty: at the designated .schools would

. evacuate to their: paired .host schools. Teachers.would maintain student accountability

.... us iog daily ro s~ei;s checke_d .atithe relocation school. J'eacher:s accompany their students I

. on the buses ;to the:re location !schocl*and re.main:with th~ students until each student is picked 1up. Parental notificati<m ;w ould be. via the automated electronic syste'm Connect-ED. The message would tell parents to pick up their children only at the reloc~tion I

school , since no students would be released prior to evacuation.

' . . ' ~ ' ' I~

Communication systems iwern numerous and *redundant-. Initial notification to Miarni-I Dade Public Schoo ls Administrative Office is from the M -iami-.Dade emergency operations center, to include school representative staffing. This was demonstrated during the exerci se on February 22, 201 ~* Schools representatives in the emergency I

operations center. continuously maintained conta'ctwith the Adrninistmtive Office using a variety of communication systems. If an evacuation were required p lans and procedures were in place.to insure a safe evacuation, with 100 perceht student accountability I

maintained from departure from the school unti l the last chi ld is released to parental control. Miami-Dade County staff and the school staffs interviewed projected the confidence, knowledge, and management skills required to implement protective actions I

for the student body and staff of their schoo l system.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were I

MET: 3.c.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None j:.

I

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. P rior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Un resolved: None I

32 I

I

I Unclassified I Radiological Emergen'c y Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I 3.3.2.5 Miami-Dade County Congregate Care I Environmental Response/Health and Safety*Capability Summary:

On26 January 2017 during an out of sequence exercise members of Florida Department I of Health Miami-Dade County, the*American Red Cross, and officers from Miami-Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation successfully validated their*ability to safely and

• expeditiously provide life sustaining critical care and services to the affecteo Miami-I Dade County inhabitants evacuating from an incident at Turkey:Point Nuclear Power Plant. ' 1 '

• I The team set.up operations in Arnold-Hall, a fac ility: with ci capacity for 10,000 people; Arnold Hall is in the .controlled area of the Youth Fairgrounds inside Tamiami Park.

Officers from Miami-Dade County Corrections and Rehabil-itatiot.1 provided .security for I the fairgrou nds and a1so registered evacuees before they were allowed access to the reception center. *Registration included verification that *all *persons *allowed *in the' fairground s were free*ofcontamination;. ,., * *. * , *

• I

• '! **. : ; . i Florida Department of Health Miami-Dade County screened individuals, provided

.

• information about potassium iodide, issued potassium iodide and documented its

• I consumption by. iridividuals'.

• Members from The American Red *Cross provided assistance with family reunification, medical needs; mental health needs, spiritual care, fe.eding and temporary housing.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.e.l, 3.b.1, 6.c.I.

I 1a. Level lFindin*g: None I b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None . :. A*

I 'I I

I 33 I

I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant 3.3.3 Monroe County I 3.3.3.1 Monroe County Emergency Operations Center *

• I Operational Coordfoation Capability Summary: .

Monroe County Emergency *Management personnel and emergency operations center support staff successfully demonstrated the capability to establish and maintain a unified I

and coordinated operational structure and process while integrating all critical stakeholders. ** ** I Activation of the emergency operations center was initiated following the Alert declaration.

• Emergency operations* staff were prepositioned for the exercise in accordance with agreements . . The center had sufficient equipment and *communication I

• capabi Iities for conducting*operations and*coordinating response actions with stakeholders.

I

• The radiological emergency preparedriess*adniinistrator kept 'staff aware of ongoing incident status and provided relevanHrtformation through frequent staff briefings and round table discussions. For this exercise, the administrator coordinated appropriate I

precautionaty actions in anticipation of formal protective' actio11s dec isions for emergency workers ahd the public. The Monroe County Emergency Management representative in the utility's Emergency Operations ,Facility*demonstrated the ability to coordinate I

protective action decisions 'with the State* of Florida and Miami-Dade County decision makers. ., ' I The administrator used a teletJhone conference call line to participate- in coordination calls w ith the' emergency management directors of the two risk counties and the State Incident Management Team. The emergency operations center staff fo llowed their I

position specific procedures to implement their responsibilities in preparation of*

protective actions. Law enforcement representatives established and managed appropriate traffic and access control* during the emergency.

I For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a.1, l.c.1, l.d.l , l.e.l, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.I, 3.a.1, 3.b.1 ; 3.c!l:; 3.c.2, 5.a.l. :

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a. Level 1 Finding: None  ?'. . '

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b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None .. '

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d. Prior Level 2 Findings -Resolved: None

• I 34 I

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I Unclassified I After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I Public Information and Warning Core Capability Summary:

In support of a simulated emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Monroe I County Emergency Management staff successfully demonstrated their ability to deliver coordinated, accurate, and actionable information to *the public in a timely manner.

I I The primary alert and notification system has no public sirens . .*The. only area requiring notification in the county is Ocean Reef Community. The community is notified by route alerting and use of a reverse call system to notify all residents and employees. This alert activity was follow~d by the broadcast of Emergency Alert System messages over. local I radio, television and weather radios., These emergency.messages were supplemented through the dissemination .of formal press .releases*..- The news releases expanded upon the emergency messages and provided specifo: detaik:d infonnation*to the, public and media.

I The emergency alert and notification system was activated twice during the exercise. A representative from Ocean Reef Publfo Safety,demonstrated his knowledge, resources, I .. and .abilities*to alert the res.idents, yisitors and employees of.the community.

