ML17312A896
| ML17312A896 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17312A893 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-96-11, 50-529-96-11, 50-530-96-11, NUDOCS 9608060114 | |
| Download: ML17312A896 (37) | |
See also: IR 05000528/1996011
Text
ENCLOSURE
2
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.:
License Nos.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved By:
50-528
50-529
50-530
NPF-51
50-528/9611
50-529/9611
50-530/9611
Arizona Public Service
Company
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
Station,
Units 1,
2,
and
3
5951
S. Wintersburg
Road
Tonopah,
June
2 through July 13,
1996
K. Johnston,
Senior Resident
Inspector
J.
Kramer,
Resident
Inspector
D. Garcia,
Resident
Inspector
D. Carter,
Resident
Inspector
D.
F. Kirsch, Chief, Reactor Projects
Branch
F
ATTACHMENTS:
Attachment
1:
Partial List of Persons
Contacted
List of Inspection
Procedures
Used
List of Items Opened,
Closed,
and Discussed
List of Acronyms
9608060ii4 960726
ADOCK 05000528
6
I
f
I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,
Units 1, 2,
and
3
NRC Inspection
Report 50-528/9611;
50-529/9611;
50-530/9611
This integrated
inspection
included aspects
of licensee
operations,
engineering,
maintenance,
and plant support.
The report covers
a 6-week
period of resident
inspections.
~0erations
~
Operators
exhibited strong performance
in response
to
(EHC) fluid leak
and in the subsequent
restart
of the main turbine.
The reactor operator dedicated
to board monitoring
was well focused during the turbine startup.
Additionally, there
was
good management
and nuclear
assurance
oversight of startup activities
(Section 01.2).
A Unit
1 Auxiliary Operator
(AO) was observed
during routine rounds
conduc'ting thorough checks of plant equipment,
appropriate
reviews of
equipment clearances,
and demonstrated
excellent
knowledge of plant
radiological conditions
(Section 01.3).
Unit 2 operations'ad
not demonstrated
an adequate
understanding
and
ownership of the Qualified Safety Parameter
Display System
(QSPDS)
(Section
04. 1).
Maintenance
Maintenance
personnel
responded
promptly and thoroughly in their
evaluation of an
EHC line leak in Unit 3.
Additionally, the licensee
initiated appropriate
corrective actions
aFter vibration monitoring data
collection efforts inadvertently
caused
a turbine control valve to close
(Section M1.3).
~
Mechanical
maintenance
personnel
demonstrated
excellent maintenance
and
radiological protection practices
during the performance of work on the
Unit 3 high pressure
safety injection (HPSI) system
(Section M1.4).
En ineerin
~
Instrumentation
and Controls
(I&C) maintenance
engineering
had not
developed
a comprehensive
plan to address
longstanding
deficiencies.
As
a result,
communications
with other organizations
was
weak
and available resources
were not adequately
focussed
to resolve the
problem (Section
M6. 1).
~
A violation was identified concerning
the failure of I&C maintenance
engineering
to follow procedures
for the performance of a
f
screening
evaluation for a plant change.
Maintenance
engineering
had
not recognized that
a change
made to the
(ISPDS involved
a change
to the
facility as described
in the licensing basis
(Section
E3. 1).
Plant
Su
ort
~
Radiation protection
(RP) staff demonstrated
very good performance
in
their support of maintenance
activities conducted
on the Unit 3 Train A
HPSI system
(Section
R4. 1).
~
A violation was identified concerning
the failure to perform
a search of
personnel
and
hand carried
items using screening
equipment prior to
being allowed access
to the protected
area
(PA) (Section Sl. 1).
I
N
i
Re ort Details
Summar
of Plant Status
Unit
1 began
the inspection period at
100 percent
power.
On July 4, the unit
reduced
power to 88 percent to perForm maintenance
on turbine Control Valve 4.
The unit returned to
100 percent
power the
same
day
and operated
at
essentially
100 percent
power for the duration of the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated
at essentially
100 percent
power for the duration of the
inspection period.
Unit 3 began
the inspection period at
100 percent
power.
On June
10, the
operators
reduced
power to 30 percent
and manually tripped the turbine due to
an
EHC oil leak
on Control Valve 4.
On June
11, the unit returned to
100 percent
power.
On June
25, operators
manually tripped the turbine from
essentially
100 percent
power 'due to another
EHC oil leak in the
same vicinity
as the previous leak.
On June
27, the unit returned to 100 percent
power
and
remained
at essentially
100 percent
power for the duration of the inspection
period.
Ol
Conduct of Operations
01.1
General
Comments
71707
4
Using Insp'ection
Procedure
71707,
the inspectors
conducted
frequent
reviews of ongoing plant operations.
In general,
the conduct of
operations
was professional
and safety conscious.
Specific events
and
noteworthy observations
are. detailed
in the sections
below.
In
particular,
the inspectors
noted that the philosophy of a dedicated
board monitor, free from the distractions of ongoing surveillance
and
maintenance
support activities,
had
been
applied consistently
in all
units.
01.2
0 erator
Performance
Durin
Hain Turbine Transient
Unit 3
, a.
Ins ection
Sco
e
71707
and
92703
On June
25, Unit 3 experienced
a
EHC oil leak and
a manual turbine trip.
The inspectors'esponded
to the control
room to access
the plant
and
operator
response.
On June
26, the inspectors
observed
the Unit 3
operators
perform the startup of the main turbine.
b.
Observations
and Findin
s
On June
25, operators
received
a low EHC level alarm in the control
room
and dispatched
an
AO to investigate.
The
AO reported
a large leak in
turbine Control Valve
4 and
no oil level indication in the
EHC tank.
Control
Room operators initiated
a manual trip of the turbine
and
stabilized the plant at approximately
30 percent
power.
e
'C)
e
On June
26, the inspectors
observed
the Unit 3 operators
perform the
startup of the main turbine
and observed
good communications
and
procedure
compliance.
Appropriate management
and nuclear assurance
oversite
was evident during the startup.
The reactor
operator dedicated
to board monitoring remained
focused
on the monitoring and
was not
distracted
by the turbine startup activities.
The shift supervision
limited the activities in the control
room.
C.
Conclusions
01.3
a.
Operators
exhibited strong performance
in response
to the main turbine
EHC fluid leak
and in the subsequent
start of the main turbine.
The
reactor operator dedicated
to board monitoring was well focused during
turbine startup,
Additionally, there
was
good management
and nuclear
assurance
oversight of startup activities.
Ins ection
Sco
e
71707
b.
On July 2, the inspectors
accompanied
an area operator during the
performance of Procedure
"Area 3 Operator
Logs,
Modes 1-4,"
Revision 8.
In addition,
the inspectors
observed
the
AO perform
clearances
and perform
a charging
pump start in accordance
with
"CVCS Normal Operations,"
Revision
21.
Observations
and Findin
s
The inspectors
observed
the
AO performance
entering the radiological
controlled area
and noted that the
AO was very knowledgeable of the
plant radiological conditions of the auxiliary building.
The
properly performed the equipment
checks
required
by
Procedure
During the plant tour, the
AO performed
additional
checks of the plant equipment in the areas
and documented
equipment discrepancies.
The
AO utilized closed
loop communications
when conversing with the control
room.
The
AO properly verified the
position clearance
components
using multiple indications
and correctly
used
Procedure
410P-1CH01 to perform the charging
pump prestart
and
after-start
checks'onclusions
The
AO conducted
thorough
checks of plant equipment,
appropriate
reviews
of equipment clearances,
and demonstrated
excellent
knowledge of plant
radiological conditions.
e
(
i
I
e
04
Operator
Knowledge
and Performance
04.1
0 erations
Understandin
and Ownershi
of
Problems
Unit 2
71707
Unit 2 operations
had not demonstrated
adequate
understanding
and
ownership of gSPDS.
Operations
management
responded
aggressively
to
resolve
the associated
issues.
Further aspects
of this issue
are
discussed
in Section
H6. 1.
-68
Miscellaneous
Operations
Issues
08. 1
Review of Institute of Nuclear
Power
0 erations
Evaluation
71707
The inspectors
reviewed the March,
1996
INPO evaluation report which
covered
a site evaluation
performed in October,
1995.