The public information officer coordinated the content of press releases with all involved I stakeholders u.tilizing her counterpart in .the Joint Information CeBter. She maintained constant coordination with her counterparts in th~ Joint Information Center. All messages .were reviewed and approved by the Monroe County.Emergency Management I Deputy Director prior to their distribution to media outlets.

Public inquiry staff fielded calls (simwlated) from concerned citizens. They would utilize I information gather.ed from the Safety Information Brochure, .press releases, and discussions with emergency operations center staff to provide accurate, information and instructions to callers.

I For this capability, the following*Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 5.a.l, 5.a.3, 5.b.l.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None I b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I 35 I

I Unclassified After Action Report Radiological E!nergency .Preparedness Program 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

3.3.3.2 Monroe County Traffic Control I On-Scene Security, Pro_tection, and Law Enforcement Core Capability:

The Monroe County Sheriffs Department and Florida Highway Patrol successfully I

. discussed their ability to establish Traffic Control Points to ensure a safe .and secure environment for people located within Monroe County affected by the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. The county has two pre-identified traffic control points/road I

blocks, which the county sheriffs office has the responsibility to establish if an evacuation were required. All law enforcement agencies interviewed had thorough

. ~owledge of the traffic control point locations and.the equipment necessary to set them I

up. Officers ex.plained traffic flow directions, location of the reception .center, and the reason for establishment of traffic control points at the two different locations. Aqditional vehicles and equipment are requested through the emergency operations center and are I

available thro,ugh_the Florida Depa~ment ofTri,insportation and the local fire department.

' ,, ; '. j * .:;i: I ;*.J ***, I The county keeps a well-organized group.of radiological kits available for emergency I

workers at the firehouse lqcated at mile marker .J06. The. county hazmat specialist was pre~ent and discµssed in detail .all radiological exposure control* limits, including dosimetry usage and placemelflt, administrative, limits and turn back values, and.the I

purpose of KI. He was very knowledgeable regarding his role and responsibili ties.

Resources to remove impediments are coordinated.between th<? Monroe County Sheriffs I

Office, Florida Highway Patrol, Public Works Department, and Department of

• Transportation . . Law enforcement officers were fully aware of how to remove impediments to evacuation ttafftc in .the field and how to request additional resources I

from the emergency operations eenter if necessary. Local wrecker companies and the fire departments have vehicles equipped to assist in impediment removal as well. I For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.e.1 , .3.a.1, 3.d..l , 3.d..2. /

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a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Fii:iding: None I

. c. Not Demonstrated: None I'

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d. Prior Level 2 Findings -Resolved: None ,.

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e. Pr_ior,LeveJ2, F.indings. -, Unresolved: None

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I U nClassified I After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I 3.3.4 Joint Information Center I Public.Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Public information officers and staff from the State ofFloriaa, Miami-Dade and Monroe I counties successfully*integrated into an effective team, They developed and disseminated accurate and timely emergency public information in respons~ to a simulated *emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant.

I i ,,

The Joint Information Center was activated i11 accordance with,established procedures following the Alert .declaration by the *licensee. In accordance with the extent-of-play I agreement, pre-positioned State and county public in.formation officers and support staff reported after receiving prescribed notifications. * * '"

I The Joint-information Center-was a purposefully-designed facility with sufficient administrative resources and redundant communication capabilities and supplies to support emergency operat'ioris. Internet connected <i:bmputers served as*the primary means qf information sharing arrd communication between-the Joint Information Center I staff and their respective home jurisdictions.: Both dommercia:lfandlines a11d cellular telephone-s*were*used as alternate *forms of communicat<ion.* Minor internet connectivity issues were quickly resolved and did not impede operations.

• I The process for preparing and distributing press releases varied among the agencies in accordance with their plans and procedures. Coordination with their respective home I jurisdictions was excellent~ however, coordination between the public information staffs within the Joint Information Center took place only after the press releases were prepared. No evidence of joint development of emergency informatiort and instructions I was observed.

Collectively, fifteen press releases were distributed within the Joint Information Center.

I All published products contained accurate, timely, and useful information containing the essential elements required by prescribing directives.

I The pub I ic information staff also participated in two formal media briefings following the Alert and General Emergency declarations. In both instances, the tim.ing of the media briefings coincided with changes in the emergency classification levels, creating minor I inconsistencies in messaging. During the first media *bri'efing, the licensee announced the emergency classification level as Site Area Emergency while the State of Florida maintained its prearranged script for Alert. As the second inedia'briefing* began, county I public information officers had not received formal approval from their home jurisdictions to announce protective aetions consistent with a General Enrergency. This approval was received during the media briefing and quickly provided to the Miami-Dade I County public information officer. She adapted to the interruption and subsequent I 37 I

I Unclassified After Actjon Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

change in messaging seamlessly. Both media briefings did all public information products.

includ~d Spanish translation, as I The public inquiry and rumor control functions were conducted within each agency' s emergency operations center.

I For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was MET: l.a.l , l.d.l , l.e.l , 5.b.l.

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a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None I

d. Prior Level 2 Findings -Resolved: None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 3.3.5 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration I

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary: I The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Miami, Florida was observed out of sequence. The station staff successfully demonstrated their ability to relay emergency information regarding a simulated incident at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. The I

station operator discussed how the message would be received ; either facsimilia or EMnet verified and broadcast to the public and local radio and television broadcast stations. The participants discussed how to maintain a closer relationships between the I

station and the county public information officers to help ensure emergency information would be transmitted to the public. The station operator indicated that he was always available to emergency officials and demonstrated a commitment to keeping the public I

informed during emergencies.

For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were I

MET: l.d.l , l.e.l , and 5.a. l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

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I U nclas'sified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

• c. Not Demonstrated: None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings -Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I '*

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I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness*Program I

After Action Report ** 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

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I Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Section 4: Conclusion I Officials and representatives from the State of Florida, the risk counties of Miami-Dade and Monroe, Florida Power and Light, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and numerous other organizations participated in this exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants I was evident throughout all phases of the exercise. The Federal Emergency Management Agency wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made this exercise a success. State and local emergency response organizations demonstrated knowledge I of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them.

Highlights of the exercise included the timely, accurate, and unified emergency information and I instructions provided to the media and the coordination and cohesion of protective action decisions. In nearly every aspect of the exercise, there were examples of organizations going above and beyond the requirements of the exercise extent of play agreement.

I During this exercise, FEMA identified the following two Level 2 Findings, both of which have been resolved . The first once concerning contamination control by a radiological monitoring I field team member was resolved during the exercise with on-the-spot training and demonstration of the proper techniques by the field team member. The second one concerning the inability of dose assessment staff to provide independent dose projections was resolved during a May 24, I 2017 drill at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant.

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After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Po int Nuclear Power Plant Appendix A: Exercise Timeline T ime T ha t Notificatio n Was Received or Action Was Ta ken Emerge ncy T ime C lassifica tion Utility FL-SEOC FLIMT FL DOH BRC ENC MIAMI -DADE MONROE Level or Eve nt Declared DOSE COUNTY EOC COUNTY ASSESSMENT EOC Unusual Event Alert 0819 0827 0827 0827 0828 Site Area Emern:encv 0923 0932 0932 0932 0926 0932 0931 General Emern:encv 1023 1040 1039 1039 1032 1040 1040 Simulated Rad. Re lease 10 10 1023 1023 1023 1045 1023 1023 Simulated Rad. Re lease ongoing ongo ing ongoing ongoing ongoing ongoing ongoing Terminated Faci lity Declared Operational 0920 0910 0944 0942 0930 0935 0900 Declaration of Florida State of 0911 0942 1005 0950

_Emerg~!l-~------------------- ------------- --------------- --------------- ------------------- --------------!---------------- ---------

Local 1028/0947 0945 0945 Exercise Terminated 1155 1148 1148 1150 1150 1148 Precautionary Action: Special Pops, Schools Relocated, 1135 1032 Areas: 2,4,5,6,7,8 (Q,R,A) 0 Marine Restrictions I st Protective Action Decision: Stay Tuned 1005 0948 1005 0948 0948 I st Si ren Activation 1005 1005 1005 1005 l st EAS Message #2 1005 1005 1005 1005 I st National Weather Service Activation 1005 1005 2nd Protective Action Decision: Evac 2 & 4, Shelter in place (3,5,6,7,8,9) Kl EW, Animals 1103 1056 1117 1056 1053 0- 10, Marine Restrictions 0- 10, MDC E-17, Monroe PR6, L I, EAS#3 2nd Siren Activation 1110 1110 1110 11 10 2nd EAS Message #3 1110 1110 1110 1110 2nd National Weather Service Activation 1110 11 10 Kl Decision : MDC/BRC/State EW only 1050 I 038(FT)/ 104 I 1056 1053 43

I Unclassified After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

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I Unclassified I Radiological E mergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders I Regional Assistance Committee Chair: Kevin Keyes Section Chief: Randall Hecht Site Specialist: Walt Cushman I Locatiq*

Joint Onerations Evaluation Team CapabWty & Activity EOF/State IMT Walt Cushman (FEMA) Operational Coordination I HC Andrew Seward (FEMA)

John Pelchat (NRC)

JT Ackerman (FEMA) Public [nformation & Warning I Dose Assessment John Simpson (FEMA)

Libby Adkins (OJT)

John Fill (FEMA HQ) Situational Assessment FMT Management John Fill (FEMA HQ) Environmental Response /Health I Field Teams I and 2 Joe Harworth (FEMA)

Timothy Harris flI (FEMA HQ) and Safety Environmental Response/

Health and Safety EAS Walt Cushman Public Information & Warning I (Address) (OOS February)

State of Florida Director:

I SEOC Risk Counties ,;*'>

Alex Sera (FEMA)

,*.}

Operational Coordination Public Cnformation & Warning

_,' L Miami-Dade County I Director: Curt Sommerhoff EOC REP

Contact:

Neil Batista # 786/863-9350 Bob Spence (FEMA) Operational Coordination Mike Dolder (FEMA) Public Information & Warning I T ACP's (Interview EOC)

Glenda Bryson (FEMA)

Quintin Ivy (FEMA) EOF Mike Dolder On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement I Waterway Warning (Interview at EOC)

Protective Actions for Schools Mike Dolder Mike Dolder (FEMA)

Public ]nformation and Warning Critical Transportation (OOS January 10-12 @) 22 Schools Drew Seward (FEMA)

I Glenda Bryson (FEMA)

Congregate Care (OOS 26 February Matt Bradley (FEMA) Environmental Response/Health &