The inspectors
found that the evaluation
was consistent
with recent
NRC perception of
the licensee's
performance
and did not identify any areas
which
substantially
deviated
from NRC perceptions.
II.
Maintenance
Hl
Conduct of Maintenance
Ml. 1
General
Comments
on Maintenance Activities
a.
Ins ection
Sco
e
62703
The inspectors
observed all or portions of the following work
activities:
Clean
and Inspect Essential
Spray
Pond
Pump
A Sliding
Screen
(Unit 2)
Replace
the
9R Emergency
Diesel
Generator
Injection
Pump Delivery Valve (Unit 1)
b.
Observations
and Findin
s
The inspectors
found these
work activities were performed in accordance
with procedures.
In addition,
see the specific discussions
of
maintenance
observed
under Sections
H1.3
and H1.4.
I
H1.2
General
Comments
on Surveillance Activities
a.
Ins ection
Sco
e
61726
The inspectors
observed all or portions of the following surveillance
activities:
Revision 25, Diesel
Generator
A Test (Unit 1)
Revision 9, Moderator Temperature
Coefficient at
Power
(Unit 2)
Revision 8, Containment
Personnel
Air Lock Seal
Leak
Rate Testing (Unit 3)
b." Observations
and Findin
s
The inspectors
found these
surveillances
were performed
as specified
by
applicable
procedures.
Hl.3
Troubleshootin
of EHC Line Failures
Unit 3
a.
Ins ection
Sco
e
62703
The inspectors
reviewed the licensee
repairs of the
EHC oil leaks
and
corrective actions.
b.
Observations
and Findin
s
On June
9,
a crack developed
in the
EHC piping for turbine Control
Valve 4.
The licensee initiated corrective actions to repair the
cracked
EHC piping and
a condition report/disposition report
(CRDR) to
evaluate
the
EHC piping for potential cyclic fatigue failure.
On
June
25,
a crack occurred in the
same vicinity as
a previous
EHC piping
leak.
The licensee initiated another
CRDR to identify the root cause of
the cracking to prevent reoccurrence.
The licensee
sent the failed
section of
EHC piping offsite for analysis to determine
the failure
mechanism.
In addition,
the licensee
replaced
several
servo-control
and
logic cards for Control Valve 4 in an attempt to reduce the vibrations
generated
by the valve.
The inspectors
found these corrective actions
to be appropriate.
On July 1,
as part of the corrective actions,
a vibration technician
used
a magnetic
probe to obtain readings
on the Control Valve
4 servo,
causing
the control valve to shut for approximately
35 seconds.
The
control valve closing induced
a power oscillation of approximately
5 percent.
The licensee initiated
a
CRDR to evaluate
the event.
The
licensee
advised other vibration technicians of the event
and planned to
issue
a
"NEWS FLASH" to inform all employees of the effect of using
magnets
near servos.
The Maintenance
Director stated that the magnetic
effect
on servos
was not well understood
throughout the industry
and
that
he planned to forward information on this event to industry.
The
inspectors
found these corrective actions to be appropriate.
c.
Conclusions
Maintenance
personnel
responded
promptly and thoroughly in their
evaluation of an
EHC line leak in Unit 3.
Additionally, the licensee
initiated appropriate corrective actions after vibration monitoring data
collection efforts inadvertently
caused
a turbine control valve to
close.
Ml.4 "Corrective Maintenance
Performed
on Train
A HPSI
S stem
Unit 3
a,
Ins ection
Sco
e
62703
On July 10, the inspectors
observed
the portions of the following work
activities involving the Train A HPSI.
~
Rework and Replacement
of Valve SIA-HV-0698 Stem
and
~
Removal
and Engineering
Inspection of Flow Orifice
SIA-P02
~
Sampling of Oil and the Installation of Oil Sample
Ports for the Motor Bearings
In addition,
the inspectors
discussed
the work activities with
maintenance
technicians
and
RP personnel.
b.
Observations
and Findin
s
The inspectors
obse'rved that the maintenance
activities were performed
with the work packages
present
and in active use.