@ Tamjami Park) Walt Cushman (FEMA) Safety I Monroe County Director: Marty Senterfitt REP

Contact:

Vince Kalson #305/797-1030 EOC Matt Bradley (FEMA) Operational Coordination I Lisa Rink (FEMA)

Gerald McLemore (FEMA) EOF Public [nformation & Warning I T ACP (Interview at EOC) Lisa Rink On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement I 45 I

I Unclassified After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant

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I unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Appendix C: Florida Exercise Extent of Play Agreement I 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant FEMA Evaluated Exercise Extent-of-Play Agreement I All activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans and procedures as they would be in an actual emergency (FEMA must receive these plans, standard operating I guides supporting agency procedures NL T 60 days before the exercise). This Extent of Play Agreement is written by exception. If it is not listed as an exception, it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard operating guides (SOGs) and/or procedures (SOPs). Any issue I or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be re-demonstrated if allowed by the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair or as listed herein. This allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and is mutually agreed to by the Offsite Response Organization I (ORO) controller and FEMA evaluator.

Core Capability: Operational Coordination I Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Organizational Capability Tcwget: Emer~~ncy Operations Management Critical Task: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654 A. l.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1 , 4, 6; D.4; E.l, 2; F.1 , 2 H.3 , 4; Criterion lal).

I Miami-Dade Personnel will be pre-positioned in the Miami-Dade EOC. Personnel assigned to the EOF will transition to the EOF as necessary to the exercise evolution.

I Monroe Monroe County Emergency Management personnel will pre-position at the FP&L Emergency I Operations Facility located at 9250 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida until notification of Alert. Upon notification of Alert those personnel will deploy within the FP&L Emergency Operations Facility to their respective positions. The Monroe County Sheriffs Office Dispatch I located at 2796 Overseas Highway, Marathon, FL 33050, will receive the Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification form from the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant. Appropriate notifications will then be made to exercise players and will simulate remaining notifications. Monroe County I Emergency Management personnel will also pre-position at the Tavernier Radiological Emergency Preparedness Emergency Operations Center located at 151 Marine A venue, Tavernier, Florida. If necessary, decisions will be made while in transit.

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I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Florida Division of Emergency Management I EOF: Incident Management Team (IMT) wiH travel to the Emergency Operations Facility when an Alert has been declared in anticipation of that facility being dedared operational at a Site Area Emergency.

I SEOC: The State Emergency Operations Center located at 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard in

• Tallahassee, will demonstrate a real time activation by sending notifications to the Emergency I Support Functions to respond to the State Emergency Operations Center in accordance with the State Radiological Emergency' Preparedness Ptah' and Comprehensive Emergency Managemerit Plan. ** ,* '  ;, I DOH-BRC EOF: Bureau of Ratliatiott Control*will preposition 6perations Officers and Dose Assessme'f1t personne1 at the EOF and be'gi'n play at the *notificatio~ of an Alert. **

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CrUical Task: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response (NUREG-0654 H.3 ;

G.3.a; J.10.h, J.12; K.5.b; Criterion lbl). "

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I I 1 ' , ' .- i Miami-Dade ( * *J .

• The Miami-Dade Emergency Operations Center will be reviewed during the staff assistance visit on Dec '12, 2016. The Jbint Jnformation Center will be -reviewed during the Evah.iated Exercise on* Feb 22, 201'7. * * ..... I Monroe Facilities will be reviewed during site assistance visit December 16, 2016. I Florida Division of Emergency Management Faciliti.es will be rev~pwed during site assistance visit March 23 , 2017.

I DOH-BRC NIA I Critical Task: At least 2 communications systems are available, at least 1 operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate loc,ations.

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• r I Communication's capabilities' are managed in support of emergency'dp~rations (NUREG-0654 F.l , 2; Criterio1i'ldl). "' ... 1 I

Miami-Dade Communications systems will be demonstrated in the Miami-Dade County EOC, scenario dependent. The Hot Ring Down telephone is the primary communication system. The backup I

systems include standard digital and 'analog telephone . lines as well as the EMnet telephone.

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I Unclassified I After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Monroe Hot Ring Down and land line telephone communications will be demonstrated as pri~ary and I back-up systems respecti vely at the Tavernier E;mergency Operations.Center. Landline communications will be maintained between Monroe County staff at the Tavernier Emergency Operations Center and the FP&L Emergency Operations Facility, and Secondary EOC (per I discussion) throughout the exercise.

Florida Division of Emergency Manag~ment ,

EOF: One primary and one secondary communications system between the IMT at the fl~&L I Emergency Operations Facility and the State Emergency Operations Center will be demonstrated.

I SEOC: Should an actual failure of the Hot Ring Down system occur during t.h.ti exercise; the secondary communications system wil,I be demonstrated *a t the State Emergency Operations,,

Center. Should no actual failure occur; this objective will be demonstrated through discussion.

I DOH-BRC Communications will be operated as per BRC SOPs, with 800 MHz radios as primary, satellite I phones, cellular phones, and commercial phones as backups.

Critical Task: Equipment, maps; displays, monitoring instrum~nts , dosimetry, KI, and other I supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654 H.7, 1O; I.7, 8, 9; J.1 O.a, b, e; J.11 , 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion I el).

I Miami-Dade Direct-reading, Permanent-Record dosimeters, Potassium Iodide, and Monitoring Instruments will be reviewed during the SAV scheduled for Dec 12, 2016 .*

I For non-facility based operations (e.g., Out of Sequence Drills) equip:ment and supp fies will be sufficient to demonstrate the function(s) being assessed.

I Out of sequence non-evaluated drill information is contained under separate cover in the respective exercise plans.

I Monroe ,* .

An adequate supply of thermo luminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and dosimetry will be available at Ocean Reef Public Sflfety Complex, Key Largo North Station 25, and Tavernier Fire Resc~e I Station for the emergency workers who may respond immediately to the scene and Incident Command Post. This will be demonstrated out of sequence during SAY December 16, 2016.

I Florida Division of Emergency Management:

EOF: The IMT will have sufficient equipment to support their missions defined in the State I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan. The REP Technical Specialist will provide information related to the distribution of dosimeters and potassium iodide.

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I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Prep~redness Program I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

SEOC: The SEOC will have sufficient equipment to support.their missjons defined in the State ,

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan and the.CEMP. Dosimetry and potassium iodide will be available for inspection at 2555 Shumard Oak B lvd ., Room 320-G, and will not be I transported.

DOHBRC Covered under appropriate Core Capability I

Organizotional C'fq>{(hility}'arget: Protective Action Decision Making I Crif ical.Task: Key p~rsonnel with lea,der;ship roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654 A.1.d; ,_.

A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6; Criterion lcl).

I Miami-Dade "

OEM staff will demoQstra!e directioo and ,control. in the EOC, scenariq dependen_t. _

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I Monroe Area command for Monroe County will be established at the Tavernier Radiological Emergency I

Preparedness Emergency Operations Center located at 151 Marine Avenue, Tavernier, Florida. ,

Florida Division of Emergency Managem~nt I

EOF: The .lMT Incident Commander will provide direction and control at the EOF.

SEOC: The SERT Ch~efwill provide direction and control at the EQC.

I DOH-BRC Operations Officer/Dose Assessment will provide direction and control from the EOF.

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I Critical Task: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and , .

appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of Kl, is in I

place for EW s including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs (NUREG-0654 C.6; J.10.e, f; K.4 Criterion 2al). I Miami-Dade The decision-making process will be demonstrated at the Miami-Dade County EOC during the exercise, scenario dependent.

I Monroe , ,.

This will be discussed at the Monroe County EOC at the Tavernier Fire Rescue during the I

exercise, scenario dependent.

Florida Division of Eme.rgency Ma~agement I

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'Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I EOF: Information relative to State Emergency Worker exposure control will be provided through discussion with the REP Technical Specialist in the EOF.

I SEOC: Not Applicable this exercise I DOH-BRC Exposure control and use of KI decisions and recommendations will be made by the Operation's Officers at the EOF, as per BRC SOPs. , ,, ,

I Critical Task: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropri ate factors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public (including the I recommendation for the use of Kl, if ORO policy) (NUREG-0654 A.3 ; C.4; 6;,D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m Criterion 2b2). ., ** * '*

I Miami-Dade This criterion will be demonstrated during the exercise, scenario dependent. Miami,;.Da'.de* '*

• County Emergency Management personnel will co-locate with Monroe County Emergency Management, and State agency at the FP&L Emergency Operations Facility located at 9250 I West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida to coordinate PAD ' s.

' ,t r I Monroe Monroe County Emergency Management personnel will co-locate with Miami-Dade County Emergency Management, and State agency at the FP&L .Emergency Operations Facility located at 9250 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida to cdordinate PADs. Area command will be I established for Monroe County at the Tavernier Radiological Emergency Preparedness Emergency Operations Center at '151 Marine Avenue, Tavernier, Florida to carry out the PAD.

Florida Division of Emergency Management 1* EOF: The IMT will participate with Miami-Dade and Monroe Counties in 'the development of initial and subsequent protective action decisions in accordance with the State Emergency I Radiological Plan.

EOC: Not Applicable this scenario.

I DOH-BRC Exposure control and use of Kl decisions and recommendations will be made by the

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Operations Officers at the EOF; as' per BRC SOPs Critical Task: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with I disabilities and access/functional needs (NUREG-0654 D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e; Criterion 2cl).

Miami-Dade I The decision-making and coordination process for accomplishing this criterion will be demonstrated at the EOC during the exercise, scenario dependent. EEAP information is I 51

I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Prbgram I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant confidential and will not be available for rev,iew. Schools will not be contacted during the I exercise. The process will be explained and general documentation may ,be examined.

Monroe I The decision-making and coordination process for accomplishing this 'criterion will be .

demonstrated at the EOC during the exercise, scenario dependent. EEAP information is confidential and will not be available for review. Schools will not be contacted during the exercise. The process will be explained and general documentation may be examined.

I Florida Division of Emergency Management EOF: The IMT will pa,rticipate in the development of in,itial and subsequent protective action I

decisions in accordance with the State Emergency Radiological Plan.-.

EOC: Not Applicable.th is exercise * *

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DOH BRC: Not Applicable Critical Task: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate PADs are made based on the ORO .planning critevia{NUREG-0654 A.3; C. l , 4; 0.4; J.9, 11; Criterion 2d l ). *'

I Miami-Dade: Not required to be demonstrated. I Monroe: Not required to be demonstrated. '*

• Florida Division of Emergency Management: Not required to be demonstrated:

I DOH BRC: Not required to be demonstrated I Critical Task: Timely post-plume phase relocation, reentry, and return decisions are made.and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO 's plan and/or procedures (NUREG-0654 1.1 O; J.9; K.3.a; M.1; Criterion 2el*).