The maintenance
technicians
exhibited detailed
knowledge of the valve's construction
and
repair.
The technicians
demonstrated
good radiation worker practices
during all aspects
of the job.
Maintenance
supervisors
frequently
monitor the job progress.
During the installation of an oil sample port, the
head of the old oil
plug broke off.
The maintenance
technician
stopped
the activity and
discussed
the problem with supervision.
The technician properly
obtained
an
amendment
to the work package
to remove the
damaged
plug and
complete the job.
e
RP technicians
demonstrated
very good supervision
oF radiological
controls throughout the job.
They ensured
face shields
were worn when
required
and allowed the technicians
to remove the shields
when
contamination levels decreased.
RP technicians
performed air samples of
the work area during packing
removal
and
when the system
was breached,
and ensured
the work area
remained wetted to prevent contamination
from
becoming airborne.
RP te'chnicians
ensured
that tools were wiped clean
throughout the job and that torque wrenches
were prewrapped
to prevent
the spread of contamination.
Conclusions
Mechanical
maintenance
personnel
demonstrated
excellent maintenance
and
RP practices
during the performance of work on the Unit 3 HPSI system.
Maintenance
Organization
and Administration
I&C Maintenance
Troubleshootin
of
Problems
Unit 2
Ins ection
Sco
e
62703
During the inspection period,
I&C maintenance
performed troubleshooting
of the Unit 2 Channel
A gSPDS.
The inspectors
reviewed the operating
history of the Channel
A gSPDS,
discussed
troubleshooting efforts with
I&C maintenance
and Unit 2 operations,
and reviewed associated
work
documentation.
Observations
and Findin
s
~Back round
The inspectors
reviewed the system description
manual
and the design
basis
manual for the
gSPDS.
The
gSPDS consists
of two redundant
Class
IE channels,
seismically qualified, electrically and physically
independent for the continuous display of safety parameters
which
provide indication of the thermal-hydraulic states within the reactor
pressure
vessel
during the approach to, the existence of,
and the
recovery from inadequate
core cooling (ICC).
The
ICC signals
are
processed
by system microprocessors
into three parameters:
~
margin to saturation
(subcooled
margin)
~
reactor vessel
water level
~
reactor core exit temperature
Each
gSPDS
channel
is comprised of three chassis
containing
instrumentation.
The
ICC instrumentation
consi'sts of hot-leg
and
cold-leg resistance, temperature
detectors,
pressurizer
pressure
sensors,
(CETs)
and reactor vessel
level monitoring
system
(RVLMS) probes
employing the heated junction thermocouple
heater
Il
I
~t
L
I
t
f
(
i
controllers.
Each channel of QSPDS receives
two sets of CET data,
one
which is directly fed to the main
QSPDS computer
and the other which is
processed
through
a fiber optic isolation device.
Together both
channels of QSPDS process
a total of 61
CET temperatures.
The inspectors
determined that for the past year,
the Unit 2 Channel
A
had sporadically displayed
suspect
and out-of-range data for
some
or all of the
CETs in Channel
A.
Additionally, the Channel
A QSPDS
would periodically lock up, requiring manual
operator action to reset
the system.
IKC technicians
established
that the most likely source of these
problems was,'rom the Chassis
C, which provides
16 optically isolated
CET inputs to the Channel
A QSPDS.
On Hay 31,
1996,
as part of the
troubleshooting efforts,
ISC technicians
removed the field inputs from
Chassis
C and operated
the Channel
A QSPDS without 16
CET inputs.
On
June
4,
18C technicians
installed
a spare
chassis
in place of Chassis
C
in order to determine if the problem was isolated to the installed
Chassis
C.
The spare
chassis
was mounted
on
a cart
and
was not
-considered
to meet seismic
and quality requirements.
Between
June
4-June
21,
ILC technicians
placed the spare/test
chassis
in service
on Tuesdays
and disconnected it on Fridays'hile the spare
chassis
was
in service,
operators
considered
that Channel
A of QSPDS
was inoperable.
On June
21, operations
performed
which
considered all of the Channel
with the exception of
its
CET functions,
when the spare
chassis
was in service.
Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.6,
"Post-Accident Monitoring
Instrumentation,"
Table 3.3-10,, provided requirements for QSPDS
instrumentation.
The table required four operable
CETs per core
quadrant
as the limiting condition for operation
(LCO).
The licensee
considered
that this
LCO was met during the troubleshooting efforts
on
the Channel
A QSPDS since .the
30
CET inputs to the Channel
B QSPDS
provided at least four operable
CETs per core quadrant.
Action 29 of Table 3.3-10,
which applied to all the postaccident
monitoring instrumentation with the exception of RVLHS, established
a
7-day allotted out-of-service limit, with a subsequent
shutdown action,
if one channel
was inoperable.
With two channels
out of service,
Action
30 of Table 3.3-10 reduced
the allowed out-of-service limit to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
Actions 31
and
32 of Table 3.3-10 applied to
RVLMS and included similar
allowed out-of-service limits.
However, the subsequent
action
was
limited to
a report to the Commission.
TS
Com liance
and Unit Lo
Entries
The inspectors
reviewed the TS, unit log entries,
and discussed
the
QSPDS configuration with operations
personnel.
On June
14, the
inspectors
noted that the licensee
had entered
Action 29 of Table 3.3-10
and questioned
the reason with the Unit 2 control
room supervisor
(CRS).
~
~
The
CRS stated that
he was not'lear
why the action
had
been entered.
The
CRS noted that the
TS action statement
For the minimum number of
CET's required
had not been affected
and stated that the entry into
Action 29 appeared
to have
been
a conservative
interpretation.
The
did not recognize that the entire
Channel
A of gSPDS
was considered
inoperable with the test chassis
installed, requiring entry into both
Action 29 and
31 of TS Table 3.3-10,
The inspectors
found that the
did not have
a clear understanding
of the
gSPDS configuration
and the
impact it had
on applicable
TS actions.
During subsequent
reviews,
the inspectors
noted that, with the test
chassis
placed in service
and the Channel
A gSPDS inoperable,
operations
personnel
had consistently
entered
TS Table 3.3-10, Action 29'he
inspectors
questioned
a Unit 2 shift supervisor regarding whether
any
other
TS Table 3.3-10 instrumentation
was affected with the Channel
A
gSPDS inoperable.
The shift supervisor
reviewed the configuration
and
the
TS requirements
and determined that Action 31,
as it pertained
to
the
RVLMS instrumentation,
was also applicable.
The inspectors
performed
a review of the Unit 2 control
room log from
May 27 through June
18.
The'nspectors
determined that during this
period, operation
crews
had not consistently
logged the entry of Action
31 when Channel
A of gSPDS
was
made inoperable.
The inspectors
determined that the inconsistencies
were the result of operators
having
a weak understanding
of the
TS action statements
applicable to gSPDS.
The inspectors
noted that in al,l cases,
the more conservative
Action 29
was entered
and
an out-of-service limit was never exceeded.
The inspectors
also found that the Unit 2 log entries
were not
adequately descriptive
and the inadequacies
in the log entries
made it
difficult to assess
the system configuration,
given the fact that the
test chassis
had
been installed
and
removed several
times.
Th'e
TS action entries
and inconsistent
log entries
were discussed
with
the Unit 2 operations
department
leader.
The department
leader stated
that the log entries
had not met his management's
expectations.
The
department
leader stated that operators
in all units would be provided
additional
guidance
on expectations
for logkeeping
and the operation of
gSPDS.
Based
on these findings, the inspectors
concluded that Unit 2 operations
had not demonstrated
adequate
understanding
and ownership of the
gSPDS.
However, operations
management
responded
aggressively
to the
inspectors'oncerns.
In addition, operations
identified weaknesses
in their action
to reset
the
gSPDS
and that the system
had not been alarming for system
malfunctions
as described
in the design basis.
IKC Maintenance
Mana ement of
Problems
4
During the week of June
18, operations
requested
that
I&C maintenance
engineering
leave the test chassis
in continued service
and develop the
basis to allow Channel
A gSPDS to be declared
With technical
input from I&C maintenance
engineering,
operations
developed
an
and,
on June
21, declared
Channel
A gSPDS
operable with the test chassis
installed.