I Miami-Dade: Not required to be demonstrated. I Monroe: Not required to be demonstrated.

Florida Division of Emergency Management: Not required!to'*be demonstrated . .

I DOH BRC: Not required.to be demonstrated

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• I Organizational Capability Target: Protective Action Implementation I

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I Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I CrWcal Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage*radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of I each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (NUREG-0654 J. I O.e, K .3.a, b; K.4 ; Criterion 3a1}

• I Miami-Dade The provision of direct-reading-and permanent-record dosimetry, dosimeter'chargers, and I instructions on the use of these items will be discussed by OEM personnel , at the Miami-Dade County EOC, scenario dependent. '" ' '*

The 'provision of KI and instructions on its use will be discussed by Florida Health i'n Miami-I Dade County personnel , at th~ Miami-Dade County EOC , scenario depend~nt. ' ' ,

• Other elements of this criterion will be demonstrated during non-evaluated Out *of sequence , .

drill(s). Information regarding those drills is contained under separate cover in the respective I exercise plans.

Monroe I An emergency worker will .discuss exposure control, out of sequence,TBD at a time to be determined, at the Monroe County EOC, scenario dependent. Issuance of dosimetry and '

procedures for use will be discussed by EMA personnel , out of sequence, at the Monroe County I EOC on TBD, scenario dependent.

Florida Division of Emergency Management I EOF: Not Applicable I EOC: Not Applicable DOH BRC: Covered under appropriate Core Capability I Critical Task: *KI and appropriate instructions are available if a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals I and the general public is maintained (NUREG-0654 J.10.e, f; Criterion 3bl).

Miami-Dade I The provision of KI to the general public, institutionalized individuals (e.g., hospital patients) and instructions on its .use will be discussed by Florida Health in Miami-Dade County personnel, at the Miami-Dade County EOC, scenario dependent.

I Other elements of this criterion will be demonstrated durin.g'Out of sequence drill(s).

Information regarding those drills is contained under separate cover in the respective exercise plans. '

I I 53 I

I U nclass-ified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Progra_m I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant Monroe I Distribution of Kl, along with appropriate instructions, will be done through interview discussion at the Monroe County Health Departmen~ by a Monroe County Hea,lth Nurse during the SAV

• December 16, 2016 as well as during the EOC activation in Tavernier. I Florida Division of Emergency Management EOF: Not Applicable

) . ~ ,

I EOC: Not Applicable DOH BRC: Covered under appropriate Core Capability I

Critical Task: Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and acc~ss/functionfil i:ieeps other th<J..n schools. within are~s ~ubject to protectiv ~ actions (NUREG-I 0654 J.10.c, d, e, g; Criterion 3c l). . ,. . , , ..

Miami-Dade I

This criterion will be demonstrated through discussion with OEM personnel and transportation providers at .the EO~. No.one with disaqitities and ~c,cess/functions needs will be .contacted. I EEAP information is confidential and will not be available for review.

Monroe

,l

. ... I This criterion will be discussed with social services or DOH personnel, implementing protective action for Special Population other than schools, at the Monroe County REP EOC scenario dependent. I Florida Division of Emergency Management EOF: Not Applicable I

EOC: Not Applicable I DOH BRC: Not Applicable Critical Task: OR Os/Schoo l officials implement protective actions for schools (NUREG"'.' 0654 i I

CJ.10.c, d, e, g; Criterio11 3c2).

Miami-Dade I

The implementation of precautionary and/or protective actions for schools will be demonstrated ,

by Miami-Dade County Public Schools personnel.through discussion at the Miami-Dade County EOC, scenario dependent. . !,

I Select schools will be visited during the SA V scheduled the week of Jan 9, 2017 and the principal or their selected representative wilt be avaitable for interview. I 54 I

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I Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

Monroe I This will be discussed by intervie'w with the school' representatives, ORPS, or their designee, scenario dependent at the Monroe County REP EOC.

I Florida Division of Emergency Management: I .~ . .

EOF: Not Applicable I EOC: Not Applicable I DOH BRC: Not Applicable

. I.

Critical'Ta:sk: Appropriate traffic and access control *is established. Accurate instructions are I provided to traffic and access control personnel (NUREG-0654. A.3; C. l, 4; J. l O.g, j ; Criterion 3dl)

Miami-Dade ., ' 1 I , , * ' *, * ,

The Miami~Dade County School Potice De*partmertt will demonstrate this criterion out of sequence on January 23, 2017. . ,:

I Information regarding the Out of sequence drill is contained under separate cover in the respective exercise plans.

I Monroe The Monroe County Sheriffs Office will discuss traffic and access control , during the exercise at the Tavernier Radiological EOC, scenario dependent.

I Florida Division of Emergency Management: Not Applicable I DOH BRC: Not Applicable Critical Task: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (NUREG-0654 J.1 O.k; I Criterion 3d2).

Miami..:.Dade I The Miami-Dade Police Department will discuss impediments to evacuation at the EOC during the exercise, scenario dependent.