The inspectors
reviewed the
and noted that it relied
on the following
factors:
The link between
Chassis
C and the
gSPDS computer
was through
a
fiber optic modem link which acted
as
an isolation device.
The Channel
A CET data
and information derived from the data would
not be used
and
was not necessary
for operability.
I&C maintenance
engineering
had performed
a
evaluation.
The inspectors
reviewed the
10 CFR 50.59 screening
and evaluation
performed
by I&C maintenance
engineerin'g
on June
21,
and determined that
the screening failed to identify this
as
change to the facility as
described
in the licensing basis.
Combustion
Engineering
Standard
Safety Analysis Report,
Chapter
17,
Appendix B, "Address of Three Nile Island Action Plan Requirements,"
Table 3-2, "Evaluation of ICC Detection Instrumentation,"
stated that
the plant design
had
61
and that, together,
both channels
of gSPDS
could display all
CET temperatures.
The inspectors
determined that,
with the test chassis
installed,
only 45
CETs were displayed
and that
this was
a change to the facility as described
in the licensing basis.
As
a result,
the
I&C maintenance
engineering
had not performed
a review
sufficient to determine if the change
involved an unreviewed safety
question
as required
by 10 CFR 50.59 for changes
to the facility
described
in the safety analysis report.
The failure to follow
procedures
for 10 CFR 50.59 screenings
is
a violation (50-529/96011-01).
The inspectors
discussed
the
10 CFR 50.59 screening with the
maintenance
engineering
section leader.
The section leader
agreed with
the inspectors'onclusion
and stated that the
10 CFR 50.59 screening
and evaluation
would be performed.
On June
25, the inspectors
determined that
I&C maintenance
engineering
had not completed
the additional
10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.
Therefore,
from June
21-25, operations
had not been
aware that the
evaluation,
that
had
been the basis for the Channel
A gSPDS operability
evaluation,
was not valid.
I&C maintenance
engineering
subsequently
completed
the evaluation
and determined that the change
had not involved
an unreviewed safety question.
The inspectors
discussed
this example of
weak interorganizational
communications
with both the Unit 2 operations
0
r
f
0
-10-
C.
department
leader
and the
I&C maintenance
department
leader.
The
licensee
subsequently
initiated
a
CRDR and
an evaluation of I&C
maintenance
engineering
performance.
The
I&C maintenance
department
leader recognized that the
gSPDS
has
had
multiple problems
impacting both the reliability and availability of the
system.
The department
leader
noted that
I&C maintenance
had
experienced
problems resolving
system design
issues
with the system
vendor
and that considerable
time and
I&C department
resources
had
been
expended
on the Unit 2 Channel
A gSPDS
problems.
This issue
had not
been'ocumented
in the form of a
CRDR or in any other way to ensure site
attention,
such
as including it as
an engineering
issue or as department
"Level
1" action.
The"inspectors
concluded that this
may have
impacted
the quality of communications
between organizations
and contributed to
the issues
discussed
in this report.
Subsequently,
I&C maintenance
initiated
a department
"Level
1" action'o
address
the performance of the Unit 2 gSPDS.
In addition,
maintenance
established
frequent meetings
between operations,
computer
services,
I&C maintenance,
and the engineering
organization to develop
and implement
a troubleshooting
plan.
The inspectors
found these
planned actions to be appropriate.
Conclusions
A violation was identified concerning
the failure of I&C maintenance
engineering
to follow procedures
for the performance of a
screening
evaluation for a plant change.
Naintenance
engineering
had
not recognized that
a change
made to the
gSPDS involved
a change to the
facility as described
in the licensing basis.
I&C maintenance
had not
developed
a comprehensive
plan to address
longstanding
gSPDS
deficiencies.
As
a result,
communications with other organizations
were
weak
and available resources
had not been
focused to resolving the
problem.
Unit 2 operations
had not demonstrated
adequate
understanding
and ownership of gSPDS troubleshooting efforts.
Operations
management
responded
aggressively
to the inspectors'oncerns.
III.
En ineerin
E3
E3.1
Engineering
Procedures
and Documentation
Facilit
Chan
e Performed Without Performin
Unreviewed Safet
uestion
Review
37551
A violation was identified concerning the failure of I&C maintenance
engineering
to follow procedures
for the performance of a
screening
evaluation for a plant change.
Maintenance
engineering
had
not recognized that
a change
made to the
gSPDS involved
a change to the
facility as described
in the licensing basis.
Further aspects
of this
issue
are discussed
in Section
H6. 1.
e
-11-
E8
E8.1
Miscellaneous
Engineering
Issues
(92903)
Closed
Unresolved
Item 50-528 95021-02:
accident condition identified
puts auxiliary feedwater
beyond
component level design basis.
The
licensee
completed
the evaluation of this item and issued
Licensee
Event
Report 50-528/95-13,
dated
December
31,
1995, to describe
the
significance,
cause,
and corrective actions for the item.
Followup
inspection for the licensee
event report will resolve
any outstanding
issue
associated
with this item.
IV.
Plant
Su
ort
R4
R4.1
Staff Knowledge
and Performance
in Radiological Protection
and Chemistry
RP Staff Performance
Durin
Maintenance Activities
71750
On July 10, the inspectors
observed
the
RP staff during work activities
involving the Unit 3 HPSI system.
The
RP staff demonstrated
very good
performance
in their support of the maintenance activities.
Further
aspects
of the maintenance activities
and
RP practices
are discussed
in
Section
M1.4.
S1
0
si.i
Conduct of Security
and Safeguards
Activities
Material Enterin
the
PA Without Pro er Search
a
~
Ins ection
Sco
e
71750
b.
On July 3,
1996, the inspectors
observed
an individual
and the
hand
carried
items,
proceed
into the
PA without
a search.
The inspectors
discussed
these
observations
with the security force
and with security
management.
Ob'servations
and Findin
s
The licensee's
security search train at the main personnel
access
for
entry to the
PA consisted
of metal detectors for personnel,
x-ray
machines for hand carried items,
and nitrate detectors
for both.
On
July 3, the inspectors
observed
a janitor proceed
from inside the
PA,
through the search train area,
to
a waste container outside the search
train.
The janitor then collected the waste liner and its contents
and
proceeded
back inside the
PA without processing either herself or the
waste through
search train equipment.
The inspectors
asked
a security officer, who had
been
posted
nearby -the
waste container, if he
had observed
the janitor's actions
and if these
actions
were appropriate.
The security officer confirmed the
inspectors'bservations.
The security officer indicated that the
container
had, within the past
10 minutes,
been
moved from a location
under the x-ray machine to
a location outside the search train.
The
't
-12-
security ofFicer also noted that the waste container
had
been
under his
observation
and
was able to itemize the contents.
The security officer
indicated that the actions of the janitor to bypass
the search train
when collecting waste
was
a
common practice
and did not see it as
inappropriate.
The inspectors
discussed
this observation with the security shift
sergeant.
The security shift sergeant
also noted that what had
been
observed
was standard
practice.
The sergeant
concluded,
however, that
it would have
been appropriate
to either
have the contents
screened
or
to have
a janitor remove waste inside security headquarters
to directly
outside the
PA.
In response
to the inspectors'oncerns.
that material
could
be introduced into the
PA without a proper search,
the security
shift sergeant
initiated action to have the waste containers
emptied to
outside the
PA.
The inspectors
subsequently
determined,
through interviews with security
and janitorial personnel,
that it was standard
practice for the
janitorial staff to process
through the search train equipment prior to
initial entry into the
PA.
The janitorial staff would then proceed to
a
supply closet in the
PA portion of the security headquarters
building to
collect cleaning supplies,
then proceed
out of the
PA onto the floor of
the search train,
and perform cleaning activities.
The janitorial staff
would then reenter
the
PA without
a search of themselves
or hand carried
cleaning supplies,
Security management
had established
the position
that while the janitorial staff was in the search train area they were
under the direct observation of security officers and, therefore,
did
not require
a search prior to reentry into the
PA.
The inspectors
reviewed the security plan
and security procedures.