I Monroe The Monroe County Sheriff's Office will discuss *impediments to evacu.ation *during the exercise, at the Tavernier Radiological EOC, scenario dependent. * ,

I Florida Division of Emergency Management: Not Applicable I 55 I

I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant DOH BRC: Not Applicable I Critical Task: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food. sµpplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pat~way emergency plaryning zone for impler:n,entation.of protective actions I

(NUREG-0654 A.3; C.1 ,_4; J_.ll; Cr.it~rion 3~1).

' i Miami-Dade: Not required to* be demonstratt<d.

i. ' - .. I Monroe: Not required to be demonsfrated. I Florida Division of Emergency Management: Not required to be demonstrated.

DOH llRC: Not, r~quired .to be .dernqnst.rated; * * . I ' ,1

• ** J.

I Critical Task: Ap~ropriate 'measutes, stiategles, a~cl 'pr~~prihted instru~tio'nal material are developed for" implementing protective actjon decisions for contaminated water;.food products, I

milk, and agricultural production . .(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP~l, G.l , J,9, ,11; Criterion 3e2) . .

Miami-Dade: Not required to be demonstrated.

I I

Monroe: Not required to be demonstrated.

I*

Florida Division of Emergency Management: Not required to be demonstrated.

I

'l DOH BRC: Not required to be demonstrated. . \

Critical. Task.' Decisions regarding controlled reentry of emergency workei;s and relocation and ,

return of the pub I ic during the post-emergency phase are coordinated with appropriate '*

• I organizations and implemented (NUREG-0654 E.7; J.10.j; J.12; K.5.b; M.1, 3; Criterion 3fl).

Miami-Dade: Not required to be demonstrated.

I Monroe: Not required to be demonstrated. I Flor.ida Division of Emergency Management:

• Not required to be demonstrated.

DOH BRC: Not required to be demonstrated. ..) ~* .

I ~ '

• I I

Core Capability: Public Information and Warning Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and.actionable information to the whole community I

through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

I 56 I

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I Unclassified I Radiological Emergency *Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

Organizational Capability Targel: Emergency Notification and Public Information I Critical Task: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency I officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The' initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP Guidance (Timely: The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the I appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (NUREG-0654 E.5, 6, 7; Criterion Sa 1).

I Miami-Dade Primary alerting and notification of the public will be demonstrated through simulation/discussion at the Miami-Dade County EOC, during the exercise', 'scenario dependent.

• I The siren system will be discussed; Injects w,ill be u ~_eq if sire.n failLJres are need~d.

EAS message distributrori will be 'demonstrated by discussion atthe Miami ~Dade County EOC, scenario dependent. Dissemination of EAS messag'es w ill be simulated.

I Monroe II PNS activation will be demonstrated through simulation/discussion at the Monroe County EOC, during the exercise, scenario dependent. EAS message distribution will be demonstrated by discussion at the Monroe County EOC, scenario dependent. Dissemination ofEAS messages will be simulated. , .,

I Florida Division of Emergency Management:

I EOF: The SAT will play a coordination ro le only. The State Management Team will not be responsible for the actual sounding of sirens, the broadcast of Emergency Alert System messages or route alerting.

I EOC: Not Applicable this exercise I BRC: Not Applicable Critical Task: Backup*alertand notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time I following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system (NUREG-0654 E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c; Criterion 5a3):

I Miami-Dade .* , ., *

[f siren failure are injected, backup alert and notification of the public will be demonstrated through discussion, scenario dependent. "

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I Unclassified After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

Monroe .. r This criterion will be demonstrated by discussion on the day of the exercise, at the Monroe I

County EOC. If siren failure occurs, Backup Alert and Notification will be demonstrated.

Florida Division of Emergency Management: Not required to be demonstrated .

I DOH BRC: Not required to be demonstrated.

I Critical Task: Ensure ,OROs provide accurate emergency information and .instructions.to the public and the news media in a timely manner (The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to di sseminate the appropriate information/ instructions with a.sense of I

urgency and without undue delay) (NUREG-0654 E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.a, c; Criterion 5b 1).

Miami-Dade *

' ' \. I Actual message will b e developed,. however distribution to the public and media \>Vill be simulated, scenario dep endent. I Monroe . . , ,

Actual message will be developed, however distribution to the public and media will be simulated, scenario dependent. * "

I Florida Division of Emergency Management SEOC: This criterion will be demonstrated at the-State Emergency Operations Center in I

accordance with the State Radiological Emergency Plan. ,:

• IMT: This criterion will be .demonstrated at the Joint Information Center in accordance with the I

State Radiological Emergency Plan.

DOH BRC: Not required to be demonstrated.

I Core Capability: Environmental Response/,Health and Safety (Reception Centers, Emergency Worker Decontamination Facilities, Field Teams)

I Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including hazardous

• materials, acts of terrorism , and natural disasters in support of the responder operations and the affected communities. ,

• I Organizational Capability Target : Support Operations and:Facilities I

Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monit0ring instruments, dosimetry, Kl , and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654 H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11 , 12; K.3.a; K.5 .b ; Criterion lel ).

I Miami-Dade: Not required to be demonstrated. Reception Centers for training only I

58 I

I

I Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Monroe: Not required to be demonstrated.

I Critical Task: OROs issue apprdpriate dosimetry, Kl, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or I chart. OR Os maintain appropriate record keeping of the administration of Kl to EWs (NUREG-0654 J .1 O.e, K.3 .a, b, K.4; Criterion 3al ).

• I Miami-Dade: Not requ ired to be demonstrated: Reception Center for training only Monroe: Not required to be demonstrated.