Both
the security plan, in paragraph
5.3.2
and 5.3.7;
and
PA ingress
Procedure
Revision 8, in Paragraph
3.2. 1.4, required that
personnel
and
hand carried
items
be properly searched
through the search
train equipment prior to admittance to the
PA.
The inspectors
determined that the janitor had not complied with these
requirements.
The inspectors
discussed
this determination with the Director of Site
Security.
The Director of Site Security stated that it was the
licensee's
position that both the janitor and the waste container
had.
been
under constant
observation
by security personnel
and that this was
a standard
practice.
The director indicated that this practice
was
consistent
with the security plan exemption of a search of a vehicle
reentering
the
PA if it had
been
accompanied
by an
armed security
officer.
The inspectors
were concerned that Security management's
position that
the janitorial staff would be under constant
observation while cleaning
the search train could detract
from the principal duties of the security
officers to monitor ingress
screening.
Conversely, if the security
officer was distracted
by his/her principal duties,
an opportunity was
0
-13-
created for items to be introduced into the
PA undetected
on the person
of the janitorial staff or. their equipment.
The inspectors
agreed
that
the security plan provided
a few specific exemptions
to
a search prior
to entry into the
PA.
These
exemptions
were specific
and highlighted
special
circumstances.
The practice
employed for the janitorial staff
was not discussed,
either specifically or in general,
in the security
plan or security procedures.
The failure of the janitor to follow
security procedures
for searches
prior to entering the
PA is
a violation
(50-528;529;530/96011-02).
c.
Conclusions
A violation was identified concerning
the failure to perform
a search of
personnel
and
hand carried
items using screening
equipment prior to
being allowed access
to the
PA.
V. Nana
ement Heetin
s
'l
Exit meeting
Summary
The inspectors
presented
the inspection results
to members of licensee
management
at the conclusion of the inspection
on July ll, 1996.
The licensee
acknowledged
the findings,presented.
The inspectors
asked
the licensee
whether
any materials
examined during the
inspection
should
be considered
proprietary.
Ho proprietary inFormation
was
identified.
e
'e
ATTACHMENT I
PARTIAL LIST OF
PERSONS
CONTACTED
Licensee
T. Cannon,
Department
Leader,
Engineering
R. Flood, Department
Leader,
System Engineering
D. Gouge,
Department
Leader,
Maintenance
Services
B. Grabo,
Section
Leader,
Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
J.
Hesser,
Director, Nuclear Engineering
L. Houghtey, Director, Security
W. Ide, Director, Operations
A. Krainik, Department
Leader,
Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
J.
Levine, Vice President,
Nuclear Production
D. Mauldin, Director, Maintenance
R. Myrick, Department
Leader,
I&C Maintenance
G. Overbeck,
Vice President,
Nuclear Support
C.
Seaman,
Director, Nuclear Assurance
W. Stewart,
Executive Vice President
fi
e
e
IP 37551:
IP 61726:
IP 62703:
IP 71707:
IP 71750:
IP 92703:
IP 92903:
~0ened
INSPECTION
PROCEDURES
USED
Onsite Engineering
Surveillance
Observations
Maintenance
Observations
Plant Operations
Plant Support Activities
Followup of Confirmatory Action Letters
Followup - Engineering
ITEMS OPENED
CLOSED
AND DISCUSSED
50-529/96011-01
failure to follow 10 CFR 50.59 screening
procedures
50-528;529;530/96011-02,VIO
failure of a janitor to follow security
procedures
Cl osed
50-528/95021-02
condition potentially outside design
basis
which
could lead to turbine driven
AFW pump tripping
on'verspeed
E
CRDR
IKC
LCO
gSPDS
RVLNS
TS
LIST OF ACRONYHS USED
Auxiliary Operator
Combustion
Engineering
Standard
Safety Analysis Report
Condition Report/Disposition
Request
Control
Room Supervisor
High Pressure
Safety Injection
Instrumentation
and Controls
Inadequate
Core Cooling
Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations
Limiting Condition for Operation
Protected
Area
gualified Safety Parameter
Display System
Radiation Protection
Reactor
Vessel
Level Monitoring System
Technical Specifications