• I

' .. . ' ~ .

I Critical Task: KI and appropriate instructions are made available in case a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of Kl for ..

• I institutionalized individual s and.the general public is maintained (N.UREG-0654 J. l O.e, f;*

Criterion 3b 1).

I Miami-Dade: Not required to be demonstrated. Reception Center for training only I.

Monroe: Not required to be demonstrated.

I Critical Task: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate res ources, and .

trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registfation of evacuees (NUREG-0654 A.3 ; C.4; J.10.h; J.12; Criteribn 6al).

I Miami-Dade: Not required to be demonstrated. Reception Center for training only I Monroe Not required to be demonstrated .

I Critfoal Task: The fac ility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination o-f emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles (NUREG-0654 K.5".a, b; Criterion 6bl).

I ' '* ,.

Miami-Dade: Not required to be demonstrated.

I Monroe: Not required to be demonstrated.

OrganLational'Capabilit:v Targt?t :* Field Measurement and Analyses.

I .,, '

Critical Task: Field teams (two or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure (NUREG C.1; H.12; 1.7, 8, 11; J.1 O.a; I Criterion 4a2).

I 59 I

I Unclassified After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

Critical Task: At least 2 communications systems are available, at least 1 operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

I Communications capabilities am managed in .support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654 .

F.l, 2; Criterion ldl). I Critical Task: Ambient radiation I1).easur(iments are made and recorded *at appr0priate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low-background location to qf(termine whether any significant (as speci.fied in the plan and/or I

procedures) amount of,radioactivity bas been..Gol.lected on the sampUng media .(NUREG C.1; I.8, 9; HJ2;). l O.a; Criteri<;m 4aJ). * .. , , .

I * !

I DOH-BRC Two field teams will use instrumentation and measurement techniques to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and control radiation exposure, as stated in standard

• I operating procedures. : , , ,,

Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other I

supplies are sufficient to support .e,m~~rgency operations (N!JRE G-0654/FEMA-REP-l , H.7, 10;

• 1.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11 , 12; K.3 .a; K.5.b; Criterion l.e.l) .

I DOH;-BRC Two teams will use instrumentation and measurement techniques to obtain sufficient field data '**

pertaining to the measurement of airborne radioiodine particulates and ambient radiation, as I

stated in standard operating procedures.

1;.

Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological

"' I exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end *of each mission read their dosirpeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (NUREG-I 0654 J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3al).

DOH-BRC I

Two teams in accordance with plans and procedures.

I Core Capability: On-Scene Security and Protection (Traffic and Access Control Points) 1 ' !,. ,' j I

Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all :.

traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

I

!,-:.,*t*, ',I . * '1 .,.

Organizptional Caw1bifity Target:

~rotective Action Impl.ementation I

Crilical Task: Equipment,. ~aps , displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI; and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654 H.7, IO ; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11 , 12; K.3 .a; K.5.b; Crit~rion lel). :

I 60 I

I

I U ricla§sified I After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I Miami-Dade

. ;1 I See this critical task under Operational Coordination Core Capability.

• Monroe I See this critical task under Operati6nal Coordination Core Capabilhy. -

f ,.

Critical Task.: OROs issue *appropriate dos.imetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological I exposure to EWs in accordance with the pl'ans/procedures. EW.s periodi'ca:lly and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the approptiate;exposure record' or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record keeping of the administration of Kl to EWs (NUREG-I 0654 J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3al) .

Miami-Dade

. ' ~ .'

See this critical task under Protective Action Implementation Core Capability.

I Mon roe .. , * *'*: **

See this critical task under Operati6rial Coordination Core':Capability.

• I Critical Task: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel (NUREG-0654 A.3 ; C.1 , 4; J.10.g, j; Criterion I 3dl);" ,* * . '

' J-, *, "!

It*,  ! '

Miami-Dade

• 1 I See this critical task under Protective Action Implementation Core Capability.

Monroe I See"this critical task under Operational Coordination Core Capability.'

Critical Task: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (NUREG-0654 J.10.k; I Criterion 3d2).

Miami-Dade I See this critical task under Protective Action Implementation Core Capability.

j .

Monroe * * '. ** *.

I See this*critical task undeP Opel"afronal Coordination Core Capability .

.' . J~*

• Core Capability: Critical Transportation (Schools)

I Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel , equipment, and services; into the affected 'areas.

I Organizational Capability Target: Protective Action Implementatiori I 61 I

Unclassified I

After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant I

Critical Task: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools (NUREG-0654 CJ.I O.c, d, e, g; Criterion 3c2).

I Miami-Dade See this critical task under Protective Action Implementation Core Capability.

I Monroe This will be discussed by interview with the school representatives, ORPS, or designated I

representatives at the Monroe County REP EOC.

Core Capability: Mass Care (Congregate Care Facilities)

I Provide life-sustaining services to the affected population with a focus on hydration, feeding and sheltering to those who have the most need as well as support for reunifying families. I Organizational Capability Target : Support Operations and Facilities Critical Task: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate before entering congregate care facilities (NUREG-I 0654; J.10.h ; J.12; Criterion 6c1).

Miami-Dade I

This criterion will be demonstrated out of sequence on January 26, 2017.

Information regarding the Out of sequence drill is contained under separate cover in the respective exercise plans.

I Monroe Not required to be demonstrated.

I I

I I

I I

62 I

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